Introduction
Collaborative approaches to policy and decision-making have become increasingly popular within tourism settings, leading to calls for analytical tools to assist with research. Although researchers have examined collaborative and stakeholder participatory exercises from a number of theoretical perspectives, for the most part evaluation of collaboration tends to be descriptive. However authors continue to assert the need for further development of theoretical frameworks that are capable of addressing wider outcomes of collaborations (Jamal & McDonald, 2011). In particular understanding power relations is considered essential if examination of stakeholder groups is to avoid reaching possibly ‘deceptive’ conclusions according to Bickerstaff & Walker (2005).

This paper is concerned with developing an analytical framework that considers the nature of power within collaborative and participatory processes. Authors have repeatedly referred to the relevance of power within stakeholder groups and collaborations (Gill, 2007). Specifically Everett and Jamal (2004:58) have noted that “the incomplete nature of the work in the area of collaboration is readily apparent in the area of power,” partly due to the difficulty associated with defining power. They consider that the complexity of power relations within collaborations requires “a framework sensitive to … multidimensionality” (Everett & Jamal, 2004:58) rather than a focus on a specific source of power such as resources. This fits with the complexity inherent in the background to collaboration and participation, as Gray (cited in Bramwell & Sharman, 1999:393) suggests that “collaboration occurs when the problem is complex and a single organization cannot solve it on its own.”

Participatory processes exist in a variety of forms, including partnerships, cooperation, collaboration and “various types and scales of community participation” (Timothy, 2007:200). However the underlying purpose seems to be to bring together interest groups (stakeholders) in order to develop a common approach to their problem domain. Consultation exercises are described as a form of
stakeholder inclusion although the level of stakeholder involvement is tokenistic and unlikely to lead to change (Timothy, 2007). Conversely participation may be genuinely inclusive if stakeholders share the responsibility (and benefits) of policy and decision-making (Timothy, 2007). In addition, achievement of this level of participation assumes that stakeholders’ decisions are implemented.

The concept of stakeholder participation developed from the literature surrounding strategic management, and the purpose behind stakeholder inclusion in private sector business was the improved effectiveness and efficiency of the organisation. Through the inclusion of stakeholders it was argued that shareholders would ultimately benefit from the better manageability of the business (Scholl, 2001). Rowley has viewed organisation/stakeholder relationships as competitive and argues that the “density of the stakeholder network surrounding an organization and the organization’s centrality in the network influence its degree of resistance to stakeholder demands” (1997:888). Furthermore Rowley suggests that a dense network of stakeholders will be better equipped to resist the organisation’s pressures (1997). This interpretation of organisation/stakeholder relationships requiring each to withstand the pressures from the other does not imply the presence of collaboration and empowerment that has been hoped for in the tourism policy-making literature.

There is broad agreement that stakeholders need not be restricted to any particular class of entity: they can be individuals, groups, organisations and even the environment itself (Mitchell et al, 1997). However in order to provide an effective management tool and avoid unmanageable numbers of participants, it can be expected that an organisation would involve only those stakeholders that pose a threat to the financial well-being of the company. Consideration of the legitimacy of claims to a ‘stake’ in organisations led to a number of models designed to assist in stakeholder identification (Mitchell et al, 1997; Friedman & Miles, 2002). Perhaps paradoxically Hardy and Phillips consider that stakeholders “require sufficient power to demonstrate that they have a ‘legitimate’ right to participate”
(1998:220) suggesting that legitimacy would not be present in a ‘powerless’ stakeholder’s claim.

Within tourism policy and decision-making the inclusion of stakeholder participation processes has been widely considered to lead to empowerment that is beneficial for participants (Church & Coles, 2007). In this context empowerment is seen to occur through the transfer of power to stakeholders (Timothy, 2007) and assumes that they initially participate from a position of powerlessness (Church & Coles, 2007). Typically empowerment is discussed in relation to developing countries and Timothy (2007) refers to ‘meaningful participation’ (which assumes genuine involvement of stakeholders by government) as “perhaps the most common level of empowerment in the developed world” (Timothy, 2007:203). In this paper the processes being discussed are situated within the developed world and some of the participating stakeholders are drawn from interest groups that may be perceived as empowered, such as landowners.

Power is often identified as a resource for participatory processes, and also is directly related to discussion surrounding the empowerment of participants in stakeholder groups. However tourism literature frequently fails to examine its other features more closely (Jamal & Getz, 1999). When considering existing research into participative ventures, it has been noted that some authors have used the term ‘power’ without being clear whether they perceive it as a construct of “influence, authority, persuasion, dissuasion, inducement, coercion, compulsion, force ...” (Dahl, 1986:40). The assumption is made that readers will understand the meaning(s) imputed to the word. However in order to develop an in-depth understanding of how power affects stakeholder groups, the alternative forms that power takes have been considered.

The perceptions of power detailed by Dahl (1986) suggest that sensitivity to both covert and overt aspects of power is appropriate in the complex environment of stakeholder participation in a developed country. Initial examination of the data
considered in this study indicated that Lukes’s three-dimensional view of power (2005) is sensitive to features of the participation processes discussed in this paper. It has been noted that Lukes’s view of power focuses on the concept of persuading the less powerful to conspire in their own domination by adopting the interests of the powerful as their own (Heyward, 2007). This approach suggested a basis for an analytical framework that may be extended appropriately.

**Developing an analytical Framework relating to Power**

It has been noted by Hall (2003) that the possibility of some stakeholders being more likely than others to achieve their chosen outcomes indicates that the subject of power should be examined, at least from the perspective of imbalanced power relations among the stakeholders. Power is described as particularly relevant where there are efforts to influence policy-making (Hall, 2003) although sources of power are diverse and may exist even among apparently marginalised stakeholders (Coles & Scherle, 2007). For example, the use of persuasion, ingratiation, emotion and intimidation have all been typified as tactics aimed at achieving specific outcomes and indicative of alternative sources of power (Coles & Scherle, 2007). However empirical research into power is particularly complex given this variety of sources, and it may not be possible to establish causal links between all the possible tactics and the outcomes (Dahl, 1986).

Silva (2007) considers the lack of suitable frameworks for the analysis of power in the study of the role of power in the management of information systems (Silva, 2007). In this case Silva compares phenomenology, critical theory and structuration theory but all are found to have limitations as they “do not contain a concrete theory that analytically conceptualizes power in terms of its components and that directs researchers to the concrete pieces of data they need” (Silva, 2007:174). Structuration theory contains aspects that are relevant to the study of collaborative exercises. However the criticism that structuration theory fails to make links “between theory and data” (Silva, 2007:173) highlights the problems associated
with identifying a “theoretical framework for the study of power that incorporates epistemological principles” (Silva, 2007:175).

Similar issues arise when attempting to incorporate Foucauldian concepts into studies of power in collaborative exercises. Foucault stated that the power relations in which humans find themselves are involved and complex (1982). He also stated that there are no tools to assist with the analysis of power relations but we must rely on ‘ways’ of thinking (Foucault, 1982). Generally analysis of power necessarily concentrates on limited aspects of stakeholder groups and cannot examine all aspects in one study. Foucault recognised this complexity in the analysis of power with the suggestion that it would be preferable to commence analysis with the ‘forms of resistance’ against power (1982). This perspective may be capable of creating a practical boundary for research as it would enable the researcher to look for identifiable resistance instead of having to examine each possible aspect of power for its relevance.

If power resides in achieving outcomes then identifying who benefits from the outcome may provide a way of establishing a link back to the exercise of power (Lukes, 1986). Bachrach and Baratz contend that “to exercise power is to prevail over the contrary preferences of others, with respect to ‘key issues’” (cited in Lukes, 1986:9). However the selection of “which issues come up for decision” (Lukes, 1986:9) is also an exercise of power. Lukes expands on Bachrach and Baratz’s concept and argues that “power may operate to shape and modify desires and beliefs in a manner contrary to people’s interests” (1986:10). This indicates a potentially covert exercise of power since if it is carried out overtly it is likely that ‘people’ would reject the modification of their beliefs.

A key factor in policy and decision-making processes is the identification of topics to be considered – as in agenda-setting for example. This is also associated with naming problems (Bickerstaff & Walker, 2005; Hardy & Phillips, 1998), and is perceived to be power related. Furthermore Shepsle and Weingast (1981) refer to
the possibility of unrestricted manipulation of outcomes by the individual in charge of setting the agenda. Such a situation permits control of the topics under discussion and also may limit the extent to which they are discussed in meetings. Hardy and Phillips have considered three aspects of power in their study of interorganisational domains (1998). These are “formal authority, the control of critical resources and discursive legitimacy” (Hardy & Phillips, 1998:219). All of these aspects may be visible and formally bestowed and consequently observable. For example, legitimate authority is conferred upon those who are authorised to organise a participatory group. This visible formal authority is present in their capacity to structure the membership and its meetings.

Bachrach and Baratz introduced concepts such as non decision-making (1962) and restricting decision-making to “relatively ‘safe’ issues” (1962:394) - which directly relates to “the ability to ‘set the agenda’” (Heyward, 2007:48). Hall describes non decisions as a way of suppressing demands for change (2003) in the context of community decision-making. However there is an inherent difficulty in studying the concept of issues “organized into politics while others are organized out” (Schattschneider cited in Bachrach & Baratz, 1962:396) as it involves speculation regarding intent, rather than measurable data.

Since Lukes (2005) has brought together aspects such as ‘Agenda-Setting’ and ‘Non Decisions’, his views of power are examined in greater depth to determine whether they translate into an analytical framework suitable for the examination of stakeholder groups. Lukes’s three-dimensional view of power focuses on the ability to persuade the less powerful to conspire in their own domination by adopting the interests of the powerful as their own (Heyward, 2007). This view has been found to concentrate on the exercise of power that is specifically ‘power over’ others (Morriss, 2006). Lukes has considered the use of the Latin words ‘Potentia’ and ‘Potestas’ by Spinoza when distinguishing between ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ as separate variations of the concept of power (Lukes, 2005). Since ‘Potentia’ is translated as having the power “‘to exist and act’” (Lukes, 2005:73) it appears
that ‘power to’ has greater relevance to the concept of empowerment applicable to
groups involving communities and stakeholders than ‘power over’. Self
determination is implicit in having the power “to exist and act” (Lukes, 2005:73)
and accordingly, the removal of potential will be referred to as Depotentia for the
purpose of this paper. Use of the term ‘Depotentia’ does not call for analysis of
motive or intent and consequently, this simplifies examination of the concept.

The three–dimensional view of power identified by Lukes is summarised as focusing on:

“a) decision-making and control over political agenda (not necessarily through
decisions)
b) issues and potential issues
c) observable (overt or covert), and latent conflict
d) subjective and real interests.” (Lukes, 2005:29)

As with the concepts discussed by Bachrach and Baratz the difficulty of researching
Lukes’s three–dimensional view of power is that it also requires study of “what
does not happen” (Hall, 2003:106). However it is possible to reverse the lens on the
subject and study non empowerment (or depotentia) as ‘what does happen’. This
offers commonality between aspects of ‘non’ power that is not available to the
study of power.

Testing of analytical Framework
This framework has been tested on the data provided through a survey conducted by
the Countryside and Community Research Unit in 2005. The participatory groups
that were surveyed in this instance, were all the Local Access Forums in England
that were created as a result of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000
(CROW 2000) with the purpose of facilitating implementation of aspects of CROW
2000 at local level. Members of LAFs were selected by the appointing authorities
for their particular knowledge of the access issues in the countryside or for their
memberhip of a particularly affected group of stakeholders, such as landowners.
In this context LAFs are viewed as a type of stakeholder group within the broad range identified by Timothy (2007). In 2005 the Countryside Agency and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) appointed the Countryside and Community Research Unit (CCRU) of the University of Gloucestershire to investigate and report on the progress of LAFs in England since their inception (Short et al, 2005). Concern had been expressed by a number of LAFs regarding their role and the research was commissioned in response to that concern. The outcome of the report was that revised guidelines for LAFs were issued in 2007 (Defra, 2007).

The methodology employed by the consultants was to carry out “a desk study of the material available on each LAF, a questionnaire survey of LAF members and secretaries and the officers of the appointing authorities (AAs) and case study interviews in 16 varying situations” (Short et al, 2005: i). The research was addressed to all 81 LAFs in England and included a questionnaire that sought the views of LAF members, LAF secretaries and the officers of the appointing authorities – “but with as many identical questions as possible to permit comparison between the three groups” (Short et al, 2005: 14). The members’ survey drew 313 responses from 61 LAFs; 48 LAF secretaries and 55 officers of appointing authorities (Short et al, 2005).

The background to forming LAFs under CROW 2000 lies in the ongoing disputes regarding rights of access to the countryside in England. Landowners and those wishing to carry out leisure activities in the countryside have continuously disagreed on the provision of access throughout the twentieth century. CROW 2000 provided for open access to heath, moor, mountain and registered common land, and is the most recent of a long series of regulatory measures which acknowledged the ‘right to roam’. However, legislating for public access to privately owned land inevitably affected the rights of landowners and also created concerns regarding their responsibilities to the public. During House of Commons debates relating to CROW 2000, the rights of land owners and managers were...
repeatedly acknowledged by the Minister (Hansard, cols 21, 22, 25 & 27, 1999). The resulting legislation incorporated a broad range of issues that divided into the main areas of:

- Part I Access to open country
- Part II Rights of way
- Part III Sites of Special Scientific Interest
- Part IV Areas of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB)
- Part V Local Access Forums - advisory bodies established by local highway authorities or, where relevant, national park authorities.

During the announcement by the Minister, the Local Access Forums were identified as a means of minimising the compulsory aspect of the law:

“I have made it absolutely clear that we want minimum compulsion to be used. I favour the local access forums, which will be fully representative of all interests.” (Hansard, col 25, 1999)

As the forums are created to conform with the requirements of legislation, they are structured by the formal authority of national government, as referred to by Hardy and Phillips (1998). However, in LAFs, authority is also delegated to local government and national park authorities (access/appointing authorities), as their task is to implement the legislation, but they are permitted to vary in their interpretations of specified details. Nonetheless, national government has retained the authority to alter the future organisation and behaviour of forums.

The survey found that the average number of members on forums is 17 in national parks and county council LAFs (Short et al, 2005). Usually, five of these members represent land ownership interests. The members typically have entered the selection process either through responding to adverts, or by being invited to apply by the appointing authority or an interested organisation.
Discussion

Restriction upon the stakeholders who are entitled to participate (Hardy & Phillips, 1998) has been observed by researchers as a form of power. Such aspects of formal authority are present in the selection process administered by the organisers of forums. The exact structure of a LAF under CROW 2000 is decided by the access/appointing authority with the broad restriction that forums should be ‘balanced’. This is an example of a detail that is left to the access authorities’ interpretation of the legislation. In the case of LAFs the general composition is indicated in the legislation and land owners have been specified for inclusion. However the vagueness of the regulations applicable to other interest areas may mean that secondary interests are capable of undermining formally conferred legitimacy. In addition constraints upon the structure of the LAFs may occur through the membership application process. This has been indicated as an issue in the ‘quality’ of available volunteers:

“Because membership is voluntary and nobody can be forced to join, LAFs will always be vulnerable to a lack of interest and therefore a lack of quality in membership.” (Short et al, 2005:35)

In contrast, the organisers may identify and select from the volunteers the members that they perceive to be most likely to assist with their own aims for the LAFs:

“Many LAFs wrestled with the question of a balanced representation. In the case of one LAF they appointed members on the basis of their diversity, preferring ‘the 4x4 driver with a degree in tourism’ to someone more specialist.” (Short et al, 2005:36)

Members of LAFs have been found to be drawn from backgrounds with careers as landowners, self employed business people, a retired surveyor, Duke of Edinburgh Awards assessor and Rural Payment Agency inspector (Cumberland News, 2008). Consequently they do not fit the perception of stakeholders that occupy a position of powerlessness (Church & Coles, 2007). However in the report prepared by Short et al in 2005 it was found that members experienced feelings of powerlessness that would not be expected in groups intended to be empowering:
“Feeling of Powerlessness
7.32 … This feeling arose as a result of:

• uncertainty over the role they have to play;
• perceived lack of opportunities, so far, to affect access management;
• perceived lack of resources (staff resources to run the LAF and financial resources to implement work – especially actions proposed within the emerging RoWIP);
• a preponderance of agenda items that are too remote from the local situation (for example, the third most frequent agenda item across the country was discussion of government consultation papers, yet many felt that they had little influence over such matters).” (Short et al, 2005:50)

Members may depotentiate themselves internally through being reactive to the organisers and permitting them to control the stakeholder groups, rather than members taking control of the process themselves according to the report:

“Other LAFs commented on how overwhelmingly reactive they are, to both government consultation papers and to AA (access/appointing authorities) plans and proposals. Being proactive takes up more time than is often available at meetings, although there may be individuals amongst the membership who are willing to invest more time.” (Short et al, 2005:38)

It has already been noted that members have backgrounds associated with business and professional careers. These do not always permit them to have sufficient free time for proactive involvement in LAFs. Nonetheless the outcome is that members do not control agenda-setting and naming of problems; rather, it is mainly controlled by national government and the appointing authorities.

An external source of depotentiation for the LAFs is the lack of funding available to implement decisions that may be made in meetings, partly due to the constraints of access authorities’ budgets. However national government has had a depotentiating effect through not providing additional funding for these purposes:

“Invariably, increased resources were on the aspirational agenda of many LAFs. Increased funding to improve the secretariat would be useful, and
In the implementation of CROW 2000, national government has stated the amount of additional funding to be made available. This has allowed it to retain a level of control over financial resources. Local government is able to prioritise certain expenditure within its remit and consequently it also exercises some control over financial resources, but neither level of government has complete control of finances.

Additional sources of depotentia are present where the organisers are reluctant to engage with the participation process. This has been referred to as a ‘tick box approach’ in the report by Short et al:

“In some areas it seems that the side effect of the statutory basis for forming LAFs is a response by the AA (access/appointing authority) to undertake the ‘bare minimum’. This ‘tick box’ approach impacts on the effectiveness of the LAF as it is rarely incorporated into the existing structure nor is the existing structure adapted to receive it. The concern about the AAs not taking LAFs seriously was mentioned a number of times. Cases were mentioned where the advice from LAFs was heard but there seemed to be a perception, from secretaries and officers and well as members that it would not be taken seriously.” (Short et al, 2005:45)

In addition it has been found that organisers fail to implement recommendations made by the LAFs, adding to the external sources of depotentia affecting the groups:

“There was a mixed picture among the three surveys but it is clear that a significant number from each survey feel that the AA (access/appointing authority) do not take account of the advice and recommendations received from the LAF.” (Short et al, 2005:33)

As in the case of ‘organising out’ issues, it is unlikely that non decision-making (or non implementation of decisions) would be explicitly identified as an objective of stakeholder groups. However Mills (cited in Lukes, 2005) argues that non
decisions or failure to make decisions, by those in a position to do so may be often of more consequence than the actual decisions that are made.

Jamal and Getz (1999), as part of their study of Canmore in Canada, examined the concept of consensus. In that case they found that in order to be invited to take part, stakeholders had to be known to be willing to compromise. This aspect of ‘consensus’ may be indicative of deeper issues that require investigation within the stakeholder selection stage, if there is an implication that prospective participants must comply with predetermined attitudes before they may join a stakeholder group. In addition Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) have found that despite the implication that consensus and collaboration would be expected to be evident where there is a partnership or network (Lowndes & Skelcher, 1998), in reality, the competitive compulsion undermines the process. Such competition between interests has been indicated in LAFs:

“5.37 … Between a quarter and a third of LAF members across all types felt that there was polarisation within the LAF. Officers thought there was in joint and some county LAFs while secretaries felt this was true of half of the urban and county LAFs. In terms of a dominant interest group this was considered less likely in all three surveys with the highest levels, between a third and a quarter) in county LAFs. Given the higher likelihood of access land in these areas and the tension among stakeholders this is perhaps not surprising. Respondents were asked to indicate the interest group concerned and they tended to refer to a variety of specific interest groups suggesting group dynamics is important.” (Short et al, 2005:30)

However there is also the possibility of pressure on stakeholders from their own interest groups as well as other stakeholders competing for resources. Church and Ravenscroft (2007) noted that stakeholders compete within their own interest area if they consider the rights they have acquired will be lost by over use.
Table 1: Analytical Framework

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SOURCES OF DEPOTENTIA</th>
<th>EXTERNALLY IMPOSED</th>
<th>INTERNALLY PERPETUATED</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DECISION MAKING, NON DECISIONS AND OUTCOMES</td>
<td>ADVICE NOT ALWAYS TAKEN</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BARE MINIMUM</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NON IMPLEMENTATION</td>
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<td></td>
<td>LACK OF FUNDING</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGENDA-SETTING</td>
<td>MAINLY CONTROLLED EXTERNALLY</td>
<td>REACTIVE</td>
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<td>CONFLICT</td>
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<td>STRUCTURE</td>
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<td></td>
<td>BALANCE OF INTERESTS</td>
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Summarising the issues discussed in this section has enabled the sources of depotentia to be specifically identified in Table 1. The issues indicated by the data have been coded into groups developed from Lukes’s three-dimensional view of power (2005). Notably external sources of depotentia relating to decision-making are summarised into the areas of the access authorities’ failure to take the advice of LAFs, or to perform the bare minimum (as in the ‘tick-box’ approach). Furthermore the access authorities may not implement the decisions made by LAFs, although this may be due to a lack of available funding through their wider policy or through lack of government provision. External sources of depotentia are also indicated in the area of agenda-setting as this is mainly controlled externally. However LAF members can also contribute internally to their depotentia through the reactive nature of their participation. An additional source of internally perpetuated depotentia is in the area of conflict through competition between interests. Finally external sources of depotentia are indicated through the structure of the LAFs as access authorities control both the selection of members and the interpretation of ‘balance of interests’.

Conclusion

In the environment of stakeholder groups within UK tourism policy-making and planning it appears from the application of this perspective that depotentia (and
conversely empowerment) arises from several sources. Extending Lukes’s three-dimensional view of power (2005) has confirmed that empowerment can be removed from stakeholder groups through external influences and by the stakeholder participants themselves. Since Lukes’s three-dimensional view of power (2005) was not specifically created to be applied to stakeholder groups it is appropriate that it should be extended. Although participants may not have adopted the interest of the powerful as their own, as envisaged by Lukes, they can still conspire in their own non empowerment through perpetuating non empowering practices. Depotentia exists within situations such as non decision-making, non implementation of decisions, organising issues out of the agenda, the structure of the group and conflict. Initial responsibility for these aspects rests with external governmental organisations but the stakeholders can still reduce their empowerment if they allow the ‘competitive urge’ to affect their relationships with other interest areas. Theorising about depotentia in stakeholder groups in this context rests upon the notion that it is possible to identify relationships between the ‘political will’ of both internal and external interest groups and the aspects of depotentia. However the main value of this analytical framework lies in its relevance to the multidimensional nature of power in stakeholder participation.

It has been observed that the stakeholder groups in this research have not been composed of individuals seeking empowerment. The members are apparently educated, empowered people in the main. It has been conspicuous that in contrast to the expectation of empowerment within LAFs, power has been effectively removed (depotentia). In order to achieve the aims of participation organisers must be willing to permit empowerment to be achieved and also they must take account of secondary interests of potential participants in order to minimise the possibility of alliances against minority interests. It appears that national government requires local government to be willing partners by permitting forums to influence them, in line with the revised guidance (Defra, 2007). Considerations such as this resonate with the stakeholder theory concept in management literature. In that environment stakeholder relationships with the organisation are perceived to be competitive. In
this study the access authorities’ resistance to full engagement with LAFs suggests that stakeholder participation in governance is competitive in the same way that is indicated in the management and organisational literature.

From the perspective of policy-making, the framework may assist organisers to reduce the experimental nature of participatory groups. The framework could be suitably developed so that it can be considered in participatory exercises in advance of implementation, enabling participants and organisers to evaluate whether the exercise will provide the degree of empowerment that was anticipated. If policy makers are able to remove aspects of depotentia prior to implementation then there may also be a financial saving as flaws in the process will not need to be removed later. In addition stakeholders may not become disillusioned with the process and this could lead to wider involvement in future projects if stakeholders do not expect the process to be ‘tokenistic’, as occurs in consultation exercises (Timothy, 2007).

There is a risk associated with the occurrence of depotentia that stakeholders may withdraw from participatory exercises. Withdrawal of prospective members will add to the problems experienced by appointing authorities, where forums already have some interest areas with a shortage of recruits. This will inevitably affect the constitution of a ‘balanced’ forum. The research suggests that further consideration should be given to the question of what constitutes balanced stakeholder groups, if the interpretation of a ‘balanced’ forum permits some interest areas to be represented by a minority of one in order to maintain diversity in the membership.
References


Hansard (Commons) HC Deb, 8 March 1999, Vol.327, cols.21, 22, 25, 27


