Theism and contrastive explanation

Came, Daniel (2017) Theism and contrastive explanation. European Journal for the Philosophy of Religion, 9 (1). pp. 19-26. ISSN 1689-8311

Documents
02%20Came.pdf

Request a copy
[img] PDF
02%20Came.pdf - Whole Document
Restricted to Repository staff only

138kB
Item Type:Article
Item Status:Live Archive

Abstract

I argue that there could not be grounds on which to introduce God into our ontology. My argument presupposes two doctrines. First, we should allow into our ontology only what figures in the best explanation of an event or fact. Second, explanation is contrastive by nature, in that the explanandum always consists in a contrast between a fact and a foil. I argue that God could not figure in true contrastive explanatory statements, because the omnipotence of God guarantees that for any true proposition p, God could have made it the case that ~p just as much as He could have made it the case that p.

Keywords:God, theism, contrastive explanation, atheism, ontology
Subjects:V Historical and Philosophical studies > V500 Philosophy
Divisions:College of Arts
Related URLs:
ID Code:30423
Deposited On:01 Mar 2018 17:02

Repository Staff Only: item control page