Abstract

Academic freedom has always been under threat, in some way or another, in different parts of the world. However, the threat has also been felt more acutely in Europe in recent years. Politi-cal, institutional, or societal defenders of academic freedom raising concern here legitimately refer to attacks on the autonomy of universities or the speech rights of academics in countries such as Hungary, Poland, or Turkey. As justified as the critique is, endeavours to safeguard academic freedom in Europe often narrowly target what may be called academic freedom viola-tions of the “first generation.” Violations 1.0 are usually perpetrated by authoritarian or illiberal regimes against those whose scholarly views conflict with the vision of those in power. Ironically, however, the more serious threat to academic freedom in Europe today emanates from the increasing commercialisation of higher education and science, which has its basis in the deliberate higher education and science policies of democratic governments. Academic freedom violations of the “second generation,” as one may term these infringements, find expression in the financial and moral overincentivisation of science, the financial dependence of universities on contract research, the marketisation of IP rights, top-down forms of governance (line management), and the conscious adoption of an audit culture (performance management). Violations 2.0 attack the Mertonian disinterestedness of science, by placing considerations of managerial efficiency and political or economic utility above science adequacy. These violations do not target the technical autonomy of universities, or academic content as such, but academic freedom as a principle for organising, and allocating responsibilities in, academia. They erode rights of academic self-governance, collegiality, secure working conditions for academics, and the genuine independence of universities (which is different from their technical autonomy) – all of these aspects expressly protected under UNESCO’s Recommendation concerning Higher-Education Teaching Personnel of 1997.
A dilemma in this regard is that the European human rights framework, in its textual conception, is rather weak to afford adequate protection to academic freedom, especially insofar as the latter organisational aspects are concerned. Neither the European Convention on Human Rights nor the Revised European Social Charter expressly protects academic or scientific freedom or a broader right to science, both of which are protected under the International Covenant on Eco-nomic, Social and Cultural Rights or the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“freedom indispensable for scientific research”, “right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”). The European Convention protects the right to freedom of expression, but, as the separate opinion in the Erdoğan case of 2014 explains, “academic freedom transcends the scope of Article 10,” notably in respect of academic freedom as an organisational principle. Also the right to educa-tion in the Convention as a potential normative basis is problematic. The right is defined negatively and minimalistically. The Revised Charter protects the right to vocational training. The European Committee of Social Rights has held that vocation training covers university educa-tion. There is, moreover, a right to take part in the determination and improvement of the working conditions under the Charter. This chapter will endeavour to establish whether the European human rights framework can be developed in a way to adequately protect academic/scientific freedom, including particularly the organisational component, and a broader right to science, to offer robust protection against academic freedom violations of the first and second generation.