Abstract

Existing studies of intelligence oversight have established the view that oversight takes places at different levels carried out by a range of institutions and actors drawn from the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state as well as civil society. At each level oversight bodies are often seen as performing distinct and separate roles, as systems are designed to prevent overlap and provide the compartmentalisation necessary to ensure security. While the proliferation of actors involved in oversight may have enhanced intelligence accountability, if the mandates of different oversight bodies neither overlap nor intersect, this fragmented approach can lead to accountability gaps. It also runs counter to the ‘joined-up’ approach which has emerged in recent years as a means of improving policymaking in a range of different areas including national security. Drawing on examples from a number of states, this paper will examine the limitations of the current fragmented approach to oversight and question whether the principles of ‘joined-up’ policymaking might effectively be applied to intelligence oversight systems.