Chapter 6 Robust Against Whom?

Cowen, Nick (2018) Chapter 6 Robust Against Whom? In: Austrian Economics: The Next Generation. Advances in Austrian Economics, 23 . Emerald Publishing Limited, pp. 91-111. ISBN UNSPECIFIED

Full content URL: http://doi.org/10.1108/S1529-213420180000023008

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Chapter 6 Robust Against Whom?

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Abstract

Robust political economy (RPE) is a research program that combines insights from Austrian economics and public choice to evaluate the performance of institutions in cases of limited knowledge and limited altruism, or “worst-case scenarios.” Many critics of RPE argue that it is too narrowly focused on the bad motivations and inadequacies of social actors while smuggling in classical liberal normative commitments as part of a purported solution to these problems. This chapter takes a different tack by highlighting the ways that RPE as currently understood may not be robust against particularly bad conduct. It suggests that depending on the parameters of what constitutes a worst-case scenario, classical liberal institutions, especially a minimal state, may turn out to be less robust than some conservative or social democratic alternatives.

Keywords:robust political economy, public choice, tuism, altruism, perverse preferences, minimal state
Subjects:L Social studies > L190 Economics not elsewhere classified
L Social studies > L170 Economic Systems
L Social studies > L150 Political Economics
C Biological Sciences > C880 Social Psychology
L Social studies > L210 Political Theories
Divisions:College of Social Science > School of Social & Political Sciences
ID Code:36355
Deposited On:03 Jul 2019 14:23

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