Abstract

The study of mentalising has been dominated for the past two decades by two theories: simulation theory (ST) and theory theory (TT). TT postulates that we understand others’ mental states by applying a series of rules which form a folk psychological theory, whereas ST claims that we use our own mind as a model for understanding the decision processes of others. Whilst these theories are relatively easy to delineate at a theoretical level, it has proved frustratingly inconclusive to test them at the behavioural level. Neuroimaging techniques promised an exciting new avenue for distinguishing between ST or TT processes, but in a provocative critique, Apperly (2008) proposed that ST and TT cannot be distinguished at either the behavioural or neural level and no longer provide a fruitful framework for the study of mental state understanding. In examining Apperly’s argument, I find that ST and TT may not need to be abolished, but need to be sharpened in their formulation, such that they provide a constrainable and, most importantly, testable theory. In a recent hybrid model, we (Mitchell, Currie & Ziegler, 2009) have attempted to put forward such a framework which we hope provides a testable account of mentalising and its development. ST and TT allow us to put together disparate pieces of empirical evidence and provide a deeper understanding of the way our mental world connects with that of others.