Appropriate emotions and the metaphysics of time

Pearson, Olley (2018) Appropriate emotions and the metaphysics of time. Philosophical Studies, 175 (8). pp. 1945-1961. ISSN 0031-8116

Full content URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0944-z

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Appropriate emotions and the metaphysics of time
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Abstract

Prior used our emotions to argue that tensed language cannot be translated by tenseless language. However, it is widely accepted that Mellor and MacBeath have shown that our emotions do not imply the existence of tensed facts. I criticise this orthodoxy. There is a natural and plausible view of the appropriateness of emotions which in combination with Prior’s argument implies the existence of tensed facts. The Mellor/MacBeath position does nothing to upset this natural view and therefore is not sufficient to block one drawing conclusions for the metaphysics of time from the nature of our emotions.

Keywords:metaphysics
Subjects:V Historical and Philosophical studies > V500 Philosophy
Divisions:College of Arts
ID Code:36693
Deposited On:27 Aug 2019 08:36

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