



Italian civil society against the Mafia: From perceptions to expectations

Baris Cayli ^{a,b,*}

^a *School of Applied Social Science, University of Stirling, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland, United Kingdom*

^b *Department of Law & Politics, University of Camerino, 19f/2 P.zza Cavour, 62032 Camerino, Italy*

Abstract

This study presents the results of a survey of 72 civil society organisations in Italy that work against the Mafia. The study investigated their perceptions of the anti-Mafia movement in four main areas: (1) government performance, (2) civil society performance, (3) the government-civil society relationship, and (4) the Mafia phenomenon and anti-Mafia policies. The study first revealed that civil society is not satisfied with the government's performance on anti-Mafia policies. Second, civil society finds its own performance relatively better than the government's, although it needs improvement. Third, civil society perceives a conflict between the government and civil society concerning anti-Mafia policies. Fourth, the Mafia-politician network is seen by civil society as the most important factor in the Mafia's power. Finally, creating a culture of lawfulness is perceived as the most influential anti-Mafia measure attainable.

© 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Anti-Mafia movement; Italian Mafia; Civil society; Anti-Mafia policies; Social movement; Culture of lawfulness

1. Introduction

The Mafia¹ phenomenon and civil society's reaction to it represent two competing discourses and values in Italy. On the one hand, the former represents illegality, corruption, lawlessness, violation of human rights, and hampering democratic principles. On the other

* Department of Law & Politics, University of Camerino, 19f/2 P.zza Cavour, 62032 Camerino, Italy. Tel.: +44 7748607771, +39 3881009493.

E-mail address: baris.cayli@unicam.it

¹In this paper, "Mafia" is used to define organized crime in the country. It does not specifically refer to any organized crime group but encompasses all of them.

hand, civil society's reaction is based on creating a culture of lawfulness, transparency in administration, participative democracy, and rule of law. Swidler (1986) emphasised the role of culture in shaping actions and "structural opportunities" as a determinative factor in competing ideologies, especially in unsettled cultures. Action and culture have been tightly and significantly connected, and the importance of cultural structures in this synergy cannot be denied.

In this context, Italian civil society has produced its own reaction against the assassinations of journalists, prosecutors, police officers, and other anti-Mafia fighters by the organised crime groups that sent society into a state of shock. Corruption, the political-criminal nexus, and the infiltration of white-collar crime into strategic levels of the state have become obvious in the country. The "Southern Question," *questione del Mezzogiorno*, historically reflects the economic, criminal, and social problems of Mezzogiorno, as well as the lack of trust that surrounds it (Romano, 1966; Blok, 1974; Gambetta, 1993; Schneider, 1998a,b; Paoli, 2000; Moe, 2002). Such a multifaceted view preserves the uncertainty of preventive measures to halt the Mafia phenomenon. The Mafia's widespread domination in the region has been one of the most significant parts of the Southern Question. Despite the Mafia's strong penetration into the main parts of the social system in the South, the local people have resisted dislodging the stronger parts of the Mafia's system through individual attempts. Moreover, civil society organisations throughout the country have declared their opposition to the Mafia after those individual resistances. Hence, an intensive fight has been initiated in a more organised way, especially in the Southern parts of the country, where extortion and corruption have been obvious. The appearance of these activities confirmed that something must have been done beyond the efforts of the state and administrative institutions. Thus, the emergence of the civil society reaction against the Mafia has produced an increased level of moral concern in society, which has naturally been followed by grassroots movements.

Despite recent studies on civil society's fight against the Mafia (Schneider and Schneider, 1994; Jamieson, 2000; Orlando, 2001; Schneider, 2002, 2003; Iorio, 2009; Cayli, 2012), there is still a lack of empirical evidence about the perceptions of the civil society concerning the Mafia phenomenon and anti-Mafia movements that have been initiated and implemented by the state and nonstate actors. In this sense, even if active and intense actions of the civil society are taken against the Mafia, it is still unknown how the Italian civil society perceives the Mafia phenomenon and Mafia policies in the country. Therefore, this study investigates the perceptions of the civil society concerning the Mafia phenomenon, guided by four important questions: (1) How does civil society perceive the government's performance? (2) How does civil society perceive its own performance concerning Mafia policies? (3) How does civil society perceive the relation between its government and Mafia policies? (4) What regulatory practices should be adopted against the Mafia according to the civil society? Thus, this study aimed to elucidate anti-Mafia movement in Italy, particularly the role of civil society organisations that work to eradicate the Mafia and diminish its effects in the country. The following proposed hypothesis is tested: Civil society prefers to create its own public discourses, so it is more prone to work independently toward its goals rather than collaborating with the state apparatus.

Moreover, three main arguments are developed in the paper. First, the principal contention is that the role of the civil society in the fight against the Mafia should not be underestimated by state bodies. Second, state bodies should seek more active cooperation from civil society because it is not reluctant to enter such collaboration and its rational approach and goals work toward such a choice, even though there is a certain level of distrust of politicians. Finally, the fight against the Mafia requires a long-term and consistent effort. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that anti-Mafia policies should be well planned. However, Italian civil society does

not present a unified attitude toward anti-Mafia policies. Thus, the civil society perceives that creating a culture of lawfulness would appear to be the most important tool to hamper Mafia operations. This study ventures to offer a guiding principle before the Italian state and nonstate forces construct complex anti-Mafia policies. This guiding principle is simply to create a culture of lawfulness in the society, which is also the main aim of the civil society organisations.

To provide background information for this study, the first part introduces the features of the civil societies that participated in the study and focuses on a historical review of the anti-Mafia movement. Second, the historical background of civil society's endeavours against the Mafia is discussed to explain the factors and reasons that structure the discourse of anti-Mafia movements. Third, this study focuses on some notable individuals who opposed the Mafia. Fourth, it elaborates how anti-Mafia movements in civil society began to be institutionalised in Italy. After the summary of the historical background, the fifth part describes the methodological design and challenges of this survey research. The sixth part presents the findings of the survey, and the last part includes the findings presented in relation to social movements and contentious politics, to contribute to the discussion in the anti-Mafia movement within these theoretical frameworks. Finally, the limitations of the study and opportunities for future studies are discussed.

2. The civil societies that participated in the survey

This section discusses the civil society organisations that participated in this research survey, their contexts, and a historical review of the anti-Mafia movement. This part first defines *civil society* and presents the organisations established in the second half of the twentieth century. These groups have grown exponentially since the early 1990s.

Contemporary understanding of civil society fills a significant void in social, political, and cultural public life. The current definition of the civil society is different from the 19th century that reduced civil society to the interactions between “family” and “state” institutions, as Hegel argued (Kaldor, 2003: 584). The World Bank's definition of *civil society* includes the major stakeholders, their ideologies, and their interactions in society that eventually shape people's daily lives: “the wide array of nongovernmental and not-for-profit organisations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of organisations: community groups, nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank, 2010). However, our data for Italian civil society covers a fraction in the line with this definition. First, we particularly focused on civil society organisations that work against the Mafia. Second, even though a small number of labour unions were included, most of the respondents in our survey were from civil society organisations particularly founded to fight the Mafia. Therefore, labour unions, trade unions, faith-based organisations, and politically oriented civil society organisations, whose priorities were not fighting the Mafia, had little to no representation in our survey results. Most civil society organisations categorised themselves as nongovernmental organisations, working toward realizing cultural transformation in the society by erasing the legacy of the Mafia. In other words, the civil society organisations that participated in the survey were limited to civil society movements, which were striving to be NGOs through moral, cultural, and

anthropological attempts and policies to combat the Mafia syndicates in the country by creating a culture of lawfulness and thereby strengthen the rule of law.

Civil society organisations against the Mafia were largely established in the intense political era of post-1990,² when society was shocked by the assassinations and massacres (Santino, 2009). These organisations were mainly based in the southern and central part of the country where the Mafia's presence is historically more common. Further, the organisations largely consisted of 10 people at most who administered their organisations from their offices, from their home offices, or through the Internet. Except *Sinistra Critica*—an anticapitalist, leftist civil society organisation—all participants announced that they were explicitly apolitical. Moreover, these institutions were run substantially through voluntary participation. Although they had no age requirements, a primary focus was on young participants. Finally, except for some organisations, such as those that worked on drug prevention or child trafficking, the main target population of civil society organisations was the whole society because these organisations held principle values based on ethical and moral approaches, such as justice, truth, legality, responsible citizenship, and a culture of lawfulness (see Table 1).

Some of the main civil society organisations participating in the survey and having no reservations about publishing their names included Libera. Associazioni, nomi e numeri contro le mafie, Addiopizzo, Associazione tra i familiari delle vittime della strage alla stazione di Bologna del 2 Agosto 1980, Associazione tra I familiari delle Vittime di Via dei Georgofili, Sermais. Società Civile Responsabile, 19 Luglio 1992, L'Associazione Rita Atria, L'Associazione Osservatorio Droga, L'Associazione Acmos, L'Associazione non lucrative di utilità sociale ONLUS.³

3. Individual opposition to the Mafia

The Mafia has traditionally been a phenomenon of the south, but in recent decades, it has been functional in the North as well, becoming a national problem rather than just a regional issue and indicating how Mafia groups have diversified and modernised their systems (Armao, 2000; Calderoni, 2011). Therefore, individual movements against the Mafia have been increasing in recent years as various civil society organisations have conducted anti-Mafia activities throughout the country.

Before the institutionalisation of the anti-Mafia movements, individual efforts against the Mafia occurred. One of the first and most notable individual effort against the Mafia in Italy was that of Peppino Impastato. Peppino grew up in a Mafia family, and his father and father-in-law were important Mafia figures. When he witnessed his uncle's assassination by a car bomb, he became aware of the cruelty of the Mafia and turned against it. He started a radio program, *Onda pazza* (Crazy Waves), to expose the corrupt activities of the Mafiosi in the city of Cinisi. He was murdered by the Sicilian Mafia in 1978 because of his direct public opposition to them. In 1979, the year after his assassination, a march to commemorate him was organised in the city (Behan, 2008).

²The article includes only the name of the organisations which have no reservations to use their names as contributors to the survey. For more information: <http://www.stragi.it/> <http://www.strageviadeigeorgofili.org/indici/index.php> <http://www.sermait.it/> <http://www.19luglio1992.com/> <http://www.ritaatria.it/>; for Osservatorio Droga visit: <http://www.osservatoriodroga.it/>; for ONLUS visit: <http://www.agenziaterzosettore.it/index-2.html>; For Acmos: <http://acmos.net/>.

³This bill prohibits recording conversations without permission to protect privacy. The criticism is because this is one of the most effective methods in Mafia investigations. Even though the law does not cover Mafia cases, it may make investigations into money laundering or drug trafficking more challenging.

Table 1

Descriptive table of participating civil society organisations by establishment date.

Geographic location		Size of the organisations		Political orientation of the organisations		Target population of the organisations	
Pre-1990	Post-1990	Pre-1990	Post-1990	Pre-1990	Post-1990	Pre-1990	Post-1990
7 South	65	5 Small ^a	30 Small	1 (Political)	71 (Apolitical)	The whole society,	The whole
	41 South	1 Big ^a	31 Medium ^a	<i>Sinistra Critica</i>		If has not any	society, If has
	15 Central		5 Big			primary	not any primary
	9 North					focus group	focus group

^a Small organisations have at most 5 workers. Medium organisations have more than 5 and less than 10 workers. Big organisations have more than 10 workers in their offices, home offices, or administrative units.

The second significant individual initiative was that of Libero Grassi. The Mafia attempted to extort money from Libero as protection for his clothing manufacturing business. He refused and placed an advertisement in the Sicilian newspaper *Giornale di Sicilia*, calling all businesses in Palermo to unite in resistance and refuse to pay extortion money. This was the first public stance against extortion, which has been the most significant way the Mafia controls its territory and increases its illicit profits. Unfortunately, Grassi shared the same fate as Peppino Impastato and was murdered in 1991, less than one year after his public stand against the Mafia (Jamieson, 2000).

Recently, two examples of individual resistance against the Mafia included a journalist, Lirio Abbate, and a businessman, Vincenzo Conticello. Fortunately, they are both still alive but under 24-h, police protection. Lirio Abbate's book, *I Complici (The Accomplices)*, published in 2007, managed to frustrate the Mafia by exposing the relationships between politicians and Bernardo Provenzano, the notorious Mafia boss who was captured in 2007. Abbate received threats during the trial of another Mafioso, Leoluca Bagarella, but he did not leave Palermo, explaining, "If I left after they put a bomb under my car, I would be setting a bad example to other Sicilians" (Brown, 2007). Vincenzo Conticello showed his resistance by refusing to pay extortion money in 2008. Moreover, he cooperated with the police and testified against the man who demanded protection money in return for the police guarding his popular restaurant in the city of Palermo. After his cooperation, the police followed Conticello and captured the Mafioso who threatened him (Camuto, 2010). He became a good example for other businessmen and increased the trust and legitimacy of collaboration with the local authorities when extortions are demanded.

4. Institutionalisation of the anti-Mafia movement

In addition to these limited but remarkable individual struggles, there is much to be said for the institutionalised dimension of anti-Mafia movements. This section focuses particularly on milestones and struggles in the movement's history since the 1950s. The Mafia found a place in every part of the social system, and social movements against the Mafia were very limited until the mid-twentieth century. The most important anti-Mafia movement in the first half of the twentieth century was the peasants' movement, which was a reaction by peasants in Sicily against oppression at the hands of the large landowners and the Mafia. This movement was terminated after the May Day celebration in 1947 with the massacre at Portella della Ginestra, resulting in eleven people murdered and 33 wounded (Santino, 1997; Dickie, 2004). The peasants intended to march against their long working hours and poor conditions on land that did not belong to them. The massacre led to a conflict that the right-wing and left-wing parties in the region blamed each other (Hobsbawm, 1959). The Communist leader Girolamo Li Causi blamed the Mafia rather than

the separatist bandit, Salvatore Giuliano, for shooting the peasants. Giuliano admitted to shooting over the peasants' heads, not to kill them but to frighten them for voting in favour of the leftist party in the previous election (Servadio, 1976; Lupo, 2009).

The peasants' oppression led to marches shortly after the Portella della Ginestra massacre. These marches included various journalists and prosecutors protesting the Mafia phenomenon in southern Italy, particularly in Sicily. There is no doubt that this was a signal of the people's hope for a "normal society" and a "widening and branching in response to events, above all assassinations of anti-Mafia heroes and authorities, then contracting under the returned weight of 'normalcy'" (Schneider and Schneider, 2001: 439). In addition to these marches, in the early 1980s, students and teachers began an extensive campaigning process in schools. These activities consisted of active participation to enhance the concepts of democracy and civil society, establish study groups, increase knowledge and motivation, and raise people's voices against the corruption of the politicians (Dalla Chiesa, 1983).

Undoubtedly, the most dramatic assassinations in Italy in the last two decades were the murders of two famous prosecutors, Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino, two months apart in 1992. These severe offenses fostered significant, anti-Mafia movements. For example, after these tragic events, the "Committee of the Sheets" was established in Sicily. This society protested and showed their anger at the Mafia by hanging bed sheets from their windows. Leoluca Orlando, the ex-mayor of Palermo, reported that locals overwhelmingly appropriated the protest to the extent that if people could not see a bed sheet hanging over a building, they should suspect that a Mafioso lived in that building (Schneider, 1998a,b; Weissman, 1999).

Moreover, the protests from people of different ages and from different parts of the country became more active following the establishment of *Libera* in 1995. Today, *Libera* is the most popular and largest anti-Mafia civil organisation, with connections to over 1200 associations, groups, and schools in the country. It fights corruption; organises anti-Mafia education; and has projects on work, development, social uses for confiscated goods, and anti-usury activities. The widely established network system is the most concrete way to illustrate the institutionalisation of anti-Mafia grassroots movements in Italy in the last two decades.

Libera is not the only anti-Mafia institution in the country. Many other local and national nonstate organisations have demonstrated their resistance to the Mafia clearly and openly. For instance, Confindustria, a voluntary organisation and the largest cooperative of manufacturing and service companies in Italy since 1901, recently announced that it would remove any member who pays protection money to the Mafia. This is a strong signal by a union with 141,599 businesses (Adnkronos, 2008). One of the most recent and interesting anti-Mafia movements is "Addiopizzo". This initiative, led by a group of young people, began by distributing stickers to the local people that stated, "All people who pay the pizzo are people without dignity." The efforts of these young people have become more effective and popular each year. Regrettably, most of the businesses in Palermo and some parts of southern Italy have continued to pay *pizzo*, extortion money, to the Mafia (Forno and Gunnarson, 2009). Even though fear, untrustworthiness, and extortion are still dominant in southern Italy, the significant attempts by civil society to oppose the traditional ill-gotten gains of the Mafia are a plea to stand against them and their notorious criminal culture.

5. Method

The survey was conducted from June 2010 to November 2010 with respondents from 72 organisations participating. This study is the first attempt at gathering data on civil society's

perceptions of the Mafia phenomenon and anti-Mafia policies in Italy, so the primary aim was to attain a high participation level. This aim also influenced the design of the survey. The survey was designed to capture the perceptions of as diverse a population of participants as possible. Therefore, nonprofit and NGOs (including the volunteer sector and trade unions) and semi-governmental organisations were included at the first level.

Only organisations that partially or entirely worked on anti-Mafia policies or mobilisation of people against the Mafia phenomenon were used as target groups. Thirty-nine organisations were identified in the NGO data at the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) on 43 organisations in Italy, and the remaining 56 organisations were identified through the anti-Mafia network of *Libera*. In the end, 95 not-for-profit civil society organisations were identified for potential participation. This list included all civil society and not-for-profit organisations that work against the Mafia partially or totally in the country. Apart from not-for-profit civil society organisations, 77 trade unions were found that work against the Mafia.

A sample population was created, and the survey was first sent to 30 respondents, of which 15 were trade unionists. No response was returned from the trade unions. Even though the survey was intended to reach as many respondents as possible, it was found that responses were received only from nonprofit NGOs. All nonrespondents (i.e., the trade unions) were called to participate in the survey, but their disinterest caused them to be excluded. Thereafter, the survey was revised and targeted only nongovernmental, not-for-profit civil society organisations in the country.

A web site was created for the survey and a link to it sent to the respondents in Italian by e-mail. Follow-up phone calls were also made. The names of the respondents who responded to the questionnaire on behalf of an organisation were checked for accuracy. Ultimately, 72 of 95 respondents in the target group replied to the survey—a 75% response rate—with some respondents preferring not to answer some items due to sensitivity of the material or not having an answer. Thus, the response level for each question ranged from 49 to 71 participants (Table 2). The last question, regarding the priority of anti-Mafia policies in the country, received the lowest level of response (68%). This low response rate possibly indicates that there is still no clear, primary policy-making method by civil society organisations.

The civil societies that participated in the survey largely came from the south, with a participation level of 87.2% (48 of 55). The region with the second greatest participation was the centre, with 62.5% (24 of 38) of the participants from the centre. Finally, the north had the lowest turn-out level, with 50% (9 of 18) of the participants responding. These findings show that most of the civil societies against the Mafia are in the south. More to the point, civil societies in the south demonstrated higher participation than those in the centre and the north (Fig. 1).

During data analysis, every organisation's perspective was accepted equally, regardless of its size or effectiveness. In addition, the questions were grouped into four sections by factor analysis. The first part of the survey (two questions) was intended to measure civil society's

Table 2
Response rates for survey items ($N = 72$).

Questions	Q-1	Q-2	Q-3	Q-4	Q-5	Q-6	Q-7	Q-8	Q-9	Q-10	Q-11	Q-12
The number of the respondents for each question	70	70	70	60	65	63	64	71	70	71	63	49




Fig. 1. Geographical distribution of the organisations that participated in the survey.

perceptions of the effectiveness of anti-Mafia policies of the state and governments. The second part of the survey (four questions) addressed the perceptions of civil society concerning its own policies. The third part (three questions) was about the relationship between the state bodies and civil society on anti-Mafia policies. Finally, the fourth part of the survey (three questions) addressed anti-Mafia policy measures and the Mafia groups' power in the country. The first and last questions asked for the respondent's organisation type and contact information, respectively.

6. Findings

6.1. Civil society's perceptions about the effectiveness of government and state anti-Mafia policies

Two questions related to the evaluation of the government's performance and anti-Mafia legislation were asked in the first part of the survey. The overwhelming majority of civil society organisations 85.7% (60 respondents) perceived the anti-Mafia policies of the current government to be "insufficient." Only 11.4% (8 respondents) thought that the policies were "sufficient but it should be better." None of the respondents thought that they were "good." Finally, 2.9% (2 respondents) found them "neutral." Additionally, 7 respondents preferred to write their own thoughts in the optional response section. These respondents thought that the government's anti-Mafia policies might be contradictory to the anti-Mafia struggle. For instance, one respondent called the government's policies "schizophrenic legislation" against anti-Mafia movements. Another respondent stressed that "the government's efforts are harmful to anti-Mafia measures," and one respondent reported, "There is little done to resolve the collusion between the Mafia groups and politicians." Most of the responses and the comments of the 7 respondents who differed from the survey response options highlighted the civil society organisations' dissatisfaction with the government's anti-Mafia policies.

Anti-Mafia legislation is another direct measure under state control through legislative and executive bodies. The second question on the survey asked how respondents evaluated anti-Mafia legislation in the country. Like the first question about the government's performance on anti-Mafia policies, a number of the respondents evaluated anti-Mafia legislation as either "insufficient" (32.9%, 23 respondents) or suggested that "it should be improved" (57.1%, 40 respondents). Additionally, 2.9% (2 respondents) were neutral, and only 7.1% (5 respondents) perceived it as "good." In addition to the multiple-choice responses, 7 of the respondents preferred to write their own comments. Six of these comments suggested that the anti-Mafia laws needed to be reformed in terms of their functionality and effectiveness. Therefore, the existing anti-Mafia laws are insufficient and lack implementation with sufficient resources. Finally, one of the respondents criticised the government's willingness to implement the wiretap bill.³

6.2. Civil society's perceptions about its own policies

Four questions were asked in the survey to measure the perceptions within civil society organisations concerning their own anti-Mafia policies and how to increase their effectiveness. The first question addressed their performance evaluation. Even though the civil society organisations indicated their performance relatively better than the government's performance, a clear dissatisfaction concerning the implementation of their own policies was still evident. For instance, 24.3% (17 respondents) thought that civil society's performance was "insufficient." Most of the civil society organisations (55.7%, 39 respondents) thought that their performance was "sufficient but should be improved." Only 12.9% (9 respondents) thought that the performance of civil society was "good." Finally, 7.1% (5 respondents) remained neutral on this question, and five respondents wrote their own comments. These last five all underscored the heterogeneous dimensions of the civil society organisations' performances in Italy against organised crime. One of the respondents suggested that "civil society organisations' performances change from one region to another in Italy." Another respondent remarked, "The networks of the NGOs should be strongly effective for mobilisation of the people." Another respondent stressed the "need for consistent and vigorous policies and efforts for a good performance, which has not yet been completely achieved."

The second question regarded increasing the effectiveness of civil society's collaborators. Politicians were perceived as the main contributors to civil society's struggle to achieve its goals effectively, and 56.7% (34 respondents) thought that politicians should contribute as the main actors in collaboration with the anti-Mafia studies. In contrast, 28.3% (17 respondents) suggested that mass communication tools should be the main contributors to their anti-Mafia policies. Finally, 15% (9 respondents) thought that the local people should be the first target for collaboration on anti-Mafia policies. One respondent wrote, "Even though the politicians should be the most significant contributor, their role has been mostly defective because of their collusion with the Mafia, and this makes the paradox of the anti-Mafia struggles in the country."

The third question was related to the target groups of civil society activities. Two sub-questions were directed to the respondents, asking whether they should focus on a target group or address their policies to society as a whole. Most of the respondents (61.5%, 40 respondents) preferred to implement anti-Mafia policies at the community level rather than making particular policies for each target group. A large number of responses (30.8%, 20 respondents) stressed that priority should be given to the young people, and 7.7% (5 respondents) thought that students in primary and secondary schools should have priority as a target group. No

respondents thought there should be policies specifically for the women who have defected from the Mafia in recent years by collaborating with the state. Finally, four respondents had ideas that differed from the choices. One of the respondents thought that, even though young people should be the priority, another point that needed to be emphasised was “to change the perception of the young people about the means of the life. In this context, mass media has the main role because of the media’s ability to depict money and power as the main targets to be attained.” Another respondent had a similar idea. The two remaining statements mentioned the importance of creating different policies for each target group but applying them to the entire society without prioritizing the target groups.

Finally, the last question asked whether civil society should focus on multiple anti-Mafia policies at the same time, and if not, which tool should be used to increase the persuasion, support, and mobilisation of the public. Most of the respondents (82.5%, 52 respondents) thought that the policies should be designed with no priority and all measures should be combined to increase public persuasion and mobilisation. On the other hand, some respondents thought that some policy methods should have precedence over others. For instance, 6.3% (4 respondents) said that “asking for urgent punishment of the politicians who collude with the Mafia” should be implemented as the most effective method, and 6.3% (4 respondents) remarked that the “development of a moral language among the local people where the Mafia infiltrated” should be the primary policy. Two respondents (3.2%) thought that cooperation with mass communication in the form of documentaries, news, and television shows against the Mafia should be the primary policy target. Only one respondent (1.6%) thought that organizing demonstrations against the Mafia should be the primary focus to increase public persuasion and mobilisation. Finally, no respondents remarked that social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter should be used as the primary methods to increase public support and mobilisation.

6.3. The relationship between the state bodies and civil society on anti-Mafia policies

In this section, three questions were asked. The first question examined whether a conflict existed between the state and civil society concerning anti-Mafia policies. The second question was about the effect of civil society on the government, and the last question was related to the relationship between civil society organisations and the government in building anti-Mafia policies.

Concerning the first question, many of the respondents (89.1%, 57 respondents) perceived a conflict between civil society and the government over the anti-Mafia policies. Only 10.9% (7 respondents) thought that no such conflict existed. Six respondents preferred to write their own comments. Three respondents said that sometimes such contradictions may occur but not in every case. One respondent had a different opinion, saying that it happens frequently. Two of the respondents have similar arguments regarding insufficient attention from politicians to the anti-Mafia efforts of civil society.

The second question asked whether civil society has the potential to pressure the government to influence and determine anti-Mafia policies. Most of the respondents (75.0%, 54 respondents) agreed with the statement and thought that civil society has the potential to determine anti-Mafia policies by pressuring the government. In contrast, only 1.4% (1 respondent) thought that civil society does not have this potential. Finally, even though they were a minority, a substantial number of respondents thought that civil society has that potential, but it is limited (23.6%, 17 respondents). Two respondents commented on this question. One said that “there should even be appropriate culture and atmosphere for functionality and to put pressure on the

governments,” and the second respondent stated, “even though civil society does its best, its effectiveness is strongly related to the response from the politicians.”

The third question was about the possibility of cooperation between civil society and the government in designing anti-Mafia policies collaboratively. The number of participants who thought that such cooperation is possible (67.1%, 47 respondents) was much higher than those who thought that it was not possible (4.3%, 3 respondents). There were also a considerable number of responses (28.6%, 20 respondents) indicating that such cooperation depends on the position of the government. In addition to those responses, two respondents wrote their own comments. The first respondent indicated, “Apart from the cooperation with the government, the collaboration is also important between the civil society and municipalities/regional governments.” The second respondent stated that, even though people do not know whether such collaboration will have an effective outcome, at least a good synergy could be maintained between the government and civil society through collaboration on anti-Mafia policies.

6.4. Anti-Mafia policy measures and the Mafia groups’ power

The last part of the survey consisted of three questions. The first question was designed to measure the perceptions of civil society about anti-Mafia policies in general. The second question examined the perceptions of civil society about the social networks that affect the power of the different Mafia groups in the country. Finally, the last question attempted to evaluate which of the anti-Mafia measures was perceived as most effective by civil society.

The first question confirmed that most of the respondents found anti-Mafia policies to be insufficient in general (73.2%, 52 respondents). No respondents found it sufficient. However, 25.4% of the respondents (18) found it “sufficient but it could be improved.” Finally, 1.4% (1 respondent) remained neutral. In contrast to those responses, one respondent noted, “There is collusion between the Mafiosi and politicians, but the proof is non-existent, so this makes it publicly not a reason of its empowerment. In fact, the reverse is true.”

The second question was asked to determine the perceptions of civil society about the effectiveness of the social networks of the Mafia. A large number of respondents, 96.8% (61 respondents), thought that the social networks, including the Mafia and politicians, are the most significant reasons for its power. Only 3.2% (2 respondents) thought that social networks between the Mafia and local people were important to its power. Finally, the social networks among members were not perceived as effective, as indicated by the zero response count. Additionally, five of the respondents offered their own comments. Two of the respondents emphasised the Mafia’s power over the economy and its infiltration into legal businesses. One of the respondents noted the three-network system from which the Mafia derives its power: the “Mafia-political nexus, Mafia-cultural nexus, and Mafia-economic nexus.” Another respondent noted, “There is still a major tolerance of the Mafia by some of the local administrators where the Mafia is active.” The last respondent stressed the culture of patronage and clientelism as the major factors that empower the Mafia syndicates.

Finally, in the third question, anti-Mafia measures were explored to determine the most effective measure, as perceived by civil society. The most effective anti-Mafia measure perceived by civil society was “creating a culture of lawfulness” (77.6%, 38 respondents). Confiscated goods were listed as the second most effective measure (16.3%, 8 respondents). Therefore, these two measures were perceived as the most effective anti-Mafia measures. Finally, the accountability and transparency of the local governments and the central government were perceived as the third most effective anti-Mafia measure (6.1%, 3 respondents).

Operations by the police and intelligence services to capture the Mafiosi and demolish illegal structures were not perceived as being as effective as other previous options (0 respondents). Finally, three respondents wrote their comments in the optional section. The first respondent wrote, “The operations which target financial illegal structures of the Mafia are the most effective measure to have a quick outcome from the operation.” The second respondent noted, “Even though confiscated goods are the most important measure against the Mafia, the state should give back those confiscated goods to the community and public immediately.” Finally, the last respondent mentioned that, even though the law (109/96) that enables public use of the confiscated goods derived from the Mafia is important, the functional justice system remains the most indispensable and effective tool against the Mafia.

7. Discussion and conclusion

In the first part of the survey, government performance and anti-Mafia legislation were perceived by civil society as either insufficient or in need of improvement. The most important result was the evaluation of the government’s performance, which was found to be insufficient by the overwhelming majority of the NGOs. This finding demonstrated a clear dissatisfaction with the current government’s performance, but more interestingly, it also suggests a paradox. According to recent statistics, in the last two decades, there has been a decrease in Mafia crimes (Paoli, 2008). This decrease is due to anti-Mafia legislations in the last two decades that challenged the Mafia, reflecting civil society’s belief that anti-Mafia legislation is relatively better than the government’s performance. However, most of the respondents indicated that existing anti-Mafia legislation needed improvement and criticised its functionality.

The results of the first part demonstrated consistency with the theories on social movements. For instance, community actions have specific identities and the networks and activists that are the main actors of the movement engage conflicting issues through unconventional participation (Della Porta and Diani, 1999). First, new social movements began emerging in the post-industrial period after the 1960s. These movements focused on demands concerning the protection of the identities, cultures, and lifestyle; therefore, the activists of the new social movements emphasised social aspects more than material ones (Pichardo, 1997: 412). On the one hand, in the case of Italy, civil society efforts are related to material aspects because a poor economic situation is one of the outcomes of the Mafia and one of the main reasons for anti-Mafia mobilisation. On the other hand, the new social movements have been influential in institutionalizing anti-Mafia movements among civil society organisations because of seeking a legal society with no collusion between politicians and the Mafia, distrust among the people, dysfunctional state organs. Hence, such distrust, as delineated in the first part of the survey, and the Mafia’s material and moral harm greatly influence mobilisation of anti-Mafia movement.

In the second part of the survey, the aim was to measure the perceptions of civil society using four questions to assess and evaluate their performances, collaborators, target groups, and propaganda tools. In response to the first question, respondents indicated that civil society’s performance was relatively better than the government’s; most of the respondents found it sufficient, but many emphasised the need for improvement in their performance. Additionally, the most noteworthy result of the responses to this question is the heterogeneity among the civil society organisations who found each others’ efforts insufficient and equal in the work against the Mafia. In the second question, civil society overwhelmingly approved that politicians were the most significant partners to acquire in developing effective anti-Mafia policy collaborations. This result indicates that the effectiveness of anti-Mafia policies depends on the role of civil

society as well as political power. The responses to the third question in this section showed that most of civil society organisations prefer to focus on society as a whole rather than a target group for anti-Mafia policies. However, one of every four civil society respondents reported that young people and school-aged children must be the primary focus.

Studies have shown that some women in the Mafia can potentially oppose it through their collaboration with the state (Siebert, 1996; Fiandaca, 2007). However, none of the civil society respondents observed women in the Mafia as the primary target group. Finally, in response to the last question, an overwhelming majority of the civil society respondents believed that there should not be a single primary anti-Mafia policy tool for propaganda but rather that all propaganda tools should be implemented at the same time. Moreover, some respondents preferred propaganda tools, such as immediate punishment of Mafia criminals and collaborators and development of a moral language among local people and mass media.

In light of the results of the second part, it can be argued that, despite its heterogeneous structure, Italian civil society aims to renew the culture through deploying multiple methods at the same time. Civil society is transformed and restructured through new spaces, solidarity functions, and democratic forms (Cohen, 1983: 106). The contribution of civil society to the democratic sphere was noted as one of the significant requirements for increasing both the quality of the democracy and control over the government's performance (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). In the case of Italy, the motivation of the anti-Mafia movements in civil society are related to the government's wrongdoings, including the lack of sufficient and consistent socioeconomic reforms in the region and the collusion of politicians with the Mafia. The reaction of the civil society includes a commitment to new spaces and democratic forms by mobilizing people to take collective action for social change. A distinctive feature of this collective action and contentious politics is their ability to gather ordinary people to confront "opponents, elites and authorities" (Tarrow, 1998: 4). The costs and benefits of participating in social movements constitute collective incentives. Moreover, the goals and achievements of the social movements are closely related to individuals' participation in attaining these goals (Klandermans, 1993).

A major concern in this area is the attempt by civil society to demonstrate the reasons for the Mafia phenomenon and the reasons to fight against it. As scholars have noted, the social movement's political environment and political opportunities were determining factors for its mobilisation (Schumaker, 1975; Goldstone, 1980; Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1998). This determination is also valid in the case of Italy. In this regard, the anti-Mafia movement in Italy was structured by the political environment, so civil society dramatically confronted corruption in politics. Furthermore, civil society attempted to change those challenges to political opportunities by creating a culture of lawfulness. It is important to emphasise again that civil society and the cultural sphere inherited the social conflict phenomenon from the political realm (Melucci, 1985; Touraine, 1985). Moreover, conflicts may occur between the government and social movements when social movements are influenced by the tactics and behaviours of the government (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005: 9). Accordingly, Italy falls within the scope of creating a reverse culture against the corruption and lack of trust among the local people through the attempts of the civil society, which collaborates with the state even though it is perceived as one of the main sources of the Mafia's power.

In the third part of the survey, the questions were designed to explore the relationship between civil society and the government. Three questions were asked about the existence of conflicts between these two actors, the role of civil society on the government, and the possibility of cooperation between these two actors. A large number of the respondents thought

that there was certainly a conflict between the government and civil society over anti-Mafia policies. Some respondents emphasised the disinterested stance of politicians toward civil society policies. These responses showed that two anti-Mafia policy actors may hold diverse policy options. Furthermore, most of the respondents confirmed that civil society has the potential to pressure the government to affect anti-Mafia policies. However, according to some respondents, this pressure is limited, but civil society does not underestimate its role in anti-Mafia policies.

Finally, a substantial number of the respondents affirmed that cooperation is possible between politicians and civil society to build anti-Mafia policies together. Even though some respondents found this collaboration possible, its effectiveness depends on the position of the government. The large number of positive responses to this question indicates that civil society is not very pessimistic about such a consistent collaboration between the government and civil society in the future. The responses from the Italian civil society encompassed certain parts of *realpolitik* by leaving the channels open to collaborate with politicians, that is, the power holders. However, it cannot be denied that such an approach does not violate Italian civil society's own moral stance because such collaboration is focused on permanently removing the Mafia phenomenon from the country. In this context, the results of the third part of the survey referred to the relationship between social change through social movements and strategic methods of those collective actions. The "construction of a collective identity is one step in challenging cultural domination" (Gamson, 1992: 60). In addition to cultural symbols and meanings, the success of a movement is related to its potential for functional innovation and disruption (McAdam, 1983). Therefore, mobilisation can gain importance by focusing on cultural values, particularly cultural symbols and meanings, leading to collective action that attains the goals of the social movement. Italian civil society organisations aim to replace the values of the Mafia with values that are largely abstract, such as creating a culture of lawfulness, legality, and respect for the rule of law. These are symbolic and meaningful efforts that should not be underestimated as they are activated by nongovernmental institutions (Godson, 2000).

In the last part of the survey, respondents were asked about the Mafia phenomenon in general, its networks, and the most effective anti-Mafia measures. One of the most prominent results of this paper is identifying the discontent within civil society about anti-Mafia policies. In particular, civil society's disapproval of the government's wiretap bill shows that the Berlusconi government was seen as a detrimental actor in anti-Mafia policies. The social network between the politicians and the Mafia was overwhelmingly perceived as the most effective factor in empowering the Mafia. This belief also affects civil society's distrust and distance towards politicians and local administrators. Ultimately, most of civil society considers that long-term anti-Mafia measures would be more effective where the Mafia phenomenon is deeply rooted in social, historical, and cultural contexts. A number of respondents concluded that creating a culture of lawfulness must be the primary goal and instrument to defeat the Mafia. Confiscated goods were perceived as the second most important factor in diminishing the power of the Mafia.

Discontent, "popular excitement" (Hopper, 1950; Macionis, 2000), is a crucial element in the emergence of social movements. Hopper (1950) observes that discontent is the second stage of the social movements, and it should be preceded by propaganda that produces agitation or "social ferment." In the third stage, formalisation, strategies are formulated. In the last stage, institutionalisation, the movement is almost complete and has become part of society. These stages have already been completed for Italian civil society, which fights against the Mafia as

indicated previously. However, it is still quite difficult to declare that its ultimate goal has been met. Even if the ultimate stage is eventually completed, it can be at risk when the goals of civil society have been realised or it has failed due to a decline in mobilisation (Miller, 1999; Della Porta and Diani, 1999). Thus, with elimination of political impunity and the corrupt political culture, the motivation of the Italian civil society may decrease. In this sense, we argue that anti-Mafia movement must be coupled principally with lingering values of cultural encoding, such as culture of lawfulness at the bottom level rather than targeting a change at the top political and elitist level. Mobilisation from the bottom up may prevent loss of interest in the anti-Mafia movement because the major change at the bottom level has a great potential to propel the top political system.

Finally, it is worth noting the importance of the culture of lawfulness to the Italian civil society in eradicating the mafiosi culture in the country. The rule of law is a significant source of confidence in the agents of the society to unite around certain rules and exercise their rights within those rules. Hence, the rule of law in the society is measurable through the “quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann et al., 2007: 4). Fundamentally, the rule of law cannot be effective in a society if there is no culture of lawfulness. The rule of law is the most appropriate long-term method for attaining “justice, economic and social development” so its achievement depends on the creation of culture of lawfulness (Godson, 2011: 1). Thus, a culture of lawfulness significantly revitalises the rule of law in the belief of the citizens concerning obeying the law and exercising deliberative democracy in which the state is the main safeguard of the principles of culture of lawfulness.

However, there is legal and normative discrepancy in the application of the rule of law and the gap between the rule of law and the culture of lawfulness in the Italian social and justice systems. The Italian justice system is notorious in the international arena because of its violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which guarantees basic fundamental principles of the rule of law. Moreover, millions of cases are on the waiting list in the Italian justice system (Valori, 2000; De Matteis, 2008). Accordingly, Italy has demonstrated a certain level of reluctance to accept the superiority of the Convention over statutes (Sweet and Helen, 2008: 695). This reluctance could be overcome recently by the decisions of 348/2007 and 349/2007, which recognised the compatibility of the constitution with the ECHR, a landmark change in harmonisation of the Italian constitution (Consorte, 2009: 26). Additionally, “Italian criminal courts seem unable to deal with the backlog of cases. Further, a 2006 pardon law intended to put an end to the endemic overcrowding of state prisons, has further undermined public confidence in the state’s ability to bring justice to criminal matters” (Maffei and Betsos, 2007: 465). Even though the ECHR explicitly warned and condemned the Italian justice system at the beginning of the millennium, the deadlocked problems in the justice system not only violate the ECHR but also lead to a serious deficiency in the justice system that aggravates the situation by losing the trust of the citizens in the justice organs in the nation (Valori, 2000; Fabbrini, 2009).

Even though efforts have been made in recent years to ameliorate the Italian justice system, there is an urgent need for serious justice reform to ward off the deficiencies, which render it dysfunctional if not at its lowest ebb. Thus, the dysfunctionality of the Italian justice system has sparked a set of debates regarding its influence on the empowerment of the Mafia groups in the country, which historically dominated the criminal justice system by threats and violence when the state forces have been unable to protect its own justice system and magistrates, in some cases violating the Italian constitution through collaborations of the state bureaucrats with the

mafiosi (Catanzaro, 1992; Anderson, 1995). Ineffectiveness of the state bodies to maintain the rule of law causes certain threats to the culture of lawfulness and Articles 2 and 3 of the Italian constitution, which recognises and guarantees equality under the law and the inviolable rights of citizens. Italian civil society organisations that fight against the Mafia aim to restore the culture of lawfulness through their policies that target citizens, on the one hand, and play a significant role as a stakeholder through pressuring and restructuring the Italian political system for effective and functional justice and bureaucratic system, on the other hand.

The limitations of this study highlight opportunities for future research. First, although the survey was targeted at different civil society organisations, such as trade unions and semi-governmental organisations, it was unsuccessful because only persons from volunteer, nonprofit NGOs responded to the survey. Thus, the findings are limited to the specific civil society organisations. Studies should be conducted on other types of civil society organisations to investigate their perceptions. Specifically, trade unions should be emphasised as important actors where the Mafia dominates the economy illegally and creates black markets and cartels. Second, in this study, nineteen respondents did not identify the names of their organisations; this was the second most frequently skipped question. Thus, even though a high response rate was achieved at the end of the survey, some civil society organisation representatives were still sensitive about identifying themselves in relation to questions that criticised the government and politicians. Finally, even though this study endeavoured to explore the perceptions of civil society organisations, the crucial question of why they had the perceptions they reported cannot be answered in this paper. In this regard, exploring the reasons for these perceptions in face-to-face interviews with open-ended questions may be helpful.

Above all, it is important to stress that, on the one hand, fatalism could be one of the natural outcomes of the Mafia tragedy (Schneider, 2003). On the other hand, memorializing the tragedy could also result in moral responsibility (Alexander, 2004). At this juncture, civil society's reaction to the Mafia has been an increasingly important phenomenon for social change and anti-Mafia policies because of its emphasis on civic and moral responsibility in its fight against the Mafia and Mafia culture (Cayli, 2011). Moreover, certain results from this survey should be considered as policy suggestions for future anti-Mafia policies. First, distrust of politicians, who have historically colluded with the Mafia, was quite high among civil society organisations. Moreover, politicians were perceived as the most effective factor that empowers the Mafia. If collaboration between the civil society and politicians is sought in the future, civil society's trust in politicians must first be restored.

Second, even though civil society perceived politicians as the main obstacles in anti-Mafia policies, they acknowledged the need for politicians to fight the Mafia effectively. They saw politicians as the most appropriate actors for collaboration. This is a significant reason for optimism about consistent collaboration between civil society and politicians. More importantly, this outcome is also a response to test the initial hypothesis: Civil society seeks more independence as power holders in the contradiction concerning the issues with the state bodies. This hypothesis is more appreciated, especially in the political arena in which the independence of the civil society yields to challenge the political spectrum (Foley and Edwards, 1996). In other words, there is a certain level of egoism in the members of civil society that yields to protect their own interests (Taylor, 1975; Houlgate, 2005; Setianto, 2007). Contrary to this argument, as evidenced by the survey responses, Italian civil society members who worked against the Mafia indicated incentives to collaborate with the state even when there was a low level of trust in the politicians and a conflict concerning anti-Mafia policies between the politician and civil society. This perspective further presents the importance of the ultimate goal

of civil society: eradicating the Mafia and its culture from the social, political, and economic sphere of the country.

Finally, a culture of lawfulness was perceived as critically significant and the most effective factor in combating the Mafia. Creating these values in society will certainly be a long and arduous path, but it can be accomplished with the consistent efforts and commitment of all societal actors. These values are related to the value of law, the culture of lawfulness, and trust in the state; the values are also crucial in addressing social problems, such as the Mafia. The devaluing of these factors explains why the roots of the Mafia are still so powerful. Long-term measures, like establishing a culture of lawfulness with the potential to put the foundation of the Mafia at risk, become significant resources for all anti-Mafia actors.

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank Prof. Marco Giovagnoli for his help in the design of the survey and questions. I am very grateful to Giuseppe Parente from the LIBERA who demonstrated consistent efforts in the distribution of the survey. Finally, I would like to thank all civil society organizations that fight against the Mafia for their significant assistance and cooperation during my research.

References

- Adnkronos, 2008. Italy: businesses paying Mafia 'protection money' could lose licenses. Accessed at: <http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Business/?id=3.1.889829288>.
- Alexander, Jeffrey C., 2004. Toward a theory of cultural trauma. In: Jeffrey, A., Eyerman, R., Giesen, Bernhard, Smelser, Neil J., Sztompka, P. (Eds.), *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*. University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Anderson, A., 1995. The red Mafia: a legacy of communism. In: Lazear, Edward P. (Ed.), *Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia*. Hoover Institution, Stanford, pp. 340–367.
- Armao, F., 2000. *Il sistema Mafia. Dall'economia mondo al dominio locale*. Bollati Boringhieri, Torino.
- Behan, T., 2008. *Defiance: The Story of One Man Who Stood up to the Sicilian Mafia*. IB Tauris, London and New York.
- Blok, A., 1974. *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860–1960. A Study of Violent Entrepreneurs*. Harper, New York.
- Brown, S., 2007. Living on the Mafia's hit list. A Journalist's Tale. Reuters, 23 October. Accessible at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1249827220071023>.
- Calderoni, F., 2011. Where is the Mafia in Italy? Measuring the presence of the Mafia in Italian provinces. *Global Crime* 12 (1), 41–69.
- Camuto, R.V., 2010. *Palmento: A Sicilian Wine Odyssey*. University of Nebreska Press, Lincoln.
- Catanzaro, R., 1992. *Men of Respect: A Social History of the Sicilian Mafia*. Trans. R. Rosenthal. Free Press, New York.
- Cayli, B., 2011. Anti-mafia policies in Italy: the need for collaborative governance and transition of the policy actors from isolation to coalition. *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice* 19 (1), 15–36.
- Cayli, B., 2012. Resistance against the Mafia: a civic struggle to Defy an uncontestable power. *Anthropological Journal of European Cultures* 21 (1), 103–125.
- Cohen, J.L., 1983. Rethinking social movements. *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 28, 97–114.
- Consorte, F., 2009. The effects of the European Convention on human rights in National criminal law: the harmonizing process. *Ankara Law Review* 6 (1), 17–29.
- Dalla Chiesa, N., 1983. Gli studenti contro la Mafia: Note (di merito) per un movimento. *Quaderni Piacentini* 11, 39–60.
- De Matteis, L., 2008. Reasonable delay in the Italian Justice System: a European perspective. *Relations*, 30/06/2008. Accessible at: <http://www.europeanrights.eu/index.php?funzione=S&op=5&id=144>.
- Della Porta, D., Diani, M., 1999. *Social Movements: An Introduction*. Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
- Della Porta, D., Tarrow, S., 2005. Transnational process and social activism: an introduction. In: Della Porta, D., Tarrow, S. (Eds.), *Transnational Protest & Global Activism*. Lowman and Littlefield, Oxford.

- Diamond, L., Morlino, L., 2004. The quality of democracy. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4), 20–31.
- Dickie, J., 2004. *Cosa Nostra A History of the Sicilian Mafia*. Hodder and Stoughton, London.
- Fabbrini, S., 2009. The transformation of Italian democracy. *Bulletin of Italian Politics* 1, 29–47.
- Foley, M.W., Edwards, B., 1996. The paradox of civil society. *Journal of Democracy* 7 (3), 38–52.
- Forno, F., Gunnarson, C., 2009. Everyday shopping to fight the Mafia in Italy. In: Micheletti, M., McFarland Andrew, S. (Eds.), *Creative Participation: Responsibility-taking in the Political World*. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder & London.
- Gambetta, D., 1993. *The Sicilian Mafia; The Business of Private Protection*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (MA).
- Gamson, W.A., 1992. The social psychology of collective action. In: Morris Aldon, D., McClurg Mueller, C. (Eds.), *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Godson, R., 2000. Guide to developing a culture of lawfulness. *Trends in Organized Crime* 5 (3), 91–109.
- Godson, R., 2011. *Building a culture of lawfulness, a guide to getting started*. National Strategy Information Center.
- Goldstone, J.A., 1980. The weakness of organisation: a new look at Gamson's the strategy of social protest. *The American Journal of Sociology* 85 (5), 1017–1042.
- Hobsbawm, E.J., 1959. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Hopper, R.D., 1950. The revolutionary process: a frame of reference for the study of revolutionary movements. *Social Forces* 28, 270–279.
- Houlgate, S., 2005. *An Introduction to Hegel. Freedom, Truth and History*. Blackwell, Oxford.
- Iorio, P., 2009. *Il Sud che Resiste; Storie di lotta per la cultura della legalità in Terra di Lavoro*. Ediesse, Roma.
- Jamieson, A., 2000. *The AntiMafia: Italy's Fight against Organized Crime*. St. Martins Press, New York.
- Kaldor, M., 2003. The idea of global civil society. *International Affairs* 79 (3), 583–593.
- Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2007. *Governance Matters VI: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996–2006*. Policy Research Working Paper Series 4280.
- Kitschelt, H.P., 1986. Political opportunity structures and political protest: anti-nuclear movements in four democracies. *British Journal of Political Science* 16, 57–85.
- Klanderans, B., 1993. A theoretical framework for comparisons of social movement participation. *Sociological Forum* 8, 383–402.
- Lupo, S., 2009. *The History of the Mafia*. Columbia University Press, New York.
- Macionis, J.J., 2000. *Sociology*. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey.
- Maffei, S., Betsos, M.I., 2007. Crime and criminal policy in Italy: tradition and modernity in a troubled country. *European Journal of Criminology* 4, 461–482.
- McAdam, D., 1983. Tactical innovation and the pace of insurgency. *American Sociological Review* 48, 735–754.
- Melucci, A., 1985. The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements. *Social Research* 51, 789–816.
- Miller, F.D., 1999. The end of SDS and the emergence of the Weathermen: demise through success. In: Freeman, J., Johnson, V. (Eds.), *Waves of Protest: Social Movements since the Sixties*. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, MD, pp. 303–324.
- Moe, N., 2002. *The view from Vesuvius: Italian Culture and the southern question*. University of California Press, Los Angeles.
- Orlando, L., 2001. *Fighting the Mafia and Renewing Sicilian Culture*. Encounter Books, San Francisco (CA).
- Paoli, L., 2000. *Fratelli di Mafia: Cosa Nostra e 'Ndringheta. Il Mulino*, Bologna.
- Paoli, L., 2008. The decline of the Italian Mafia. In: Siegel, D., Nelen, H. (Eds.), *Organized Crimes: Culture, Market and Policies*. Springer, New York.
- Pichardo, N., 1997. New social movements: a critical review. *Annual Review of Sociology* 23, 411–430.
- Romano, F., 1966. *Storia Della Mafia*. Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, Salerno.
- Santino, U., 1997. *La strage di Portella, la democrazia bloccata e il doppio stato*. Centro Siciliano di Documentazione. "Giuseppe Impastato" Accessible at: <http://www.centroimpastato.it/publ/online/portella.html>.
- Santino, U., 2009. *Storia del movimento antimafia*. Editori Riuniti, Roma.
- Schneider, J., Schneider, P., 1994. Mafia, Antimafia, and the Question of Sicilian Culture. *Politics and Society* 22 (2), 237–258.
- Schneider, J.C., 1998a. Italy's 'Southern Question': Orientalism in One Country. Berg Press, Oxford.
- Schneider, J.C., 1998b. Educating against the Mafia: a report from Sicily. *Trends in Organized Crime* 4 (2), 7–18.
- Schneider, J., Schneider, P., 2001. Civil society versus organized crime; local and global perspectives. *Critique of Anthropology* 21 (4), 427–446.
- Schneider, J.C., 2002. Suggestions from anti-Mafia struggle in Sicily. *Anthropological Quarterly* 75 (1), 155–158.
- Schneider, J.C., 2003. *Reversible destiny: Mafia, anti-Mafia, and the struggle for Palermo*. University of California Press, Berkeley.

- Schumaker, P.D., 1975. Policy responsiveness to protest-group demands. *The Journal of Politics* 37, 488–521.
- Setianto, B.D., 2007. Somewhere in between: conceptualizing civil society. *The International Journal of Not-for-profit Law* 10 (1). Accessible at: http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol10iss1/art_3.htm.
- Servadio, G., 1976. *Mafioso. A History of the Mafia from Its Origins to the Present Day*. Secker & Warburg, London.
- Sweet, A.S., Helen, K., 2008. Assessing the impact of the ECHR on national legal systems. Faculty Scholarship Series, paper 88. Accessible at: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/88/.
- Swidler, A., 1986. Culture in action: symbols and strategies. *American Sociological Review* 51 (2), 273–286.
- Tarrow, S., 1998. *Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Taylor, C., 1975. *Hegel*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Touraine, A., 1985. An introduction to the study of social movements. *Social Research* 52, 749–788.
- Valori, V., 2000. The European court of human rights condemns Italy. *The European Legal Forum (E)* 3-01, 175–176.
- Weissman, R., 1999. The committee of the sheets. *The essentials*. Accessible at: <http://lists.essential.org/corp-focus/msg00011.html>.
- World Bank, 2010. Defining civil society. Accessed at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,contentMDK:20101499~me_nu_PK:244752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html.