Riley, Alan and Peysner, John (2006) Damages in EC antitrust actions: who pays the piper? European Law Review, 31 (5). pp. 748-761. ISSN 0307-5400

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Abstract

The prospects for private antitrust enforcement to supplement public enforcement by competition authorities in the EC depends on the mix of incentives and disincentives for private parties to bring action. The perceived advantages that underpin US antitrust litigation; namely, treble damages and wide discovery, can be replicated in the EC by awards of interest and damages above pure compensatory level in specific cases and the leniency procedure can be mined for useful documentation. However, the advantage of access to the courts through contingency fees has limited appeal in Europe and a Contingency Legal Aid Fund, incorporating private and public elements, is proposed.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	The prospects for private antitrust enforcement to supplement public enforcement by competition authorities in the EC depends on the mix of incentives and disincentives for private parties to bring action. The perceived advantages that underpin US antitrust litigation; namely, treble damages and wide discovery, can be replicated in the EC by awards of interest and damages above pure compensatory level in specific cases and the leniency procedure can be mined for useful documentation. However, the advantage of access to the courts through contingency fees has limited appeal in Europe and a Contingency Legal Aid Fund, incorporating private and public elements, is proposed.
Keywords:	Competition law, Legal advice and funding, Private enforcement
Subjects:	M Law > M120 European Union Law
Divisions:	College of Social Sciences > Faculty of Business & Law > Lincoln Law School
Depositing User:	Bev Jones
Date Deposited:	27 Sep 2007
Last Modified:	13 Mar 2013 08:24
URI:	http://eprints.lincoln.ac.uk/id/eprint/882

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