One should hear the calling of two hyperbolic selves within this questioning concerning what I would propose to call here the desire for **panop-tech-clair-voyance**: 

**Selfless** interpreted as an infinite reactivity (machinery)  
**Selfless** interpreted as an infinite responsibility (agency)  

*Reaction or response* is what, according to Derrida, always classically partitions the human (agency) off from the entirety of the non-human an-agential (i.e. whether animal or machine). Within this oppositional coupling, of the reaction or response, the presumed cleanliness of a humanistic responsibility forms the self-sealing benchmark or organising pivot par excellence. Reaction then would form the height of irresponsibility.

Outside of this partitioned history of such a safe ahistorical truth comes the imminent arrival, as we will soon see futurologically demonstrated, of certain ‘invasive’ prostheses that will promise or threaten the return of the human to the status of that animal or machinic an-agency just mentioned. This threat or this promise comes along however within a train that forms a component part of but a whole history of prior invasive woundings to the anthropo-centralised ego. Such wounds to the *agency-of-the-human* have come, according to a recent historical recap by Haraway, within the numeric shape of four comparatively modern wounds to this once presumed safe base of the absolute human-whole: the Copernican, the Darwinian, the Freudian and now finally the Cyborgian. Somewhat fittingly however for such post-humanistic prostheses, attachments or (machinic) extensions, there seems to be within this final fourth wounding a notable lack of a proprietorial nomenclature, or of an anchoring proper name. This *residence* of the [C]yborgian wound lacks capitalisation. Can we perhaps question this acephalic lack of a named head and in return *supply* (which is not quite to buy into) the potent common currency of a founding biographical signature to act as supportive metonymic signage?

In answering to such a quest, we would offer here for our, as we will see panop-tech-clair-voyant, purposes the figure of the ‘**Galvanian Wound**’, named after the 18th Century Italian physician and physicist Luigi Galvani. As discover of the bioelectric properties of these “animal” and “human” nerve and nervous systems, a whole subsequent arché or paleo-prosthetic pan-electrical truth system was unlocked within the very heart of the human envelope and thus was born the possibility and the potential to interface and “interfere” (for how can one now be seen to either invade or “interfere” with what was previously always already charged with such a currency-of-the-electrical?) with “the human” via apparatuses that could lead, we might worry, toward the nameless monstrous bridge-being of a Frankensteinesque composited-recognition. More than such de-monstrosities however, the galvanic wound opens or offers the inside up to the outside and allows for a veritable folding-out into the arbitrating open; an invaginal folding-out that would allow for an electrical archiving of what might in fact lie (and we obviously measure the semantic resources
of this word carefully) beneath. The skin of the being-that-we-are is now no longer something that folds or better holds the inside, but which now conveys, through the trans-portal\textsuperscript{xvi} ontology of this wound, a connection or an availability. \textbf{The galvanic skin responds and thus (now only) reacts? Response or reaction?}

Does then this fourth galvanian ‘bio-electrical wound\textsuperscript{xvii}, this dehiscent ontological \textit{opening} of the selfspace onto the sheer expanse\textsuperscript{x} of the otherspace, offer any directional cues to a location (for this abridged human-animal) of either a space of response or of reaction? And further, does this galvanian wound, so called, while forcing upon us the recognition of a now ontologised history of an always already pre-existing electrical interior, also involve an attendant concern or hope (depending on one’s point of view) of an \textit{additional} turning toward a further techno-scientific or pragmatological plunging into \textit{either} Über-responsibility or Unter-reactivity\textsuperscript{xv}? In other words does this recognition of the primacy of the bio-electrical interior offer either a promising or threatening furtherance of responsibility or reactivity respectively? Response or reaction?

\textbf{1. Selfless Responses or Selfless Reactions?}

So, to rewind and remind ourselves of the \textit{doubling} of the latter part of our opening titles, we are working here within the dual undecidable orbit of two futurally directed ends or \textit{solicitations} of the semantic resources (or recourses) of this singular syntagmatic questioning concerning “immediation”. Some concrete images of these somewhat ambivalently split ends: \textbf{The first end} is of the eschatological end, or of a perhaps quite \textit{worrying} interpretation; where we worry that we ourselves and all of these human others, will lose our “selves” and become just so many reactive machines, zoo animals or beehive dwellers\textsuperscript{xxi} (the death of the infinity of the Levinasian agential \textit{autrui}?\textsuperscript{xvi}). \textbf{The second end} is the more promising teleological \textit{promise} of a self and an other driven or encouraged into a highly self-responsible selflessness\textsuperscript{xvii} by the \textit{affordances} granted by the opening-up structures of the network; by being hooked-up to the \textit{sociality-of-the-social} and thus to be brought or encouraged out of a previously protective, somewhat selfish, shell. \textit{Selfless} then or \textit{self-less}\textsuperscript{xvii}, this \textit{self} is thought at this prior-moment (as still existing before the encroachment of these futurally positioned ‘ends’) to be a singular separable “self”. It is \textit{just} this specific idea, and this ideal, of a previously sheltered and homely ‘intra’ prior-privacy that we will later, toward our conclusion, be questioning further with our strategic pre-figurative use of our paleo-prosthetic \textit{galvanian wound} (a pre-existent paleo-prosthetic process somewhat akin, we believe, to Derrida’s conceptually related network\textsuperscript{xviii} of concepts such as ‘\textit{invagination}, ‘\textit{différence}, ‘\textit{pharmakon}, ‘\textit{the trace}, ‘\textit{supplement}, ‘\textit{hymen}’ and ‘\textit{arché-writing}’). Before approaching this logical conclusion\textsuperscript{xviii} however let us concentrate on the idea of a supposedly secondary prosthesis that would come along to cure a certain lack of being \textit{opened to the other}. We must however \textit{remain} suspicious of such notions of invasive secondarity and remember that the galvanic wound is primarily \textit{intimate}. It does not come along any later than anything that would seem to be sealed away from it.

Something then is merely \textit{seen to be} imminently coming along (we place our ear upon the tracks and some well-attuned ears can hear the approach) to steal this Cartesian ‘self’ away\textsuperscript{xviii}. The purpose of this paper, it must be made clear before
examining our exemplars, is to cast or to sew some doubt around a supposedly pre-existent, pre-im-mediatised ‘selfness’ that would pre-exist such an imminent approaching of immanence and some doubts also around the subsequent downstream modelling of a choice either of some hyperbolic surplus of responsibility in the face of this imminently arriving outsiding-of-the-inside or a hyperbolic\textsuperscript{ix} deficit-restrictiveness of reactivity (again in the face of the imminent arrival of an outsiding-of-the-inside) that a certain form of projected tele-techno-pathic engagement would seem to presuppose as delivering. The purpose of this paper then is not one that is fuelled by, or which would wish to therapeutically work-through, the operating of models of fear or of hope, but of a positing of a model of the human based upon the problematic of the reactivity of the human before\textsuperscript{ix} such machinery. It would not then be a case of worrying over the loss of a responsible self, or a self-responsibility, but of a questioning of such a site-of-the-self as the site of some quasi-transcendent self-responding agency. Long before we reach these closing questions concerning pre-panop-tech-clair-voyant reactivity we will concentrate here on a few exemplars who would wish to expand our humanistic horizons by unplugging us from previous restrictions and plugging us into the sheer expanse of the post or trans-human space.

1.2 Posthuman Interfaces and Inter-Face-iality

Who or what parties could we call upon, as representing the promise of this currently encroaching post-humous self-lessness (of which at the moment we are self-ed but soon to loose(n))? In such searching we could find, of course, no shortage of futurological exemplars who would, as a notional totality, see us as soon achieving the ability to raise and place ourselves squarely outside of this all-too-finite temporo-spatial condition that we presently are constituted within; a new trans- or post-condition perfectly exterior to the confines of this self-hitherto-trappedness. These exemplars then are often commonly labelled and self-labelled as the post-humanists and the trans-humanists. We will very briefly look toward three such representative post-human resources or exponents from the transhumanist field before settling in some more significant depth upon our main cyborgian\textsuperscript{xi} case study or example.

Representing a potent post-human dose of hyperbolic responsibility there is John Perry Barlow. Projecting and protecting the a-domain of cyberspace Barlow and his somewhat kooky borderless border-guarding text “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace”\textsuperscript{xii} forms the contour of a strong polemical opposition to those who would like to re-impose (i.e. those modelled on the national, etc.) restrictions on Internet communicativity; Barlow would here like to clearly re-echo some valuable founding-foundational sentiments that have been so palpably lost within the modern age of ‘restrictions’. For as electronically-freed techno-enabled Thoreauan\textsuperscript{xiii} tele-hunters, he believes that we should be able to hunt and comport ourselves out the within the cyberspatial open and boundless without any terrestrially ‘positioned’ laws picking us up through any conventionally territorial Locardian exchange-values; localised-legal “values” that might tightly establish or prohibitively police our footprints and movements\textsuperscript{xiv}. Cyberspace is a frontier and a properly lawless, open-source pathbreaking frontier that transcends and should transcend these pre-cyberspatial terrestrial localist restrictions. Upon this royal road to the unrestricted place, we cannot help but step into some contradictions or potholes...
However. In relation to such models of de-territorialised disembodied space/s, we have investigated elsewhere a somewhat illustrative aporetic example of so-called tele-presentation that problematises or unfurls some of the strange logic of this wish for a transcending of territorial regimes through the possibility of the actual hunting of animals placed within distant countries and shot via an internet connection. Questions of the undecidability -not the indeterminacy- of the status or the exact coordinate-of-the-kill and inter-spatiality were concentrated upon there.xxv. Similarly, Barlow’s sovereignly separatist model of Cyberspace would wish not to touch down on any particular (lawbound) territory or its regimes or practices, even though it cannot help but touch down upon the very territories it nevertheless wishes to escape and evade being captured within. Needless to say, Barlow’s is an argument with and assault upon territory-reality that powerfully deconstructs its own premises and grounds.xxvi.

Then there is Ray Kurzweill the technological futurist and sometime inventor of some concrete and very helpful ontical technological prostheses. To go along with this solid track-record of the creation of these useful groundfloor concrete-ontico-practices, he has written two books full of predictions of future Moore’s law fuelled apparatuses; mostly centring upon predictions of the future-fact of being able to download our psyches into permanently-existing “mechanisms”xxvii and thus dispose ourselves of our aforementioned Platonico-Cartesian shells (as just so much innocent and now unnecessary baggage). In a sort of technological version of Fukuyama’s.xxviii ‘end of history’ or ‘last man’ argument (itself concerning the fall of another form of dialectical-divisive-dualist curtain) there is the powerful image of an ultimate synthesis or singularity that is near and that will soon end the longheld and somewhat problematically ‘finite’ (as his findings are findingxxix) sticking-point of this body and its tendency toward decrepitude and final closure. He is taking his food-supplements until soon, and somewhat luckily within his own lifetime, he and we can finally live forever: peter[pan]occhio?

Relatively, and closing in upon our main post-humous quarry, or case study, there is George Dvorsky. Dvorsky, while ultimately sharing Kurzweill’s transhumanist predilection for and prediction of ultimate immortality, sees a more short-term achievable goal of an imminently-to-hand (that is, soon to be integrated into a networked everyday experiential ‘ready-to-hand’) invention of what he neologistically calls techlepathy.xxx. He points out how recently Chuck Jorgensen,xxxi, a scientist based at NASA, has invented a technology to implant reading-writing (input-output) prosthetic technologies upstream from previously damaged or non-functioning vocal apparatuses of some disabled subjects, by hacking or tapping-into nerve signals, situated within the throat, that control speech. These pre-verbal nerve signals, Jorgensen’s experiments found, operated in normal subjects whether or not they actually enacted the process of physically moving their lips. Thus he hacked into a region situated upstream from these lips, in a region situated notionally closer to the location of the human organism’s site of the intending-to-say; at some point spatially “earlier” then than this localised ontical sticking or “saying-point” that is broken in these particular subjects. As so often is the case, these injured subjects function as test cases, or pragmatically driven thought-experiments, for something much more radical and socially-encompassing (an upping-of-the-ante). For while the power of speech is then given-back or bestowed upon those once relatively closed or struck-dumb, this lucky or local repair job can form the basis of some more transformational or trans-humanist success or proof-work. As a result then of these
borrowings-of or burrowings-into these previously purely\textsuperscript{xxxiii} naturo-biophysiological signals, he points to the presence of a close-by somewhat unintended-transportation or resource to help furnish the onward teleological journey (and as we will see, one set within an entelechial\textsuperscript{xxiv} family-circle) to the long-sought location that is telepathy.

It strikes him, in hearing about this space agency invention, that by the process of moving the prosthetic connection \textit{up a little}\textsuperscript{xxxv}, up this anthropo-biological entity’s communicative-process chain, that we might totally cut out \textit{and} expand these vococentric (I will not of course say phonocentric\textsuperscript{xxxvi}) apparatuses out and then, as of waking up one simple morning, be able to communicate our very \textit{intending} or \textit{meaning-to-say}, without going to the (deferred\textsuperscript{xxxiii}) trouble of actually having to say it. For he states:

“As I thought further about this similarity it occurred to me that the technology required to create a technologically endowed form of telepathy is all but upon us. By combining Jorgensen’s device and a cochlear implant with a radio transmitter and a fancy neural data conversion device, we could create a form of communication that bypasses the acoustic realm\textsuperscript{xxxviii} altogether. The dream of mind-to-mind communication and the desire to transcend one’s own consciousness is as old as language itself. You could make a strong case that there’s a near pathological craving for it, a tendency that manifests through the widespread belief in paranormal telepathy\textsuperscript{xxix}. ESP aside, it seems that this craving will soon be satisfied. Several advances in communications technology and neuroscience are giving pause about the possibility of endowing us with techlepathy. As we continue to ride the wave of the communications revolution, and as the public demand for more sophisticated communications tools continues, it seems a veritable certainty that we are destined to become a species capable of mind-to-mind communication.” (Dvorsky)

Speech and what it does will still be there, but will now (or at least ‘soon’) be so much clearer and cleaner. Such a will-to-cleanliness and the washing out of what might muddy communication haunts as well our main exemplar\textsuperscript{xl}, who we will now move along to.

2. Kevin Warwick and the Feeling of the Feeling of the Inside of the Significant Other

Professor Kevin Warwick works within the apparently very practical\textsuperscript{xli} environment of the University of Reading Cybernetics lab. Something of a media darling a few years ago (especially on a number of titillating “future-shock” and “future-sex” shows), Warwick has invented a series of subcutaneous or embedded prostheses to enable communication between, for example, 1) one’s own proper-body and the buildings which one owns (or perhaps work at\textsuperscript{xlii}) and which are thus one’s extended property\textsuperscript{xliii}, and 2) the ability to control technologies that operate across internet connectivity (with attendant benefits to medicine and of help in augmenting or creating various other tele-extensible ‘expertises’ unable “themselves” to travel)
and finally, at least for our main purposes here, 3) an embedded batterless chip that enables both himself (he loves being his own guinea-pig\textsuperscript{xiv}) and his wife to share the (co-)presence or evidence of their internal “love chemicals” as evidence of their intimate pleasure within one another’s presence, without as a consequence having to worry about any previous uncertainties of any (perhaps) questionable vouchsafes-of-the-voice or of any fogging or blocking-of-the-face\textsuperscript{xv} (that this technology then seeks to bridge and unblock). In answer to such untrustworthy bugs or glitches within the communicative realm, Warwick is intent on upgrading both himself and his wife Irena to henceforth avoid such difficulties.

For Warwick has invented himself as “the world’s very first cyborg” and believes in the future of highly integrated technologies that will expand our sensory and sensual milieus and radically alter our interpersonal environments or Umwelten and that these will help to form the very horizon or extra-intra coating or armature of our future post-humanity. Older forms of communication via speech and facial gesture will soon be on the wane. Warwick paints us a picture of just what major transformative upgrades await us\textsuperscript{xvi}. In his autobiography (or should we say his autocyborgography?\textsuperscript{xvii}) Warwick states that our children’s children will “look back with wonder at how their ancestors could have been so primitive as to communicate by means of silly little noises called speech\textsuperscript{xviii}” (my emphasis). In a television interview\textsuperscript{xix} that reported on a related implanting of chips into both his wife and his own nervous systems (and pre-faced with a section title reading “linking the brain with technology in order to upgrade the human species”), Warwick states:

“That was for me the most exciting thing scientifically thing that I’ve been involved with. She had electrodes pushed into her nervous system, and with my implant-electrodes in my nervous system, electrically [intonation in original] we linked our nervous systems together. So what happened, when she moved her hand ‘chuke-chuke-chuke’, my brain received three pulses “chuke-chuke-chuke”. So we communicated telegraphically, nervous system to nervous system, for the first time in the world. Quite clearly now communicating brain-to-brain is the next step”

Such replacements of external speech and of external sight by the replacement or upgrade of a more direct technological brain-to-brain ‘thought transfer’ (what we are proposing to call here panop-tech-clair-voyance) will finally transport us to the long awaited promised land or location of the behind-of-the-face-of-the-other and allow, as such, for a direct and immediate form of communication that will finally be able to edit or splice out any uncertainty or undecidability from our intimate and significant relationships. In logical extension of this technological bi-directional trussing, any ceremonial swapping of rings would no longer, through such a directness of connection, form merely the symbolic remainder or residue of a mutual coming together but will henceforth bind a unity through a direct technological or electric-blood circuitry (and as we will soon see, in genealogical-ancestral form, with Hegel below). For Warwick then, no longer will there be any, possibly, un-truss-worthy speech act or any other speechless act of the body to be worried over, concerned by or questioned or really anything else that might fall outside of the encirclement of the ring (nor presumably, by extension, will the embarking-promissory of the once necessary, though still perhaps perturbing, performative of the “I do” of the wedding ceremony any longer need to signature-stamp the opening of a marriage?) but will allow us to really share our real spirit and feeling with our
significantly immediatised other (a shared space or an overlapped hearth of ipseity). For the faces and the voices that will once have projected our significant others ‘out’ to us will no longer form a possible undecidable barrier-entrance to what presumably lies beneath, but will provide a final cure for such uncertainty of these two sites of mediation of, for example, the pre-immediatised voice and the face: intimate as they are, these two communication devices also project or intimate a certain irreducible ‘uncertainty principle’ or the possibility of a radical loss of meaning. Hence, in answer, the need for a device to intimately inter-face together with and to open up the previously hidden potential of the galvanian fourth wounding that we opened with.

2.1 Of Certain Double Edged Gifts-of

For these latter “natural gifts” (of the face and of the voice) that one certainly presently greets (through our aisthesis that enable a quite immediately-felt interpretation) with great pleasure and which one certainly loves-of-the-other and which give one so much food-for-desire-and-thought (gifts that allow the human subject to be-with-the-other, or of the Heideggerian significant otherly oriented mit-da-sein) always immanently include an element, or at least the possibility of a risk of a deviation from the path-of-the-proper. Through the presence now of such prosthetic grafts, the family-plot of the couple can now truly thicken and blend into a unified one. In the face of such thorny difficulties (of the face and of the voice) who could then argue that these secondary prostheses, though coming late upon the scene, are not themselves so much more primary than what they come along later to so secondarily augment? For surely the desires embedded within our seeking of the very behind-of speech and of the other-side-of the face; such ‘behinds’, for-the-sake-of-which, we seek out our intercourse in the first place (the seeking for the catching of its sight/site). Intercourse has always already and intimately assumed then a distance of mediation that is, quite paradoxically, not the intercourse itself. In answer to this intercoursal-lacking Envois (Derrida) then are sent out through such intercourse, but the demanded closure of the destination is not touched upon enough (in its joint-core) so a second-order envois or envoy is always already pre-supposed by the failure of the primary internally-fissured envois to properly deliver its message and have it finally arrive. A algorithmic paradox then exists here for intercourse: Intercourse cannot trust intercourse as intercourse itself is not the aim or the teleology of the intercourse, as intercourse is thoroughly divided by its very own intercourse. And this is the untouchable in itself.

Something, in excess, then cannot quite find itself being touched within such activities of intercourse, even as-one is speaking, looking or touching upon the very matter of the other. What is sought-out within the operations of the sense organs is the envois (message) that apparently might lay, or perhaps “lie”, behind the intercoursal-touching and is then much more intimately at stake within the circulations of the game than the surface of the loved one that one makes contact with. Mediation (or intercourse) itself then, in this somewhat pre-Levinasian totalising model, is nothing but the embodied desire to erase itself as (de-)distancing (as a “materiality” that comes between).

The desire then is to both obviate and bridge and once bridged, the mediatory device (for this is now what we are calling these various ontical intercourses, in
“sympathy” with this totalising model) disappears to become immediate: the ultimate teleology of speech or sexual intercourse here would reduce writing, as excess, from itself (as undecidability, improbability; difference) and of course as différance.

Thus, as with Dvorsky and his speech-thought based techlepathy, Warwick would now techlepathically connect and interface with his own wife’s very organismic, as well as orgasmic, interiority and to be (rather than previously, perhaps, not determinably enough to be) his wife’s own ipseic pleasure; a pleasure that he himself has gifted or given to her and most certainly and symmetrically vice-versa (more than simply a mise-en-abyne mirroring?). The previously dominant inter-personal, inter-spatial or inter-facial economy as excess-beyond-total-exchange vanishes within a lossless and vastly reduced economy and a sort of joint interpersonal Umwelt arises within its previously divided wake. Obviously we are questioning concerning this “techlepathy” or of what I would prefer to label here (to distance us from Dvorsky’s unproblematically inclusive term but also to bring out a Derridean overtone of “the envoi”) a panop-tech-clairvoyance.

3. Certain Philosophical Questions Concerning the Problem of Thought-Transference: Hegel & Tele-Familiarity

A so-called pre-panop-technological clair-voyance, as we asserted, involves the desire of the reduction of the fog or the spatial interruption that is the distance of the aesthetic apparatus of sight from its interest on a grand scale. Clair-voyance, by definition, reacts from a distance and yet is as close and immediate as ‘being-their’. This clear-vision (as the word translates) or augmented second-sight at a distance, as well as forming the dream-life of many a historically concrete couple, has also been the concern of some prominent thinkers. Just as for Freud (as Derrida points out in his “Telepathy”, where Freud played-with and leaned-toward telepathy as possibly existing inter-personal cashable currency of soul-exchange), so Hegel wrote some words on this subject for his own audience (also to be delivered in the publicly engaged situated lecture format) in talking a little about his own particular example and “use” of clair-voyance.

He was not however, as his English translator Wallace is at pains to point out, exactly sold on clair-voyance, but this lack of being-sold-on-it was not so much the result of a doubt as to its veracity (i.e. as something that actually can happen), but on its proper place within a communicative system or circuitry that places a pure (human) spirit pyramidically at the top and thus somewhat above its base level of intercourse. “Clairvoyance” then is primitive but it nevertheless does exist. So base though it may be, it still nevertheless does have a function to provide, if only as a powerfully figural illustration, within the circle of spiritual family values. Such an activity (of the figure of) clair-voyance can certainly travel well, if only to be tamed through figuration and symbolically transformed into the gold-standard or unity of the actuality of spirit. It is in this former figural aspect of its presence, at the very least, that it has a rather uplifted and upright existence.

It exists as something then that, within the grand Hegelian tradition, is to be lifted-up (the famously powerfully teleological Aufhebung) into the human spiritual
realm: a realm that, most importantly, centres around the inviolable solidity of a filial-familial unity. In the particular passage of the lecture where Hegel talks of clairvoyance and the family unit together, we find echoes that closely approximate those of the aforementioned Freudian excursions into the family+telepathy coupling. But there will soon be a problem that will inherently and intricately haunt these high functioning figurations, these telepathic family ties. We will have to wait a little longer to see these problems bubble on their surface.

Both of these excursions (Freud and Hegel’s) bind-to or feed-from the solidity of a blood-based family unit. For blood circulates through the channels of these distantly placed arché or paleo-prostheses and bring out within these channels of discourse only what is all together most proper, and thus already together, all together. The figure of blood that circulates through clairvoyance contains difficulties however, as we just alluded. Hegel himself states as much (and backed-up, as we will see in his footnotes, by certain conceptual clarifications of his English translator) in his ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit’. He states within the universal first-person that:

“The family tie constitutes my actuality. There can be people who, when in the external situation some change occurs, know about this in their own inwardness, their genius. So we have now to consider what exists in the form of presentiments. A man of forceful, sound self-feeling is bound to the usual condition of knowing. -But there are several examples in which, removed at a distance, a subject suffered a loss, nevertheless experienced an immediate sensation of that loss, believing that he had heard the noise or some such thing”

(Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, p130)

“Clairvoyants also know about distant objects. The individual is actual, and to his actuality belongs everything that concerns him. Since clairvoyants know their actuality, and their actuality is this concentration of feeling, -they know all of this in an immediate way…”

(208 Wallace reads: so they know of this without the mediation through which one otherwise knows of such objects existing outside oneself. They know in an immediate way).

“This is particularly true of blood friends…”

(209 Wallace adds: the same blood. Family is an ethical, but also a natural unity. Actuality of the one is substantially included in the substantial actuality of the other).

“The sphere of actuality also extends to persons that interest one, belong to one’s environment, but extends further to such objects as belong to one’s circle and of which one can therefore know in one’s emotional life […]. Here belongs the phenomenon of ‘second sight’ of the Scottish […] Also the prophet
Muller of Heidelberg can be mentioned [...]. The occasion of his capability is noteworthy. At the death of his father he threw himself on top of his father, and with the most inner fervour prayed to God. The father was awakened, and this highest effort, this positing of the soul outside of itself, had fixed this predominantly emotional life in him.” (Hegel, ibid. p136)

The figure of the composited "blood-friend". Thus distance and mediation are short-circuited in such clair-voyance by an immediation where blood flows within one large body composed of two geometrically distinct coordinates; a clair-voyant sang-clair that flows over and penetrates the barriers of skin and thus not at all anything like a haemorrhaging out from an invasive wound. It is only through this blood that such communication can (ethically) flow. And yet simultaneously the blood must also simultaneously be composed of the social (hence the “blood friend”) which Wallace reads as composing of the “ethical and natural family”: one’s spouse that one has a bond of spirit with binds itself here by the placing of an immense, though hidden, weight upon the word “ethical” while placing a more open and seemingly clear weight upon the (seemingly less contestable) word family. Thus there is a naturalistic arché-responsible blood-bond that ties an ethics of the one to the other, without any “real” blood being present. All of the burden is placed upon this somewhat structurally uneasy bridge-term then of the “blood friend”. But what cannot be questioned, even apart from this questionable real-distance, is that blood is blood. But what of this blood that flows through what is not in fact in itself composed of blood?

Back to the Future: Panop-tech-clair-voyance

In answer to this questing “but what of...” we come back to something, a spectral metaphoricity that is composed of blood but which, while not openly speak within this dialectics, is nevertheless fuelling our present exemplar (Warwick) and his embedded chip enabled panop-tech-clair-voyance. In such a panop-tech-clair-voyance we would not be dealing with a secondary ‘invasive’ prosthesis (that would invade the prior-primacy of the a priori natural body-proper) but of a prosthesis that completes the call-of-blood. This call-of-blood will complete a lack that apparently, as with Dvorsky and his ‘techlepathy’ earlier, always needed to be completed. The love-envoi sent out from the “blood-friend” (a rather inherently-aporetic appellation as we have just seen) receives something already close-by and already interior. It just completes it more, or signs most fully what was there already.

From a position where it was previously unable (through the seemingly inherent blockage of sensory-deprivation) to see inside we come to see the actually experienced position of the blood friend that so concerns Warwick and his pre-invention. A pre-invention in a long-long-long line commun-ication inventions. Again it is a long story whose recounting would seem to be coming to a present-day close: Warwick sees himself as carrying out the work and the challenges that would place him in direct filiation with the tele-technological communication apparatus of Alexander Graham Bell (he would indeed like to be remembered as an inventor of similar life-changing, geo-space-bridging prestige). And, just as in the 19th century when technological photo-graphs and tele-phones were partnered by an occultish tele-
pathy, we come full-circle and find telepathy itself, to be no longer a spectral or occult thing.

This is not however akin to tying two yoghurt cartons together with a piece of string in order to colloquy more immediately with our blood-friend loved ones, but more an super-intimate soliloquy of the (behind-the)face-to-face(behind). This would be something altogether more than a de-distancing electric speech, but of a sort of panopetheclairvoyant electric immediacy. This bypassing of the previous externality of the face takes each of us/them inside them-us in a sort of intra-circuitous technico-blood-grouping. But of the distance brought shorter, to disappearing..? Is there nothing more to say? Questions that we opened with of selfless otherness? Surely to connect so snugly to the other, we must already be at home most cannily within ourselves? And if we are soon to be together with each other, there must have been a privacy that can later be made to join within a new properly compounded blood-privacy?

If the history of mediation or communication has always also been a history of the desire for the bridging and the bringing closer of previously distant distances (according to McLuhan, Ong, Levinson’s ‘Digital McLuhan’, the systems/cyberneticists, etc.) and of vanquishing missing or errant excesses that might otherwise fall to the tomb (and whose seeds might not be deposited within the knowledge-bank) we have two questions perhaps to problematise it. One is the Levinasian ethical question concerning totality, another is the more “permanent” or ineradicable (and less ethically inclined) Derridean/Bataillian problem of a general economy and différance.

For economy of time we will move onto the second question concerning panop-tech-clair-en-voyance, the disappearance of différance. For unlike Levinas’s respect for the alterity of the autrui (and of the face as something that stops and starts our having-of-the-other), the possible bypassing of the facial does not for all that implode these alter-spatialities. For the self here is not, prior to this possibility of a solid-bridging, in control and possession of its owness, to then be able to take-control or totalise (and not leave to excess or infinity) that which comes before this spatial coming before (the other).

Is the self a self before it comes to wish to hold itself out to the other? Is the self a monad looking for something outside, itself? Does the self need to build a prosthetic bridge toward the other, or is the prosthetic of the bridge-outside already inside? For Derrida we are perhaps always already telepathic and thus always already invaginationally wounded:

*The truth, what I always have difficulty getting used to: that nontelepathy is possible. Always difficult to imagine that one can think something to oneself, deep down inside, without being surprised by the other, without the other being immediately informed, as easily as if he or she had a giant screen inside. (Derrida, Telepathy)*

And yet, we still seek to supplement this arché-telepathy, but perhaps the better to hide or bury ourselves away from this prior techclairvoyant substratum that we have always already so thoroughly been composed of? Remember the galvanian wound of the arché-electrical. Prostheses of prosfetishes do not hide away a lack but offer the threat or the promise of an extension to hide the existent alreadyness of a
prior extension beneath the apparent prior lack of this invasiveness. Just as for Leroi-Gourhan the hand is not in any way invaded by the prosthetic tool but already available for it and calling-out for it in its very shape and ability to grasp or clasp onto what is outside, so the body (as galvanic already, but more as vibrating with invagination) is a quite uncanny abode: not of itself but of what is thought to be prosthetically outside.

In a twist on Haraway’s desire to have responsibility given to (to Christianise?) the animal -after Derrida’s question of animal possibilities of response-we might ask: and say the human reacted and has only ever reacted? What if the responsibility of the individual was only ever the panop-tech-clair-voant machinic reaction of the other, of an alterity, inside? A reaction machinery unable ever to stand or have stood on its own two feet in any responsible way?

“[T]hen comes the last stage, the one that is still before us, but that I see seeing us coming and that softwarily, will have anticipated us right from the start. In this way a life is totally transformed, converted, paralysed by telepathy would await us, given over to its networks and its schemes across the whole surface of its body, in all its angles, tangled up in the web of histories and times without the least resistance on our part” (p243)

Such threats, offered within the voice of the somewhat camp quotation above, offer a return to a poverty of world, but where for all that were the riches? What would be a resistance where, in truth (?) a solidity ground has always already been lacking?

For here we spot a contradiction or a strange aporetic cut within Haraway’s somewhat celebratory cyborgian fourth wound and one that Luigi Galvani already helped to have us recognise as dehiscent or open. Galvani’s electrical-technical interior does not seek to open a chasm, an abyss, or a wound between the animal and the human but to wound the safe biblical distance of a safe anthropocentric division (a division of which both Heidegger and Uexküll also partake of). In rightly seeking to question this rather neat divide however, why give responsibility unto to the animal and thus share out something of the human “individual’s” presumed possibility of answer from the bottom of an owned-responsibility? And so, without wishing to re-establish the dividing line between the human and the animal, we might ask the question: “and say the human reacted?”

**Preliminary Bibliography**

Babich, B.E. Words in Blood, Like Flowers: Philosophy and Poetry, Music and Eros In Holderlin, Nietzsche and Heidegger

Barlow, J.P. A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace

Bataille, G. The Accursed Share: General Economy

Becker, R.O. The Body Electric: Electromagnatism and the Foundation of Life

Buchanan, B.  
Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll

Bush, V.  
As We May Think (from ‘The Atlantic’ 1945)

Cassirer, E.  
An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture

Derrida, J.  
Eating Well: Calculation of the Subject

Derrida, J.  
Glas

Derrida, J.  
Of the Aforementioned Human Genome Project

Derrida, J.  
On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy

Derrida, J.  
Speech and Phenomena

Derrida, J.  
Telepathy

Derrida & Stiegler  
Echographies of Television

Devereux, G. (ed)  
Psycho-analysis and the Occult

Dvorsky, G.  
Evolving Towards Telepathy: Demand for Increasingly Powerful Communications Technology Points Towards Our Future as a “Techlepathic” Species.

Engels, F.  
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State

Finger, S et al (eds)  
Brain, Mind and Medicine: Essays in Eighteenth Century Neuroscience

Focaccia M.  
Luigi Galvani, Physician, Surgeon, Physicist: From Animal Electricity to Electro-Physiology (in Finger, S. et al)

Freud, S.  
Dreams and Occultism

Fukuyama, F.  
Our Posthuman Future

Galvani, L.  
Commentary Concerning the Effects of Electricity on Muscular Motion

Geary, J.  
The Body Electric: An Anatomy of the New Bionic Senses

Genet, J.  
The Thief’s Journal

Goffman, E.  
Asylums

Hägglund, M.  
Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life

Harraway, D.  
When Species Meet

Hayles, N.K.  
How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Infomatics

Hegel, GWF.  
Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit
Heidegger, M.  The Age of the World Picture
Hubbell, R.W.  4000 Years of Television
Irigaray, L.  Speculum of the Other Woman
Kurzweil, R.  The Singularity is Near
Lawlor, L.  This is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida
Levinas, E.  Time and the Other
Levinas, E.  Totality and Infinity
Levinson, D.  Digital McLuhan: A Guide to the Information Millenium
McNeill, W.  Life Beyond the Organism: Animal Being in Heidegger’s Freiburg Lectures, 1929-30
Merleau-Ponty, M.  Nature: course notes from the College de France
Merleau-Ponty, M.  The Structure of Behaviour
Mills, J.  The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel’s Anticipation of Psychoanalysis
Nagel, T.  What’s it like to be a bat?
Nietzsche, F.  The Future of Our Educational Institutions
Piccolino, M.  Luigi Galvani and animal electricity: two centuries after the foundation of electrophysiology
Piccolino, M.  Luigi Galvani’s Path to Animal Electricity
Piccolino, M.  The Taming of the Electric Ray: From a Wonderful and Dreadful “Art” to “Animal Electricity” and “Electric Battery” (Finger, S. et al (eds.))
Rickels, L.  The Vampire Lectures
Royle, N.  After Derrida
This conceptualization of the possibility that there could be something as perverse as a promise (i.e. rather than a more usual threat) of a restrictive or entrapping animal-return (as well as the more obvious threat to the responsible agency that such prostheses would pose), may of course strike one as a little sadomasochistic as a desire to have. But it has indeed often been recognised within various fora, that a humanistic gift-but-burden-of-responsibility that would separate us out from ‘the animal’ is so often also simultaneously pre-theoretically “experienced”, and then reflected upon, as the fused or implosive promise-threat of an accompanying double-edged sword. In answer to this Christian (sometimes also, it must be said, a Christianised and relatively weak-atheism) image of a cleanly divided human “presence-responsibility” engine, the possibility of a future return to the other side of the seemingly unbridgeable abyss where the animal-reaction nexus resides, would tap into a certain image of a returnable relief-of-responsibility through a return to a notional pre-responsive total institutionalization (a sort of Goffmanesque relinquishing of the human’s presumed freedom of movement that would take place outside of such an ontic biological total institution and instead just be the way we are, anywhere we are) that would relieve the very “human burden” of an undecidability of choice and thus the responsible-decision that is commonly seen as a responsibility to a future as what is open to, or dependent upon, our decisions. By the erection of such penetrative prostheses that offer up the image of a promise of a return to a
certain un-obliged reaction (commonly en-figured as the futurological image of a totally closing totalitarian regimen where any individual responsibility-of-choice exists no longer), a certain release from responsibility would be perhaps promised and the ultimate diminution of an open or expanse that terrifies in its very plasticity. This paradoxical and composite intricate-entwining, of the unified double-edged threat-promise, we will importantly be exploring here within the mere seeming empirical domains of some supposedly merely technical devices of embedded communications (such is often the self-image of the proponent of such technologies also: the ordeal-of-the-undecidable is reduced toward a unity: here, in our example, in the form of a spouse’s responsibilities of being-in-a-relationship). Such innocently practical communications and bridging or bringing devices indeed, as we will see, do require some conceptual unpacking (we are not within the restrictive technoscientific domain of the merely technologically ontic (Heidegger 1982), in this question concerning the teleological horizon of techlepathy that we will be looking into, but are entitled to step back to ask some ontological questions that are questions such practitioners also ask themselves. Clarification: by “ask themselves” we mean that these are not questions that we are asking as errant critical outsider intruders into a purely technological space but that these are questions that the technology is already asking itself within the very intimate and immanent erection of itself within its practices). In connection to this intimate-immanent pre-theoretical asking we will also look later, through the work of the early C20 zoologist, or biosemiotician, Jakob Von Uexküll (and also through a recent recap of Uexküll’s work by Giorgio Agamben) and his Hamburg based Umweltforschung (umwelt -or environment- research), at such an idea of reaction as a lack of response through the powerfully metaphoric image of a simultaneously imprisoning-transparent soap bubble that entraps and allows only for reaction that would be a total de-individuation (for some of a pessimistic hue see the threat/promise of these apparatuses is that such prostheses will take away, or vampirically drain, a previously certain responsible self). We will also look at certain concrete communications prostheses that, unknowingly or not, draw or feed from the current or currency (within their immanent pre-marketing or promise) of the powerful cybernetic systems-image of the imprisoning well-oiled machinery of the ur-image of a beehive that would form all components (once called ‘selves’) into a restrictive economic total institutional existence. It is interesting, in this regard, to note (and then save for some further reflection later) how the arch dramaturgical analyzer of the staging techniques of human institutions, one Erving Goffman, opens his meditation on the encircling spatiality of the “total institution” through his own ur-example of an asylum system, that we might easily exchange for the imagery of such a beehive:

"Every institution captures something of the time and interest of its members and provides something of a world for them [my emphasis]; in brief, every institution has encompassing tendencies. When we review the different institutions in our Western society, we find some that are encompassing to a degree discontinuously greater than the ones next in line. Their encompassing or total character is symbolized by the barrier to social intercourse with the outside [my emphasis] and to departure that is built right into the physical plant [...] These establishments I am calling total institutions.” (Goffman, Asylums, p.4)

I have quoted this at length here as it captures something of the potency of the imagery of a previous or blockaged world of human respons-ibility become an infinite (“something of a world for them”) total-word-of-reaction that we hope ourselves to capture within an exploration of the fears and desires of certain
emerging intricately relationally networked or data-based tele-techonolgies. Again however, to stall or question the wish-fulfilled working of an imagery of some previously azure clear responsive freedom, we would wish to point toward a certain historical or genealogically networked operating of such imagery, as well as a strong and very concrete prior history or genealogy of a networking of the spatiality-of-the-other that does not have wait until now, or soon, to get going. We do not need to wait for any emerging computational concept of “networking” for this to be so (for such a computational concept is itself obliged or is itself networked into such a concrete history of a network that precedes networks). This then is not of ‘the new’. For we will ask, even outside of such a networks-genealogy: where is or was a pre-networked ‘responsibility’ in a perfectly individual or indivisible sense before such recent or encroaching tele-technological prostheses that would make of us nothing but a rekindled bee? What is the outside, before this bee-network (this being-in-the-network)? And such a bee would not have access to the nectar of responsibility.

Grandcentral networking paradox itself: In answer to this image of a hyperbolic-reactivity we find the answerability of a rather symmetrical hyperbolic-responsibility that, in a sense, comes full circle to encroach upon the spatiality of its other. For also here we often find a certain powerfully inhering image of an outside already existing and ensconced within a supposedly free or sovereign inside (for it is, of course, said that one does have responsibilities). As we will see later, this image of an organic and unquestionable already-inside of an outside that one is unquestionably responsible toward-which and inherently drawn out toward (through Hegel’s ontological networking concept of the “blood friend”) of a certain naturalistically privileged outside will help to develop the work of a proto or pre-panop-tech-clair-voyance that any secondary or technological panop-tech-clair-voyancy (i.e. the ontic development of…) apparatuses would do nothing but to solidify, repeat or innocently re-affirm this innately-inhering-desire. The apparently occult or mystical foundations of these authorities (the natural right to inspection or of the teleological functioning of an immanent archiving of the significant other) will furnish powerfully ideological and invisible support foundations or functions for the very concrete building of these ontical prostheses themselves (an authority that, in all of its implicit power, does not need in any way to be consciously situated, cited or re-visited, as of ‘an’ or ‘The’ authority, as we pointed out earlier in this footnote). Finally (and we will concentrate on this later, and in some considerable detail) in building embedded or bio-integrated technologies that would wish to erect a prosthesis for a sense apparatus of telepathy that is itself of a seemingly occult status, this occult itself was never such an errant or strange splinter within the economy or housing of the supposed empiricism of the ‘I’, but is nothing (and yet something) more than a solidifying of what is most familial and thus already together, all together (i.e. it is not an errant image). Techlepathy then already has a place staked out in advance for itself, just as telepathy held a place of supreme importance (even for those who misbelieved its possibility of proof-readiness). The summative algorithm of the latter part of this rather long footnote: If telepathy does not in fact exist as a sense apparatus, at least we are now in a position to invent it!

\footnote{As we will see towards the end of this study, Haraway is quite far and away from occupying a univocal or unequivocal position vis-à-vis the status of the animal (in the reductive singular). Indeed her usage of the Derrida of ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am’, as a friend or companion at her pan-bioligistic “mess table”, is equally far from being safely or univocally demonstrated or indeed secured. The cyborgian wound that Haraway opens for our attention and the somewhat pan-spatial position of the animal that she believes that Derrida helps to prize open this wound up with, by asking the question of the status of an individual agential response on the part of an-animal (here a cat, an empirical
cat, in front of him in his bathroom one fine day): the question that Derrida asks in asking “And say the animal responded?” does not however stop dead in just one direction (of a reaction-becoming-response: the animal being now granted a place at the table or of holding a responsible stake within the game) but can be seen also to move the question equally in quite the opposite direction. We can ask (and later we will) whether response is such a safe-extensible category? Derrida rarely stretches one category to cover, supplant or take-over ‘the other’, so we hope in view of this ontological lack-of-directional-closure to close our conversation with a question concerning the reaction and its undecidable stretch over the domain of the seemingly safe response (through our case study of panop-tech-clair-voyance). We might worry, further, about the status of a relatively simple ‘pan’ stretching of the category of “responsibility” as a curative or sublative to a dualist conception that places or parcels the animal as reactive-human-opposite and which thence ties up all of the ends (the ends that we have here opened with) or whether the conceptual category of this response/reaction opposition would be sufficiently problematised by stretching either end of this duality to cover or obviate the other. While we will certainly, at the close of this argument, be problematising Haraway’s stretching and inclusive opening-up of the category of responsibility (an opening up that would include the animal as a companion or ‘fraternal’ ‘friend’ and which sometimes, in her descriptions, indeed verges on the cartoon comedic but also, less humorously, on the dangerously reactionary: for she can say within her theory of the ‘Companion Species’ that a laboratory animal is a partner in experimentation!) by provisionally coming in the opposite direction with a human given covering of reaction, we hope to unsettle or to shake this conceptual framework in a much more undecidable direction without obvious end. An impressive book that redresses a tendency to reduce deconstruction to the ethical (albeit, it must be said, much more impressive shapes than Harway’s: Critchley, Bernasconi, etc.) takes something away from the gift-of-responsibility of the human and infinite answerability that certain forms of atheism share with Christianity. The book ‘Radical Atheism’ (Martin Hägglund) seeks to uncover some of the relatively hidden detail that would make of atheism something often quite theistic. Derrida is his key lever in this with concepts such as essential corruptibility and the inherent possibility of the effacement of the trace. In (shared regard) to responsibility he states:

But to deny this inevitable risk, to deny the essential corruptibility of responsibility or to project its consummation in an ideal future, is to deny the condition that makes responsibility possible in the first place. (p.106)

iii Though we do, of course, see the irony of this lack of a head (acephale) in usefully foregrounding a certain lack of responsible ownership, an irony quite useful for the forwarding of an idea, and thus a certain sense of properness in reflecting the concept of, the cyborgian itself (and why the proper name is a humanist nomenclature and should thus perhaps be replaced by something more numeric in spirit, such as one Fereidoun M. Esfandiary famously using ‘FM-2030’). In supplying the placeholder of a name to such a ‘place’ we do not seek to redress or to resupply the gravitational pull of a founding humanistic locale and thus to supply or excavate some lost recognition or own(ership) to a pastly-present pure participant or owner of a founding or foundational deed. For it must be said that in lacking a name of such previous wounders as “Copernicus”, “Darwin” or “Freud”, the Cyborgian wound does not for all that struggle free of the founding recognition of what only the presence of a name could supply, but also partakes of the idea(l) of an irreducible location that just as much seeks to break free or provide a breach from what was previously taken to be safe (before this name or signatory came forward to perform the opening of the wound). On
the contrary, in supplying ‘Galvani’ as a signatory, marker or name for the wound, we seek instead to provide all the more the position of a ‘non-place’ or topography (not a founding hero-ism) that stretches back far before the name. In supplying the name ‘Galvani’ as an index we see a place of pressures, experiments and accidents and a place that does not then for all that belong to the personage of the one who is seen as stumbling upon what the name marks out as incomparable. This is not an attempt to establish proprietary naming rights but to place at our disposal some usefully magnetic pictures of what is at stake within a particular expanse of time, while also, of course, to follow through and outward to some of the attendant echoes accruing from the mark ‘Galvani’ that subsequently feeds into skin responses, foldings-out, the right to inspection and a certain allowance or vision of the body as something no longer containing or being proper only to itself (as it now, as we say, invaginates or folds into the outside). It is then not at all an attempt to bring back a propriety (within the usage of our own Galvanic Wound) that the ‘cyborgian’ moniker might have itself so easily overcome simply by disposing or dispossessing us of the properness of the proper name.

This Galvanian fourth wound then is not a singular but a double-wound, for in being both bio-electrical, in and of itself, and common (across “the cleave”) to both the so-called human and so-called animal, two once safe borders become invaginated within a format that problematises two supposedly distinguished temporalities. Also, and more importantly, we feel that the concept of a ‘cyborgian wound’ gives the dull and safe impression of something still nevertheless outside (even if we would no longer hold any, historically enforced, right of barring entry), whereas the archaic intimate knotting (for there is nothing earlier) of the galvanian wound, as we will see immediately below, is a very primary-prosthetic (or ana-prosthetic) that functions to question the very idea of a singularly secondary invasive prosthesis. Galvani called for the recognition of what he called “intrinsic animal electricity” (as opposed to some extrinsic excitation of something from without), and so for Galvani there would be nothing cleanly or clearly cyborgian to come to supervene upon or to come along later as an attachment to bring or import such electricity inwardly (we will see the importance of this important, and thus not at all local, conceptual clarification in the footnote below regarding the historico-politically interesting case of ‘Galvani Contra Volta’)

Now this birth, this recognition, was the birth of a recognition in all senses. This final wound to the enveloping pride, like these previously recognised wounds, is not some explosive prosthetic invention that comes invasively along from some errant technological exterior coordinate, but is a discovery of something always already interior. This wound then is not an invention that offers a practical distance from previously more observational discoveries (Copernican, Darwinian Freudian) of a prior-existing nature, but is itself an injurious recognition of something always already prosthetic. Here then we would mark out within this wound a substantial distinction or difference to the previous three wounds: the intimate presence of a secondary techné at the heart of the primacy of physis. It is then nothing late coming. For as far back as ‘back’, the paleo-prosthetic electrical interior that Galvani helped us to recognise was already doing its firing and its sparking, even as those ignorant yet noble cave men were trying to spark up and ignite their first primal fires and then later pre-scientifically mythologising the sending or arrival of these gifts. And much later on, but still comparatively long ago, our closer but still somewhat naive ancestors may worry about a certain illicit trade or of the stealing of something improper to our supposed prior nature; something dangerously additional but nevertheless safely distanced by the
placement of a coordinate position that is perfectly external. We now recognize
that one can be supplemented by too much of what we already have; a
supplementation of something dangerously internal. The very harm that this
electricity can do is not because it invades something that was altogether empty
of it, but instead comes about through the overloading of a circuitry that can only
take so much extra current, currency or charge. “Whenever” the dividing line
occurred that struck man down, or built man up from a previously reactive
“animality” (and like the sparked-fire, later mythologised as either supplied or as
stolen away), this electrical interior, this charge that finally always drains away
from us, finds all life living under its temporary protection (hence the wound to
our animal separation anxiety). But this is a double-edged recognition that offers
something futural just as it takes away something we thought to be altogether
anterior: new images of capture and storage electrical circuitry are offered in
substitution or replacement for a prior blood-replacement mythology (for we are
thinking obviously of vampires as escapees of the imprisoning of the double-
edged settings of the sun) with an electrical systems-theory that simply
interfaces with just a suchlike supplemental expansion of its already-own.

vi Again, to recognise this monstrous-monster, after this wounding that we now
uncannily cognize and have since then come to “know” via the enlightened
investigations of Luigi Galvani, it is not then the mere supplemental “lately”-
invasion of some errant extra-monstrosity, but of a monstrous-city already
internal to our previous “nature”. Obeying here then the integral rulings of
Kristevian abjection, the symbolic vomiting out of this integral integrated
imagery is nothing but the somewhat difficult (to say the least) recognition of
an image already really inside as real-ity. A strange logic-of-the-pictor-real is
residing in in-alien-able-residence here (and we use “pictor-real” here as a
hyphenated portmanteau to point toward a certain strength or adhesion of
embeddedness within the very operating of real of the representation: no longer
then a distanced or detached reproduction) in this place of the intimately
dissonant unheimlich. Something ensconced safely inside does not come to
imagine the horrors of something purely outside, but is thoroughly (and already)
economically invested with its invaginating electrical-code (and we should not
forget that the economy or the Oikos etymologically arises or takes its functional
bread from the safe navigation of the family circle of the home as opposed to
what might divest it of its encircling vestments). Within then such an intimately
and inherently sutured electrical code then there really is nothing worryingly or
architectonically foreign to code-break-into, and here the horror itself resides.
The firewall is nothing but a very (nothing but) porous myelin sheathing that
itself conducts the charge (Julius Bernstein’s ‘Membrane Hypothesis’ took
Galvani’s work on bioelectricity forward into the realm of the working of cells
within electrophysiology and neurophysiology. The myelin sheathing in
conducting such an intimate electrical charge if or when stripped, our archival-self
is itself of course lost as it itself is nothing but this electrical resting/excitation
potential). Also, in underlining the presence of a supposedly abiologic-posth-
thetic within the very heart of the bio-Élan-vital, the quantum physics
theorist Nils Bohr said of Galvani that he demonstrated “an intimate combination
of the laws of inanimate nature with the study of the properties of the living
organism” (quoted in Focaccia, ).

vii We would see here a double-facing de-monstrosity that monstrates and de-
monstrates somewhat simultaneously: the Baron Frankenstein’s unnamed
monster’s monstrous presence is allowed or brought-about by the artifice
(techné) of being able to composite or to piece together, through a supposedly
secondary late-coming electrical charge, what was already charged within its
prior intimate-interiority (of what each of the pieces were already composed). This late arriving “secondary” electricity however seems to interrupt a proper circuitry of circulation that should be put into motion only via a proper birth from a proper-womb. The secondary-womb that (constructing a “hideous progeny” Shelley, p.ix) adds a secondary-charge, and which runs across or which monstrously sutures (what should be) the gaps of dead pieces, adds a false-life or a second life that can never outrun or live up to the live truth of the primary prior-primacy. Such a secondarity should clearly be placed, or will inevitably find itself, by itself, dropping down, into the flames. But this secondarity is a pharmakos, or a scapegoat, for something more primary.

This then is not anything at all like a pre-sewn-up or natural end for such satanic secondarities. Shelley, in the preface to her own modern-technologised Prometheus (the “hideous progeny” of a non-natural birth, that is not the famously virginal form of a bypassing of coitus) casts a secondary or composite hue upon the really quite electrically unified figure of the galvanic. For things are not so pre-settled, as Luigi Galvani had ably demonstrated (and which, as we will see, forms an intimate-secondarity that a competitive colleague, one Alessandro Volta, could not conceptually come to terms with): Intimate Animal Electricity. And this prior-intimacy follows the itinerary of a recently theoretically expanded path of the dangerously primal supplement. For a primary-primacy finds itself haunted or seconded through a Derridean logic-of-the-supplement which cannot help but see (though the wishfully cleansing-abstractive flame of a vomiting-abjection would most un-certainly hope to bury or to cast-off this unease) the illicit writing work of this electricity as already present and charging the very intricate-intimate-interiority of what is now not most proper (intimately not most proper). This fire all too easily burns their very own fingers, as their fingers are composed of it itself (the technological signage of a writing-death are internal to the very integuments, vestments or in-vestments of speaking-life, as Derrida has analogically shown (analogous to our strange galvanian logic) in the dangerous logic-of-the-supplement in ‘Of Grammatology’ and within the strange logic of the operating of the Pharmakon in ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’). The algorithm: a supposedly primary physis is always already a secondary techné: thus a paleo-prosthesis.

According to Jakobson there are three forms of translation, transpositional or transportation from one notional position into another. While two of these are notionally linguistic (intra-linguistic, for example in rewording, or of swapping signifiers, for better audient understanding while inter-linguistic occurs for the sake of a pleasant journeying between two language systems that are notionally foreign to one another; in swapping signifiers for what would hopefully be relatively stable signifieds), a third sense of ‘translation’ has to do with the translation between one semiotic system and another. One such semiotic system is the language of the galvanic skin response. Once discovered or recognised as a trapped and untapped form of communication then instruments can be invented and invested for the reading or the interpretation of such utterances: another system (for example an exemplary speech-based linguistic one) is necessary to read-off these traces or movements. Just as Freud reads hysteria as but a series of symptoms of something beside itself, in itself, we have the presentation of a new interiority not previously having been available to be read or indeed known-of (reading forms the nexus-instrument of such possibilities of systemic exchange) or fathomed. A prior secrecy (existing outside the level of intentionality or attentionality) then is uncovered where previously it was secreted away, entombed or hermetically encrypted, quite away from an inspecting sunlight that might be cast upon it. Never really then quite hermetic,
this place is now opened and placed within the opening of the hermeneutic circle. With such an open and in-secured availability and while also hardly uncovering a secret in-secrecy, the engine of the archiving-open runs to burrow deeper toward that notional core and translates it outward into a publically available language or discourse. No longer analogue it is merely a question of digital reproduction and transposal. It is also nothing new and only furthers the notion of a psychoanalytic uncovering of the core. For the goals of public praxis as science and the continuing fulfillment of the long tradition of un conce alement was always Freud’s avowed goal (and, interestingly, why the figure of telepathy forms such a spectral figure in his ‘Dreams and Occultism’ lecture: “does it exist?” in which case we have a discovery of science, or “does it not?” in which case psychoanalysis will discover other reasons or psychic compulsions for the symptom-itself-of-telepathy). This ambivalence concerning telepathy in relation to psychoanalysis’ status as a science, but of a science open to the other (even if that other must be brought within a safe-sphere of being opened), is interestingly explored (especially in terms of reference and exchange with Derrida’s playful uncovering of these unassimilable psychoanalytic remainders) by Royle in an essay titled ‘The Remains of Psychoanalysis: Telepathy’. Here he points to the unassimilable figuration that telepathy assails, or wounds, the Freudian wound with. As mentioned in note ** above, translation and trans-portion within the panop-tech-clair-voyant desire-systems, that we will shortly be looking at, take or incorporate (or introject?) the figure of telepathy as a prosthetic goal that is not in any need of a prior ‘a priori’ natural-existent-telepathy. Here then (and really quite originally) we would have a prosthetic supplementation of a sort of mystical sixth sense whose empirical existence or empiric extension is, of course, highly uncertain (as a mental image to help focus or estrange this idea for thinking: the construction of a prosthetic extension of something uncertain in its existence could we picture the construction of a prosthetic “God Machine” as a prosthetic supplement to such a famously occultish uncertainty principle? If God is not at the beginning will he be at the end as a sort of prosthetically infinite answering machine?). Returning to the conceptually more manageable terrain of telepathy and its possible extension from a zero degree via prostheses: Here we would perhaps then be techno-scientifically supplementing or prosthetising a myth or indeed a ghostly naked lack (which we would hazard to term a prosfetish?). Within this latter and quite pragmatically oriented science of the prosfetish then there is not the worry of status of discovery that so haunted Freud but the invention of a prosthetic system that would induce the presence of what previously was perhaps merely the domain of certain occultish desire. Such an occult would be the engine of this regional output of an ontic technoscience, but an occult that merely voiced a desire spread somewhat more generally. For some interesting discussion of the problem of ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’ in relation to other related worries and problems of prostheses, read Derrida’s excellent essay titled ‘On the Afforementioned Human Genome Project”. Also Mary Shelley herself in reflecting on both her own creation (Frankenstein) and her creation’s creation (the unnamed monster) reflects upon the problematic border between a natural discovery and a prosthetic or artistic invention:

"Everything must have a beginning, to speak the Sanschan phrase; and that beginning must be linked to something that went before. The Hindoos give the world an elephant to support it, but they make the elephant stand upon a tortoise. Invention, it must be humble admitted, does not consist in creating out of void, but out of chaos; the material must, in the first place, be afforded: it can give form to dark, shapeless substances, but cannot bring into being the substance itself. In all matters of discovery and invention, even of those that
apertaing to the imagination, we are continually reminded of the story of Columbus and his egg. Invention consists in the capacity of seizing on the capabilities of a subject, and in the power of moulding and fashioning ideas suggested to it.”

(Shelley, author’s own introduction to Frankenstein, p. ix)

Shelley, reflecting upon artifice and specifically her will be going on to talk about how her own creation, rather than her creation’s creation came about (although she does unearth symmetries between her fictionising self and the fictionised Baron’s fashioning of the monster), questions invention as a secondary originary act and brings it back to a prior supporting network that, as it were, pre-invents or invests the invention with a spark that precedes it. Discovery is the seat or the egg and cannot be questioned or peeled back, even if invention comes under some metaphysical scrutiny.

x On the famous Galvani versus Volta controversy. For a while it seemed that the experiments of Galvani into ‘intimate animal electricity’ had been supplanted (even though influencing) by the work of Alessandro Volta, which ultimately led to the invention of the first electric battery (and he called, in what he thought of as merely a sales or marketing metaphor, an ‘artificial electrical organ’). From this pragmatic invention/use of such discoveries his reputation was sealed and Galvani was left, it seemed, merely as an ancillary adjectival attachment to such processes as the ‘galvanic skin response’ and some key imagery for monstrous suturings of Shelley’s ‘Frankenstein: or, the Modern Prometheus’ (“Perhaps a corpse would be re-animated; galvanism had given token of such things: perhaps the component parts of a creature might be manufactured, brought together, and endued with vital warmth.” from Shelley’s introduction to Frankenstein). This has lately however come to be reassessed and it seems that Volta might have shied away somewhat from the sheer naturalism or intimacy of an electricity operating intrinsically within the very interior “economy of the animal” that Galvani was much more willing to embrace. In an analogous dualistic relation to the theologically shielding necessity of the Cartesian ‘pineal gland’, Volta just could not see how electricity could be so unified. He was sure of a split or division between the external excitation and then what subsequently comes to be excited from an electrified outside: however responsive to electricity the natural body might be, it cannot itself be composed or worked by such a thing. Where he saw only a sort of bridgeable gap, Galvani saw a very intimate paleoprosthesis. Now, of course, the workings of such nerve cells (or “minute leyden jars”) have been shown to be bioelectrical or electrophysiological, just as Galvani had theorized, but which was overshadowed, or insulated safely, for a time by Volta’s more externalist (and his pragmatic external, seemingly merely metaphorically-prosthetic, constructions). It is interesting, no doubt, to see here how the workings or the symptoms of the politics of the time (just as with the difficulty of the Copernican wound) come to interfere with the reading of such electrical contacts (for more on this somewhat slow working-through see Piccolino 1997).

x For we say ‘expanse’ here to mark the illimitable archiving opportunities that are henceforth allowed for in such a recognition. As something that is no longer ‘local’ or proper only to itself or its surrounds, the uses it can be put to no longer bear upon themselves the traces of a restricted outer locality. In the slipstream opened up by this galvanian wound we will no longer then perhaps think of the inside as opening up onto another outside that is a sort of intimate inside (though, importantly, certain borders, as we will see, are still symbolically locked-
in-place; to assure the proper functioning and outer circulation of what the skin transmits: for the family-circle is what would still maintain the proper routing or circulations of such an economy, Oikos or housing but to an outside that cannot any longer be given any shapely architectonic boundaries. As such a spatial-temporal open, or expance, the inside and its now opened databasing possibilities can be put toward a veritable infinity of uses far beyond those imagined by any intentional agency who would bear responsibility for what goes on inside itself. Like the location of a gravestone or of a crypt, the vestments of the inside might only be maintained, like the grave itself, as long as there are local memories enough to be assured of its deposits (the grave classically only exists for very few generations and then becomes an open or faceless resource). In truth the nodal-point that is the symbolic strength of the grave or the crypt no longer protects a singular body-of-work (and non-localised concepts such as intertextuality, and other concepts of structuration, very much prepare the way for such a conceptuality of the recognition of the paradigm of the galvanic act). Henceforth the inside will not be marked-off by anything that an inside might wish to hold or fold within itself (to idiosyncratically en-crypt). As filled with the pathos of the loss-of-property, as this might sound or sound the death-knell for, we mean to say that the use-values of such a dehiscent galvanian space becomes nothing itself but an infinitely useful and expansive nodal-point contained within the dimensions of another exppanse that itself is possibly infinite. This is the now non-localised wound that now no longer can be localised. Again, we would see the language of the reaction/response opposition as feeding or resourcing the reading of such a matrix: webs, hives, waypoints, expanses. This is not a sharp-left sea-change so much as a re-focusing, or better rack-focusing, of something already repressed within previous institutional-representational formations. The wound is merely more clearly visible.

xi See note above.

xii This is the strange celebratory-deploring apocalyptic image that Josh Harris, the 90’s Internet entrepreneur, likened the future of humanity to. As objects of the zoo (or of the zoographic gaze) he believes that we will most certainly superlose our privacy and that we will, in the future, very much “live in public”. As experimental-pro-pragmatic proof of this prediction he created two famous New York public/private happenings that rolled Big Brother into some predictive, predative facebook experiments. In his first social experiment “We Live in Public” he created a closed-in beehive styled pod (or coffin?) hotel where all ‘exhibiting’ members would be able to look at and interact with each other 24/7 for an extended period of time (until it was shutdown by the police around a month in). Every pod was networked together via cable-cctv and from time-to-time members were taken out and interrogated by Stasi-imitating overseers who would work to reduce further inhabitants’ sense of self (again playing into the notion of the Goffman’s total institution discussed in note ** above). In an interview to introduce his conceptual-concept-artifice to the world he stated “Everything is free here, except the videotape. That we own” to underline the disownership of personal space that each inhabitant would be giving up or exchanging for this regulated freedom of consumption and movement. He then went on to conduct another experiment of opened-pod-privacy (“Quiet: We Live in Public”) where cameras in every area of his apartment (including, somewhat imaginatively, the toilet bowl!) could observe and interact via a chatroom with his and his partner’s every movement within their flat-cage (on one occasion she slept on the couch after an argument on the advice and interaction of an anonymous Internet chatroom member). Such a selfless image of the worker-bee again raises its powerful metaphoric (lack of) visage, just as it so powerfully does
also, as Derrida points out, as a pivotal image within Heidegger’s zoo-graphic chamber in ‘Basic Problems in Phenomenology’. Equally in Uexküll’s influential essay ‘A Stroll Through The World of Animals and Men’ (not least for Heidegger, who wrote at some considerable appreciative length in this ‘Problems’ book about the then currently live umwelt researches of Uexküll) talks about the poverty of animals in comparison to man’s richness of world and particularly, and paradigmatically, of the trapped tick that reacts mechanically to the butyric acid secreted by a passing cow or mammal. This trapped poverty is the umwelt that we must understand that surrounds the animal as of a soap bubble (Uexküll provides some impressively communicative examples that hide, while certainly not trapping, an impressive conceptual complexity). In truth, he points out, we occupy umwelts too, but our “own” umwelt is a very open and shapeable sort of bubble. Such restrictive imagery of the bee and the beehive residence that encompasses and would threaten the rich human relation to ‘the open’ is also memorably (and in predictive eschatological intones) captured by E.M. Forster in his short story ‘The Machine Stops’ where people no longer travel or embark on journeys into the open, but stay in their pods and see, but not touch, everything (including their intimate geo-distant relatives) from a distance. Nobody, apart of course from the few, see within this machine, which will eventually stop, anything really to worry, agitate or campaign about (for of course actual travel makes you dirty in all senses) as nobody here realises their entrapped, and now merely reactive, poverty of being (and how very machinic-bee-like they have become). Unsurprisingly some see this now as an early C20 short story based on a future vision of some captivating zoographic web 2.0 Internet-machinery. The pieces however were already in place and captured by quite a number of stories and inventions that the Internet is merely an extended family member of (though, of course, like the ancient Greek steam engine they had yet to find their epistemic local prowess) such as the Victorian Internet or the age of tele-technologies such as the telegraph, telephone and pneumatic tubes (later visualised so cleverly in Gilliam’s ‘Brazil’) and, of course, later Vannevar Bush’s ‘Memex’ machine. Further into the dark land of the repellant imagery of the reactive human-insect there is the image of the crowd where the individual-responsibility of the face disappears, no longer to stand out as a figure from a ground. Here we find the ‘The Day of the Locust’, where a swarm of insectuous quasi-telepathic mood-enraptured de-individuals mechanically play-out a reaction programmed in by some powerful event that overruns them. A pre-crowdal responsibility thus hemorrhages out from holdings the body-proper and thus gets itself lost within the faceless dimensions of the labyrinthine cityscape. An interesting anthology titled ‘Crowds’ (edited by Jeffrey Schnapp) explores many such images of the crowd (and its cityscape).

For we will ask later whether the desire for penetration that operates through the desireful imagined machines that we will see as exemplifying the panop-tech-clair-voyant “alter-spatial-gaze” do not wish to cut out the undecidability of the face itself and all that it stands for. What we would here call inter-faciality (dually echoing both Levinas’s concept of the face-of-the-other and the traditional idea of the techné of the prosthetic interface) would wish to cut out or deface the undecidable site of the face itself. For ‘The Face’ is what presents the theatre of the interior to the exterior and which not only offers the possibility and hope of a means of clear access or denial through certain non-verbal cues (forming a notionally simultaneous visible-invisible curtain), but also the haunting counter-veiling-possibility of the secret and its secretion (entombing a truth denied to a particular outside that would desire or demand rightful access) that might fail to betray a notional intentionality. The face then simultaneously occupies the position of both friend and enemy to the notional interlocutor and so as an ‘inter’
or *between* site, there is always the risk as *well* as the reward. The face presents an undecidable Pharmakon. Something must come in to secure a passage through this possible deformation-of-the-surface. The site of *the face* and the possibly thorny intercourse that it provides can best be captured by other means of a notionally *hypo-dermic-interlocution*. As site of preference, or of clear reference, the clear and present reward of the truth (in all of its desired pre-facial nakedness) and of the possibility of the secret of a secretion is what interlocution is after (but would also wish to come before, in all senses). The bypassing of the possibly blocked road of the face, through interfacing with the bio-electrical galvanic apparatus, would assure and, as we said, cut out the necessity of the troubling facial intercourse. This possibility of a matrix of the extra-facial, as we will see later, is what umbilically *feeds* and keeps going our main panop-tech-clair-voyant exemplar Prof. Kevin Warwick’s quest and here we will only find the working of a most strange paradox, a little further into our argument, when interfacial or sexual intercourse *itself* becomes a sort of secondary supplement for something other or else. The *face* would thus be lifted out of the picture and panop-tech-clair-voyant apparatuses brought down as of an ultra-clear-penetrative-visor; clearing out the thickety problematic-of-the-undecidable that any inter-facial intercourse (and other supposedly intercourses lacking *immediacy* by extension) would maintain. On this view (for we are certainly not forwarding this simultaneous pessimistic-optimistic position as our own, but for more complex reasons, that we hope will later become more clear, or even clair, later) *responsibility* would, in such a bypassing of the undecidability of the face, be replaced by a beautifully and purely reactive machinic cybernetic loop. Nothing would, any longer, fall toward the tomb-of-uncertainty through such an impenetrably thick fogging of the face. Reaction *not* responsibility.

xiv So many social networking ideals exhibit images of hyper-consciously empowered ‘smart mobs’ (for here we are not dealing with the pessimism attached to that irresponsible *entity* that we call *the crowd*) who come together to see their interests through before dispersing to other interests and other responsibilities. On this view, as tea party activists they network together, not with the aim of losing their identity within the confines of some labyrinthine mass, morass, crowd or hive, but of temporarily and temperately coming together, within temporary *agoras* of some quite shapeable plasticity (we could indeed term these *plast-agoras*), so that the imposition of a framework does not win (and thus make them reactive machines to something imposed from “Washington” or somewhere even less present that is distantly centralising). Within this particular and progressive portrait of such a model or paragon of selflessness, the situated self joins likeminded selfs to help out a cause that is heartfelt. If this were not enough, and as added evidence of this securing of their self’s security, they would point out the sheer overlap yet disparity of group identities (venn-dentities) within their facebook pages. They are not, on this view, zoologically confined to a bubble, but are self-less in a very self-full way. Networking here makes contacts and stretches the self’s bubble into the most diverse and expanded of territories: the riches and the possibilities of replenishing the stocks and shares of the responsible unwelt thus increase and here again we find some powerful and potent post-human imagery at play, or on the prowl? For we will see (in section ** with J.P. Barlow and R. Kurzweill) that there is a clear, and really not very paradoxical side, to such post-humanism that sees an bounteous-everlasting *increasing* of the human within its very simultaneous overcoming or *posting*.

xv Animal reaction is a self-less poverty-of-world in opposition to the human’s world-forming *vision*. While coming from a lecture course of Heidegger’s, this is
also almost a straight quotation of Jacob Von Uexküll’s (although original dates actually might point towards a reciprocal working back in of Heidegger into Uexküll’s: Heidegger’s ‘Problems’ lecture series were delivered in the academic year 1928-29, while Uexküll’s ‘Stroll’, which aimed to make palpably-public his work, is dated around 1933). Further evidence of Uexküll’s influence upon a 1920s German strain of phenomenologically inclined (or more properly here Neo-Kantian in this case) philosophy at the time comes in the shape of Ernst Cassirer who headed the University of Hamburg where Uexküll set up his Institute for Umweltforschung and who probably also introduced Heidegger to his work (Heidegger attended a lecture of Cassirer’s at Davos-Switzerland where Uexküll’s current umwelt researches formed part of the subject matter). Cassirer writing in his ‘Essay on Man’ stated, “There is an unmistakable difference between the **organic reactions** and **human responses**” (p.29, my emphasis). Again we have reaction and response and an abyssal space wedged in-between them. To augment and to clarify this distinction of the human agency Cassirer adds an extra symbolic layer for the human, which comes or intervenes between Uexküll’s terminological poles of the **Merknetze** (receptor net) and the **Werknetze** (effector net) that the animal also possesses. Man is not just set apart as the Aristotelian **animal rationale**, but according to Cassirer also the highly distinguished **animal symbolicum**. The animal is clearly and cleanly denied access to the symbol. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (‘Nature’) in appreciably addressing Uexküll’s non-mechanistic externalist approach to the animal, however likens certain categories of animal to what he calls ‘animal machines’ or non-institutional (as in lacking in the locality of a certain portion of plasticity or ‘choice’) ‘reflex republics’ where organs rule the organism instead of vice versa. While allowing for more variegation within the animal domain(s) he erects a machinic comparison that sets the human at a summit of an a-machinic positionality. Merleau-Ponty does however simultaneously open up a space of temporal-based reactivity within more ‘complex’ bio-entities in his interpretation of Uexküll: “The **Merkzeit**, for Uexküll, is not a fact of consciousness, but a component of the physical structure, which is manifest in the behaviour of the animal” (Nature, p.173).

---

xvi Of course Derrida denied that such word-concepts could be taken out of their highly delimited operating environments (the particular texts being deconstructed through the capture of a uneasy term, extracted from the texts themselves). There is however, no doubt, a network-effect that arises from their variously positioned similarity of undecidability within each of their locales.

xvii To jump ahead a little, to give a sense of a roadmap toward a destination, we will offer towards the end the word/concept of an ineradicable, incurable and absolutely irreducible **distérrance** that, not only comes between or intervenes irreducibly upon the actions of two or more communicative parties as an **inter-distérrance**, but also equally irreducibly within any single party as an **intra-distérrance**. Our key term (for the conclusion of our argument) “Distérrance” is a composite of three irreducible “difficulties”: **distance**, **différance** and **errant/errancy**. Though clearly related in terms of their concentration on unbridgeable ‘gaps’ these three contain fissures that we would wish to have stay exposed and un-sutured. Firstly there is a Levinasian aspect of **distance** (as in the autrui or **infinity of the other**) but which we would wish here to **drain** of its autrui privileging by adding, stitching or compositing also Derridean **différance** that would take away this alter-privilege (without retracing steps back to a privilege of the singular subject) while still keeping the notion of a splitting involving notional subjectivities (différance alone does not contain the notion of inter-faciality or of sub-jects). Thirdly we would add to this Levinasian-Derridean split-containment a third notion of irreducible **errancy** that draws attention to a
certain Foucauldian will-to-power-knowledge that always finds itself contending or grappling with what would be errant. This errancy is irreducible and always in a process of becoming and is the very condition of possibility of the knowledge that would bring it into line. This errancy again is not (solely) the errancy of any particular possibly errant empirical party (a spouse or, as we will see, a Hegelian “blood friend”) whose errancy would be fought against through the erection of such prosthetic panop-tech-clair-voyant mechanisms to contain such errant mis/behaviour, but is (very importantly for the conclusion of our argument) contained within the very “intra” of the passageways of the subject in themselves (self as already distant; already différance; already errant – hence the need to provide a portmanteau word of these three irreducibles). Any panop-tech-clair-voyant “viewing screen” that one might, as we will see, wish to erect inside the previously protected force-field of the face of the other (to screen their behaviour) is not only about an errancy to look out for that is geometrically placed over there, but also an errancy in the very interiority of the self itself that cannot itself be brought under any control, itself. Such an originary arche-intra-errancy, as we will see, prevents the subject from occupying any secured or firewalled position of self-ownership before they would wish to construct any bridging act of ontic communication that would then prevent the errancy so worried-over in the other (the evidence of the very wish that Warick exhibits in wishing to construct this family-encircling prosthetic mechanism). As a split-nexus of three terms then distérrance is the very material support that will prevent the closure of a pre-distérrant panop-tech-clair-en-voyance.

xviii Obviously we are (that is my-self here and now, in depositing this trace) somewhat cynically placed before this title of self-less-ness. Self-other.

xix This latter apocalyptic hyperbole is, of course deplored (and adored by those who manage to simultaneously or implosively celebrate-deplore) in the works of Baudrillard and Virilio. Loss, implosion, gone and biblically profound these writings intone in the tone of street occupying sandwich board walkers who we in ignorance walk by and make room for. There is a nascent eroticism within these intonations that captivate in a similar way to McLuhan in the 60s/70s where media “theory” takes an emotive turn and becomes sexy within the very spaces that it trains its own optics on. The irony is not lost upon either party and a strange beelike dance of the hunter and the hunted ensues where each does not quite know which role the other is playing, as their roles (as both also notice) have imploded.

xx This before then should be heard in two senses, just as in Derrida’s ‘Before the Law’. We would perhaps wish to see ourselves as responsible ‘before’ these technologies and before these technologies came along (either to add or take away; deposit or de-position), but also as responsible before reaction and before what is mechanical and prosthetic. The before then is not temporal or spatial (as one appears before some-time or some-space, e.g. ‘The Law’, in all our responsibility) but an inmixing of both and neither. Once we are before; once we were before; once we’re here before; once we’re there before: responsible or reactive; self-ful or self-less? The purpose of this paper then is not to mediate between these positions in favour of a new law, but of problematising any responsibility before such prostheses. The prosthesis, in being an already-electrical, might not be so promised or threatened and might not be so whole. Here we would agree with Martin Hägglund’s reading of Derrida in the face of certain religious or ethical attempts at recuperation. He points out in ‘Radical Atheism’ that certain Levinas inspired readings of Derrida (Critchley, Beardworth, Cornell) wish to find an infinity in Derrida that we would read as bringing back a
certain Christian responsibility and thus humanism. While we are not suggesting our own radical-reaction (for Hägglund’s radical atheism) again such a recuperation of responsibility (by Haraway), we would draw attention to the working of the iterable (in relation to the Austinian performative) that Derrida talks about so extensively in his reply to Searle in Limited Inc.

xxi We will ask, as can be imagined, what in fact a cyborg is and how one can use the somewhat questionable barrier the skin as the figural border of use of technology from technology becoming a newly integrated organ. Technological resources have been used ‘since the beginning’ as means of communication or expansion of the present horizon (the French archaeologist Andre Leroi-Gourhan pointed out some time ago the primal-originary nature of the hominin’s integral relation to technology –via the hand’s very shape- that questions any idea of an early innocence prior to a technological encroachment). Subcutaneous invasions and upgrades to the human skeleton partake in fact of a romantic image of a whole-being whose whole comes later to be invaded. Leroi-Gourhan points out that this invasion is hardly late coming but was already always underway.

xxii John Perry Barlow is a retired cattle rancher who takes much of the imagery of the both the wild untamed west and the individualistic east coast transcendentalist Thoreueanism and transposes it or updates it across to the free space of cyberspace....

xxiii Henry David Thoreau is famous for his meditating upon his wish-to-withdraw from the encroached of technocratic-democratic modernity, written about in his book ‘Walden’. Like his much later fellow-traveler J.P. Barlow, H.D. Thoreau sought out the solid ground of an independence from the constraints that he saw presently being erected all around him, in his time. Modeled upon the idea(l) of a self that is already secure Thoreau’s declaration-of-personal-security is very much paradoxically a shared ideological plank or component of the very vessel of modernity that he saw himself as struggling against being forced to be a part of (albeit a differing enough wing of such a vessel) the currency-of-money and all that it captivates of the self (making of it simply an element-of-exchange). A independent good life is thus sought within the location of Walden where the only support for his own figure is the ground of his very own figure. He will support and only be supported only by himself.

xxiv

xxv Embalmed|Unembalmed: Problems of the Lived Event in Media Studies 2.0’

xxvi Similarly we would argue against (as would Derrida) any McLuhan-esque notion of a interneted global village where everybody is brought together upon some de-territorialised ground. The realization of such a groundless ground pre-supposes a teleological concept of communication that would re-establish the connections (at last) that writing some time ago put asunder and divorced us from. Prior to this the oral-based community of village life allowed for an immediacy that writing later would place its deferring/differing delay circuits into and between. The story of such mediations has apparently here been also the story also of a simultaneous dispersion but re-gathering. At the end of the dispersed journey a secondary-writing (the poison) would also provide a secondary-orality (the cure) that will bring us back together through the very means that originally separated us off from the immediacy of a unified social body. In a book titled ‘Digital McLuhan’ Levinson sees a vindication of McLuhan’s global village that sadly McLuhan himself (as ‘Digital Moses’ to this idea) did
himself not get to experience or reside upon. The Internet brings us together upon an expansive land that at longlast is no longer divided or celled-up.

xxvii My uneasy inverted commas, but not in a moral sense. Again the distinction (as in Heidegger’s between organic organ and secondary equipment) is presupposed within the act that would see a future replacement of the entirety of the organs by new permanent technological (and thus not liable to decrepitude) organs. Is the distinction that Heidegger is eager to make between organs and equipment, not also presupposed in Kurzweil’s innocent idea of downloadings and replacements? It is true, to be sure, that Heidegger and Kurzweil come from two radically differing traditions (with the latter operating, in what Heidegger would see as Cartesian inspired technologically enframed world-picture), but both see something of the pre-prosthetic (paradoxical, to investigate further?) in the saveability, presence or substantiality of something inside (and it could easily be argued that Kurzweil clings onto this in a much stronger fashion than does Heidegger who has a rather more ambivalent relationship between technicity and a soul-substance opposite). Kurzweil celebrates the machine and the picture but cannot let go of the idea of the self that such a machinery should store or animatedly archive.

xxviii Although Fukuyama wrote about the end of history, he has questions about extending life into some near infinite. See ‘Out Posthuman Future’

xxix ‘The Singularity is Near’ (a title surely armed for television) and ‘The Age of Spiritual Machines’ are both very quantitatively-inclined books. Moore’s Law (of exponential computer speed increases) assure us of a time that is close on the horizon. Similarly Kevin Warwick tells the BBC website of the soon to occur takeover of the world by computer intelligence (which, as children watching for the monstrous, we should be watchful over) and how very close this is. Sarcastic as this note is toward such a conception, neither of these futurologists seem to need to consult any “authorities” within the departments of philosophy of mind. Kurzweil is aware of one such cynical philosopher (the militant Heideggerian scholar Dreyfus and his books about “What Computers Cannot Do” and “What Computers (Still) Cannot Do” which point out how the most seemingly basic of human comportments, based upon tacit, quite ‘fuzzy’ knowledge, cannot be downloaded into a Minskian robots, etc.) he calls a sort of spoil-sport. No counter-argument is needed, only a pointing out of speed increases and the continued embeddedness of the computer within our lives. This ‘within’ however should be conceptualized in very careful and variegated ways.

xxx Dvorksy obviously coins this term in the early 21st century to show the technological culmination or supplementation of something altogether more occultist. The term that Dvorsky uses (techlepathy) plays on a term which itself was coined within an age of technological transformation. Addressing his colleagues of the London ‘Society for Psychical Research’ (an institution which he cofounded) Frederic Myers stated “we venture to introduce the words Telesesthesia and Telepathy to cover all the cases of impression received at a distance without the normal operation of the recognised sense organs”. Myers introduced this term (just as Dvorsky does later, in a more neologistic-parasitical fashion) to replace ‘thought-transference’ to precisely add the transfer of something ‘aesthetic’ or the receiving of impressions at a distance, while also partaking of the explosion of various tele-media (as Royle points out) that were promising tele-communication at the time. While the transfer of thought-at-a-distance offers the opportunity of something akin to the sharing of a purity of meaning, telepathy takes us closer to ‘the’ site occupied by whatever impresses the notional sender in the first place. This impression is, as we will see below in Dvorsky’s own usage, something that
would take us more proximate to the meaning-to-say that would first fire-off the meaning and the thoughts (which are secondary to the primacy of the impression). Here again then we find sympathy or empathy instead of a mere understanding of the other (albeit at some distance) and thus something much more hyperbolic than the transfer of a mere thought.

xxxix This is dressed-up within the rhetorical garb of the futurist visionary who, as is so often the case, is someone who picks up on the invention of something that, innovative in itself, will have further revolutionary unforeseen "uses". While this ontic innovation becomes tomorrow's (Silicon Valley) fish and (silicon) chip wrapping, Dvorsky sees semi-buried within this resource a revolutionary ontological way of finally unwrapping the self and opening it up to technological openness in all senses...

xxxi It is this proximal spatial closer that so captivates Dvorsky's attention within this local ontical invention of Chuck Jorgensen's. It resonates with something he has been thinking for a long time. For here he sees the intending-to-say as a site and a place that can be siphoned-off and directed to technologies that, as we will soon see, allow for two parties to be brought closer (and this closer is not simply some quantitative increase within a sphere that is some mere metaphorical spatial proximity, but a veritable qualitative transformation: a singularity) to the spirit that desires the ultimativity of union: colloquy (i.e. colloquy+soliloquy=n). Here we are obviously thinking of Derrida’s early study of Husserl in ‘Speech and Phenomena’ (some translate the title as ‘Voice and Phenomena’) where Derrida discusses Husserl's attempts to divide a supposedly internal 'expressive' sign from an external and public 'indicative' sign. The supposedly singular expressive (soliloquy) sign however cannot clear itself of its divisive 'indicative other' and Husserl’s whole phenomenological exploration of the intimacy of the self finds itself surrounded on all sides, and within all its hoped-for sovereign dimensions, by what is outside (and now inside-outside). It is this hidden-hauntedness, as with (mis)appropriations from many other deconstructive source readings, which Derrida will use more openly himself as 'différance'. Dvorsky, as with Kurzweil and soon with Prof. Warwick, would wish to ignore such an intimately divisive dehiscent différance. For Dvorsky (and soon Warwick) presupposes an unquestionable presence of 'the intimate'; an intimacy-of-presence that we will soon be able to break off and share with our significant other: an intimacy that will transcend our, presently conventional, poorly expressive indicative conversational signage. Once then we can siphon this site of the meaning-to-say, our loved one will come to see exactly what we mean. Derrida (or rather Husserl in his own marginalizing folds) points out however that here there is no pure thought (signified outside of signifiers; soliloquy outside of colloquy) to purely "thought-transfer".

xxxiii Again we would refer to this desire to isolate some purity of signal that, just as with the complexities of moving robots along xyz coordinates involving "obstacles", would allow access to some expressive ‘desire-point’ as a journey that is not only problematic at the notional point of arrival (communication with the interiority of the commicatee) but at the very point of departure itself (the commicator being able to be within their own proximity).

xxxiv As well as with Aristotle, entelechy was used as a term in the biological sciences and was introduced in the by the German 19th/20th century biologist Hans Driesch. Having similar qualms to Uexküll a few years later with his umwelt researches, Dreisch did not agree with the mechanistic externalist Darwinian views of the biological organism that were currently coming to dominate the biological sciences. Contra to these externalist models he pointed to the
entelechial motion of the organism towards its goal, etc. He also, interestingly for our purposes, happened to believe in the existence of telepathy. We will try to draw together some of these seemingly disparate strings later in our argument.

It is quite funny when he reaches the point where he visualizes the location of the new upstream interface, that although there is a location for the existing prosthesis developed by NASA that the newer more deeper-burrowing apparatus is not really explained very well. He simply says, this simple next-step will involve the delivery of “a fancy neural data conversion device”. Such a simple device really is for others to worry about, for there will be really nothing to it.

Because obviously this wish to erase the voco from the apparatus will not displace (in any Derridean general writing) the phonocentric but will, on the contrary, solidify its rule, its supposed archy. For the meaning-to-say is all the more deemed to be a location or coordinate, whose provenance and domain will be proven and expanded, on this view, on a higher, grander scale.

For in cutting out this deferred externalization that is the vocal apparatus, and placing an electric-prosthetic closer (if not at the very location) of the meaning-to-say, we find something analogous in its desire to Husserl’s expressive as opposed to indicative sign that we discussed a few footnotes ago.

As we will see below with Dvorsky’s fellow traveler Warwick, the bypassing of the previously held dominion of such an ‘acoustic realm’ does not itself equate to an ending of the sovereign rule and dominion of the ‘phonocentric realm’, for this post-human and trans-humanist domain still very much carries with it the rule and regulation (not to say also the role) of the humanist spirit of the intentionalist locale. Here we find a very important irony within the use of such supposedly transformative prefixes as ‘trans’ and ‘post’, as this extension and prosthesis that Dvorsky proposes to call techlepathy and that Dvorsky sees so much expansive-explosive-explosive potential in, seeks only to extend and prosthete the dominion of something still very still-humanist. A rché, rule and a localist-personalist dominion here would very much be extended rather than transcended all that the acoustic-ideological realm carries with it. Here we can only refer him across to Derrida’s seminal study ‘Of Grammatology’, as well as the justly celebrated essay ‘Plato’s Pharmacy’ (in ‘Dissemination’) and ‘Speech and Phenomena’ that we discussed above, for some useful clarification on some of these phonetic-acoustic-gordian knots.

We will talk below about this prosthetic or technological supplementation of an occult sense or desire. While we would like to quote longer this very interesting passage that indeed exposes and uncovers a certain encompassing immediatist desire within communications and their draw/promise this could easily break the flow of the argument. He goes on to state however that this timeless reaching toward telepathy (and now arriving through techlepathy) through the finally cleansing checkpoints and arrival-points (into this so long promised land) of many current post-industrial technologies. In a section immediately following the above, and within an obviously McLuhanesque sounding section titled ‘The Shrinking Planet’ (and it is worth quoting at length for the conveyance of a tone that is hyperbolically exalted and excited in its reportage-from-the-front-line, from one so intimately concerned with the possibilities of immediation) he states:

“Our civilization’s current postindustrial phase has often been referred to, quite rightly, as the Information Age. Moreover, the speed at which information is processed and exchanged is only getting faster. There’s no
question that humanity’s collective clock-speed is steadily increasing. Indeed, as is Moore’s Law, the communications revolution is still in effect and showing no signs of abating. Thanks to the rapid-fire nature provided by such things as email correspondence and instant messaging, conversations that used to take weeks or days now only take hours or minutes. In fact, as I recently read an archived exchange between Charles Darwin and his rival Louis Agassiz from the 19th Century, I realized that the entire exchange must have taken months if not years since their letters had to cross the Atlantic by boat. (Darwin lived in England while Agassiz was in the U.S.) Today when scientists converse, they debate, critique and collaborate at breakneck speed. What’s interesting isn’t just the types of communication tools that now exist. It’s also the way in which people use them—ways that hint at a desire for more intimate and open forms of communication [my emphasis].

Sitting at a red light the other day, I noticed a herd of pedestrians crossing the street—each and every one of them with a cell phone held tightly against their ear [one has to admire here the somewhat comical haughty cod-anthropological tone and again note the animalist-reactive-ganged metaphor of ‘the crowd’ that the anthropological one takes their distance from]. These days, information transfer between people is nearly instantaneous, regardless of what they’re doing and where they are. Many people are also tapping into the power of instant messaging. Programs such as Messenger, ICQ and GAIM are immensely popular, changing the way in which people interact altogether. Family members converse with each other while in the same house (calling the kids down for dinner will never be the same again). Parents chat with their kids while at work. Coworkers, whether they’re in the same building or offsite, can quickly exchange information and work in collaborative ways. Social networking programs, such as Friendster, Tribe and Orkut, are also contributing to novel forms of communication. These programs are undoubtedly making the world a smaller place by steadily decreasing the number of so-called degrees of separation that exist between people. I’m continually stunned at the efficiency of how this works. I have only 19 immediate friends in my Friendster network, but it explodes out from there to 1,010 second-degree friends and 50,611 third-degree friends. I’m pretty much convinced that if you’re on the Internet there’s no less than four degrees of separation between you and anyone else on the Web, which is two complete degrees below the conventional six degrees of separation that is thought to exist for all people…” (Dvorsky, ibid)

We are in the presence then of somebody who can interpolationally-extrapolate from such increasing degrees of immediacy (itself a notion we obviously question, again even of a self-intimacy, before such a reduction in numerical degrees) to a position of clear-immediacy once these desires are properly harnessed and given their goal. What is certainly worth agreeing with Dvorsky on, whatever disagreements in the reading one might make of these teletechnologies, is of the desire and its movements (if not the unitary achievement of the goal) for-the-sake-of immediation within many current ontic networking technologies such as those described by Dvorsky, so knowingly and techno-shamanlike, above. What Dvorsky fails to grasp (in describing the communications detail and topography of this post-industrial age) is a certain displacement of the arché that he nevertheless would wish to cling onto. This is the very double-edge that, in wishing to forego, only creeps on back through the back-door like some irremediable weed or self-multiplying virus.
For as we will see, speech at present provides too much colloquy, and ultimately telepathy should furnish a sort of join-soliloquy.

I say ‘practical’ for, as with Kurzweill, the creation of such practical ground-floor prostheses is embedded within a larger more globalizing project that far outstrips the reach of these prostheses and lands us within territories that are. In his autobiography (or should we say auto-cyborg-ography) ‘I, Cyborg’ Warwick talks of a time where our children’s children will “look back with wonder at how their ancestors could have been so primitive as to communicate by means of silly little noises called speech”. When one examines what Warwick understands by speech, we find however something quite linguistically primitive and that he is working within a model of communication which does not seem to feel the need to visit any theoretical debates on communication. Indeed while the bibliography within this book has some interesting entries (Dreyfus, Haraway, Hayles, Fukuyama, Penrose), none of these are referred to within the main body. In a similar fashion Kurzweill (who Warwick received a supportive email from when some critics were wondering about his sales-patter when playing with his embedded prostheses), sees philosophers of mind, language, technics, etc. as just so many spoil-sports. Minsky had a similar approach at MIT in the 70’s but then was forced to reevaluate his use of Cartesian coordinates as quantitative data within the buildings of robotics. Philosophers of embodiment had been saying for some time that getting around was not merely a case of following some xyz mapping agenda but is based more around tacit knowledge and complex background processes. Although fuzzy-logics have begun to broach this post-quantitative approach, still notions of clean ‘information’ tend to override any possibly opposing ‘logic’. Indeed Warwick is very excited by error-diminution and seems somewhat to be caught in the wonderments of the infinitely plastic 50s in his model of sci-fi futurity. The future is simply about ‘less errors’.

And are these differences of buildings so different. We are not so much talking about the now-famous stretching of work into the home and the breaking of the border that upset the work and homelife balance as a...

It would, of course, be interesting to map the coordinates of this physicalist folding out of the selfspace’s body-space into the otherspace’s embodied-space that would match this more psychical ‘panopt-tech-clair-voyant’ variety that we are attempting to map out here. By ‘chipping’ oneself to identify (and again fold-out) in various ways to the outside, the coordinate of the skin, as self, comes into question (but again we would question a prior-skin deposition). We are, it is obvious, dealing with the commonality of the subject-object divide that will add some interesting (Merleau-Ponty?) questions of where things touch and where they end.

He makes references to film, both in semiotic terms in the external design of the prostheses (“Borg Collective” Art Nouveau curves) and in also pointing out that his own inventions have proved influential within certain filmic representations (James Bond subcutaneous chip is embedded in exactly the same place, a place unnecessary in itself as a subcutaneous location, as his own). He is very much tied then to his technology as a user-inventor of the old C19 shed-based/sideshow tradition. And also gains, of course, a certain ethical prestige, through not putting someone else through what he himself would also not go through. This provides a very overdetermined nexus of presences, just as he presents his inventions and his reinvented self.

We will soon be addressing issues of inter-face-iality and the paradoxical image of coming face-to-face with something that nevertheless presents the
possibility of an external obstacle or barrier to admittance. *Just* as we might, in frustration, come to require, or perhaps demand, the teleological promise of some *face time* to really get to grips with the very meaning-to-say that would transport us into a position of ‘immediacy’ (and Apple’s iPhone 4 ads present a *tactile promise* in their images of co-present de-mediated communication via their face-time protocols: the s/he character touches the other s/he *via* the screen as one sees the facial presented in a figuration of tele-present immediacy *via* telephone), so the face offers a double-edged Janus-faced problematic that we as communicators would wish to get beyond. Levinas (who we will later also question a little more deeply via the problematic of a super-valorized alterity that does nothing but *repeat presence* in the absence of a self-presence) opposes the *saying* to the *said* and offers up the sight/site of the former as the site of singular shared sincerity, just as the presence of the exteriorizing sight of the face-of-the-other *places us* in a position of some immediacy with the other as other: Other they may be but we still share an immediacy in the saying-act. The *live-saying* (as opposed to the *dead-said*) would place us infinitively closer to the infinity of the other that would also take us outside of a written relation of a will-to-totality (question: but will infinity *clash* with totality?). So any communication that could (and we must state this argument is not fuelled by a *worry* about the possible future-presence of such a panop-tech-clair-voyant apparatus, whose arrival would simultaneously be its own simultaneous-intimate failure) cut through the present transportation of a *said* (writing as the classical failed masturbatory marker of an en-crypted *dead-said*) and provide a *transported saying* (Apple’s ‘FaceTime’ as a fantasy marker of Warwick’s fantasized and more intimate immediatory apparatuses of a unemblamed-*saying*) would supposedly present much more than the face alone allows (by its barrier-entrance). Here we find again a prosthetic apparatus that would extend a sense that, *not only* did not exist prior to the possibility of the erection of such techlepathic, or as would prefer to say ‘panop-tech-clair-en-voyant’ prostheses (for it was a figure of the occult that sucked imagery from newly arriving tele-technological prosthetics (as we saw in an above footnote with Myers’ coining of metaphorically fuelled *telepathy* and *teleesthesia*), but also which would use figures of sight and haptics (seeing and touching) but would wish to (in the very metaphoric using) bypass the external screens and reach right inside to the truth of what fuels the saying (a sort of proper-saying *behind* the saying). We will look later at some of Levinas’s paradoxical immediacies of the self’s chimeric connections with the saying-face of the other. For here Levinas might share some ground with his somewhat inflated notion of the trace (which is very different to Derrida’s).

The temporal *modality* within the rhetoric that we mimic here within our usage of the word “awaits” is important because, as with Dvorsky above, Warwick paints a powerful picture of a future that was always already prepared for and awaiting us as a arche-parent from the very start of it all (presumably, the very first or primal prosthesis): a sort of future ‘on-rails’, like a date or a programmed-in teleological-terminus station guaranteed from the very moment that one is *aboard*. Indeed before one is aboard. This then is a highly magnetic *future-anterior* that is not, if set within an enveloping plasticity, accidentally stumbled upon within a sort of random Darwinian *play*, but which magnetically draws us near from the very departing extreme-of-distance of *the very beginning*. It is thus a very biblical-entelechial liveness that everything has been ganged in lockstep towards. Such an ongoing *liveness* of this future-anterior bespeaks within every singular empirical step along the way.

For every step is a small structural component of one very long song that *all* technologies and *all* their ‘inventors’ and *all* their ‘investors’ and *all* their
'investigators' have all been singing, within one large historically disparate relay-compilation or chorus, and which, after each have in-their-turn stepped up to and then stepped down from the same archiving microphone (withdrawing for the next and sharing some cross-over time), will all fade out trans-generationally together, like a song that has been sung across the many generations. This singularly long song might not, of course, have always been sung by many of its participants, for charity, but in the end it will even out and trickle down and we will all thence (ancestrally, at least) be the winners. It is very hard for a technology or any exponent, one can see, to escape from the orbiting of this songbook.

xlvii For the very opening words of Warwick’s autocyborgography titled ‘I, Cyborg’ state: “I WAS BORN human” (uppercase in the original) within a somewhat traditionally pulp-fictional-functional retrospective-facing originary narratonoovelistic tone. That the end of his life, is not the coextensive with the end of this book, as it itself (his own end) is of course itself currently unwritten (at the time of the depositing of the traces within the writing this paper). And yet, and of course, presumably the transformation into a cyborg, that could write or imprint such a line, harbours the safety of the harbour-of-a-future where a sentence such as “I DIED cyborg” will not be written and thus the bio-graphy itself becomes a difficulty of testament or testimony of any coming ultimate past tense (and by extension, of testimony and time). Although this line, “I WAS BORN human”, smells (if a cyborg can smell) or has the odor of a line of marketing-mediation (as well as an opening line of a salvo within a polemic against the protective shells of a technologically fearful pre-post-humanism), it nevertheless harbors a paradoxicality that Warwick is not sufficient “himself” broad enough to broach.

xlviii See last paragraph of the last but one footnote, which we could mechanically duplicate here.

xlix Although it is not available to me, a titillatingly titled 2001 documentary called ‘Digital Sex’ has Warwick talking about being able to experience his wife’s pleasure and vice versa. While electrical implants are spoken about in the quotation below in terms of a direct brain-to-brain communication, this documentary takes a much more chemical approach where the presence of secretions of sexual hormones are passed along to the other and vice versa. The idea here is to complete a sexual-circuitry where again, as we will point out below, intercourse would itself presumably become its own absence.

i Or ‘Singularity’ to use Kurzweill’s adopted “master” term.

ii This sentence may seem to exhibit a rather excessive or gratuitous amount of “intercourse” (I) that some might complain about, but we must un-gratuitously and strategically-structurally underline the internally riven nature of any immediationary intercourse and how fundamentally based upon différance it necessarily is. Any wish to surmount it inevitably would wish to cancel out the undecidability of intercourse, which would be the end of all intercourse itself.

iii Touch is, of course, a metaphor that carries a lot of gravity or weight. As Derrida has pointed out (in ‘On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy) ‘touch’ often figures as the teleology of communication and acts therein as a sort of economic guarantor or gold-standard. “…I could almost touch it” can be attached to so many other apparatuses that it acts as a sort of master-prosthesis. This highly geo-metric figure (Berkeley himself saw sight as a becoming-touch sense and that the tactile quality of locating something is that something’s guarantee of what exactly it is. Add to later (imp. note for immediation idea)
Intercourse: “speech” in the sense of Dvorsky, “sex” in the sense of Warwick.

[The Intercourse of] Touch is here not listed as it is the supervisory authority-sense (as in footnote...) that serves these other two (speech and sex). As the master-sense it would have these other two be able to reach-inside-the-other and find something singular that it can touch. Such is the whole that such touching presupposes and upon which the subject (as responsible agent) is pre-supposed, etc. (clean-up note, develop?)

This is the model of writing that McLuhanesque models of mediation work within. Something more than simply a village, and something better than a reintegrated higher-scale talk?

As somebody pointed out to me in conversation at the Cardiff Zoontotechnics conference where I delivered this paper, the figure of technological/telepathy has changed somewhat since the sc-fi images of 1950s/60s, from information transferral to something now much more ispec and intimate and which this paper has been attempting to address in a related sense. Perhaps this mutation within the figurology of the tele-pathology (from a wish for a teleological structure of pure information to a desire for pure orgasmic immanent-interiority) fits or locks in well with a recent turn to the affective and the emotive, which has been mapped by many scholars recently (and which docusoaps in television reflect on a more quotidian or everyday lived-level.

This was Jakob Von Uexküll’s term that sought to tackle the predominant Darwinian and anatomically centered theories that sought merely to take apart the physics of the particular creature or organism. Uexküll saw the more important goal as understanding how these physical apparatuses all glue together to form into an (gestalt-like) umwelt for the particular creature composed of these parts (sensory receptors, motor effectors, etc.). Neither outside nor inside, the umwelt enables the outside to appear as such. In a sort of pre-Derridean “Il n'y a pas de hors-texte” (often translated as “nothing outside the text”, but better to say “there is no outside-text”), Uexküll pointed out that we should not look at the subject or its objects as merely entities with properties but as meaningful totalities each with its own containing bubble. In his famous essay ‘A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men’ he presents pictorial figures that show his drawing-room from the ‘internal’ perspective of both a human and a dog, showing the different ‘views’ of these same objects that each subject has depending on the requirements of each of the species of which they are a member. While the dog, caught within the total “institution” of its species, sees only a mechanical reflection of its rather entrapped species-being, the human is faced with an infinitely plastic universe (habitus). An example of this plasticity of being: any recent western visitor to Uexküll’s drawing room would see something altogether different to what one of Uexküll’s contemporaries would have seen. Such would be the richness of differing historico-cultural possibilities and uncertainties available to the human ‘umwelt’. Human response versus animal reaction. The animal cannot itself inhabit a habitus (trapped a it is, without any ability for comportment, within its ‘disinhibiting ring’ (Heidegger 1995, p.253)). Influential on Heidegger, he himself creates a huge unbridgeable gap between animals and men that betrays a certain religious gathering, even in the midst of a scientific endeavor: “animals” in all their variety and variegatedness are huddled together on one side and are poor, while “men” all stand upright on the other side and are rich and open in their gathering of the world.

As I am programmed to do (in not being able to bear the ultimate responsibility for this questioning and to correspondingly tie everything that
might be excessive down into a structurally non-leakey syntagm, and perhaps being evaded by a certain notionally whole quota of meaning that it is not mine (in the very immanence the writing) to control. This pre-prog-grammation, can only be matched and redoubled by a lack of perfect responsibility within the reading).

And to beg the indulgence of the reader further in this somewhat clumsy and forced allusion to Heidegger’s ‘Question Concerning Technology’ we would say, as he does concerning technology, that the question concerning techlepathy is not itself a techlepathical question. Thus replacing technology with techleapthy each time, we might say:

Likewise, the essence of technology [techlepathy, etc.] is by no means anything technological [techlepathical, etc.]. Thus we shall never experience our relationship to the essence of technology so long as we merely conceive and push forward the technological, put up with it, or evade it. Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to do homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology (Heidegger 1977, p.4)

(and of the remoteness of site or of our situatedness). Here we could add to the totality of this gaze a panop-tech-clair-voyance?.

Clarification: ‘being there’ (Da-sein) is of course Heidegger’s early master term par excellence (circa ‘Being and Time’) and refers to what exactly makes each and every dasein da-sein (we are the ontological being-there species whose quality is, ineluctably, as the species that takes-a-stand-on-its-being, one of being-there). Here we replace ‘being-there’ with ‘being-their’ to augment this spatial ontology of the desire of the panop-tech-clair-voyant relation. Whether this could place the relation within a resource of ‘standing-reserve’ (something Heidegger states is impossible for Dasein, as opposed to every other entity) would be a difficult and thorny question for another place.

This inevitably adds a sense input, which forms a sort of meta-sense input that would closely metaphorically mimic at least one of the accepted other five. A sixth sense is thus called upon which is a sense nonetheless. This supplement of a sixth sense however adds a dimension lacking in the poorer more accepted siblings. A teleesthetic apparatus is thus born. A newer extra-sensory third-eye arises then that would see further but also see altogether differently; it penetrates deeper just as it penetrates otherwise. This third-eye would operate right from the captain’s inner eye without the need for the aspects of the physical vessel that the captain would rely upon: the captain here is in no need of the ship that he nevertheless is steering. The res cogitans sees purely outside of the embodied sensorium of the res extensa that nevertheless forms the contours of the very metaphoric interests that it needs as justification. Speaking of metaphorical extension, Hitschmann likens the myth of telepathy to “a psychic prosthesis, a stretched-out arm, which reaches out mystically toward that which is far off and cannot be approached in actuality by physical means” (p.126). Once the subject is subjected to psychoanalytic translation, the tele-language of telepathy gets reconverted into familial transactions displaced by the psyche.

Perhaps most strange is a certain acceptance of the possibility of telepathy by the physicist Einstein. He wrote a short forward for a book on telepathy by the American social critic Upton Sinclair called ‘Mental Radio’. The book, again
suggesting the centrality of telepathy to the family circle, surrounding tests on his depressed second wife, reports on tests of her ability to read certain signifiers that she herself did not have sensorial access to through her five accepted senses. We will see in the footnote below the metaphoric importance of secondary prosthetic apparatuses for likening these telepathic internal apparatuses.

Freud stated that: "What we call 'telepathy' is, as you know, the alleged fact that an event which occurs at a particular time comes at about the same moment to the consciousness of someone distant in space, without the paths of communication that are familiar to us coming into question. It is implicitly supposed that this event concerns a person in whom the other one (the receiver of intelligence) has a strong emotional interest. For instance, Person A may be the victim of an accident or may die, and Person B, someone nearly attached to him –his mother or daughter or fiancée- learns the fact at about the same time through a visual or auditory perception. In this latter case, then, it is as if she had been informed by telephone, though such was not the case.” Leaning against a comparison with a secondary prosthesis, Freud points to a primary prosthesis that in bypassing the primary communicative apparatuses, ends up taking on the qualities of what is counted as a graft. Again the presence of a prior “connection” allows for this primary-prosthesis to be something much less invasive or secondary than a graft or techno-graft.

Some temporarily missing or misplaced postcards that finally made it to their recipient. Playing on Lacan’s message that a letter always reaches its destination, it seems that these postcards did not make it through to their recipient in time for being published in “Postcard: From Plato to Freud and Beyond”. These postcards speak of the character’s love for his lover...

Although Derrida points out that Freud did not actually deliver these introductory lectures, but they make it into a transcription as delivered in this lively, public-forum way.

Somnambulism is not of actuality or entelechy. Hegel sees actuality as an aggregate of interests that compose the individual who only comes together as “his genius” once out of an auto-matistic somnambulist stage (which would include base-clairvoyance (see Philosophy of Spirit, S.406)

Indeed it would be hard to find a reference to any act of telepathy that did not serve to solidify a family relation and the family relation itself, as we will see, is what commun-icates itself to us via clair-voyance and this telesthetic telepathy. In an article titled ‘Telepathy and Psychoanalysis’ Edward Hitschmann, a close colleague of Freud’s, tells the story of the poet Max Dauthendey who had telepathic intimations of his father’s death and later received a tele-gram recording his father’s death as simultaneous with the thought he had earlier had. Hitschmann comes to explain this according to certain historical troubles within the trouble bubble of the family circle. But in a manner very similar to Freud (and Hegel) we find an ambivalence to telepathy that is something more than a middle ground, but where the family owns a sort of centralised position. Across a number of articles we find a vibrating indecision that at one time rejects and at another is more accepting. This splinter under the skin of the body of psychoanalysis finds within the family a very troubling and rather uncanny home or habitus that a more program-performative prosthetetelepathy will come to inhabit in its turn, as we will see.
For want of interpreting after the fashion of Wallace, environment here seems to refer, not so much to a physicality of environment, but to an environment that seems a little like Uexküll's umwelt bubble….

That might then lead to the exsanguination of the figure of responsibility

For this is not an invention, so much as an invention that, as we saw, pre-invents something natural and inherent. An invention is something, by definition, that comes out of nowhere (and we are thinking along the lines here of Derrida's dual concepts of l'avenir/futur and of the invention/discovery duality that he excavates in his presentation/essay 'Of the Aforementioned Human Genome Project'.

Warwick's previous incarnation was as a British Telecom engineer, so telephony is something close to his heard, and no doubt something that haunted him in his youth, as he looked forward to inventions he is currently inventing. The end of the age of invention, he will show is not over with.

Again as in footnote (***) above, Rickels in talking about vampires outlines an intimate historical relation between emergent technology and the occult, in the shape again of telepathy, and again, to continue a trend we seem to have set ourselves, within the helpful pedagogic language of the situated lecture format:

> It does not matter whether the fantasy corresponds to fact; if it is doing a number on you or inside you, it exists. Freud concluded that only his own discovery of the unconscious and the invention of gadgets of live transmission (his example is the telephone) had made it possible to comprehend such occult mechanisms as telepathy. In other words, only psychoanalysis understands vampirism in the context it shares with technology or unmourning. Psychoanalysis and vampirism are rival sciences of the undead (Rickels, The Vampire Lectures, p.32)

The vampire just as he breaks the temporal-historical rule of abiding-within-his-time also steals time in wishing to harbour it and uses the proper route also of familial communications technologies (which are obviously always historical, always furnishing a future) to divert proper energies:

> At the control panel we find the vampire, the incarnation of telepathy although, as with Hegel's questioning concerning clairvoyance, there are questions hanging over telepathy, we see a more disfigured-familial engineer at work in this figuration, than Rickels conveniently does here, though we can see his reasoning. And how and where does Count Dracula penetrate the west? What is his double point of entry? How are his signals first picked up close range even as his ship's off on the horizon? First his arrival is sensed by [or made to be sensed by?] Lucy…"

Not only then does the vampire steal or illicitly siphon-off a previously circulating blood that previously circulated in bodies proper and mortal for their own time (to steal the normally pumping or passing time and hold it static, as an improper prosthesis), he also steals and siphons-off the familial-blood circuitry of a telepathic communion that should belong and connect only to a Hegelian blood-friend lover. Dracula here is a sort of illicit virus-blood-hacker, hacking into the channels of love to secure a time that belongs to the other. In such a circuitry the vampire forms a powerful metaphor for the flipside or of a negative circuitry of the positive circuitry-of-the-sun.
A theoretically exciting book titled ‘The Telephone Book’ by Avital Ronnell considers these envoi issues with telephonic communication which is very much in the spirit of Derrida’s (non-moralistic) questions concerning tele-technologies. Far from de-distancing the possibility of crossed-wires these technologies hauntologically allude and denude the “certainty” of paths of communication all the more. Similarly in the film ghostdance Derrida does not allow the post-feudal age of information technology to prevent the summoning of the ghostly or of the monstrous.

For we would like to play with a thought experiment where a third party might hack (or be invited) into a couple’s tech-clair-voyant circuitry. Just as the pornographic industries are to be found prowling close-by in greeting the births of almost all media opportunities so, no doubt, we can visualize a newer way of experiencing porn where we plug, as somewhat ‘interactive’ audiences, into a couple’s sexual activity. In a scene reminiscent of Spielberg’s ‘Minority Report’ we might find certain dirty old men plugging into (via a Warwickian embedded chip with credit-card payment options attached) certain apparatuses that interface with the interior of certain tele-distinguished bodies. In terms of the, now remote, possibility of a partner circumventing the watchful panoptic gaze of the ‘blood-friend’ partner, one could foresee a ploy where a cheating spouse could convince their official blood-friend that they found the other to be pleasuring them through the devious syncing up a time where the person they really wanted to make love with was broadcasting their pleasure at the exact same time coordinate. What is to stop the official blood-friend from believing that it is them that is ‘supplying’ the transference of this signal-communication, rather than the one their partner would rather be with. “Were you thinking of someone else?”, might still then be a possibility in terms of a hacking-to-the-path-of-the-proper. Again, shades of the somewhat circuitous slidings from the gaze of the panopticon which remind one of Minority Report in steeling somebody else’s eyes to slip the iris identity gaze of a truth/identity-seeking state apparatus. And further outside of the proper-home of the blood-friend tech-clair-voyancing, could we not, somewhat perversely perhaps, vacariously be-towards-someone-else’s-death by embedding a chip in certain suicidal bodies in something not altogether different to a taped or filmed suicide (this latter has been attempted on YouTube). Interesting as these apparatuses would no doubt be, such secondary or even primary identification (as in the cinema) is never so easily transposable, as do we ever truly identify with ourselves before we come to gaze? But there are further issues that take us into the vicinity of the (Austinian) performance of “the promise” and of any other first-person performatives, that depend upon the notion of an isolable causally responsible agency enveloped or wrapped up within their own secure decision-making apparatuses. Following again further through the territory of these two rather frivolous thought experiments on thought-transfer, will there be any future need for the “I do” of the marriage ceremony, or further of the sexual intercourse that performatively secures the bond within its very securing (thus in this latter case obviating the very thing which the apparatus was invented to augment)? “I do”, as Derrida points out in SEC, only accomplishes the intentional transposal of an “itself” by also simultaneously allowing itself to not accomplish itself. As soon as there is no need for the “I do”, because there is not now any uncertainty of intention that would need the “transmission” of an expressive-indicative “I do”, there is also no longer the thing itself. For how can the thing exist outside also of its possible integral failure. Such is the strange logic of the performative which Derrida uncovered within Austin’s impressive lecture course upon the (excitable) saying that does things.