Abstract

Is it still possible to see an act of violence and feel guilt? To feel a sense of complicity beyond social duty or desire? There have been questions similar to this in discussion for centuries now, in fact, many of the systems of thought dedicated to answering it invoke entire metaphysical apparatuses to provide for its completion. This one, however, is specific to our time. Is it even possible to feel guilt anymore? In an attempt to provide an outline of the ethical ramifications of complicity, this paper discusses the effects of Immanuel Kant on our present day understanding of violence and of ourselves. That is, there is none. Instead the shortcomings consist of an obfuscation of the dominant order and an obstruction of political action. By continuing from the historical analysis of the subject begun by Michel Foucault in his early writing, coupled with his assessment of disciplinary power from his earlier writings, these difficulties may not only become apparent, but also an issue that may hold the potential for change. In this light, it may be possible to consider an ethics of the subject as spectacle and progress towards, or at least entertain, the idea of complicity.