The Behaviour and Evolution of Boko Haram: A Multi-Level Analysis

Solomon Timothy Anjide

A Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirement of the University of Lincoln for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

School of Social and Political Sciences, College of Social Science

November 2018
Declaration

I declare that this thesis has been undertaken for the sole purpose of the award of PhD International Relations at the University of Lincoln and it has not been submitted previously or concurrently for the award of any degree. This thesis is the product of my own investigation, with any other material used in writing this thesis having been fully acknowledged and referenced. I accept any errors committed by commission or omission.
Abstract

Boko Haram (BH) has transformed from a small group living in isolation to a large-scale terrorist movement. Academics and policy makers suggest that BH seeks to substitute Nigeria’s secular state with a strict Islamic system, while BH’s violent campaign has spilled over to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. Existing studies have suggested that socioeconomic deprivation along with religion and counter terrorism (CT) sustain BH’s violence, with these studies having concentrated on the causes and consequences of BH terrorism.

Terrorist behaviour is dynamic, and thus the ever-changing nature of terrorist behaviour requires groups such as BH to be studied over time both internally and externally in order to have an in-depth understanding of a terror group.

This thesis is a case study on BH. It investigates how the behaviour of BH has influenced its evolution from a small isolationist movement to a large-scale violent group. The study provides a multi-level analysis on the role of internal and external factors on the evolution of BH. The multi-level analysis is used to examine the behaviour and evolution of BH through individual, group, state, sub-national and international levels of explanations.

A mixed methods case study approach is applied in examining BH and their strategic choices. These methods include documents, statistics and a qualitative technique of semi-structured interviews with some senior Nigerian government officials and experts on BH. Additionally, it employs the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) comparative method to assess the variation in BH violence.

The findings of this thesis extend beyond the conventional linkage of BH to poverty, religion and illiteracy. They instead provide explanations on the strategic choices, intensity of violence and changing tactics of BH.

This thesis illustrates that different aspects of terrorist behaviour determine the evolution of a terrorist group. The behaviour of terrorist groups relates to their ability to function, and without one aspect of such behaviour, other explanations will be incomplete, therefore making any investigation through a single unit simplistic. The study suggests that multi-level analysis provides a strong methodological advantage in terrorism research. Its flexibility enables the application of more theories and empirical studies for a more systematic and critical debate in terrorism research. The study recommends areas for policy actions and future research on BH.
Acknowledgements

My profound gratitude goes to my supervisors, Andrew Defty, Kaisa Hinkkainen and Adèle Langlois, whose patience, encouragement and guidance have been instrumental in my intellectual growth. I remain grateful to them for not only supporting me in the completion of my Ph.D., but for unlocking my potential and installing in me a passion for academic study. My esteem gratitude to my Ph.D. examiners, Dr. Rob Dover and Prof. Heather Hughes for their valuable suggestions towards the success of this thesis and my intellectual growth.

My earnest gratitude also goes to the School of Social and Political Science for providing me with a friendly atmosphere in which I could develop in the aspects of teaching and research. I also cannot express enough thanks to Jacqui Briggs, Peter Somerville, Joshua Skoyslis, Louisa Parks, Yee-Wah Foo and Sue Bond-Taylor, to mention but a few, for their encouragement and goodwill.

The University of Lincoln has been kind to me. I have met a number of great friends from different countries around the world such as Yasmina Abou-Hilal, Zamira Noh, Hadiza Abdulrahman, Michael Ilevababor, Kieran Richardson, Ikenna Leornad, Abednego Jatau and numerous others whose unquantifiable levels of friendship will constantly remind me of the joy and beauty of friendship across religious, racial and ideological divides.

I am appreciative of my mentors and benefactors Dr. Rose Kela, Dr. Aliyu Akwe Doma, Prof. Onje Gye-Wado, Kaisa Hinkkainen, Amb. Samuel Jimba, Gen. Mohammed Kabir Galadanchi, Barr. Labaran Magaji, Krijn Peters, Barr. Innocent Lagi, Dr. Kamaludeen Kabir Kastina, Ignatius Anjide, Juliana Shammah, Justina Anjiode, Hussein Sunadari Adamu, Architects Mustapha Bimbo Suraj and Ahmed Buba whose numerous acts of kindness have inspired me to commit myself to the service of humanity whenever I find myself.

My deepest gratitude goes to my family for sponsoring my Ph.D. programme. Many thanks go to my mother Lily Anjide and my siblings John, Alex, Tessy and Mariah. My unending gratitude goes to my mentor and father Mr. Timothy Anjide, whose untiring quest for knowledge combined with humility and selfless service to humanity remains my cardinal philosophy of life. Finally, I give God the glory for blessing me through my friends, family, mentors and benefactors.
6.1 Nigeria’s CT: complexities, policy and strategies.................................................................131
6.2 The introduction of NACTEST and the inclusion of a nonviolent approach to Nigeria’s CT...........................................................................................................135
6.3 Nigerian state versus Boko Haram ........................................................................................139
6.4 Assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of Nigeria’s counter terrorism approach on Boko Haram ........................................................................................................152
6.5 Chapter Conclusions ............................................................................................................154

Chapter 7: Sub-National Level .....................................................................................................157
7.1 Similarities between cases .......................................................................................................160
7.2 Variation in frequency of target types in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states ......................165
   7.2.1 People and private property.........................................................................................169
   7.2.2 State forces ................................................................................................................170
   7.2.3 Education/religious figures and institutions ...............................................................171
   7.2.4 Government buildings and non-military officials ......................................................172
   7.2.5 Other incidences .........................................................................................................173
7.3 Discussion and conclusions .................................................................................................173

Chapter 8: International Influences .............................................................................................176
8.1 Radicalisation of BH: combinations of state, regional and international narratives........180
8.2 Opportunities for violent extremism ....................................................................................186
8.3 Spillover to neighbouring countries .....................................................................................189
   8.3.1 Historical ties and geographical proximity.................................................................190
   8.3.2 Similar narratives of Islam .........................................................................................193
   8.3.3 Regional instability .....................................................................................................194
   8.3.4 Geographical features ...............................................................................................195
   8.3.5 Technological advances .............................................................................................195
   8.3.6 External intervention ..................................................................................................196
8.4 Discussion/conclusion ...........................................................................................................201

Chapter 9: Conclusions .................................................................................................................205
9.1 Findings .................................................................................................................................206
9.2 Policy implications ...............................................................................................................216
9.3 Avenues for future research ...............................................................................................220
9.4 Contributions .......................................................................................................................221
9.6 Concluding remarks ............................................................................................................223
Bibliography ...............................................................................................................................225

Appendix 1: Interview participants (description, location and dates of interviews) ................266
Appendix 2: A sample of the interview request letter ...............................................................267
Appendix 3: Interview schedule ...............................................................................................269
Appendix 4: Sample of the consent form ..................................................................................272
List of Tables

Table 4.1: Percentages and number of attacks of target choice under different BH leaders

Table 6.1: Timeline of Nigeria’s violent counter terrorism actions.

Table 7.2: Similarities and deprivation indicators between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe (statistics data of the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, sourced from Knoema website).

Table 7.3: Percentages and number of Boko Haram attacks on different target types (data obtained from the GTD).

Table 7.4: Percentages of attacks on each target type across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states.

Table 8.1: Boko Haram's attacks outside of Nigeria.
List of figures

Figure 4.1: Structure of BH leadership in 2013 ......................................................... 83
Figure 4.2: Divisions and unity after the death of Mohammed Yusuf ......................... 86
Figure 4.3: BH casualties under different leadership figures: 2009-2015 ..................... 88
Figure 5.1: Map of Nigeria showing the state and LGA branches of BH ..................... 99
Figure 5.2: Organisational structure of BH ................................................................. 101
Figure 5.3: Reasons for changes in the organisational structure of BH ....................... 102
Figure 5.4: Map of Nigeria showing Lake Chad region, the three border states and Nigeria's neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Chad and Niger) ...................... 104
Figure 5.5: BH's strategies and opportunities for recruitment: voluntary and conscription .......................................................... 110
Figure 6.1: Intensity of violent responses by Boko Haram to state counter terrorism ......................................................................................................................... 151
Figure 7.1: Map of Nigeria showing the proximities of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe to each other .............................................................................................................. 161
Figure 8.1: Factors responsible for the radicalisation of Boko Haram ....................... 184
## Acronyms, abbreviations and translations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adaiduala sahu</td>
<td>Religious policy against social vices practiced in Kano Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGF</td>
<td>Attorney General of Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmadyya</td>
<td>Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s school of thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahl al-sunna wa-l-jama’a-wa-l hijra</td>
<td>Community of Sunna adherents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almajiri</td>
<td>Young Quranic students or apostles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almajirai</td>
<td>Plural of almajiri</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almajiranci</td>
<td>Almajiri system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Almuhajiroun</td>
<td>A migrant in search of Islamic knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Murabitoon</td>
<td>Islamist groups in Mali, Algeria, Libya and Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Qaeda</td>
<td>An Islamist group with networks across continents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>An affiliate of Al Qaeda in Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir</td>
<td>Leader of an Islamic movement, society or country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amir ul-Aam</td>
<td>The title of Boko Haram’s leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar</td>
<td>A violent Salafist group in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansaru</td>
<td>Former faction of Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APD</td>
<td>Antisocial Personality Disorders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aqida/aqeedah</td>
<td>Creed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al Qaeda in the Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATA</td>
<td>Anti-terrorism Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BH</td>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BVN</td>
<td>Bank Verification Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAN</td>
<td>Christian Association of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBN</td>
<td>Central Bank of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEP</td>
<td>Counter Extremism Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>the American Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Civilian Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSOs</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVE</td>
<td>Counter Violent Extremism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Darul Tawheed</em></td>
<td>The abode of monotheism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Da‘wah</em></td>
<td>Islamic evangelism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCCN</td>
<td>Da‘awah Coordination Committee of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSS</td>
<td>Department of State Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dajjal</td>
<td>Anti-Christ who will appear at the end of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>A defunct group of political thugs in Borno state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFCC</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Crimes Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fasiqun</em></td>
<td>Wrongdoers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBOs</td>
<td>Faith Based Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMWAN</td>
<td>Federation of Muslim women in Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDI</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSS</td>
<td>Government Secondary School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTD</td>
<td>Global Terrorism Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Hazihi Aqeedatun-wa Minhaju Da‘awatuna</em></td>
<td>Our creed, what we believe in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imam</td>
<td>An Islamic spiritual leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMN</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGP</td>
<td>Inspector General of the Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INEC</td>
<td>Independent National Electoral Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPOB</td>
<td>Indigenous People of Biafra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State; Islamists with global networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamism</td>
<td>Islamic militancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISMAT</td>
<td>Islamic Countries Against Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jama’atul Ahlis Sunnah-</td>
<td>Association for Propagating the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lidda’wati wal- jihad</td>
<td>to strive for Allah’s sake; also interpreted as a holy war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izala</td>
<td>Largest Sunni group in Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kafir</td>
<td>Infidel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanuri</td>
<td>An ethnic group in the Lake Chad region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khalifa</td>
<td>a leader who emerges by virtue of being a successor or vicegerent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharijites</td>
<td>rebellious Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kibaku</td>
<td>one of the major languages in Chibok in Borno state, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGAs</td>
<td>Local Government Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdism-</td>
<td>Redeemer (eschatological belief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahdiyya</td>
<td>Islamic movement in the 19th &amp; 20th centuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maitasine</td>
<td>A violent Islamic group that existed in the 1980s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mallam</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah</td>
<td>Ibn Taymiyya's Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASSOB</td>
<td>Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign Biafra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDAs</td>
<td>Ministries, Departments and Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNJTF</td>
<td>Multi-National Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSSD</td>
<td>Most Similar System Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujaddid</td>
<td>Reformer who appears every century (apocalyptic belief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mujahedeen</td>
<td>Plural form of mujahid; a person who engage in jihad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJWA (MUJOA)</td>
<td>Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURIC</td>
<td>Muslim Rights Concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACTEST</td>
<td>Nigerian Counter Terrorism Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I &amp; II</em></td>
<td>Boko Haram deputies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO’s</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigerian Taliban</td>
<td>Former name of Boko Haram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Population Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPF</td>
<td>Nigerian Police Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>Nigerian Prison Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCIA</td>
<td>Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONSA</td>
<td>Office of the National Security Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PINE</td>
<td>Presidential Initiative for the Northeast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Qadariyya</em></td>
<td>Salafist ideology; Abdul-Qadir Gilani’s school of thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Red Army Faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCT</td>
<td>Rational Choice Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RD</td>
<td>Relative Deprivation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salafism</td>
<td>Ultra-conservative Islam that strictly adheres to Quran and hadith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sara suka</td>
<td>Violent political group in Bauchi state, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharia law</td>
<td>Law derived from the tenets of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shiite</td>
<td>One of the major sects of Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shura council</td>
<td>An advisory body within a movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSS</td>
<td>State Security Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>START</td>
<td>Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufi</td>
<td>A school of thought within Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunnah</td>
<td>Teachings and practices of the Prophet Mohammed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Adherents of Sunnah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takfiri</td>
<td>A Muslim who accuses other Muslims of apostasy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tijaniyyah</td>
<td>Islamic doctrine belonging to Sīdī 'Āhmād al-Tijānī</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCTP</td>
<td>Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPA</td>
<td>Terrorism Protection Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulama</td>
<td>Islamic religious scholars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wahhabiyya</td>
<td>Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab school of thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yan kalare</td>
<td>A defunct group of political thugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yan Izala</td>
<td>Members of Izala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YIM</td>
<td>Yusifiyya Islamic movement (a former faction of Boko Haram)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction

Boko Haram (BH) began as a small isolationist movement in 2002 (Maianguwa et al., 2012; Agbiboa 2013a). It then gained prominence during its 2009 uprising and the subsequent killing of its founder by Nigerian forces. After 2009, BH expanded in size and strength and was classed in relative terms, as one of the deadliest violent movements by the Global Terrorism Index in 2015. Its campaign of violence has, since 2009, focused on the targeting of state representatives, civilians and public places such as places of worship and business centres (Maianguwa et al., 2012; Agbiboa 2013a). In tandem with this transformation, the group has also changed its name several times. It started as the Yusufiyya movement, then became Jama’atul Ahlis Sunnah Lidda’wati wal-jihad (Association for Propagating the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), and then ISWAP (Islamic State in West African Province). In addition to the aforementioned names, the group is also popularly known as Boko Haram (‘Western education is forbidden’) because of its rejection of Western education.

BH is a violent Salafist movement that propagates an ultra-orthodox Islamic ideology. Scholars and policy makers believe that BH seeks to replace Nigeria’s secular state with a strict Islamic system. However, BH’s violent campaign has not been confined to Nigeria; it has also spilled over to neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. Studies suggest that poor socioeconomic situations sustain BH’s campaign of violence (Maianguwa et al, 2012; Hasen & Musa 2013), and that religion and counter terrorism (CT) further motivate their violence (Adesoji 2010; 2011), with these studies having focused on the causes and consequences of BH terrorism.

Contextual information about Nigerian politics, religion and society especially, in Northern Nigeria (where BH exist) is important to understanding the emergence of BH. Nigeria was formed through the amalgamation in 1914 (Paden, 2008) of over 250 ethnic groups and different religions, with Islam and Christianity as the two major religions (Paden, 2008; Falola & Heaton, 2008). As a result, Nigerian politics are characterised by a striving for ethnic and religious dominance (Angerbrandt, 2015).

The majority of Nigerians in the Northern part of Nigeria pride themselves on being inheritors of the precursor of Islam in Nigeria. Islam came into Nigeria through
the North in two streams (Alao, 2013). First, it came through the Borno-Yobe axis in the 9th century during the reign of Kanem-Bornu Empire, and then the second stream was through the Usman dan Fodio jihad (ibid); with both streams through radicalisation in the form of battles (Alao, 2013). A substantial number of Muslims in the Northern part of Nigeria would prefer a theocratic state where they would be governed under Islamic laws (Levan, 2013), with some wanting to be governed under a mix of democracy and Islamic rule. This is evident in the popular support that accompanied the implementation of Sharia law across 12 states of Northern Nigeria in 2000 (Levan, 2013). Sharia law refers to the use of Islamic law in governance (Kendhammer, 2013). The debate about Sharia law came to prominence in 1999 in Zamfara state under the administration of Governor Sani Yeriman Bakura (ibid).

A number of radical Islamic movements such as Uthman Danfodio Jihad of the Quadariyya (Sunni movement) sect of 1900 (Isa, 2010), the Maitasine uprising (1980-1985) (Adesoji, 2010, 2011; Isa, 2010; Maiangwa 2014), and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) (1970s) have previously attempted to establish an Islamic government through radicalism. Their quests were to dislodge an un-Islamic government that they perceived as promoting apostasy and syncretism (Paden, 2008; Isa, 2010; Adesoji, 2010, 2011).

Scholars argue that poor socio-economic situations within Nigeria create avenues for politicians to politicise religion in order to gain popular support (Levan, 2013; Akinola, 2015) Moreover, Akinola suggests that BH was established because of Islamic fundamentalism, and that it was motivated by the politicisation of religion and poverty in Northern Nigeria. In fact, the majority of Nigerian scholars argue that the nature of religiosity in Northern Nigeria has provided a fertile ground for the emergence of BH (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Levan, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 2015; Alozieuwu, 2015).

This study takes a more comprehensive approach to studying BH by looking at its emergence and evolution over time. This has involved investigating the relationship between BH’s leadership and followers, its group structure, and variations in its recruitment strategies, goals and selection of targets. This study also investigates BH’s changing strategies and its spillover of violence from Nigeria to the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Furthermore, this thesis critically evaluates changes within BH from 2009, i.e. beginning from when the group first became prominent
through its journey to becoming, in relative terms, one of the deadliest terrorist groups globally in 2015. Furthermore, this study analyses BH from 2009 because, the year marks the period when BH emerged as a significant violent terrorist group (Adesoji, 2011).

This thesis seeks to contribute to the broader understanding of terrorism using multi-level analysis. In addition, this thesis adopts a mixed methods case study incorporating semi-structured interviews, with a small N comparative method. Multi-level analysis entails the systematic compartmentalisation of the analytical process on the evolution and behaviour of BH into individual, group, state, sub-state and international levels of explanation. While the central arguments of some previous studies on BH might fit into one or possibly more of the levels of analysis utilised in this thesis, no study has yet used the model employed in this work to analyse BH. Additionally, the levels of analysis provide an in-depth understanding of the causes, actors, dynamics and factors that have influenced BH’s campaign of violence over time. This multi-level analysis offers wide-ranging implications that can inform future research in the field of terrorism and political violence. Terrorist group behaviour is complex and better understood through multi-level analysis. Furthermore, multi-level analysis intellectual rigour and allows or encourages consideration of a range of possible explanations. Moreover, each level of analysis incorporates different theories and empirical studies which helps to critically examine and explain the complexity of a terrorist group. This study also seeks to illustrate how one aspect of the behaviour of a terrorist group depends on another to function, and without an explanation for any one of these aspects, further explanation of another function will be incomplete. In examining the complex nature of BH, all of the used levels of analysis complement each other.

This study is a longitudinal case study that investigates BH over time. This allows the incorporation of a number of theories and a range of empirical studies to the study in order to engage BH literature into the broader debate of terrorism data. Moreover, the flexibility of a case study allows for the use of mixed methods when examining each level of analysis. These methods give strength to all the levels of analysis used in this case study as they have enabled in-depth and rigorous investigation of BH. Interviews with Nigerian senior government officials, local negotiators and experts on BH have been used in order to study changes in BH’s behaviour over time. The interviews in this case study are not only unique, but are also
significant because they reveal not only the thinking of policy makers who have shaped Nigeria’s CT policy, but also offer information from contact with BH gathered from local negotiators. The use of these interviews is significant because the majority of studies on BH suggest that Nigeria’s CT policy triggered and then motivated BH, but this is often based on insufficient empirical evidence and a lack of direct sources of information about BH. This lack of empirical evidence is as a result of not rigorously assessing the effectiveness and counter-productiveness of Nigerian CT both from a violent and nonviolent CT perspective. Added to this, previous studies are limited in explaining the timing, application and effect of Nigeria’s CT policy on BH’s behaviour over time. This gap will be addressed by analysing the effectiveness and counter-productiveness of Nigeria’s CT (see chapter six).

Another important feature of this research is the application of rational choice theory to the study of the activities and motivations of those involved in BH. This strategic model originates from classical economic theory (Simon, 1995; Van um, 2015), and it focuses on how terrorist groups use violence against state forces and civilians to gain political concessions (Sandler et al., 1983; Van Um, 2015). In relation to terrorism, the contemporary strategic model suggests that terrorists are rational actors with relatively stable goals, and that they compare their options to then choose the ones with the most favourable utilities (ibid). This model helps to demonstrate how BH’s campaign of violence involves the strategic use of violence, and it has been applied in order to understand how BH has responded to Nigerian CT. Moreover, it helps examine changes in BH’s tactics over time, as well as helping explain the ever-changing nature of its strategies. Finally, the strategic model highlights one of the major contributions of this thesis, this being insufficient appreciation of the rationality of BH by the Nigerian government.

This thesis addresses BH as a terrorist group because of the group’s premeditated use of violence, especially against civilians. As with many studies of terrorist groups, this study raises important and difficult definitional questions about terrorism. Defining ‘terrorism’ is challenging both in practice (Weigend, 2006) and in academia (Schmid, 2004). In practice, there is a debate about objectivity, particularly in attempting to distinguish between a freedom fighter and a terrorist. From an academic perspective, scholars have attempted to distinguish between terrorism and other forms of violence, particularly insurgency (Sambanis, 2008; Findley & Young,
2012). The literature review section of this thesis critically analyses the definitional problems of terrorism both in practice and academia.

This thesis has some acknowledged limitations. First, BH emerged in 2002 but the majority of sources about BH incorporated into this thesis date from 2009. To the researcher’s knowledge, there is a paucity of sources from 2002 to 2009 because the group was not then well-known, but from 2009 to date there are a great number of sources because of BH’s uprising in 2009 and its increasing lethality.

Second, there are limitations with the interviews from both BH and Nigerian senior government officials. BH is an active and violent group at the time of this research, and its secretive nature made it impossible for the researcher to interview BH members or obtain information from the group directly. In order to address this challenge, the researcher incorporated public statements from BH members obtained from the media. Because of security risks involved with investigating BH, not all selected interview targets agreed to be interviewed. This could also be attributed to the interviewees’ unwillingness to talk about ‘sensitive or confidential’ issues related to the Nigerian authorities and BH.

Third, the researcher had challenges in obtaining statistics about the frequency and variation of BH target selection at a sub-state level (border states; Adamawa, Borno and Yobe). The researcher was unable to obtain statistics about government deployments of security forces to border states in order to assess and quantify the influence of military action on the intensity of BH violence. As a result, the researcher relied on additional military outlets created by the Nigerian government in the fight against BH to make deductions about deployments. In addition, there were also challenges acquiring statistics for 2002 - 2016 about levels of deprivation in the border states as these statistics were incomplete.

Finally, it was challenging to identify resource transfers (funds and arms) between BH and international jihadists such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS), and there was found in fact to be more symbolic evidence that highlighted linkages between BH and international jihadists. The researcher would argue that because BH is more of a resource-wealthy group (robbery and ransom) (Zenn, 2014a), it may in fact require only a low level of resource transfer from international jihadists. Added to this, the porous borders between Nigeria and countries in the Lake Chad may be facilitating an inflow of resources to BH.
1.2 Research questions
Given the gaps within the existing studies on BH, this thesis seeks to answer the following two questions:

1) How has the behaviour of BH influenced its evolution from a small isolationist movement to a large-scale violent group?
2) How does multi-level analysis explain the role of internal and external factors on the evolution of BH?

1.3 Summary of thesis
This thesis comprises nine chapters. Chapter one is the introduction of the thesis. Chapter two reviews the literature about BH and the broader field of terrorism, while chapter three discusses methods applied in this study. Chapters four to eight address different levels of analysis, and the utility of these chapters is discussed below. Moreover, these focus on addressing the complexity of BH by examining the limitations of previous studies on the group, as well highlighting the dynamics and development of BH over time. The content of chapters two to nine is outlined below.

Chapter two highlights gaps in existing literature on BH and the broader field of terrorism. The literature review focuses on the implications of the causes, motivations, behaviour and consequences of terrorist groups on counter terrorism policies. It identifies that researchers are interested in why individuals adopt and maintain terrorist violence. Moreover, the generalisation of theories and empirical facts in the field of terrorism is challenging because of the dynamic nature of terrorists and their organisational behaviour, and therefore further empirical studies are needed to reflect this. When discussing the behaviour of terrorist groups, a review of the literature on ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorist groups has been carried out. The debate about ‘old and new’ terrorism suggests that terrorist groups that existed before the terrorist attack in the USA on 11th September 2001 (9/11) are different to those that existed subsequently (Neuman, 2009). Such differences include group structure, transnational nature, motivation, goal, lethality, targeting and tactics. However, some scholars are sceptical about this argument (Crenshaw, 2008). When considering its organisational structure, BH appears to have the characteristics of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism, and so this study also seeks to identify why BH’s organisational structure possesses such characteristics.
Chapter three discusses how and why the chosen methods of data collection, analysis and presentation of research findings used in this study have been applied. This thesis is a mixed methods case study comprising semi-structured interviews with Nigerian senior government officials, local negotiators and experts on BH, Most Similar System Design (MSSD) and extensive analysis of documents relating to BH, including statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). The chapter points out the pros and cons of each of these methods, and the drawbacks of each method are also addressed. These levels of analysis enable this study to draw upon multiple sources of data; in other words, one source of data gives strength to one unit of explanation, while at the same time corroborating another unit of analysis. An example of this is that the state level explanation of this thesis draws strength from the interview data, with the interview data then also being drawn upon in other chapters when discussing and explaining BH ideology.

Chapter four is the individual level of explanation. This chapter examines the relationship between the leadership and followers of BH. It uses statistics from the GTD to examine variations in violence under five different leadership tenures of BH. It also highlights the implications of the leadership decapitation approach - the targeted killing of the leadership of BH - by the Nigerian government. This chapter is crucial in understanding how BH members are coordinated because without strong leadership and internal cohesion, BH would not be able to remain organised as a group. Leadership is an essential part of a terrorist group (Mitchell, 2004) as it coordinates, motivates and directs its followers. Thus, the individual level of analysis explored in chapter four lays the foundation for the group level analysis of chapter five.

Chapter five provides a group level analysis of BH. It examines the organisational structure and recruitment processes of BH, as well as how the group coordinates its field operations. It outlines a broad range of factors affecting BH recruitment beyond those of poverty, illiteracy and religion, which have already been widely acknowledged in existing studies on BH. Using the rational choice theory, chapter five contributes to BH literature by investigating the internal dynamics of the group and how its organisational structure and operational capacity have changed over time. Additionally, the study unravels a mix of internal and external factors that have shaped the organisational structure of BH. In this context, external factors include counter terrorism and public support for BH. The outcomes of chapter five add to the debate on ‘old and new’ terrorism since BH appears to share attributes of both ‘old
and new’ terrorism in its organisational structure. Thus it is important to examine BH with regards to this argument, while chapters four and five also consider the impact of Nigerian CT policies on BH.

Chapter six assesses Nigeria’s violent and nonviolent CT strategy, as well as the response of BH through their differing violent tactics. Violent approaches in CT encompass military actions such as the targeted killings of terrorists, attacks and the infiltration of terrorist groups. Nonviolent approaches are non-military defensive efforts that include the use of legislation, punishments or technology in order to make it difficult for terrorists to attack (Enders & Sandler, 1993). Accordingly, the strategic model of the rational choice theory has been applied in order to understand the reactions of BH to Nigerian CT. Moreover, statistics from the GTD were used when explaining the intensity of BH violence over time in relation to Nigerian CT. Secondly, this chapter analyses whether Nigerian CT has been effective or counter-productive. Previous studies on BH have acknowledged that Nigerian CT’s violent approach has facilitated BH violence, yet no studies have systematically assessed both the nonviolent and violent approaches of Nigerian CT. This chapter is therefore important because it critically presents explanations of the implications of Nigerian CT. It explains how and why BH is a strategic actor as this is important in highlighting BH’s changes in tactics, as well as its responses to Nigerian CT efforts. The chapter draws on a number of interviews with Nigerian senior government officials and local negotiators. The interviews make significant contributions to this study because the majority of studies on BH do not talk about the perceptions of policy makers towards BH, nor how these potentially inform CT efforts against BH.

Chapter seven evaluates the determinants of BH target selection and examines variations in the frequency of violence at a sub-national level. The chapter employs Most Similar System Design (MSSD) to carry out a comparative analysis of the three most affected states in the Northeast region of Nigeria. The Northeast region is a hotbed of BH activities because of the intensity of BH violence in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states. As a result of the frequency of violence in these states, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in 2012 and extended this in 2013. This state of emergency was aimed at sustaining a military campaign to decimate and ultimately end BH. Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states are similar in population size, ethnic and religious composition, and economies, and all three are also Nigerian states sharing borders with other countries in the Lake Chad region. Despite these
similarities however, there are disparities in the frequency of BH target types within these areas. This chapter seeks to highlight explanations of the determinants underpinning BH targeting. Chapter seven also connects with chapters five and six by illustrating how the spread of BH cells has been reduced in these three states as a result of Nigerian CT.

Chapter eight focuses on the external spillover of radicalism into Nigeria. It highlights how international factors have motivated and increased the capability of BH, as well as the spillover of BH violence to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries within the Lake Chad region. These countries include the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Existing studies on BH mostly focus on the linkages/allegiances between BH and international terrorist groups. However, this chapter discusses the influx of radical Islam to Nigeria, and how events such as the Fula jihad of the 19th century influenced the dan Fodio jihad, which several scholars see as the beginning of the Islamic radicalisation of Nigeria (Loimeier, 2012). Secondly, the chapter outlines how international factors such as international terror groups (e.g. Al Qaeda and IS), the international war on terror, and events such as the killings of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Ghaddafi have motivated and increased the capabilities of BH. Thirdly, it outlines external influences that have facilitated a spillover of violence to the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Nigeria. The chapter is important because it outlines the reasons why BH connects with international terror groups and the effect of the spread of the Al-Qaeda network on BH. It also highlights BH’s switch in allegiance from Al-Qaeda to Islamic State (IS), even though Al-Qaeda and IS share the same radical Salafist ideology. Moreover, chapter eight suggests that the spillover of BH violence to territories outside of Nigeria challenges the notion posited by some scholars, that BH’s main goal is to dislodge the Nigerian government.

Through this case study of BH, this thesis highlights that different aspects of terrorist behaviour determine the evolution and development of terrorist groups. All aspects of terrorist group behaviour depend upon each other to work and without knowing one aspect of their behaviour, other aspects cannot be fully examined. Although these findings cannot be generalised, this BH case study indicates that multi-level analysis gives a strong methodological advantage in terrorism research. Its flexibility enables the use of further theories and empirical studies for a more systematic and critical debate to issues within terrorism research. The findings of this
thesis extend beyond the conventional linkages of BH to poverty, religion and illiteracy; they instead provide a number of explanations about the strategic choices, intensity of violence and changing tactics of BH. Moreover, different aspects of terrorist behaviour give policy makers a greater in-depth perspective about areas where policy intervention is needed.

Having presented the foundation of this thesis, the next chapter (chapter two), is a review of extant literature on BH and its place within the context of the broader field of terrorism.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter reviews existing literature on Boko Haram (BH) and the broader field of terrorism. In other words, the literature review is divided into two broad sections, the first dealing with conceptual debates about the nature of terrorism and the second focused specifically on the literature on BH. The threat of global terrorism has resulted in scholars striving to identify and examine the causes and motivations, state reactions (counter terrorism), behaviours and consequences of terrorists and terrorism both at an individual and group level. Thus, regardless of a terrorist group’s typologies - whether religious or ideological - researchers are keen to identify why individuals adopt violence.

This chapter’s review of literature on the causes and consequences of terrorism is to give background to the trends in this discipline so that this thesis can then contribute to future studies about terrorist group behaviour. To that end, this chapter also reviews literature on ‘old versus new’ terrorism in order to better understand how terrorist group behaviour has evolved over time. The ‘old versus new’ notion of terrorism classifies terrorism as traditional or new (Neuman, 2009), with new terrorist groups or religious groups having been established post the 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA. This is pertinent to this thesis because some scholars argue that these two groups are distinctive in their structures, goals and methods of operation (Hoffman, 1998; Laquer, 1999; Neumann, 2009). Since BH appears to have a hybrid of ‘old’ and ‘new’ terrorism within its organisational structure, this study seeks to highlight why this is so and what its strategic importance is to BH.

While the majority of studies on BH identify different factors for the cause and motivation of the group, they remain inadequate in their explanations as to why BH transformed from a small violent group to a full-blown terrorist one. Due to the complexity of terror groups and especially of BH, there is a need to look at this phenomenon from various perspectives. As such, different levels of analysis enable this phenomenon to be studied rigorously, and therefore this review categorises BH literature within individual, group, state, sub-national and national explanations. These classifications reflect the contribution of this thesis in introducing these units of analysis to the study of BH. For instance, in terms of individual influences on BH, there are no existing studies that examine the relationship between BH leadership and
its followers. Moreover, existing studies on BH have not examined the influence of BH leadership on the group’s varying uses of violence.

This chapter is organised under the following sections: causes of terrorism, consequences of terrorism, counter-terrorism and ‘old versus new’ terrorism.

2.1 Definition of Terrorism
Achieving definitional clarity of the term ‘terrorism’ is a challenging task both academically and practically, with there being a protracted debate both in the literature and within policy communities and international organisations about its definition (Weigend, 2006; Stigall, 2013). Moreover, an understanding of what terrorism is and who terrorists are has also generated debate about objectivity, especially when trying to distinguish between a freedom fighter and a terrorist. The majority of studies on definitions of terrorism focus on group or sub-state types of terrorism that involve the use or threat of violence against civilians to achieve specific goals (Schmid, 2004; Saul, 2005; Goodwin, 2006); with some studies seeking to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of violence such as civil war or insurgency. (Kalyvas, 2004; Hoffman, 2006; Sambanis, 2008; Stepanova, 2008; Findley & Young 2012). Terrorism, like other forms of violence such as criminality or insurgence, involves the use of modus operandi such as bombing, kidnapping or shooting. As a result, most studies focus on distinguishing terrorism from other forms of violence, especially that of insurgency. In fact, the majority of points emphasised by scholars when examining terrorism are centred on three major factors: the perpetrators, the motives and the acts.

There have been attempts at an international level to arrive at a consensus so that a legal instrument can be applied that clearly stipulates what constitutes terrorism. These attempts remain insufficient despite the amount of time given to them. The UN has been criticised for not having a definition of terrorism accepted by all its member countries, with one of the problems encountered being that of perception with regards to freedom fighter versus terrorist (Weigend, 2006). This problem has its roots in the post-World War II world and decolonisation when freedom fighters adopted violence as resistance against colonial regimes (Weigend, 2006). During this era, which coincided with the Cold War of the 1950s and 1960s, many ‘freedom fighters’ gained political support from different world powers; thereby making it difficult to draw a line between terrorists and freedom fighters (ibid).
Another issue that remains is that of giving a separate legal definition to terrorism as it consists of offences such as murder, assault and bombing which are already criminalised by local and international legal instruments (Weigend, 2006). Weigend (2006) poses some interesting questions about why it remains vital to have a worldwide legal sense of terrorism and what ‘extras’ should be added to re-label a criminal act as a terrorist act. The author suggests that for a criminal act to be labelled as terrorism at both national and international levels, three factors should be considered. First, that the act attributed to terrorism should lead to punishment; second, a suspicion of terrorism warrants and elicits a distinctive pattern of investigation including surveillance and limiting contact between a suspect and their lawyers; and third, strong mutual and international cooperation is needed. Because terrorism can spill into other countries, international cooperation is pertinent in order to combat terrorists and their spread to other borders, as well as to address impunity. This cooperation requires international legal assistance (ibid). In respect to such international legal assistance, the principle of aut dedere aut judicare (either extradition or trial) under international law obligates extradition of suspected terrorists to the country in which they committed the offence, or prosecution in the country to which they are exiled to (Stigall, 2013). The principle of aut dedere aut judicare is derived from multi-lateral conventions such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the 1970 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, the 1979 International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the 1999 International Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and (Kelly, 2003; Weigend, 2006; Stigall, 2013). The argument of who is a terrorist or legitimate political prisoner militates the principle of aut dedere aut judicare, with the invocation of the principle dependent on understanding between countries. An example of this is a South African court jailing Henry Okah for 13 terrorism-related charges over twin car bombings during Nigeria's Independence Day celebrations in 2010 (BBC, 2013a). On the other hand, aut dedere aut judicare could be described as ineffective, with an example from 2002 in which Denmark freed a Chechen accused of terrorism instead of extraditing him to Russia for legal prosecution (Kelly, 2003).

Despite these challenges there is, some international consensus about what constitutes terrorism. The 1994 UN General Assembly Resolution (A/RES/49/60) reaffirmed the total condemnation of all acts and methods of terrorism. Even though the International Criminal Court (ICC) lacks jurisdiction over terrorism cases, Article
Four of the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTRSt.) extends the jurisdiction of the tribunal to cover acts of terrorism under the additional Protocol II to the Geneva Convention (Weigend, 2006). The 2001 Security Council Resolution 1373 calls for the suppression of the financing of terrorism (Weigend, 2006) and recommends that UN member states domesticate counter terrorism (CT) laws (Sampson & Onuoha, 2011: 38). The definition of terrorism under Article 2(1)(b) of the 1999 Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism is that it is;

Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act (Weigend, 2006: 920)

However, the 2001 Security Council Resolution 1373 does not distinguish between a freedom fighter and a terrorist. In 2002, the notion of freedom fighter was jettisoned by member states because of the collective adoption of the 2001 Security Council Resolution 1373 (Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism). Member states agreed that the resolution should be legally binding, thereby making the definition of terrorism having no exceptions to any group or cause. Additionally, the Security Council Resolution 1566 of 2004, in support of the Financial Convention of 2001, further recommends that all states should fight terrorism irrespective of cause or motivation, and without exception to freedom fighters (Weigend, 2006: 920). Similarly in 2014, during the 69th UN General Assembly (UNGA), under the measures to eliminate international terrorism (RES/69/127) the UNGA reaffirmed its position on the 2001 definition of what constitutes terrorism. It further stressed the need for robust international collaboration between states and amongst “international organizations and agencies, regional and sub-regional organizations and arrangements and the United Nations in order to prevent, combat and eliminate terrorism”, regardless of the perpetrator of the act (UNGA, 2014). A major change in the UN’s conceptualisation of terrorism was highlighted in the 2002 adoption of the ‘exceptionless’ definition of terrorism as legally binding by states. In practical terms, this does not address the ambiguity between a terrorist and a legitimate political agitator. In other words, it can be argued that revolution may require disregarding the laws of a state, which may be the antithesis of human rights.
If disobeying a government or acting in a manner that stops a government acting is terrorism, then a number of civil society organisations or dissident groups could therefore be easily tagged as terrorist groups. However, based on the UN definition of terrorism, it can be deduced that what differentiates civil disobedience from terrorism is that terrorism must be an act that is calculated to cause death, serious bodily injury or intimidation of a population of non-combatant civilians. If this is the case, what differentiates terrorism from other forms of violence that are meted out on non-combatant civilians, and do terrorists only target civilians? To clarify these issues, it is important in order to understand the arguments by scholars related to who perpetrators of terrorism are, what their motives are and what constitutes an act of terrorism.

With regards to international concerns about the increasing threat of terrorism, it is important to note that there is a global response to what is perceived as ‘new terrorism’, which emanates in the wake of 9/11. New terrorism is religiously-oriented terrorism that is characterised by its lethal and indiscriminate use of violence (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur, 2003; Neuman 2009). The role of Al Qaeda in 9/11 and the subsequent prominence of groups such as Islamic State (IS) could be turning points in the debate on new terrorism, with the majority of violent groups with elements of religious radicalism now being classified as new terrorist groups. Although BH has elements of Islamic radicalism, it has levels of disparity with the notion of new terrorism in both its structure (see chapter five) and motivation; and over time, it has employed ethnic nationalism to motivate and mobilise people to violence (Barkindo, 2016).

From a scholarly perspective, the elements of terrorism agreed on by most scholars are the uses of violence, political motivation and intimidation (Schmid, 2004; Saul, 2005; Goodwin, 2006). With it being challenging to separate terrorism from other forms of violence such as criminality or insurgency when differentiating terrorism from other violence, Hoffman (2006) attempts to differentiate it from other forms of violence such as lunatic assassins and criminality. He argues that lunatic assassins are motivated by personal, idiosyncratic and egocentric needs. However, in contradiction to Hoffman (2006), a terrorist does not necessarily need to belong to an existing organisation and can be a ‘lone wolf,’ thereby implying that an individual can commit an act of violence as a result of personal, ideological or religious goals. While a lone wolf terrorist does not require orders from an organisation, the actor may still
need the assistance of a range of motivations from other individuals (Appleton, 2014). Furthermore, terrorists’ main goals are usually political rather than pecuniary, while criminals’ primary goals are usually monetary rather than political, and their acts are not usually intended to go beyond their victims or influence public opinion. In contrast, a terrorist act could be designed to influence public opinion or governmental decisions (Hoffman, 2006). However, terrorists can adopt criminal tactics to fund their operations and as Zenn (2014a) observes, BH has robbed banks to acquire money to fund its movement.

The most challenging aspect of trying to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of violence is trying to distinguish between terrorism and insurgency. This difficulty is created by these terms being seemingly interchangeable. Scholars argue that insurgency is characterised by open confrontation with state authorities in a form of political and military action designed to weaken a government through prolonged war (Joes, 2006; Lomperis, 1999; O’Neil, 2001). Conversely, terrorists are noted as being underground groups that apply indirect violence without engaging government forces in the form of military units (Sambanis, 2008). This indirect tactic aims to create fear and intimidation amongst civilians, as well as generating political reaction (Schmid, 2004). However, some studies suggest that insurgents can employ terrorism as a method. Studies of rebels in civil wars examine rebels employing terrorist methods against state forces. Findley & Young (2012) categorise studies on civil wars into the three categories of ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’ civil wars. They propose that groups use terrorism before a civil war to facilitate the participation of a large population of individuals, while Kalyvas (2004) suggests that rebel groups use terrorism during civil wars to control populations through intimidation. Furthermore, Findley & Young (2012) argue that the use of terrorism post-war is to spoil the peace process.

The features of terrorism and insurgency show overlap in BH. BH has the attributes of an insurgent group because it has engaged in firefights with Nigerian forces (Adesoji, 2010; Mohammed, 2014; Zenn, 2014), and it has had territorial control of and acts in both urban and rural locations (The Guardian, 2014). Within its evolution, BH had indicated its desire to remain in cities by establishing clandestine cells (START Report 2014), and these were created across Nigerian states and Local Government Areas (LGAs) (DCCN, 2009: 14) instead of in rural areas. However, the violent approach of Nigerian counter terrorism (CT) contributed to a reduction in the
spread of BH to the border regions of the Northeast (UN News Centre, 2016). Nonetheless, it is pertinent to label BH as a terrorist group in consideration to the proportion of its civilian and military targets. Between 2009 and 2015, BH attacked 1,045 civilians (private citizens and religious figures) and 437 state forces (military and police), according to the Global Terrorism Database (GTD).

2.2 Literature review on terrorism
This section reviews literature on the causes, behaviours and consequences of terrorism. It also analyses literature on counter terrorism.

2.2.1 Causes of terrorism
There are many studies about the causes of terrorism. These are classified as either psychological or environmental factors, and they are important in understanding the causes of both individual and group violence.

Psychological explanations seek to understand behavioural dispositions that make individuals join a terrorist group, with these being further divided into psychopathological and psychosocial explanations (Kegley, 1990). The psychopathological explanation argues that an individual engages in terrorism because of mental disorders, and as such speculates on what it terms a ‘terrorist personality’ (Taylor, 1988). This explanation is derived from a psychiatric perspective and encompasses different mental disorders such as ethnology, psychopathy and antisocial personality. In another explanation, Post (1990) argues that terrorism is a deviant behaviour and therefore terrorists suffer from some form of psychological disorder. However, terrorists are logical in their thinking and they plan and rationalise their actions before they act, as well as consider the benefits of their actions before they carry them out (Kydd & Walter, 2006). This thereby renders the psychopathological strand inadequate as an explanation for individual or group level terrorism.

The psychosocial explanation debunks the psychopathological one and is widely used to explain the cause of terrorism. The psychosocial explanation connects to an individual’s internal (cognitive) and external perspectives, with the most popular psychological explanation being the relative deprivation (RD) theory. This theory was espoused by Gurr (1970), who constructed it based on Dollard et al.’s (1939) frustration-aggression theory. The frustration-aggression theory suggests that when an individual is frustrated, they become aggressive. Gurr (1970: 25) describes RD as, “perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capacity.” By ‘value’,
Gurr is referring to socioeconomic and political goods. Nonetheless, RD has been criticised by scholars as being too simplistic in explaining the causes of terrorism. Walker and Pettigrew (1984) argue that RD cannot determine a level for measuring deprivation as all individuals have different thresholds of deprivation; therefore, understanding the uniformity of individual deprivation and how it can mobilise towards group violence cannot be standardised. Moreover, deprivation can lead to non-violent cooperation where individuals can mobilise and pursue their goals without violence. For instance, Martin Luther King Jnr’s non-violent movement enabled deprived Black Americans suffering injustices to seek justice through nonviolent approaches.

Some scholars argue that environmental influences such as economic, socio-political and religious factors drive individuals to engage in violence. Economic explanations suggest that economic hardship and a lack of educational opportunities make people willing to join terrorist groups. In addition, some scholars argue that these factors also provide opportunities for entrepreneurs of violence to mobilise individuals towards violence by encouraging their perception of there not being any other alternatives available to them (Shafiq & Sinno, 2010). However, some scholars have a different perception of this with Bueno de Mesquita (2005) for example, observing that in terms of selection of recruits, terrorists generally pick the most educated ones in spite of economic explanations of terrorism having been debated widely. In their study of violent British jihadists, Cole and Cole (2010) observed that individuals with earnings above the national wage who were often well-educated engaged in terrorism, with terrorists becoming an elite fighting for their deprived constituencies.

Several debates exist on whether religion causes and/or motivates terrorism. Pratt (2010) emphasises that fundamentalism is evident in Islam, but it can also be found in Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism and other religions. As Islamism dominates modern terrorism, numerous scholars have built on Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilisation theory to argue the influence of religion on terrorism. This theory has become more prominent since events such as 9/11, the Madrid bombings of 2004 and the London Underground terrorist attacks (Neumayer & Plumper, 2004). Added to this, between 11th September 2001 and 31st December 2016, over 4,000 attacks were perpetrated by jihadists such as Al Qaeda and IS in the Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe (GTD). Such a large number of attacks is the reason for the bourgeoning debate about Islamist terrorism in modern studies on
terrorism. Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilisation theory predicts that contemporary conflicts do not depend primarily on economic or ideological issues, but instead on cultural ones. Huntington’s profoundly reactionary approach (1993) sees civilisations as the cultural groupings of people of similar identity, categorising, for example, civilisations into Western, Sinic (Chinese and allied races), Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox (Russian and Eastern European), Latin American and African civilisations. Such classifications could be seen as stereotyping though, as they do not allow for consideration of individual preferences. He argues that these civilisations are deeply anchored within their history, values, norms, institutions and religions. Furthermore, he notes that especially with regards to Islam, such civilisations will radically depart from Western civilisation in their quest to return to their roots.

Huntington’s (1993) idea has been criticised. Notably, Goel (2009) argues that Huntington perceives civilisation in a monolithic manner, and that even within the West there are violent conflicts based around religion, for example the Protestant and Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland. Other studies suggest that religion does not on its own cause terrorism, but rather it justifies political violence driven by political grievances (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Pape, 2003). In other words, politically alienated individuals resort to the use of religion as an instrument to mobilise and fight their so-called oppressors (a government, other religious bodies or a secular society). Moreover, Juergensmeyer (2000) suggests that religion can either be a tool for peace or a motivation for violence. This thesis subscribes to this view and also argues that religion can be a source of nonviolent conflict where individuals engage in acrimonious debates or civil disobedience. Since the extant literature on BH suggests that it is a mix of radical Islamic views and grievances, the findings of chapters five and six are particularly relevant in challenging Huntington’s (1993) clash of civilisation theory by highlighting the environmental influences and dynamics that have facilitated the evolution of BH.

2.2.2 Consequences of terrorism

Much of the literature on terrorism focuses on its causes and motivations, CT and terrorist behaviour, with there being fewer studies on its consequences. Previous studies on the consequences of terrorism suggest that terrorism has socio-political and economic consequences.

From a political perspective, there are contrasting points of view on whether terrorism does not achieve political change (Abrahams, 2006), or that if it is effective
in achieving political goals (Rose et al., 2007; Gould & Klor, 2010). Scholars argue that the effectiveness of terrorism as a political tool can be seen in the 2004 Madrid bombing, which was instrumental in the Spanish government’s decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan (Laia & Gerrard, 2017). Additionally, in a study on the effects of terrorism on the political behaviour of civilians in the Basque region of Spain, Laia & Gerrard (2017) found that terrorists fighting against a democratic government could have had the unintended outcome of encouraging democratic participation. Other studies illustrate how terrorism militates against the existence of human rights (through killings and the strangulation of civilian liberties through fear) (Piazza & Walsh, 2009) and tourism (Enders et al., 2007), as well as results in the breakdown of economic activities of a territory affected by terrorism (Sandler & Enders, 2008).

2.2.3 Counter terrorism

Studies are divided as to whether CT is effective or counter-productive. Some scholars argue that CT fuels grievances and radicalises individuals (Bueno de Mesquita & Dickson, 2007), while others suggest that CT weakens and causes turmoil within terrorist groups which gradually leads to the defeat of the group by the state (Jordan 2009: 721; David 2002).

Many studies examine CT in terms of the cost and benefits of a state’s responses, with such studies suggesting that the implications of CT are dependent upon a government’s policies and its agencies (Rosendorff & Sandler, 2004; Jacobson & Kaplan, 2007; Acre & Sandler, 2007).

CT efforts are mainly divided into violent and nonviolent responses. Violent responses use military approaches, and these can involve the infiltration of a terrorist group, leadership decapitation, targeted killing of terrorists and different forms of terrorist camp raiding. Nonviolent responses are non-military measures designed to prevent terrorists from attacking, and these require the creation of strict laws and penalties, as well as involving an increase in technology and related costs (Enders & Sandler, 1993; Sandler & Arce, 2005).

Further to the debate on whether a government’s policies and agencies determine the implications of CT, chapter six of this thesis examines this theory further. Most studies on BH have acknowledged that Nigeria’s CT efforts have motivated BH’s campaign of violence, but these studies do not adequately examine these policies in terms of their timing, application and outcome; nor do they consider how they have affected BH’s behaviour over time.
2.2.4 ‘Old’ versus ‘new’ terrorism
Terrorism scholars suggest that the nature of terrorism has changed. Even prior to 9/11, Hoffman (1998) and Laquer (1999) had observed that terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s were gone and that new ones were emerging. The debate on the distinction between ‘old’ and ‘new’ includes a diverse array of factors such as group structure, transnational nature, motivation and goals, lethality, targeting and tactics.

Neumann (2009) argues that the structure of old terrorism is hierarchical, whereas the structure of new terrorism is loose with nodes of networks. Marc Sageman’s work (2004) on the spread of Al-Qaeda also gives credence to this notion of new terrorism. He suggests that as a result of Al-Qaeda’s global strength and visibility, groups with similar ideological beliefs declared allegiance to them without Al-Qaeda needing to reach out to them. In contrast, Crenshaw (2008) argues that old terrorists groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had units that acted independently. This thesis would argue that the difference in the organisational structure between old and new terrorist groups depends on a group’s strategy and on CT. Chapters five and six highlight how BH’s strategy and the nature of the Nigerian state’s CT have influenced the organisational structure of BH. Research is yet to show that BH units act independently, despite the group having cell structures across the regions it dominates. The organisational structure of BH in fact suggests that it is a hybrid of both old and new structures in terms of hierarchy and loose networks.

With regards to the transnational nature of terrorist groups, Neumann (2009) argues that new terrorist groups are more transnational in their operations than old terrorist groups were. Added to this, this study argues that since new terrorism is characterised by religious revival, the operational range of terrorist groups is spread across borders as a social movement. However, Crenshaw (2008) debunks this argument. She observes that leftist groups in the 1980s collaborated with anti-imperialist groups across different regions. Regardless of the concept of old and new terrorism, this study would argue that the transnational nature of terrorism is contextual. Notably, existing studies on spillover and diffusion of conflict acknowledge numerous factors that enable a spillover of terror from one territory to another. Such factors include external intervention by foreign governments (Tony & Mushed, 2002), ethnic linkages (Buhaug & Gleditch 2008) and neighbouring states with weak CT (Buhaug, 2009). Moreover, Braithwaite & Chu (2017) suggest that the
return of foreign fighters from a conflict results in new violence in their home countries.

In terms of motivation, Neumann (2009) and a number of scholars argue that new terrorism is motivated by religion (Hoffman, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; Benjamin & Simon, 2003). Another difference between new and old terrorist groups is their goal. It is argued that the goals of a new terrorist group are often unclear and the goal is not primarily to achieve political change; with this being in contrast to old terrorist groups who were mostly characterised by this (Neumann, 2009). On the other hand, it is argued that new terrorist groups are more motivated by eschatological goals and large-scale destruction, with new terrorism being more violent than old terrorism because of religious beliefs and revenge (Stern, 1999; Neumann, 2009). However, it is important to point out that terrorist groups motivated by political Islam use it as a tool to achieve their political goals. Moreover, numerous studies, especially from a rational choice theory (RCT) perspective, suggest that terrorist groups are both strategic and unitary actors. Unitary actors vis-à-vis RCT suggest that terrorists may have individual preferences but remain united by a movement’s goal (Dugan et al., 2005), and that if there is no unity of goal then the group will splinter (ibid). Moreover, terrorists use violence as a means of communication with both governments and civilians in order to achieve their goal.

On the distinction of lethality when applied to old and new terrorism, Neumann (2009) suggests that new terrorism is more lethal than old terrorism. Additionally, Stern (1999) argues that new terrorism is more likely to use weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear or chemical weapons because of modern advancements in technology, although it is difficult to know if the use of chemical or nuclear weapons is more likely as it has to-date not happened. However, Crenshaw (2008) argues that the disparity in the destructive nature of both old and new terrorism is complicated because for example, an old and new Japanese terrorist group had and has the potentiality of using weapons of mass destruction, with Aum Shinrikyo once having used chemical weapons. Crenshaw (2008) further suggests that the level of casualties recorded in Al-Qaeda attacks is not remarkably dissimilar to those of old terrorist groups. However, it can be argued that the lethality of terrorist groups depends more upon modernity and a group’s ability to access more deadly weapons.

In terms of targeting, scholars argue that old terrorism was more restrained. The old terrorist groups discriminated in their targets and did not believe in the
unrestrained use of violence because they relied on civilians or their constituencies for support (Hoffman, 1999; Benjamin & Simon, 2003). In contrast, Crenshaw (2008) argues that old terrorist groups were not always discriminatory in their selection of targets, and she gives examples of attacks such as the 1946 Zionist attack on the King David Hotel in Jerusalem and the FLN attack on Europeans during the Algerian war to note that old terrorist groups were also indiscriminate in their attacks. This thesis would argue that terrorist targeting depends on a group’s strategy of operation and ability to carry out attacks. Moreover, terrorist targets depend on the message a terror group wants to pass to a government, the level of fear they wish to instill in civilians and their ability to carry out an attack (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Notably, weak terrorist groups often resort to attacking civilians instead of state forces (Wood, 2010). Rigid assumptions within the debate on old and new terrorism are not helpful in analysing BH because in some ways, BH is more of a hybrid organisation in terms of its organisational structure. This thesis looks at the behaviour of BH in depth whereas many studies on old and new terrorism look at groups comparatively, i.e. which groups are more lethal, transnational or engage in different types of targeting.

2.3 Literature on Boko Haram
This section reviews existing literature on BH and importantly, it critically examines existing studies from both ontological and methodological perspectives. It takes into consideration the numerous studies on BH classified as either the origins or the evolution of BH. Studies on the origins of BH attempt to explain its emergence and sustenance, whereas studies on the evolution of BH encompass its changing behaviour. The majority of literature on BH focuses on causes and motivation, with the group’s dynamic nature being understudied. Additionally, the majority of studies on the origins of BH have been carried out by Nigerian scholars (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Levan, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 2015; Alozieuwa, 2015), while the majority of studies on its evolution have been conducted by non-Nigerian scholars (Zenn 2014b, 2016; Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015; Eveslage, 2013; Comolli 2015; D’Amato 2017). This section highlights major arguments about BH and identifies gaps in the existing literature on BH.

2.3.1 Cause and motivation of BH
Studies of the causes and motivation of BH have primarily been carried out by Nigerian scholars, and attempt to explain BH’s emergence and sustenance. These
studies argue from both theoretical and empirical dimensions. The two central arguments underpinning the cause and motivations of BH are that first, BH was caused by a history of religiosity in Nigeria and that second, it emerged because of socio-economic and political deprivations. In other words, they focus on examining how BH emerged from a society characterised by inherent poverty, religiosity and politics. While the studies in this section argue from different perspectives, they do agree on the trigger cause of BH’s campaign of violence: that Mohammed Yusuf (the founder of BH) and his successors have been instrumental in the emergence and subsequent growth of BH (Thurston, 2016; Adesoji 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012). The majority of scholars also argue that the extra-judicial killing of Yusuf escalated BH violence. However, most of these studies focus on BH solely as a group (Adesoji, 2010; Loimier, 2012; Oyeniyi, 2014; Agbiboa, 2013 a, b & c).

2.3.1.1 Religion and history of religiosity in Nigeria
Studies about radical Islam suggest that BH’s campaign of violence has been influenced by the nature of Islamism in Nigeria (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Levan, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 2015; Alozieuwa, 2015).

Adesoji (2010 and 2011) is a scholar whose writing laid the foundations for other studies on BH. He sees BH as Islamic revivalism in Nigeria and in his narrative, he argues that militant Islamism, ethno-religious conflicts and the Maitasine uprising of 1980 influenced the advent of BH. He views the 2009 BH uprising as a significant event by Islamic conservatives at imposing a fringe religious ideology on a Nigerian secular state. In addition, that Nigerian religious sensitivities, economic hardship, desperate devices by politicians for political power and the increasing trend for global Islamic fundamentalism enabled the emergence of BH. Moreover, he notes that the intensity of the group’s violence is motivated both by the nature of Nigeria’s counter terrorism (CT) and links to Islamist movements across Nigeria. From an economic perspective, he suggests that Islamic movements outside of Nigeria and BH use religion to attract individuals, recruit poor and uneducated individuals and more specifically, that BH recruits Almajirai as members. Contrary to the argument that poverty and illiteracy are the predominant tools of BH recruitment, findings by Nigerian forces suggest that individuals above the average national income willingly join BH (Hart, 2015). Relative deprivation, frustration and a struggle for identity can be applicable to many Nigerian Muslims, but only a select few turn to violence.
Further to the assertion of Adesoji (2010 and 2011) on the role of Islamic revivalism in BH’s emergence, Loimeier (2012) argues that the emergence, in-fighting and subsequent division of the Izala (Society of Removal of Innovation and Re-establishment of the Sunna) Salafists influenced the emergence of BH. He examines BH from a historical perspective and argues that the group’s rise is a consequence of theological disputes within Islam, as well as a number of factors within the Yan Izala (members of Izala). Loimeier (2012) observes that the dan Fodio jihad of the 19th century laid the foundations from which theologian argumentation was set as the basis for political decisions in Northern Nigeria. He suggests that the advent of British colonial rule plunged northern Nigeria into deep crisis to the point where British law, economic dynamism and Western education were perceived as a threat to Islamic education. He describes this situation as ‘modernisation shock’. Loimeier (2012) suggests that Yan Izala engaged other Sufi (unorthodox Islam) Muslims in acrimonious debate in which they perceived other Sufi to be illiterates (jahilai), and then fought violently with them to ensure reform within Islam. Furthermore, this led to divisions within Yan Izala which happened in two stages. The first was between the old and new generations. The new generation underwent ‘new education’ in Saudi Arabia but could not secure jobs in Nigeria nor occupy leadership positions within the Yan Izala group. This situation made them create their own schools, mosques and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The second stage was division within the new generation which resulted in the creation of two parties, with Yusuf rejecting modern Islamic schools and the secular system of education in Nigeria, and Shiek Ja'afar Mahmud Adam (Yusuf’s teacher) opposing the worldview of Yusuf and urging Muslims to be educated and occupy public office.

In line with Loimeier (2012), a number of scholars (Oyeniyi, 2014; Azumah, 2015; Aliyu et al., 2015) argue that BH emerged as a result of disputes within the Izala Salafist movement. They also attribute the trigger of BH violence as being the killing of Yusuf. Oyeniyi (2014) takes a broader perspective on the emergence of BH in relation to Salafism. In his attempt to explain the emergence of BH from the Izala movement, Oyeniyi (2014) blames the rise of BH on Salafist doctrine. Like Huntington’s clash of civilisations theory, he sees the rise of the Salafist movement in the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of European ideas and resistance to Western hegemony within Muslim civilisations. He maintains that Salafism sees political participation as un-Islamic because a core Salafist belief is that of monotheism, i.e.
the supreme authority of the books of Allah, the following of the prophets of Allah and the supremacy of Allah’s will. He suggests that different groups interpret these core beliefs as their religious duty as well as the reason for their struggle to establish an Islamic government and as such, BH interprets these through violence.

Regardless of the role of the Izala dispute in the emergence of BH, some scholars argue that international jihadism or the global revivalism of radical Islam has a source of inspiration for BH (Onapajo et al., 2012; Zenn et al., 2013). In other words, the authors see the emergence of BH as a reflection of the revivalism of radical Islam. When analysing the import of global terrorism to Nigeria, Onapajo et al. (2012) contend that BH emerged due to global jihadist movements and escalated due to domestic factors such as extreme poverty, ethnicity and state and leadership failure, as well as power struggles between political actors. Useing Rapoport’s (2001) ‘Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’ as a framework, they say that BH are inspired by anti-Western hatred from the Muslim world and as such, see Christians as the West and non-BH Muslims as the elite and stooges of the West, with this thinking informing their strategic use of violence. Rapoport (2001) classifies the trend of terrorism into four parts: anarchist, anti-colonialist, leftist and religious waves. He sees the anarchist wave (1880s - 1890s) as a period dominated by the assassination of politicians and key state officials. The anti-colonialist era started during World War 1 (WW1) and was dominated by colonial resistance - an ambiguous term for those fighting colonial powers as they can be perceived as terrorists or freedom fighters. Rapoport (2001) argues that the leftist wave started in the mid-1960s, a period characterised by global anti-American movements during the Cold War era. The fourth wave referred to by Onapajo et al. (2012) is the religious wave of terrorism that started in the 20th century. They argue that the 20th century gave rise to events and groups such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Aum Shinrinkyo and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). However, Rapoport’s (2001) ‘waves of terrorism’ suffers from some weaknesses in explaining the cause of modern terrorism and BH. Harrow (2008: 4&5) suggests that ideology, grievances and framing are also necessary when explaining the cause of terrorism. He implies (2008) that ideology on its own cannot explain the cause of terrorism as a mix of ideology, grievances and framing play a major role in influencing terrorism. Similar to Onapajo et al. (2012), Zenn et al. (2013) suggest that BH was greatly inspired by the Taliban from 2003 – 2009, and note that BH was at one point referred to as the Nigerian Taliban. They also argue that Abubakar Shekau’s
emergence as BH’s group leader led to more internationalisation of the group. Abubakar Shekau transformed BH into a Takfiri group, which refers to people who do not share BH ideology with Kafirs (infidels), and this encouraged him to ally the group with other terrorist groups such as AQIM, Ansar and MUJWA (The Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa).

The emergence of BH is acknowledged to have been influenced by the politicisation of Islamic fundamentalism (Levan, 2013; Agbiboa, 2013c; Akinola, 2015). Levan (2013) notes that as the British colonial system of indirect rule in 1914 allowed Sharia, this encouraged successful attempts by Muslims to make Sharia part of the Nigerian constitution. He holds that these attempts for a Sharia state elicited confrontational resistance from Christians, and further suggests that attempts inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979 extended to Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, following a long period of military rule. Furthermore, he notes that the year 2000 was marked by acrimonious debate on how to give more powers to existing Sharia courts in order to apply stricter Sharia laws. He argues that the brutal response by the Nigerian government to BH led to the radicalisation of the group, thereby motivating BH’s violence. On the notion of politicisation of religion, Levan’s (2013) account is insufficient in offering explicit understanding of BH’s disposition of violence. There is an established Sharia legal system in Nigeria that BH is not supportive of, making it therefore pertinent to understand the argumentation of BH over existing Sharia. Further to the politicisation of religion, Agbiboa (2013c) uses social identity theory (SIT) to posit that BH emanates from extreme religious identity, excruciating poverty and deprivation. SIT implies that membership of a social group is central in forming an individual’s identity (Agbiboa 2013b: Tajfel & Turner 1979). He further attempts to unveil the nexus between religion and politics by giving examples of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine and Liberation Theology in Latin America. He suggests that Islam is symbolic to a religion-politics nexus that has always clashed with secularism. He holds that the Prophet Mohammed is both a spiritual and political leader of his city, and that the Prophet inspires Muslims to practise such a theocratic system. In addition to the role of politicisation of Islam in the rise of BH, Akinola (2015) argues that BH emerged because of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria, but was sustained by the politicisation of religion and excruciating poverty in Northern Nigeria. Aloziieuwa (2015) in contrast, argues that BH emanated from political Islam, which seeks to achieve political goals through the vehicle of religion. He further
argues that Nigerian politicians who felt alienated by the Nigerian political system, supported BH’s development from an isolationist to a large-scale violent movement.

2.3.1.2 Socio-economic factors
Studies under this sub-section suggest that socio-economic deprivation is responsible for the cause and motivation of BH’s campaign of terror. Each scholar under this sub-section has combined a direct and indirect explanation of the Nigerian state to highlight the causes and motivations of BH. The direct explanation talks about CT in the Nigerian state, whereas the indirect explanation refers to factors such as socioeconomic and political conditions, as well as the ethno-religious fault lines of the Nigerian state. The indirect explanation talks more about BH using individual motivation such as poverty to recruit and mobilise individuals as a way of revolting against elite corruption. Explanations within this section overlap in terms of both the direct and indirect nature of the Nigerian state in terms of cause and motivation, and are reviewed according to the ontology and methodology of studies such as Marxist thinking, frustration aggression, framing theory and ‘wretched of the earth’ theory.

The Marxist ontological underpinning of class or the ‘have’s and have not’s’ has been applied when trying to understand the thinking and activities of BH (Ogunrotifa, 2013; Epelle & Uranta 2014). Ogunrotifa (2013) suggests that BH is a product of class struggle emanating from socioeconomic problems caused by global capitalism. He notes that religious manipulation (interpreting politics through the prism of religion) used by Northern political elites in maintaining power, particularly in northern Nigeria where poverty and hardship are most prevalent, has snowballed into BH. He argues that Yusuf mobilised the working classes to fight Western education because he believed it had created capitalism and a corrupt ruling class. Similarly, Epelle & Uranta (2014) use the Marxist political economy approach to note that the poor material conditions of BH members led to their quest for control of government machinery and means of production. They suggest that the Nigerian state is characterised by its acrimonious rivalry for power and that politicians deploy all available means to acquire and maintain political power, resulting in the destabilisation of the political system. As a result, poor people have been manipulated on religious and ethnic lines, which in turn have provided a platform for them to vent their frustrations about their poor economic situations.

Marxist ideology appears too simplistic to explain the rise and motivation of BH. It does not explain why the same working class and lumpen proletariat attack soft
target areas like markets, motor parks and other public places that individuals (including the poor) occupy. Although not all groups have the capacity to attack protected targets such as state forces and residential areas of senior government officials, BH attacks civilians in their strongholds. If BH were explainable from a Marxist point of view, the elite would be their main target. Epelle & Uranta’s (2014) argument does not give a convincing account of the religious motivation of BH towards violence, and their views are in fact more appropriate in explaining leftist terrorism. Moreover, the authors do not explain how the masses have been manipulated, for example whether they were influenced by propaganda, extremist ideology or material benefits.

Other scholars adopt the state-failure thesis and frustration-aggression frameworks to explain how the Nigerian state has caused and motivated BH’s activities (Maiangwa et al., 2012; Agbibo, 2014a; Akinfala et al., 2014; Aghedo & Osumah, 2012). The state-failure thesis suggests that a state loses its sovereignty when it cannot provide security, infrastructure or law and order (Zartman, 1995). In contrast, the frustration-aggression thesis holds that both individuals and groups act violently when their goals are prevented by society. Using the state-failure and frustration-aggression frameworks, Maiangwa et al. (2012) explain the emergence, motivation, goals, targets and extremism of BH. They suggest that security deficiencies, corruption, military brutality and economic hardship are responsible for BH’s violent activities. They argue that Yusuf created BH to fight ‘corruption and to establish a state governed by morality’. This means that BH perceives the Nigerian government as its enemy because it believes that it perpetuates societal ills through its constitution and through liberal democracy, and that these ensure privileges to women, homosexuals and prostitutes. Thus BH has termed the West and anything perceived to be western, including the Nigerian government, as an infidel, and as such it sees a Sharia state as the solution to this. Furthermore the authors suggest that BH adopted its violent strategies after a clash with Nigerian security agents and the subsequent extra-judicial killing of its leader. Maiangwa et al. (2012) hold that BH’s motivation to use violence has been influenced by endemic poverty, corruption and failure of government, and that this has translated into frustration and aggression (Maiangwa et al., 2012). Similarly, Agbibo (2014a and 2014b) suggests that BH feels alienated in the north compared to developed southern Nigeria, and that government corruption and incompetence, alongside of brutal security agents, motivate BH.
Akinfala et al. (2014) apply the frustration-aggression theory, Maslow's concept of a hierarchy of needs and Bandura's social learning theory in their examination of BH. Maslow’s hierarchy of needs suggests that humans have three stages of needs: basic, psychological and self-actualisation (a sense of fulfilment). Bandura’s social learning theory stipulates that people learn more effectively through observing others (models) than from direct experience (Bandura, 1986 & 1998). Akinfala et al. (2014) use Maslow’s basic needs (food, shelter and security) to suggest that the rise of BH is as a result of poor quality of life, youth unemployment, legal impunity and corruption. They also posit that these factors have culminated in militancy, insurgency, kidnapping and assassinations in Nigeria. Through Bandura's theory, the authors explain the motivations of BH members to use violence, with the writers suggesting that the militants of the oil-rich Niger-Delta region of Nigeria have served as a psychological motivation for BH. They argue that the successes of militants such as Asari Dokubo and Henry Okah, who successfully carried arms against the Nigerian state and were subsequently granted state pardons, serve as motivation for BH. With regards to the argument of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, Akinfala et al. (2014) argue that until 1980, the majority of basic needs for Nigerians were met.

An attempt to draw a parallel between BH and the militants of the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria (Akinfala et al., 2014) is overly simplistic. The aggrieved individuals in the South choose to force their government to alleviate poor economic and environmental conditions, while in contrast BH wants to spread ideology. Moreover, the underlying cause of BH is different from the restlessness of the militants in the Niger-Delta. Hence the two militant groups are not comparable within this context, and in fact Akinfala et al. (2014) do not illustrate any methods or evidence to prove that BH has been inspired by the Niger-Delta region militants. Contrary to Bandura's social learning theory, not all individuals learn or derive inspiration from violent backgrounds (Taylor & Quale 1994: 32), and therefore this is insufficient in explaining BH. In addition, the frustration-aggression theory is not enough to justify the use of violence. Socioeconomic hardship, political frustration or deprivation are not applicable to all individuals as some people like to live in isolation, while others like to cooperate with others through non-violence (Rummel 1977, Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

With regards to the assertion made by Akinfala et al. (2014) about self-actualisation as a contributory factor in the emergence of BH, Salaam (2012) makes a
similar argument from a demographic perspective. He argues that levels of youth deprivation are connected to the emergence and motivation of BH. Salaam (2012) suggests that the cause of BH violence is as a consequence of wide economic disparities between the rich and the poor, of unemployment and of unequal educational opportunities, particularly in the North. He argues that these factors create a feeling of injustice amongst the youth, and that such feelings motivate them to support radical Islam. The author uses the risk factor model to analyse the radicalisation of youths, and suggests that the most influential risk factors motivating members of BH to engage in violence are the poverty gap and social injustice. He believes that these has been provoked by the absence of protective factors, resulting in a complete loss of confidence in the government’s ability to ensure the welfare and security of its people. Regardless of how BH has evolved in its recruitment of youths, they have now adopted a strategy of recruiting children and teenagers, most of whom are female (BBC 2014a).

Another comparative study between BH and MASSOB (Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign Biafra) of Eastern Nigeria was been carried out by Sa´ndig (2015). He uses the framing theory in an attempt to understand their ideology, and suggests that even though both movements feel economically and politically alienated, they have a different approach to rebellion. He argues that while MASSOB adopts non-violence, BH adopts violence because of the culture of radical Islam in Northern Nigeria. However, such an argument does not explain the existence of numerous other Islamic social movements within the North such as FOMWAN (Federation of Muslim Women’s in Nigeria) or MURIC (Muslim Rights Concern) who use non-violence in their struggle for justice, equality and an improvement in the welfare of Muslims in Nigeria.

Some studies argue that state fragility is the cause of BH violence (Aghedo & Osumah, 2012; Salaam 2012). Aghedo & Osumah (2012) conclude that the emergence of BH was as a consequence of governance failure and institutional fragility. They argue that BH members cut across poor and uneducated people who have overwhelming feelings of ‘social injustice, marginalisation and human insecurity’, particularly in the north where poverty is more prevalent. Moreover, they note that this situation is coupled with the government’s inability to unite a fractionalised Nigeria. The authors selected academics, journalists, members of the Nigerian forces and politicians in four northern state capitals to participate in a survey. A total of 80 questionnaires were administered, with 20 questionnaires given to 20 participants in
each of the four states. The questionnaire was designed to understand BH’s ideology and intentions that included making Nigeria an Islamic state, the abolition of Western education, the abolition of democracy, an end to bad leadership and the alleviation of poverty. The results of their survey showed the following response frequencies:

- making Nigeria an Islamic state 78%
- the abolition of Western education 82%
- the abolition of democracy 42%
- an end to bad leadership 84%
- the alleviation of poverty 72%

Along with these responses, Aghedo & Osumah (2012) further identified factors such as the Nigerian government’s use of brutal force in fighting BH during its formative stages. Even though their study was supported by secondary data, the questionnaire appears to be inadequate in evaluating a complex group such as BH. The questionnaire did not allow space for the respondents to give independent answers in addition to those asked for by the researchers. Moreover, the study would have been more rigorous if respondents had been members of or had access to BH.

Some studies suggest that BH is motivated by the nature of Nigeria’s corrupt elite (Isa, 2010; de Montclos, 2014; Smith, 2015). Scholars argue that long years of mismanagement and endemic corruption within the Nigerian system encouraged the emergence of the BH movement. Additionally, the weak and indecisive nature of the Nigerian state has enabled BH to mature into a larger and more violent movement. Similarly, it is also argued that BH is a consequence of the manipulative nature of individuals in positions of authority within the Nigerian state. Isa (2010) sees BH as the product of many attempts by different Islamist movements through history to establish their concepts of governance, and traces these attempts through the dan Fodio jihad (Qadariyya; a school of thought in Islam), Mahdiyya, Maitasine, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) and BH. In addition, Hasen & Musa (2013) use the Fanon theory (‘wretched of the earth’) (Fanon, 1961) to explain the cause of BH’s use of violence. They view BH as working in resistance to the greed of rich Nigerian elites. In their analogy, Hasen & Musa (2013) argue that BH members see themselves as having been colonised by Nigerian elites, who act as colonialists. They contend that since BH members are aggrieved with their poor socioeconomic and political situations, they have chosen to revolt and are partly supported by the nature of northern
Nigeria, where people are more loyal to religion than ethnonational affiliations and as such, their revolt would dislodge a corrupt government.

While explanations about the causes and motivation of BH are important in explaining how BH came about in the first place, they do not explain the changing nature and dynamics of the group. As a result, this thesis examines BH’s changing dynamics over time.

2.3.2 Evolution of BH
Few studies within the literature on BH appear to have shifted their focus from the cause and motivations of BH towards explanations about its evolution. The dynamism of BH has been studied both internally and externally. The internal dynamism includes leadership disputes within BH (Zenn 2014b, 2016; Pantucci & Jesperson 2015); external dynamics involving BH’s strategy (Weerarate, 2014; Folade, 2016; Walker, 2016) and tactical reasons as to why BH’s campaign of violence has transcended beyond Nigerian borders (Eveslage, 2013; Comolli 2015; D’Amato 2017). Some major developments in the study of BH also emanate from the studies of Barkindo (2016) and Pieri & Zenn (2016), who highlight the implications of history and ethnicism to both the internal and external dynamics of BH.

With regards to internal dynamism, scholars have explored leadership disputes within BH. Zenn (2014b & 2016) and Pantucci & Jesperson (2015) suggest that the death of BH’s founder facilitated the rise of a more militant leadership, and that this generated internal conflict between his successors (senior disciples). Zenn (2014b & 2016) and Pantucci & Jesperson (2015) observe that the movement’s leadership has created and coordinated different factions of the movement against the Nigerian state. The authors suggest that BH factions connect with international jihadist groups, such as Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, across Africa.

With regards to external dynamics, Weerarate (2014) examines the expansion of BH from Borno and outside of the Northeast of Nigeria. Weerarate (2014) looks at how BH has expanded in its target selections, strategies, severity of violence and geographic locations. He argues that BH’s expansion is because of ties with Al-Qaeda, Nigeria’s armed CT measures and internal fragmentation within BH. By internal fragmentation, he means that leaders within the group have broken the movement into a cell-like structure, with each group being loyal to its own leader. With regards to Weerarate’s (2014) argument on the impact of Nigeria’s CT on BH’s violence, this thesis argues that Nigeria’s CT has been under-examined because the timings,
application of policies and outcome of their effects on BH behaviour over time has not been sufficiently evaluated. Walker (2016) highlights the transformation of BH from being a sub-national level from Borno State, which is the theatre of BH’s campaign of violence. The author highlights the nature of democratic failure at a sub-national level in the Northeast of Nigeria, and how BH took advantage of poverty in the region to recruit individuals through Islamic evangelism and financial inducements, with it then going underground in 2010 to reinforce itself against the Nigerian state. Walker (2016) presents a strong argument highlighting the logical strategy of BH, yet his argument does not give reasons for the evolution of BH’s tactics to the use of firefights, suicide bombing and kidnapping.

Folade (2016) offers a distinction to the above by focusing more on the changing strategy of BH against the Nigerian government from 2010-2015 through the ‘hybrid wars’ framework. In other words, the author examines BH’s reactions to and plans against Nigerian CT. The hybrid wars framework is a combination of both conventional and unconventional tactics such as combat, kidnapping, beheading and suicide bombings in war. Folade (2016) argues that BH is dynamic, and that international linkage to other terror groups is because both BH and Nigerian forces need foreign support to defeat each other.

With regards to the transnationalisation of BH, Eveslage (2013) attempts to explain BH’s likely spread outside of Nigeria. He conducted a content analysis of BH’s public statements, and his analysis strongly suggests that BH is a domestic terrorist movement and is unlikely to spread to neighbouring countries. Eveslage (2013) suggests that BH is intrinsically a domestic group because of factors such as religious revivalism and the weak nature of the Nigerian state, and with regards to the likelihood of BH spreading out of Nigeria, the author predicts that global Salafist ideology could enable BH to be transnationalised. However, recent events suggest that the transnationalisation of BH is as a result of a multitude of factors such as ethnicity, international military cooperation, tactics and geographical factors (see chapter eight).

Comolli’s (2015) examination of the spread of BH in Nigeria’s border regions relies on interviews with members of the Nigerian forces and media reports as the major source of data. Arguably, the study of a complex phenomenon such as BH requires a far wider variety of methods. Comolli (2015) argues that the Nigerian government’s weak CT was responsible for BH’s transformation, and that BH has taken advantage of countries bordering the Lake Chad region to connect with other
international terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab. However, Comolli (2015) does not clearly highlight the connection between BH and radical groups outside of Nigerian borders beyond that of symbolism. Furthermore, D’Amato (2017) conducted case studies on BH and Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) to look at how the transnationality of nationalistic terrorist organisations can be costly. She suggests that organising terrorist attacks across national boundaries entails physical, social and strategic costs. Physical refers to geographical obstacles, social to the ability of terrorists to benefit from opportunities such as support, food and recruitment across boundaries, and strategic implies the ability of terrorist groups to move across countries to carry out attacks. In terms of physical costs, the distance between Borno and Nigeria’s neighbouring countries makes it difficult for BH to relocate out of Borno (the epicentre of BH activities) or plan attacks. In terms of social costs, BH has less ethno-religious support than it claims because of the numerous attacks it has carried out against the Northeast region (it regards this region as its constituency) and Niger and Cameroon, who both have transnational histories of ethnic and political affiliation to. With regards to strategic costs, the author argues that Nigerian CT has contributed to the transnationalisation of BH by pushing its members to territories they feel safe in. In fact the transnationalisation of BH is complex because of the porous border within the Lake Chad region resulting from trans-Saharan trade (Hill, 2009). The Kanem-Bornu Empire created historical ties to North-eastern Nigeria, the Republic of Chad, Eastern Niger, Northern Cameroon and Southern Libya (Barth, 1858; Hill 2010). Moreover, BH has succeeded in recruiting individuals across these neighbouring countries (International Crisis Group, 2016a; 2016b; 2017), thereby suggesting that there are in fact a number of factors that coalesce to explain the spillover of BH violence.

2.3.3 Emerging arguments about BH
Emerging studies about BH suggest that it has adopted a new method of exploiting history and ethnicity to motivate and sustain its movement (Pieri & Zenn, 2016; Barkindo, 2016). These scholars suggest that BH uses the narrative of the Kanuri ethnic group across Lake Chad to maintain its movement. Barkindo (2016) argues that BH exploits history and memory to justify its targeting of Northeastern Nigeria and parts of the Lake Chad region, which they regard as the ancestral home of the Kanuri. Barkindo (2016) interviewed a BH suspect undergoing de-radicalisation at a Nigerian prison and found that BH uses the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire to mobilise
and motivate individuals to violence. Similarly, Pieri & Zenn (2016) argue that BH draws inspiration from dan Fodio’s jihad of the 19th century and his establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate. They argue that BH seeks to establish a caliphate in the Kanuri homeland of the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which was destroyed by British colonial powers. The authors argue that the reason why BH rejects democracy, constitutionalism and Western values is because they believe that the British colonial authorities destroyed their value system. The new thinking within this study is a challenge to the idea that BH is dominantly characterised, and that its motivation is radical Islam and the elimination of poverty. Until now, the majority of studies about the causes and motivation of BH analyse BH within the areas of radical Islam, poverty and CT. Barkindo (2016) and Pieri & Zenn (2016) highlight that there is an ethnic dimension to BH and that this element has been used internally to motivate its members, and externally to expand BH’s control across Lake Chad. (This thesis builds on these studies to highlight the ethnic dimension of BH - see chapters five, seven and eight).

2.4 Literature summary

This sub-chapter summarises what is already known about terrorism and BH and in doing so, it highlighted the gaps on BH literature that this thesis seeks to narrow.

On the causes of terrorism, psychological, environmental and religious factors have been discussed. They have been criticised because different individuals do not have same levels of deprivation; and deprivation as well as religion can be seen as a source of non-violent cooperation rather than solely as a source of violence (Walker and Pettigrew, 1984; Juergensmeyer, 2000; Pape, 2003). Also, contrary to conventional arguments that economic hardship causes terrorism, studies show that even individuals who earn above minimum wage engage in terrorism (Cole & Cole, 2010). Illiteracy being a cause of terrorism has also been debunked because terrorists select educated recruits (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005). Debates about the consequences of terrorism have acknowledged the destruction of lives and property, tourism and economic activities. This thesis would also argue that the spill over of violence from one region to another could also be as a consequence of terrorism. Therefore, chapter eight discusses how terrorism in Nigeria affects countries in the Lake Chad region. Furthermore, not much has been discussed about violence against women with regards to radicalisation, nor on trauma and stigmatisation of female victims of terror. The
fifth chapter of this thesis outlines how women have been affected by BH. In terms of CT, different accounts have acknowledged that CT can be effective, counter-productive or make no difference. Since government policies and agencies of government determine CT activities (Rosendorff and Sandler, 2004; Jacobson & Kaplan, 2007; Acre & Sandler, 2007), chapter six of this thesis examines the CT policies of the Nigerian government and their implications. In terms of old and new terrorism, strict demarcation between old and new might not be relevant in analysing BH because it appears to be more of a hybrid of old and new terrorism. The majority of studies on old and new terrorism generally focus comparatively on group variation, i.e. on the types of groups that are more lethal, transnational or differing in their targeting. Therefore, chapter five highlights why BH appears to be a hybrid of both old and new terrorism in terms of its organisational structure.

Along with the broader literature on terrorism, existing studies about BH highlight the origins and evolution of BH. They suggest that BH came into existence in 2002, yet by 2002 BH was already a small isolationist movement, even though little was known about it. The majority of studies on BH agree that Mohammed Yusuf (the founder of BH) and his successors have been instrumental in the emergence and subsequent growth of BH ( Thurston, 2016; Adesoji 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012; Pantucci & Jesperson 2015 Zenn 2014b). They suggest that the extra-judicial killing of the founder of BH escalated BH violence (Adesoji, 2010; Loimier, 2012; Oyeniyi, 2014; Agbiboa, 2013 a, b & c; Barkindo 2016), with some scholars suggesting that BH emerged as a result of radical Islam. Other studies argue that socio-economic problems are the cause of BH violence (Maiangwa et al., 2012; Akinfala et al., 2014), while others talk about the symbolic connection of BH to international radical Salafist movements (Onapajo et al. 2012). A few studies focus on the evolution of BH both internally and externally. With regards to internal evolution, the dispute within the leadership of BH is emphasised (Zenn 2014b, 2016; Pantucci & Jesperson 2015). With regards to external evolution, some studies identify the unconventional tactics of BH, but do not explain the reason for their changing tactics over time (Folade, 2016). Furthermore, the transnationalisation of BH has been under-examined, with only a few studies attempting to explain the spillover of terrorism out of Nigeria (D’Amato, 2017). More recent studies have examined the influence of ethnicity as it illustrates how BH mobilises its members in its efforts to spread across the Lake region in order to reclaim the old Kanem-Bornu Empire (Barkindo, 2016; Pieri & Zenn 2016).
Studies in existing literature on BH are important in understanding a number of factors that may have influenced the BH campaign of violence. Hence this thesis builds on the extant literature of BH and then attempts to address gaps in existing literature.

This study looks at BH in a different manner. It examines the group’s behaviour and evolution both internally and externally over time, and as a strategic actor using multi-level analysis. The study attempts to explain how different aspects of BH’s behaviour complement each other. Using a broader range of methods, theories and empirical studies within the literature on terrorism and political violence, the study allows for an indepth analysis of BH. In order to highlight the behaviour and evolution of BH, a number of gaps in the existing literature have been identified.

Even when BH became prominent in 2009, it was not as deadly as it is at present. Numerous studies on BH agree that the extra-judicial killing of its founder triggered BH’s violence. However, such positions are inadequate as the movement was already radicalised before its leader’s death. In addition, the majority of scholars on BH suggest that BH seeks to establish a strict Islamic state in Nigeria, yet such studies are do not sufficiently explain why BH is spreading across Nigeria’s borders. BH has transformed from a small isolationist movement to a full-blown terrorist group with transnational influences, with there being little explanation as to how or why this has happened. Existing studies on BH do not address the variations in BH’s behaviour over time. Such behaviour includes the relationship between BH principals and agents, group structure and variation in recruitment strategies, goals, target selection and the spillover of violence. The paragraphs below outline these and other puzzles within the literature on BH. In addition, they go on to highlight how these puzzles can be addressed, and these form the different chapters of this thesis.

Firstly, previous studies on BH do not examine the relationship between BH leaders and followers, and how such leaders maintain their legitimacy. Moreover, studies do not explain the recruitment approaches of different BH leaders, nor do they quantify the intensity of violence under different leadership tenures. There is therefore a need for further studies on the effects of leadership on the variation of violence and chapter four, which is the individual level of explanation of this thesis, will be addressing this.

Secondly, previous studies on BH are inadequate in accounting for the ethnic composition of BH and the changing nature of its recruitment. Chapter five, which is
the group level explanation, discusses BH’s group structure and composition. The chapter examines how BH’s structure has changed over time, and it explains the changing nature of BH recruitment, including conscription and hypnotism, which numerous studies on BH have not examined.

Thirdly, scholars on BH argue that Nigeria’s CT efforts motivate BH violence, but existing studies do not adequately assess such policies in terms of their timing, application, outcome and impact on BH behaviour over time. Additionally, studies have not adequately analysed the nonviolent approach of Nigeria’s CT. Chapter six, which is the state level explanation of this thesis, assesses Nigerian CT (violent and nonviolent) and its implications on BH’s behaviour.

Fourthly, previous studies have not adequately explained the reasons for the variation in attacks across different BH targets. Chapter seven, the sub-national level of explanation, will outline different rationalisations for the disparity of attacks across the most BH affected territories in the Northeast of Nigeria.

Finally, previous studies do not adequately address either the import of extremism into Nigeria or the spillover of terror to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. The majority of existing studies on BH suggest that the goal of BH is to establish a strict Islamic state in Nigeria, but presently BH has transnational influences across countries in the Lake Chad region. Factors in the spillover of terror such as external intervention, ethnic linkages and weak neighbouring states are not assessed in the extant literature. Thus chapter eight, the international level of explanation, details out an in-depth assessment of the spillover of extremism and terror to countries in the Lake Chad region.
Chapter 3: Research Methods

This thesis draws upon a range of sources in order to conduct a detailed case study on Boko Haram (BH). Two distinct methodological approaches are introduced and used in this research. This chapter firstly outlines the use of a case study method, the use of documents, a qualitative technique of semi-structured interviews with various experts on BH and then the use of statistics. Secondly, it explains the use of the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) comparative method for assessing the variation of BH violence at a sub-national level. The rationale for using the different methods are discussed, as well as their utility to each chapter or level of analysis.

3.1 Case study on BH

The rationale for applying a case study method to study the evolution and behaviour of BH is that it is an active terrorist group that uses tools of violence similar to those of other terrorist groups. Moreover, a case study can incorporate the complexity of BH that general arguments related to poverty, pathological or mental abnormalities or sustained ideological indoctrination cannot account for. Hence such an approach is pertinent in understanding the BH phenomenon through in-depth investigation. Case studies can investigate contemporary phenomena within a real-life context empirically, and can ensure thorough, in-depth investigations in which a particular instance or aspect can be studied (Yin, 2003: 13; Gilbert, 2008:36). A further justification for using a case study approach is its flexibility (Yin 2003) and allowance for the incorporation of different methods such as interviews or documents, as well as the use of numerical data. Such a combination of methods adds strength to a study.

In a longitual case study, a group is observed over a long period of time. This allows for better understanding of for example, a group’s path to violence. Depending upon what is being studied, longitudinal cases constitute a major rationale for selecting a study (Bryman, 2008: 55-56, Yin 2014:51). Additionally, longitudinal studies focus on any change or changes that may occur over time, or how certain events and conditions transpire (Yin, 2014: 52-53). Although this research uses a case study for a group, an embedded case study approach involving distinct parts has been adopted because the study utilises a level of analysis framework to understand changes in BH’s behaviour over time. Moreover, studying the influence of an individual, a state, a sub-state or any international factors on BH’s choice of violence allows for a systematic and comprehensive study of the group.
There are several advantages to using BH as a case study. Firstly, the study will explain the complexity of BH as a terrorist group. Furthermore, as case studies are flexible (Sarantakos, 2013: 227), this will allow for the incorporation of a variety of sources and methods in this study. Available sources about BH that are both qualitative and quantitative have been employed in this research. The findings of these can inform further studies on the rise and motivation of terrorist groups. Such findings may be used to challenge some theoretical assumptions within the field of terrorism and political violence. The findings will also be important in providing more information about linking Salafist ideology to terrorism since BH is a Salafi group. Popular opinion suggests that Salafi ideology is linked to terrorism despite several different studies suggesting Salafi Jihadism is a subculture of Salafist ideology (Sageman, 2004; Wiktorowicz & Khaltenthaler, 2006; Cottee 2010).

This study has some drawbacks, all of which are common in case studies. Case studies have problems with bias in case selection, generalisation and internal validity. In order to address any bias, the researcher has ensured that a critical literature review has been conducted along with a step-by-step case study protocol being executed in order to guarantee robust scientific enquiry. In other words, the case selection has been driven by the researcher’s background, but the methodological rigour in the case study investigations ensures that biases that may affect the findings are reduced. Moreover, the background of the researcher is in fact beneficial to the case study as others may not be able to gain similar access to expert interviewees. In terms of generalisation, the findings of this study cannot be generalised to other terrorist groups because this study only investigates BH. Nonetheless, some of the variables identified could be of theoretical importance and thus be incorporated in analysis of other groups. Replicating this study may not be possible when it comes to internal validity, i.e. the establishment of causal relationships where some conditions lead to others (Yin, 2003: 34). This is because the interviews are anonymous and the behaviour of terrorist groups, including that of BH, changes over time.

Finally, security risks and access to participants is problematic as BH is an active violent group. However, the researcher's background as a Nigerian has helped counteract this. The researcher is not only aware of security risks, but can also access selected interviewees without a gatekeeper or a fixer being required to connect the researcher to the participants and aid in moving around a research location. As interview data from participants have been used, a mixed methods approach has been
incorporated in order to triangulate all sources of data and to address any weaknesses within the interview data.

3.1.1 Documents
National and international documents and reports have been used in this study to corroborate interview data. In addition, reliable online sources and academic articles have been accessed. National documents used include the Nigerian Counter-terrorism Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) 2014 and 2016, the Terrorism Protection Act (TPA) (2011 & 2013) and the 2009 document on the resolution of the Da’awah Coordination Committee of Nigeria (DCCN). At the time when these documents were obtained, they were not in the public domain. In addition, some documents were suggested and given to the researcher while others were obtained online by the researcher. How and why these documents are used in this thesis is discussed below.

TPA 2011 was the first Nigerian counter-terrorism (CT) law. However, it had numerous shortcomings in terms of administrative structure and prosecution of terrorism laws, and TPA 2013 superseded it. The researcher has used these documents in chapter six in order to understand the implications of the late enactment of the CT laws, as well as the pitfalls of these laws in relation to BH.

NACTEST 2014 and 2016 have been used in chapter six to discuss CT within the Nigerian state. NACTEST 2014 was the first official document in Nigeria to outline strategies for addressing terrorism through violent and nonviolent approaches. Before the introduction of NACTEST 2014, Nigeria depended heavily on a violent approach that dictated the use of force for combating terrorism. Furthermore, NACTEST 2016 was used to understand the shortfalls of NACTEST 2014. NACTEST 2014 and 2016 have provided the researcher with the opportunity to examine the nonviolent approach of Nigeria's CT which outlines psychological and non-military ways of ending terrorism.

The Da’awah Coordination Committee of Nigeria (DCCN) is an umbrella body of different Islamic evangelical organisations. The DCCN met with some members of BH in 2009 after the BH uprising of that year to try and address the increasing radicalisation of BH. The gathering involved a meeting of over 40 influential Islamic leaders across Nigeria who sought to address BH violence by countering their narrative and dialogue. The document obtained from this meeting explains BH ideology and its grievances against the Nigerian state. This is available to the public and was suggested by one of the interview participants. The DCCN
document has been used in chapters four and five to explain BH ideology. The researcher was also told about a document called *Hazihi Aqeedatun wa minhaju Da’awatuna* (Our Creed) which the founder of BH used when mobilising and recruiting individuals into BH. However, the researcher has been unable to obtain a copy of this.

Non-Nigerian documents such as reports from International Crisis Group (ICG), Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch (HRW) have also been used as sources of data. The reports of the ICG were used in chapter eight to highlight BH’s activities in Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republics. The reports of Amnesty International and HRW were more useful in chapter six in discussing the CT of the Nigerian government. Data from academic articles, journals and books on BH as well as the broader field of terrorism have also been incorporated. These documents are used in chapters four to eight where the explanatory variables of this dissertation will be further discussed.

### 3.1.2 Media sources
A number of national and international media sources are employed in the chapters of this thesis. BH is a topical issue that has gained widespread media reportage. The researcher incorporated media sources to highlight BH and Nigerian state activities, i.e. CT measures and forces. With regards to BH activities, media sources help with research observing the changing tactics of BH. In other words, the researcher has been able to notice any such changes in BH incidents through media reporting. For example, the reportage of BH activities highlights turning points in BH’s use of firing fights, suicide bombings and abductions. These events have added more information about the dynamics of BH for the researcher to analyse. Using the media, this thesis attempts to understand the ideological position of BH (example; page 122), its propaganda (example; page 121). The media is also a source to acquire the threat messages released by BH and its reaction (example; page 122) to the CT actions of the Nigerian government.

With regards to media reportage about events in the Nigerian state, media sources have assisted the researcher in understanding how Nigerian forces operate against BH. In addition, they have helped the researcher ascertain whether these are consistent with the Nigerian state’s CT approach, as well as the implications of this for BH. Through the media, the researcher has also been able to gain insight into the views on BH and the Nigerian state held by some Nigerian senior government officials.
and influential individuals. These opinions have helped in understanding how the Nigerian government has reacted to BH and why individuals have joined BH for ideological reasons. Moreover, the researcher has used events reported in the media to further corroborate this study’s interview data.

Media reportage has been criticised by scholars for simply falling into terrorist group’s traps. Such scholars suggest that reportage and analysis about BH by the Nigerian local media in fact promotes BH’s propaganda (Ngige, et al., 2016), while others argue that the reportage and analysis of international media reveals an inadequate understanding of BH (Ezeah & Emmanuel, 2016). This research does not solely rely on local or international media analysis, but instead incorporates verified events reported by leading local (e.g. Daily Trust, Punch and Vanguard) and international media (e.g. Aljazeera, BBC and CNN), and then corroborates events with other data. Such data is firstly interview data as it helps in interpreting reported events, as well as helping support the argument of other scholars with factual examples. Secondly, reported events assist in interpreting statistics about BH, and such statistics include BH’s intensity of violence (see chapter seven) and casualties (see chapter four).

3.1.3 Semi-structured elite interviews
In addition to official documents, this study has drawn on data from a series of semi-structured interviews. The study explains how the interviews were planned, conducted and analysed. Semi-structured interviews are used in this research to generate new data on BH. Moreover, they provide a platform from which the researcher has been able to interact with influential individuals in order to obtain deeper insight into their experience with and views on BH. Previous studies on BH have attributed their rise and motivation to Islamism, counter terrorism, structural factors and international Jihadism. However, these studies are mostly based on secondary data (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Loimeier, 2012; Zenn 2014 a&b). Silke (2004) notes that interviewing terrorist groups is a difficult task due to their secretive and violent nature. It would have been useful to have been able to gain access to BH members but due to security risks, this was not possible.

The main interview questions in this study sought to investigate the evolution of BH. The questions were divided into cause and motivations of BH violence in order to start the conversation of the evolution of BH. A question schedule was designed with two sections, with each of these containing probing questions (see Appendix 3). The participants were also asked if they had different opinions to those expressed
within the researcher’s questions. Section one of the interview schedule focused on the cause of BH, while section two looked at the motivation behind BH violence. Questions about the influence of leadership, group, state and international units were asked. The question schedule reflected various levels of analysis.

A number of scholars highlight the importance of semi-structured and elite interviews. Kvale (1996:14) suggests that, “the qualitative research interview is a construction site for knowledge, it is literally an inter-view, inter-change of views between two persons conversing about a theme of mutual interest.” A semi-structured interview usually specifies a set of questions, with the interviewer retaining the leverage to “probe beyond the answer for clarification and elaboration” (May 2011: 135).

Lilleker (2003:207) posits that, “elites can be loosely defined as those with close proximity to power or policy making" which may include leaders of organisations beyond the confines of politics. Richards (1996: 1999) sees elites as a group of people who hold or who once held a position of authority. Additionally, Richards (1996: 200) argues that elite interviewing “helps you to understand the context, set the tone, or establish the atmosphere, of the area you are researching.” These views describe the group of participants selected for this research project.

Elite interviews conducted with senior state officials, local negotiators and experts on BH were pertinent in understanding the anatomy and thinking of BH since it was impossible to interview BH members themselves (see Appendix 1). Thus these interviews have been helpful in interpreting events and factors that have influenced BH. These interviews are important to this study because some of the experts interviewed had overseen the making of laws and policies for the Nigerian state and its institutions, particularly within the security sector. As a result, they were in a position to explain how government decisions influenced BH violence.

It is important to emphasise that interviewing these elites has provided new information that is not available in other existing studies on BH. Though the media does on occasion interview participants (senior state officials), the information they then release may be limited due to security risks or the fear of causing public fear. Moreover, interviews with state officials were important for this study because they were able to explain the reasons for the Nigerian state’s actions against BH. In addition, some of the data obtained from the interviewees also further corroborated events and documents incorporated in this study.
Elite interviews come with problems of reliability. The issue of reliability relates to whether a study can be replicated easily. This study cannot be replicated easily because the interviewees’ memories may fade on certain issues due to increasing occurrences of BH activities. Moreover, accessing the interviewees again could be problematic for study replication due to guaranteed anonymity; participants cannot be approached to answer similar questions again because their details are confidential. Lilleker (2003: 208) observes that since interviews have severe limitations particularly with regards to reliability, one of the ways to address this is to support interviews with other sources of empirical data such as documents and books.

Another issue that has been addressed is the researcher’s background and positionality as these could pose bias. The researcher is Nigerian, but his background adds strength to the study because the researcher had access to information which non-Nigerians may not have had access to. The researcher’s positionality on BH is that it is a movement inspired by radical interpretations of Islam by a few individuals. The researcher’s opinion about BH’s evolution is derived from the group’s changing behaviour, which is dependent on the group’s desire to achieve its goal. This goal is a crusade to establish its ideology and control within its community of origin, as well as its surrounding environment. The researcher’s belief about BH participants is that they have knowledge about Nigeria and BH that helps give a more rounded picture of BH. However, the researcher remains mindful about the accuracy of participants, and so a number of sources were applied to verify and triangulate the interview data. Regardless of the researcher’s opinion, the researcher has adopted a critical assessment as well as a systematic approach to investigating BH in order to arrive at an informed rather than speculative understanding of the group.

3.1.3.1 Selection of participants
22 participants were identified based on their engagement in dialogue with BH. Some of these participants were senior government officials in the three most BH-affected Nigerian states. Some were Islamic scholars with extensive knowledge of Islamic theology, with some also having access to BH. In addition, some participants were key government officials in the security sector. Importantly, some participants had been involved in the drafting of Nigeria’s CT policies. Previous interviews and public comments by other potential participants were also considered to ensure objectivity on issues.
3.1.3.2 Interview process
After obtaining ethical approval for fieldwork (i.e. conducting interviews), interviews were conducted in Nigeria between June and September 2015. For security reasons, North-eastern Nigeria was excluded as a potential interview location. No gatekeeper or third party was involved in meeting interview participants due to the sensitive nature of the research topic. Interview requests were sent to seven interview targets through their secretaries. One participant received a request via the researcher’s email address (see Appendix 2 for sample letter). A total number of 14 potential interviewees were approached face-to-face in their offices. When a face-to-face contact was initiated, an interview request letter was given to the potential participant. In line with Lilleker's suggestions (2003: 209), this letter contained concise explanations of: what the research was about, why they were selected and the nature of the questions they would be asked. Moreover, issues of confidentiality, privacy and anonymity of the potential interviewees were discussed with the researcher giving assurances of secrecy.

Out of the 22 potential participants that were contacted, three declined, four did not respond and five had a busy schedule and kept on postponing. Though several attempts to recruit female participants were made, this proved particularly difficult and as a result, the gender balance of interview participants is skewed. In total, the researcher interviewed 10 participants.

In terms of religion and origins of the participants, five of the 10 are Christians, with two participants from Northcentral and Northeast Nigeria, and one from Southwest Nigeria. The five other participants are Muslims, with two Muslims from the Northeast and Northwest of Nigeria, and one from the Northcentral area.

From the six ‘geo-political’ zones of Nigeria, the participants represent four zones. Non-Nigerians usually classify Nigeria as North and South. While this is not an incorrect classification, it is simplistic as the majority of Nigerians further classify the country into ‘six geo-political zones’. The North consists of the Northcentral, Northeast and Northwest, while the South consists of the Southeast, Southwest and Southsouthern (Paden, 2008). Four of this study’s participants are from Northeast, three from Northcentral, two from Northwest and one from the Southwest. The North is the only region that is affected by BH, and most especially the Northeast (GTD). As noted above, the participants were selected because of their influential roles in government or as negotiators. Four participants are directly involved in enacting laws and drafting CT policies, four others are former government officials, and there is an Islamic cleric
appointed by a government committee to negotiate with BH. Two others are conflict negotiators and security consultants who have had contact with BH. The data obtained from these interviews has more strength in terms of understanding the thinking of government officials about BH than on BH’s perspectives. The researcher was unable to get first-hand information about BH because of the researcher’s inability to talk to BH directly. However, this weakness was addressed by comments about BH from the media, and these supported the information given by the interview participants. This thesis is therefore able to make a strong contribution to understanding the government’s views of and subsequent actions against BH.

Interview locations were decided between the researcher and the participants. The locations were confirmed as Lafia, Abuja, Minna, Kaduna, Zaria Wamba and Jos. Before starting each interview, participants signed an informed consent form and were given opportunities to clarify any doubts or ask any questions they had about the research. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and stored securely (see sample of consent form in Appendix 4).

3.1.3.3 Coding
For analysing interview data, the researcher used QSR Nvivo 10 software to code the interview transcripts. Moreover, the interview data were coded using priori and posteriori methods of coding. Priori approach requires a researcher to insert into already established codes, whereas posteriori are codes generated from emergent issues within the interview data (Punch, 2014: 27). Yin (2003) suggests that interviews should be rigorously examined in order not to lose the originality of the interview data through carelessness or bias (2003). Given Yin’s (2003) emphasis, a hybrid of both priori and posteriori was adopted for analysing the interview data.

To use the priori approach, the researcher created codes from the research problem, research questions, units of analysis and empirical arguments about the cause and motivation of terrorism in the literature of terrorism studies. These codes included the role of poverty, religion, CT and individual and international influences in the emergence and growth of BH.

For the posteriori approach, the researcher generated codes from emergent themes within the interview transcripts. The generated codes included determinants of target selection, the spillover of BH violence to countries in the Lake Chad region and public reaction to BH. The researcher created sub-codes within the codes; for instance, under the code ‘recruitment and motivation,’ sub-codes such as conscription,
economic benefit, ideological indoctrination and evangelism, willing recruitment and spiritual initiations were created.

3.2 Use of statistics
In addition to other sources of data, statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) were incorporated in this study. The statistics were used at a disaggregate level in chapters four, six, seven and eight.

Data extracted from GTD were used to explain the intensity of violence as well as targeting patterns of BH. GTD is an open online source database with 150,000 recorded incidents. It stores information about targets, casualties and weapon types related to major terrorist groups or individuals globally. It has information about terrorist groups dating back to the 1970s and adds new statistics annually. For this thesis, the researcher collected data on BH attacks and casualties between 2009 and 2015 because 2009 was the first year the group appeared in GTD’s dataset. In addition, 2015 was the year when BH became the deadliest terrorist group in the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2015). In terms of reliability of the GTD dataset, GTD systematically collects data from open media sources around the world. GTD data have been used in chapters four, six, seven and eight. In chapter four, GTD statistics were incorporated to empirically illustrate the possible influence of different BH leadership in the variation of BH violence. In chapter six, Nigeria’s CT efforts and BH’s responses have been discussed with GTD data measuring the intensity of BH’s responses. In chapter seven, data on BH attacks were used to conduct a comparative analysis on the frequency of incidences in the three most affected states of Nigeria, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. In chapter eight, GTD statistics were used to quantify the spillover of violence to Nigerian neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region including Cameroon, Chad and the Niger Republics.

The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) is the official agency in Nigeria that gathers and publishes data about different sectors of Nigeria. Such data include economic indices, demographics and geographical indices. Available statistics from the NBS were sourced from the Knoema website and obtained from the NBS office in Nigeria. Knoema is a website that collates official data from different sectors (such as demographics, agriculture, etc.) from different countries. The statistics were useful in a comparative study of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe - are the states most affected by BH. Indices on population, adult literacy levels, unemployment, poverty, child labour, and landmass were incorporated to illustrate the level of deprivation in these three
states. The statistics obtained from the NBS were between 2006 and 2011. There were insufficient statistical data about the indicators of deprivation between 2009 and 2015. However, the available statistics (2006-2011) are significant because they cover the early stages of BH’s campaign of violence. Moreover, they indicate data similarities between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. These indicators often change slowly over time rather than varying every month.

3.3 Comparative analysis: most similar system design (MSSD)
Chapter seven of this study includes a comparative analysis of the three most frequently targeted states in Nigeria. The study incorporates a small N approach, more specifically the most similar system design (MSSD) of comparison. MSSD is applied in chapter seven. It is used to examine and compare target patterns and variations in target type frequencies at a sub-national level. Landman (2003: 405 & 406) suggests that in selecting comparable cases, efficiency, relevance and generalisations are the three most important things to be considered. The researcher also emphasises that the selection of cases could be determined by a research proposition and logic of comparison. Landman (2003) further argues that selection should also be guided by what the researcher wants to compare as well as what the researcher needs to know. Moreover, MSSD required the researcher to gain substantial information about the geographical locations to be studied in order to consider how similar they are. Additionally, these areas were picked because of how relevant they were to explaining the control variable (factors) of a phenomenon (Landman, 2003: 408) Such factors included size, population, economy, ideology and climate (ibid). MSSD allows for comparison between two and five cases using one explanatory variable (Keman, 2014).

The researcher selected Adamawa, Borno and Yobe as the cases to be investigated because they are three of the most BH affected states in Nigeria. These states have several commonalities. They have similar populations, religions and ethnic compositions as well as being similar in size, economies, education and deprivation indices. The researcher has adopted frequencies of target types in each state as dependent variables, while reasons for attack frequency variation (i.e BH’s capacity to attack) for different target types have been used as explanatory variables.

Like other sources of data, MSSD has drawbacks. Some of these have been pointed out by Landman (2003), who suggests that MSSD is limited by weak inferences and findings because it is less rigorous as a result of limited methods to support it. In terms of rigour, statistics and interview data have been used in order to
support MSSD by empirically explaining the variation in the frequency of BH attacks across the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Moreover, the statistics gave the researcher the opportunity to draw inferences for analysis.

3.4 Chapter conclusion
This chapter has explained how and why the methods used for this thesis are systematically applied. It highlights the strengths and drawbacks of each method and where appropriate, how these have been addressed. Moreover, this chapter explains how the strengths of different methods give more rigour to this thesis because the methods complement each other through triangulation. For example, interviews were supported with documents, MSSD was corroborated by statistics and the BH case study was grounded with mixed methods. The following chapters contain the levels of analysis and illustrate how the methods in this chapter have been realised. The subsequent chapters, which are the levels of analysis chapters, also review related literature within the broader field of terrorism and political violence. For example, chapter four examines BH individual leadership and also reviews relevant literature
Chapter 4: Leadership Influence

The previous chapter justified broader sources of data and methods being applied when carrying out this research and discussed the application of these within this thesis. Accordingly, this chapter lays the foundation for discussing the different levels of analysis of this dissertation by examining the individual level explanation of BH. It looks at how and why different individual leaders have contributed to organising group violence, and attempts to highlight how individual leaders influence BH violence. It also investigates why BH members cooperate with their leaders by becoming agents of atrocities. Moreover, the implications of leadership decapitation on BH and its campaign of violence are highlighted, along with how changes in leadership have affected the intensity and repertoire of BH violence.

In order to understand the dynamics of individual influence on BH, this chapter discusses BH under its five key leaders. Since its emergence, BH has had five leaders: Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the movement, and his successors Maman Nur, Abubakar Shekau, Mahamat Daoud and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, who have subsequently sustained the movement. Additionally, the influence of some senior and intermediary members of BH such as Khalid al-Barnawi, Adam Kambar, Kabiru Sokoto and Abu Mohammed who have also impacted on the rise and spread of the group will be discussed.

Individual leadership has played a fundamental role in the emergence, survival and use of violence by BH. More significantly, the internal leadership dynamics have influenced the birth of BH as well as impacted upon the group’s levels of violence (Zenn, 2014b). Previous studies have shed some light into internal disputes and the lower level operatives of BH, but the role of individual leadership has not been widely examined. Zenn (2014b) and Pantucci & Jesperson (2015) have examined internal disputes between the key leaders who have divided the group. In other words, their study accounts for leadership disputes among the disciples of Mohammed Yusuf, founder of the movement. Both of these studies also considered the influence of senior figures and intermediary leaders on the activities of the movement. These studies are inadequate however, because they do not highlight ideological and theoretical factors that explain the relationships between the leadership and followers of other violent groups in Nigeria aside from BH.
This chapter illustrates that a leader- and follower-relationship, along with the influence of individual leadership in violence variation, is attributable to a number of factors. These factors include eschatological belief, leadership decapitation (targeted killing of leaders) and individual differences. In order to critically examine BH, a wide range of literature has been reviewed in order to understand the complexity of the group. Numerous studies exist about leader- and follower-relationships in civil wars within terrorism literature. In order to understand the relationships between leaders and followers as well as the influence of individual leadership on BH, this chapter will briefly review both theoretical and empirical studies on leadership and follower-relationships in order to understand the context of this study. In addition, it will also link BH to a number of theological arguments as to why individuals remain loyal to violent movements.

Studies on the leadership of violent groups look at leadership influence through different perspectives such as principals and agents, authentic leadership, leadership splinters and ethnic entrepreneurs. With regards to principals and agents, Weinstein (2007) categorises rebel organisations as either resource-wealthy or resource-poor. Resource-wealthy organisations attract individuals in search of economic benefits. They also tend to exert more indiscriminate violence against civilians because they have access to a plethora of resources from firstly, foreign sponsorship and secondly, natural resources (which also give them control of their agents). Weinstein (2007) argues that resource-poor organisations attract individuals who are motivated by political ideology or ethnic and religious identity. Resource-poor organisations tend to cooperate more with non-combatants, and this reduces the tendency for indiscriminate violence against civilian populations. BH cannot be described as either resource-wealthy or resource-poor because it receives funding from foreign sponsors, as well as engaging in criminality such as bank robbery and drug and human trafficking across Nigeria (Zenn 2014a). BH also applies political ideology (political Islam) and ethnic identity to attract members (Barkindo, 2016). However, Weinstein (2007) sees its violence as an unintended consequence of a lack of group discipline. This claim is similar to Mitchell’s (2004) argument about the relationship between principals and agents of violence, with Mitchell also positing that, “agents of atrocities are motivated not only by a movement’s leadership directives, but are also enticed by their selfish gratification for rape, revenge and loot” (p. 42). Mitchell also suggests that looting may be attractive to both the leadership and agents of a group as, “(the
loot) may well be shared among the commanders who may then use it to support their soldiers in battle” (p. 50). Mitchell (2004) adds the caveat that the, “corrupt motivations of both leaders and agents of violent organisations may be at variance if there is low esprit de corps and pay for the agents.”

With regards to the aspect of authentic leadership, Gurr (2015) conducted an extensive study to highlight the nature of legitimacy of leadership among followers. He argues that a group’s capacity for collective action depends on major factors such as the prominence of group identity, pre-existing organisational structures and authentic leaders who manage coalitions as well as direct and regulate a movement’s activities. He further notes that leadership is crucial in the process of mobilisation of individuals and that it requires, “a set of skills whose effectiveness depends on context, not a manual of organisational behaviour or a body of nationalist doctrine” (2015: 111). Moreover, authentic leaders are perceived by their followers as advocating and representing the core values and aspirations of their movement. However, Gurr (2015) emphasises that authenticity varies and that a leader can lose or gain it through their position. Authentic leaders control resources, are symbols of a group’s identity, command pre-existing loyalties and have sufficient influence to address a group’s constraints. Furthermore, the legitimacy of authentic leaders may be relinquished or weakened by their words or actions and as such, alternative leaders or other influential figures may seek to capitalise on any errors made by in-position authentic leaders. Hence, this chapter seeks to explain how BH reflects such an ontological position as outlined by Gurr (2015).

Further arguments about leadership suggest that it plays a crucial role in the splintering of groups. Such studies argue that disagreements between leaders of a movement can lead to the splintering of a movement. Such disagreements could be based upon goal differences between leaders, which could be either ideological or non-ideological (Seybolt, 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). There could be disagreements over strategy and modes of operation (della Porta, 1995; Cunningham, 2011), or as a result of military pressure from the state (DeNardo 1985). Moroever, disagreements could be related to the support or rejection of peace processes or foreign support (Cunningham, 2011). Literature on ethnic conflicts suggests that ethnic entrepreneurs or elites also serve as mobilising forces for violence. Some arguments suggest that in weaker states, ethnic entreprenuers promote myths and memories to engender fear and/or violence in their quest for legitimacy (De Maio, 2009). Another argument posits
that ethnic entrepreneurs forge group ideologies in order to incite ethnic hatred by interpreting their own ethnic group’s grievances against other ethnic groups through collective violence (Kuafman, 2000).

An eschatological argument by scholars is needed in order to understand BH within the context of authentic leadership as espoused by Gurr (2015). From a theological perspective, Yusuf’s legitimacy may have been supported by apocalyptic and/or eschatological beliefs or goals. In this context, apocalyptic goals or ideas refer to interpretations of religious scriptures and the use of large-scale violence and destruction to instigate ‘end-of-the-world’ feelings. These feelings stimulate the need for religious obligation by ideologically-bonded people. Rapoport (1987) suggests that apocalyptic terrorists are inspired by the notion that a messiah will come at the end of time. Similarly, Mayer (2001:369) suggests that apocalyptic imagining is a major motivation for terrorism in cults and new religious movements but in itself does not elicit violence, with groups such as Al-Qaeda only adopting violence as a reaction to millennialism, real-world threats and in-fighting.

Explaining the influence of terrorist organisational leadership is essential to understanding how members of terrorist groups are organised for the use of strategic violence. Moreover, understanding BH’s leadership influence also provides information for analysing the implications of leadership decapitation on the survival, unity and overall use of violence by a terrorist group. Leadership decapitation tactics refer to the counter-terrorism (CT) strategy of targeted killing or the capturing of terrorist group leaders, with the aim being to destabilise and end their operations. The effectiveness of leadership decapitation is divided into two conflicting views. Firstly, some argue that decapitation reduces the intensity of violence because it deters others, thereby creating turmoil within a terrorist organisation (Jordan 2009: 721; David 2002). Secondly, it is counter-argued that decapitation facilitates more recruitment and therefore increases motivation among individuals for violence because it draws more public sympathy among moderates who share a similar ideology to a violent group and it exasperates and ultimately triggers group members to violence (Cronin, 2006: 22).

This chapter adds to the existing body of literature by applying both theoretical and theological explanations to BH’s leadership influences. It does this by explaining the relationship between leaders and followers and the influence of different leadership to variations in violence. It also contributes to the general argument on
leadership decapitation. This chapter uses statistics obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to account for the role of individual leadership in the intensity and pattern of BH violence between 2009 and 2015. The chapter is organised into two sections and begins by discussing individual leaders Mohammed Yusuf and his creation of BH, Maman Nur, Abubakar Shekau and factions within BH, Mahamat Daoud, Abu Musab al-Barnawi and other key leadership figures. This is followed by an examination of the implications of leadership change on BH and notably, leadership is discussed according to the succession of BH leaders. Mohammed Yusuf and Abubakar Shekau are the most prominent and widely discussed BH leaders in the media. Mohammed Yusuf is significant to the movement because he established it as well as the pre-existing loyalty that Gurr (2015) notes. It is important to state that this chapter only discusses Abukar Shekau between 2009 and 2015, this being the time period that this thesis investigates. Events suggest that Shekau was replaced as a BH leader but subsequently resurfaced, and the sections below analyse this.

4.1 Mohammed Yusuf and the creation of BH
Firstly, this section outlines a narrative about Mohammed Yusuf and how he founded BH and recruited his followers. The section also highlights Yusuf’s leadership qualities and how he established loyalty amongst his followers through theological support.

Mohammed Yusuf and his successors are interchangeably called Sheikh, Imam or Amir. Mohammed Yusuf established the BH movement and first named it the Yusufiyya Movement (after his own name). Yusuf was born on 29 January 1970 in Girgir Village, Yobe state, North-East Nigeria (Kalu, 2011), and he was known for his charisma and oratory prowess (Dibal, 2009). He started the BH movement in 2002 (Loimeier 2012; Mohammed 2014) and led the group through its embryonic stage by mobilising people through preaching. Yusuf had violent confrontations with the Nigerian authorities because of his quest to implement a strict version of Sharia law (Agbiboa, 2013a). He also engaged in battle with the Nigerian state because he felt betrayed by the former governor of Borno state (further discussed in chapter six) (African Spotlight, 2016). After violent confrontations with Nigerian security forces, Yusuf fled to Saudi Arabia and did not return until 2003 (Mohammed, 2013).

After exile, Yusuf returned to Nigeria to revive and spread his ideology. His return from exile invoked a period of intensive radicalisation within the Borno and
Yobe axis of Northeast Nigeria (Mohammed, 2014: 10; Zenn, 2014a: 5). Yusuf mobilised people who were either economically-challenged with few opportunities or were convinced by his theological arguments. Numerous messages by Yusuf were passed via audio cassettes, CDs and pamphlets (Loimeier 2012: 148). He wrote materials containing the creed of BH (from Tamiyyah's philosophy) and used these to mobilise and radicalise individuals. He also used a document written in Arabic called *Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da'awatuna* (Our Creed) (Mohammed, 2014: 18) as the guiding principle of his movement. Participant Two (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH who is knowledgeable in Islamic theology) confirms the use of this document by saying:

> I read a pamphlet entitled *Hazihi Aqeedatun wa Minhaju Da'awatuna* – these are our tenets, what we believe, what we want to achieve and why we disagree with the people or other Muslims. That is a rough translation of the title of the booklet.

During Participant Three’s visit with some incarcerated BH members, there was conversation about books that might be similar to the document Participant Two is referring to. Furthermore, Mohammed (2014: 11 & 14) attempts to explain how Yusuf used written doctrine to mobilise his followers, and he argues that:

> This suggests that there is a range of literature that has helped shape BH’s ideology over time. Yusuf’s followers and students (*almajirai*) received instructions from his mosque, which he called Markaz ibn Taymiyyah (Mohammed, 2014: 14) and which was the centre for the promotion of Taymiyya's philosophy. Yusuf preached on four specific topics: first, he talked about idolatry (*taghut*) which deals with secularism and democracy; secondly, he admonished his followers for following Western education and Westernisation; thirdly, he reprimanded those working for an un-Islamic government; and fourthly, his teachings rejected the public, local Islamic scholars (*ulama*) and his former colleagues in the Wahhabi group in Borno for referring to his group (BH) as rebellious Muslims (*Kharijism*) (Mohammed, 2014:11).

Yusuf and his followers had a number of confrontations with the Nigerian forces over civil offences (see chapter six for further details). As a result of the intense and violent face off between the Nigerian forces on 26th July 2009, BH instigated a violent uprising that affected Maiduguri, Yobe and Bauchi in the Northeast of the country. On
29th of July, Nigerian security agents invaded Yusuf’s house in Maiduguri to arrest him (Aljazeera, 2010). The Nigerian police claimed that Mohammed Yusuf was shot dead in a gunfire exchange when he tried to escape. However, in February 2010, Aljazeera (2010) video footage showed the dead body of Mohammed Yusuf with handcuffs on. The video caused extensive criticism of the Nigerian authorities, as it seemed likely that they had engaged in extra judicial killing and/or the torture of Yusuf.

With regards to leadership qualities, Yusuf had a cult-like following and the BH movement was built around him. He also had all the present-day leaders, including Abubakar Shekau, as his disciples (BBC 2014b). Regardless of any Islamic schism between radical and non-radical Muslims, it is traditional for leaders or theologians to have their movements named after them; for instance, Wahhabiyya emanates from the theologian Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Ahamadiyya comes from Mirza Ghulam Ahmad and the Tijaniyyah Movement is from Sīdī ’Aḥmad al-Tijānī’s ideology. Hence, it is important to note that this may be the reason why BH started as the Yusufiyya Movement, derived from the name of its founder Mohammed Yusuf.

Leaders also encourage their acceptance by their followers by referring to Quran 4:59, which says: "O you believe, obey God and obey the messenger and also those in charge among you.” This verse has different interpretations with the belief of it in part explaining why personalities such as Khomeini, Bin Laden, El-zakzaky and Yusuf had cult-like status within their various movements. Moreover, this verse is used by some leaders in Northern Nigeria to command loyalty from their followers through the famous saying in the Hausa language, "bin na gaba, bin Allah" (loyalty to leaders is obedience to God) (Aminiya, 2014).

From a theological perspective, Yusuf’s legitimacy may be supported by apocalyptic and/or eschatological beliefs or goals. The apocalyptic argument can be linked to BH by understanding the philosophy of Mujaddid (reformer or reviver) and Mahdi. Abu Dawud, Musnad and Bayhaqi’s Hadiths (documented reports of the life of the Prophet Mohammed) report that the concept of Mujaddid is built on the belief that at the turn of every century, a person will emerge who will revive the Deen (Islamic religion) (Ahmad, 2014). This belief has two major interpretations: non-takfiri (a takfiri is a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of apostasy) Muslims construe it as the act of being in harmony with modern day reality whereas leaders of takfiri groups use it to justify violence. Indeed, violent Islamists view it as a revival of the Deen (religion) to its original form through fighting (Ahmad, 2014).
The concept of Mahdi is often confused with Mujaddid. Mahdism is the eschatological belief by Muslims that at the end of the world, a redeemer or Mahdi (rightly-guided one) will come at the same time as Jesus Christ (Prophet Isa) comes. Together, they will fight and kill the anti-Christ (Dajjal) and his followers (Lambert, 2013: 199). The Mujaddid belief is applicable to Islamic radicalism. In the history of Islam, several Islamic theologians and jurists such as Al Ghazali, Abdul Quadir Geelani and Ibn-e-Arabi and the BH’s role model, Ibn Taymiyya were seen as Mujjadid. In the 21st century, some Takfiri groups and Islamic scholars across the world saw Osama Bin Laden as the Mujaddid and the eschatological Moses, whose mission was to liberate Muslims from the clutches of the United States (US), who they saw as being led by a modern-day ‘pharaoh’ (the American government and its forces) (Weimann, 2015; Flannery, 2015:102). This concept to some extent explains the acceptance of Al Qaeda by similar ideologues across different continents.

The concept of Mujaddid is fuzzy and subject to different interpretations. It is uncertain whether the reformer will come for the entire world, or if there will be a reformer in each part of the world to address the needs and aspirations of every distinct region (Ahmad, 2014). For example, the history of Islamic radicalism in Northern Nigeria reflects this belief. Usman dan Fodio was referred to as the Mujaddid for the jihad (war) he led in 1900. According to some scholars (Isa, 2010), the jihad was aimed at reforming the Hausa societies from un-Islamic practices. Following the death of dan Fodio, the weakening of his dynasty and the advent of the British colonial masters, the Mahdiyya movement emerged as a continuation of his reform and waged an unsuccessful war against the British. In the 1970s, members of the Maitasine movement saw their leader as Mahdi, even though he claimed to be a prophet (Adesoji, 2011). Given this, it is reasonable to argue that some BH members still see their leaders as Mujaddid. Moreover, BH recruits may see their leaders as those destined to rescue them from the Nigerian ‘pharaohs’ (the Nigerian government and its forces), and this apocalyptic thinking may have motivated some members of BH to fight, kill and die for their cause.

Regarding leadership functions, I would argue that even though a BH leader consults with other leaders (this is discussed in detail later), he enjoys a centralised power both politically and spiritually. He stands as Amir and Imam and plays a spiritual role in the nourishing of the minds of the faithful, as well as offering spiritual direction (Henry, 1993: 30). This is why for example, Yusuf through his oratory
prowess was instrumental in the radicalisation of members of BH. He was functioning as an Amir, and an Amir functions as a leader or commander of a movement, society or country who has been elected to lead a mission (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1300).

Apart from organising violence, BH leaders also take part in direct confrontations. BH was in fact united under Yusuf (2002-2009) and he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with his disciples. His death and subsequent succession by Shekau created significant internal divisions. Mohammed Yusuf’s style of leadership attracted unity and coherence that can be explained by Gurr’s notion of authentic leadership (2015), in direct contrast to that of Shekau. Moreover, Yusuf exhibited the qualities of authentic leadership through his oratory powers and use of personal resources, which encouraged his followers to believe entirely in his cause. After his return from exile, he endeared himself to large numbers of people with his preaching. He also donated substantial amounts of money to charity and was included in several violent face offs with Nigerian forces (Walker, 2016). The combination of these factors reflects Gurr’s argument (2015) about leadership gaining legitimacy through action and deeds.

Yusuf’s narrative shows that he was an authentic leader who was confident, assertive and resilient. Significantly, Yusuf did not give preferential treatment to his Kanuri tribe as Shekau did to his (Zenn, 2014a). He organised his followers through ‘morals’ (the BH creed), and his preaching prepared the minds of his supporters by invoking the firm sense of identity and awareness against the ‘un-Islamic and infidel nature’ of Nigerians (Loimeier, 2012). He also encouraged BH supporters to be tenacious in the face of ‘persecutions’. Hence it is fair to say that this kept the unity and balance of BH as a group. Similarly, Gurr (2015) argues that communal leaders or leaders of movements are seen as authentic by their followers when their actions, thoughts and behaviours reflect the significant, “values and aspirations of the group” (p.111). Thus, the actions of leaders must also conform to the common interest of the movement. For these reasons, Mohammed Yusuf was seen by his followers as an authentic leader, and his disciples remained loyal to him because of scriptural interpretations and his practical approach to leadership. It is crucial to note that the kind of pre-existing loyalty Gurr (2015) espouses was created by Yusuf’s leadership style. As the founder of BH, Yusuf provided the pre-existing loyalty within BH organisation for his successors. In other words, Yusuf established a movement
whereby his successors assumed their positions of power without any perceived legitimacy difficulties from the group’s followers (Zenn, 2014a).

4.2 Maman Nur

This section discusses the emergence of Maman Nur as a BH interim leader, his subsequent exile and return and the implications this had on BH and Nigeria. Nur’s exile and return intensified BH’s connection with Al Qaeda, but also caused an internal rift within BH.

At the time of Yusuf’s death in 2009, Nur served as interim leader of BH from being third-in-command in the movement. He became the leader because Shekau, who was second-in-command, was recovering from gunshot wounds while in custody with the Nigerian security forces (CEP). Nur was born to a Chadian family in 1976 in the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri (Kalu 2011). He was a student of theology in Maiduguri but dropped out to join BH (ibid). He led the group when most BH members had fled to neighbouring countries or had been detained (Umar, 2012: 128). Nur remained in charge until July 2010 (Kalu, 2011), but left Nigeria because he was unable to withstand the battle against the Nigerian forces.

Nur’s escape enabled him to acquire new skills and establish international connections. He was in exile in Chad and from there went to Somalia where he met with leaders of Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and AQAP, received training and established international connections (Kalu, 2011; Zenn, 2014b: 22). Nur’s international connections informed his choice of victims - Westerners and non-Muslims. His targets were the opposite of Shekau's as he attacked indiscriminately, regardless of religion. In 2011, Nur returned to Nigeria and masterminded the bombing of the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja under the banner of BH. Zenn (2014b) argues that this was significant because of his meeting with Al Murabitoon leader, Mokhtar Belmoktar. Belmoktar is a notorious terrorist and staunch loyalist of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri (Joscelyn, 2015). Nur was also accused of involvement in the bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja in June 2011.

Nur’s return from exile was significant to the splintering of BH. He broke away from BH and formed the Ansaru (Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan’ - the ‘Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa’ - which is made up predominately of Hausa tribe members (Mohammed, 2014). Before Ansaru broke away, there was disagreement between Shekau and Nur over who was competent to
lead BH. This disagreement may have been unconnected to Nur's desire to reclaim the leadership of BH, which he had held before his exile (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015). Nur's Ansaru supporters argued that Nur was competent because he had more foreign links than Shekau (CEP; Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015) Moreover, Ansaru's grievances against Shekau were due to his preferential treatment of the Kanuri tribe over the Hausas. Although Nur has not been captured or killed, he has not been heard of in the media since the 2012 Ansaru secession.

The emergence and exile of Nur is significant when looking at the resurgence of BH as it highlights the implications of decapitation on the group. Historically, decapitation of leaderships within violent groups such as Maitasine (1970s-1980) and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (1979-1999) by the Nigerian government have been relatively successful. However, the war against BH gives a contrary narrative about the effect of Nigeria’s leadership decapitation strategy. Arugably, the killing of Yusuf by Nigerian forces was intended to scatter his followers and ultimately end the movement. The proponents of leadership decapitation (Jordan, 2009: 721; David, 2002) argue that it destabilises and causes divisions within violent movements which ultimately lead to the ending of the group. The killing of Yusuf and the manhunt for Nur in fact provided an opportunity for a deadlier BH leader to rise (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015). While it did cause division within the movement, the divisions increased the intensity of violence in Nigeria, created more international linkages for BH and the division of the attention of the Nigerian forces fighting BH. This failure of the intended results of decapitation is proven under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership and is discussed below.

4.3 The rise of Abubakar Shekau and the emergence of factions within BH
Because Nur did not stay long as the leader of BH, Shekau is seen as the second most influential leader after Yusuf. He is the deadliest leader of BH and thus discussion of dynamics such as group division and unity, along with BH’s spike in the intensity of violence under his tenure, is pertinent. Participant Seven (A media practitioner and conflict negotiator in Nigeria) suggests that:

Yusuf was more a moderate and Shekau was actually the extremist. Shekau wanted things to be done faster than when Yusuf had been moderating him. When Yusuf was out of the way, he killed of course and there was anger, and
such anger usually you know, it goes to galvanise such feelings. You…, we've been telling you these people are killing us, these people are rudderless, these and all of that, so, of course, it gave more sympathy to them, and of course, it encouraged them to act even more aggressively under Shekau who was already very aggressive.

With this statement, Participant Seven is attempting to differentiate between Mohammed Yusuf and Shekau. The participant suggests that Shekau was more violent, and encouraged BH members to see the Nigerian government as brutal and that they should be responded to with violence. Following Nur’s exile and Shekau's release or escape from custody in July 2010, Abubakar Shekau declared himself the new leader of BH (Zenn, 2014b: 24). Shekau was Yusuf’s second-in-command. He was born in 1975 and is a native of Shekau village of Yobe state. He is from the same Kanuri tribe as Yusuf, speaks four languages (Kanuri, Hausa, Arabic and English (BBC, 2014b)), and is nicknamed Darul Tawheed (the abode of monotheism) (BBC, 2014b). His background, combined with his aggressive leadership style, may have contributed to his ability to mobilise his followers towards violence. Although Shekau had firm control of the movement, not all the intermediary leaders of the movement were happy with his leadership style. Some members were dissatisfied with his indiscriminate killings as well as preferential treatment of his Kanuri tribe, and such disputes eventually resulted in the splintering of the movement. Shekau then had problems with the Yusifiya Islamic Movement (YIM) and the Nur faction.

The Yusifiya Islamic Movement (YIM) splinter group emerged in July 2011 and not much information is known about it. It was a small group that excluded key leaders of BH. The group was concerned about the high rate of civilian killings and was determined to reconcile with the Nigerian government (Mahmood, 2013; Zenn, 2014b: 25). However, Shekau ended the movement by killing members of the group as well as those who had defected from BH (ibid). The information about the individuals who created the YIM movement remains unknown to researchers and investigators.

Another significant division under Shekau’s leadership was the splinter group, Nur’s Ansaru movement. The root cause of the division and subsequent split was influenced by a tussle for leadership by Nur and Shekau, with Nur and his members being dissatisfied with Shekau’s leadership style. The actual splintering was triggered by the 2012 attack on the ancient Hausa city of Kano (Mohammed, 2014: 30).
Ansaru's secession was encouraged by a desire to create a less violent group that would spare non-BH Muslims from violence, with his major target being Jos in North-central Nigeria, a city with a dense population of Christians. Nur and his Ansaru group also cooperated with MUJOA and other Al-Qaeda affiliates across Sub-Saharan Africa such as AQIM and Al-Shabaab (Weeraratne, 2015:13). Ansaru's targets included governmental agencies, schools, businesses and Westerners. As part of his strategy of attacks against Westerners, Nur kidnapped a Mr Colump, a French engineer in the Northwestern city of Katsina. In addition to YIM and the Ansaru groups, there was also a suspected coup against Shekau led by Abu Zamira Mohammed in August 2013. However, other narratives suggest that Shekau died in Mali and Abu Zamira Mohammed in fact replaced him (Kalu, 2013). Even though this narrative remains unclear, there was significant growing discontent with Shekau by BH members.

Shekau was the deadliest of the BH leaders with the level of atrocities under his tenure being higher than those of the previous three leaders (see Figure 4.3). He introduced conscription of individuals including the use of child soldiers, and the use of girls for suicide bombing as a mode of recruitment (Zenn & Pearson, 2013). Moreover, it was under Shekau’s leadership that Nigeria first experienced a suicide bombing organised by BH (Isaac, 2011).

In his face off with the Nigerian state, Shekau was reported dead by the Nigerian security three times, but subsequently appeared in videos denying his death and mocking the Nigerian state and its security agents (BBC, 2014b). However, Shekau has not been heard from or seen since he declared BH to be an affiliate of IS (Islamic State), and this has generated new rumours of his death. The President of the Chad Republic, Idris Deby, speculated that Shekau had been replaced with Mahamat Daoud and that BH was no longer headed by a, “notorious radical terrorist” (Freeman, 2015; Varghese, 2015). This speculation was at odds with a video message from Shekau in March 2016 in which he said that he was tired of fighting and urged his supporters to embrace peace. However, the video attracted scepticism by analysts, security experts and Nigerian forces as it was widely believed to be a strategy to distract the Nigerian forces from their growing success against BH. It was thus seen as a BH diversionary tactic to deflect attention from increasing military successes against them (Sahara Reporters, 2016a). This led to speculation that internal dissatisfaction eroded Shekau's legitimacy as BH’s leader.
Shekau became an established leader after being Mohammed Yusuf’s deputy. Shortly after he emerged as leader, BH divided and the Ansaru and YIM factions emerged. The senior members of BH also divided between Al-Qaeda and IS. These factors, to some extent, reduced his legitimacy and bond within the group. It is important to emphasise that factions and suspected coup d’etats under Shekau were influenced by his perceived wrong-doings (Kalu, 2013), and as argued by Gurr (2015), wrong words or deeds weaken or end the legitimacy of a leader. Shekau’s ‘wrong deeds’ were his indiscriminate killings in which Muslims were not spared. Such acts weakened his power and resulted in the emergence of different factions within BH. However, his leadership style and BH internal tensions aside, BH factions remained united by ideology and operated together across Nigeria (Zenn, 2014b). Before his ousting, Shekau enjoyed considerable degrees of legitimacy in spite of some frosty relationships within BH. Gurr (2015) argues that the power of a leader is a matter of degree, and this thesis notes that even if Shekau had problems with other leaders, he retained his local support because he was an ethnic entrepreneur and operated in an area dominated by people from his native Kanuri tribe.

4.4 Mahamat Daoud
This section discusses Mahamat Daoud’s emergence and impact on BH. Daoud became BH leader after Shekau in 2015 (France 24, 2015). He had a year’s tenure as BH’s leader and this was characterised by sustained attacks on civilians, as well as a reduction in the strength and spread of BH as a result of both Nigerian and regional forces’ successes in dealing with the threat of BH.

Daoud became BH’s leader in August 2015 (France 24, 2015) and he led the movement until the emergence of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as its new leader. There is uncertainty as to the identity of Daoud with Jonathan Hill, a BH security expert at London’s King’s College, noting that Daoud remains an unknown figure because he had not been previously heard of or discussed in the media (Varghese, 2015). It is fair, however, to assume that Daoud was in a power position in BH, perhaps as an interim leader. In August 2015, President Deby of Chad said that Daoud was ready to engage in a truce with Nigerian authorities (ibid). However, this claim was ostensible as BH continued attacks amidst it. Added to this, several unknown groups claimed to be negotiating with the Nigerian government, thereby casting further doubts about President Deby’s negotiation claim.
Regardless of the conflicting claims and truces, BH in fact weakened under the rule of Daoud. This was partially due to an increase in military operations in Lake Chad countries under the banner of the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which kick-started a robust crackdown on BH in January 2015.

Daoud’s preferred strategy was suicide attacks and attacking camps of internally displaced people (IDP camps) who had fled from areas terrorised by BH. Attacks on IDPs and the indiscriminate targeting of poor communities in Lake Chad caused renewed disagreement and discontent, and divided the leadership of BH about the direction being taken by Daoud (Salkida, 2016). Some leaders of the group argued that since the refugees and poor communities were supporters of the soldiers of the Kafirs, they should be subjected to hardship (ibid). In contrast, other leaders argued that BH goals supported by the doctrine propagated by Mohammed Yusuf had been overtaken by an individual’s ‘vengeful ploy’ and as the movement was exerting more hardship on the people than the soldiers of the Kafirs did, people would change their support to the forces of the Kafirs (Salkida, 2016).

4.5 Abu Musab al-Barnawi
The emergence of Abu Musab al-Barnawi was a clear indication of BH ties with IS. IS announced Abu Musab al-Barnawi as leader of BH, and this appointment created a new faction within BH with Shekau as a faction leader. This section analyses Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s assumption of BH leadership.

On 3rd August 2016, IS declared Abu Musab al-Barnawi the new leader of BH. Little was known about Abu Musab al-Barnawi until he appeared in a video in January 2015 as a BH spokesperson (Ajayi, 2016). Abu Musab al-Barnawi is the son of Muhammed Yusuf, the founder of BH. He re-affirmed BH’s allegiance to IS and promised to continue the fight against the government, and to spare Muslims while targeting Christians and churches (ibid). Zenn Jacob (2016), a security expert specialised in analysing BH, noted that Abu Musab al-Barnawi was the first successful BH key leader to depose Shekau from the leadership of BH for two key reasons: firstly, Abu Musab al-Barnawi criticised Shekau’s indiscriminate killings, and secondly, IS supported his emergence. This thesis would also add that these factors coalesced with the rapidly decreasing power of BH. This was why IS saw the need to bring in a transformational leader in the form of Abu Musab al-Barnawi. It is also notable that because Abu Musab al-Barnawi was a fellow Kanuri as well as being the son of
Mohammed Yusuf (Zenn, 2016), I would argue that, he seemed to win the majority of local support from BH members over Shekau, whose popularity faded as result of his leadership approach and indiscriminate killings.

Abu Musab al-Barnawi appeared to be more of a Khalifa than Shekau. A Khalifa is a leader who is vested with the power to control a state or movement by being a successor or vicegerent (Hendricks, 2015). At the time of Yusuf’s death and the exile of Nur, Shekau, Mohammed Yusuf’s immediate deputy, emerged as leader. He had pre-existing loyalty from BH members and he had also married one of Mohammed Yusuf’s four wives (BBC, 2014b). Perhaps at the time of Yusuf’s death, Abu Musab al-Barnawi was not capable or ready to lead because of his level of experience and age. In contrast, Mohammed Yusuf was 39 years old (1970-2009) at the time of his death, Nur assumed the leadership position at the age of 33 years old (born 1976), with Shekau taking over the leadership role at the age of 33 (born 1975).

4.6 Other key leadership figures
This section focuses on other key leaders that have helped sustain BH. However, this section does not conclude that these are the only key leaders because of the clandestine nature of terrorist groups. Getting information about the profiles of these people comes with great security risks.

Apart from Mohammed Yusuf, Nur, Shekau, Daoud and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, other key leaders such as Adam Kambar, Khalid al-Barnawi, Kabiru Sokoto Ali Konduga and Abu Qaqa have influenced the BH movement. These key leaders served as intermediaries and performed specialised roles in order to execute the group's goals. All the aforementioned individuals as well as Shekau have being listed by the US in the Designated Global Terrorists under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224 (US Department of State, 2012). It is important to note that while Nur, Kambar and al-Barnawi are bonded to Al Qaeda goals, Shekau’s goals are tailored towards IS.

Kambar hails from Kano, Northwest Nigeria. He was highly connected and was known as the link man between Boko Haram, Al Shabaab and AQIM (Zenn, 2014b: 24). He was also in charge of financial transfers for BH and Al Shabaab. Zenn (2014b: 24) notes that Kambar may have facilitated the meeting between Nur and Al Qaeda affiliates in Africa because of their Hausa ethnic connection. Before his death in 2012, Kambar may have acted as a specialist in foreign relations due to his links with other groups in the region.
Khalid al-Barnawi was a close associate of Kambar. They shared the same goal of regional cooperation with Al-Qaeda and they met in Algeria at an AQIM training camp. One of al-Barnawi’s trainees engaged in Nigeria’s first terrorist kidnapping of foreigners (British and Italian) in May 2011, with Al-Qaeda in the lands beyond the Sahel claiming responsibility for this kidnapping (Zenn, 2014b). Al-Barnawi operated with Abu Mohammed, a specialist in kidnapping in the North-western command of BH. Even though Shekau and Ansaru had factionalised, they still communicated on matters of common interest with Abu Mohammed as Shekau's link to Ansaru (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 28). This working relationship had been encouraged by the training they both received in the same Algerian AQIM camp. Mohammed represented the main interest of Shekau – the kidnapping business. (BH also funds itself through kidnapping and there are further details about this in chapter six). Shekau used Mohammed to provide protection for Al-Barnawi's group (Zenn, 2014b: 25; Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16), and he died of gunshot wounds while captive in a police net. Rumours surfaced that Shekau had leaked information that led to Mohammed's capture (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16). This could have been because Nur, Al-Barnawi and other members of the splinter group had less local support than Shekau, as most of them had been working for Al Qaeda for a long time in the Sahel region of Africa (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 28).

Kabiru Sokoto was an intermediary leader of BH and his specialty was attacking churches. His target areas were Christian-populated districts, especially the Middle-belt region of Nigeria (Premium Times, 2012; Zenn, 2014b: 25; Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16). He was the brains behind the 25th of December, 2011 bombing of St Theresa Catholic Church in Madalla, a town on the outskirts of Abuja (Reuters, 2013). Nigerian forces arrested Sokoto twice, with his first arrest being at the Borno state governor’s lodge in Abuja, together with a serving military officer (Premium Times, 2012). The reason for Sokoto being at the Borno governor’s lodge remains unknown. Sokoto escaped from the Nigerian police when a group of angry youths attacked the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) convoy en route to Abaji, a town close to Abuja where Sokoto’s temporary residence was to be searched. The Nigerian police re-arrested Sokoto in Taraba state in the Northeast where he was establishing a cell (Premium Times, 2012). He confessed to having trained an estimated 500 individuals as terrorists (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 15) and was sentenced to life imprisonment by the Nigerian courts. The arrest of Sokoto was important in preventing the expansion
of BH cells to Taraba, a state bordering Adamawa that had been severely affected by the rampaging violence of BH.

Abu Qaqa was the spokesperson or public relations officer of BH. However, this name appears to be a pseudonym used by several different people. In January 2012 when Abu Qaqa was arrested, he had a variety of names including Abu Dardaa, Mohammed Bello, Abu Tiamiya and Abdulrahman Abdullahi (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 13). In February 2012, the Nigerian forces captured another person who also claimed to be Abu Qaqa (ibid) and in 2013, Shekau ordered the killing of another Abu Qaqa named Mohammed. Abu Qaqa served as a communication link between BH and the local and international media. The relationship between BH and the media was centered on issues concerning negotiations with the government, threat messages to the public and the desire for future attacks (ibid 14). This suggests that BH had selected professionals to carry out propaganda tasks and perform intermediary functions between the group and the media. Since these representatives often would speak over the telephone, it was hard for security agents to track them down.

Within BH, there is an established leadership structure. However, the structure remains secret and unknown to outsiders. This is common with most terrorist groups due to security risks and the clandestine nature of their activities (Silke, 2004; Sinai, 2008; Kirby 2013). However, Figure 4.1 illustrates a possible BH leadership structure (given the forgone discussion) before the emergence of Daoud.
The top-left of the figure shows the leadership of the movement with immediately beneath it the two deputies who work with the Shura council. The Shura council is an advisory council of senior BH members that advises the leader on important matters related to decision-making. Some BH sub-national coordinators and specialists are also part of the Shura council. BH specialists include spokespeople who communicate with the media and the government when it comes to BH's decisions and matters related to dialogues. The sub-national commanders execute directives from the leader. The role of the Ansaru factions in Figure 4.1 illustrates them sometimes collaborating with the BH leader through an intermediary. The leadership of both Ansaru and BH are presently united, although there is no precise information about when these
factions united. The decimation of Al Qaeda and its affiliates as well as the arrest of Al-barnawi in 2016 indicate that both groups united with Al-barnawi as the second-in-command (more details follow below). Moreover, the intensive military campaign of Nigerian security may have distorted the group's leadership (more analysis of this is in chapter Five).

4.7 Implications of leadership change on BH
Changes in the leadership of BH have been directly connected to the killing and targeting of BH leaders by Nigerian forces, as well as BH internal pressures and decisions. The extra-judicial killing of Mohammed Yusuf and the targeting of Nur paved the way for the more violent leadership of Shekau. Shekau’s subsequent ousting from power was because of pressures from the Nigerian forces as well as dissatisfaction from within BH. The replacement of Daoud with Abu Musab al-Barnawi was because of collaboration with IS. It is therefore useful to explore how these leadership changes affected BH.

BH became a fully-fledged terrorist group under the command of Shekau. Although Yusuf and Shekau shared the same violent ideology, Shekau was far more violent. This may be attributed to the substantial pre-existing local support he had, his aggressive approaches in executing BH's goals, the group's grievances over the killing of Mohammed Yusuf and confrontations with Nigerian forces. Under Shekau, BH expanded, made strong global connections and increased the intensity of its attacks. These factors made Shekau far more violent than Mohammed Yusuf. While Mohammed Yusuf was responsible for the emergence of the movement, Shekau maintained a robust execution of the group's objectives. When asked about the levels of violence under Mohammed Yusuf and Shekau, Participant One (A former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) said:

You need to listen to their preaching to know that they have the same radical perceptions as the driving force of their messages and their modes of operation. So, the change of leadership has not affected anything. If anything, it is just a continuation of an agenda that was set long ago. Perhaps the rate at which they action things may vary; Shekau may have more speed than Mohammed, but Mohammed plans more than Shekau.

In other words, Participant One is suggesting that although Yusuf and Shekau shared the same agenda, Mohammed Yusuf may have been more patient in achieving the
long-term goals and strategies of the movement. In contrast, Shekau conducted an increased number of attacks without much planning. In addition, the participant may be inferring that Yusuf recruited and mobilised people more systematically than Shekau. This could be true because Mohammed Yusuf enticed individuals with his eloquent preaching whereas Shekau introduced conscription as part of BH’s recruitment strategy. The statement by Participant One is supported by Yusuf’s message (on CD) to his followers in which he was preparing the minds of his disciples for the consequences they were going to face. He said:

In the process they will abuse you, call you names and some of you may even die. They will shoot some of you, and we will just pray, “May Allah give you aljanna” [Paradise] and proceed without any qualms. Can we endure? We ought to endure. May Allah give us the will to endure. This is how our dawah [evangelism] is. Patience - this is what we need, brothers. And perseverance upon the truth. Allah is watching us. Victory is certain. What we lack are the helpers. We are not yet primed for victory, but we are working towards getting ready for victory. This is what we are looking for, brothers. This is an incipient dawah, and it cannot be crushed. It cannot be killed. If we really stand by what the Prophet says we should stand up, even if we die in the process. This dawah will continue – even after a hundred years. (Mohammed, 2014: 15)

After the death of Mohammed Yusuf, his disciples inherited his global connections through which he had drawn increased support for his movement. The time he had spent in Somalia and Saudi Arabia (Mohammed, 2014) highlighted his renewed commitment to spreading Takfiri ideology across Nigeria. Nur’s links to and preference for Al Qaeda and its affiliates across Sub-Saharan Africa explain BH’s targeting pattern under his command. Westerners, anything related to Christians, schools and business spaces were his primary target preferences and this to some extent, indicated the pattern of BH ideology as a group within the Al Qaeda network.

Shekau focused on the expansion of the BH movement and sought to spread radical beliefs across Nigeria by capturing territories that would enable him to spread the Sharia caliphate. His ideology was similar to the expansionist nature of IS. In June 2014, IS declared its expansionist agenda from Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Levant to other parts of the world (Roggio, 2014). Simultaneously, Shekau captured 21 Nigerian territories from the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe in North-Eastern Nigeria (The Guardian, 2014a). Apart from local rivalry among the top echelons of
BH, the different violent styles and orientations of the leaders show that there was, or there would be, conflicting allegiances to IS and Al Qaeda because Takfiri groups across the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa are either loyal to Al Qaeda or IS, not both.

Proponents of leadership decapitation argue that it reduces the intensity of violence as it deters others from the violence that creates turmoil within a terrorist organisation (Jordan, 2009: 721; David, 2002). However, from the above discussions, BH has shown that internal divisions do not necessarily end violent groups, and that decapitation can be counter-productive with regards to religious or ideological group like BH holding uncompromising belief. In other words, terrorists of a religiously motivated group are bonded by their uncompromising belief so as such; decapitation may not necessarily cause disunity among them.

Figure 4.2 illustrates the divisions within BH after the death of Mohammed Yusuf. Figure 4.3 compares the number of fatalities under different BH leaders from 2009 - 2015. Within this period, BH atrocities were committed under Mohammed Yusuf (July 30th 2009), Shekau (July 2010 - August 2015) and Daoud (August 2015 - August 2016).

Table 4.1 shows the number of attacks and percentages of different target selections under Mohammed Yusuf, Shekau and Daoud. It is important to note that before 2009 (i.e. under Yusuf), there were some undocumented attacks, but the attacks were not as severe as during the 2009 uprising and thereafter. Statistical data from the GTD suggest that there were no attacks under Nur. This is true because at that time, BH went underground to reinforce itself against the Nigerian authorities. Perhaps Nur could not withstand the Nigerian forces and therefore had to relinquish his position and go into exile. As well as debunking the above argument about leadership decapitation, Figure 4.3 and Table 1 measure the degree of an individual leader’s effect on the movement in terms of intensity of violence and target selection.
Figure 4.2: Divisions and unity after the death of Mohammed Yusuf

Figure 4.2 above shows how BH was divided after the death of Mohammed Yusuf. Notably, divisions within BH started in 2011 through the emergence of the YIM faction. The movement was terminated in the same year it emerged. BH and Ansaru were the dominant splinter groups and they united in 2013. In 2016, BH divided into the Abu Musab al-Barnawi and Shekau factions. In spite of internal divisions and in-fighting, BH remains strong in its ability to continue its war against the Nigerian state.
From 2009 to 2015, 12,849 deaths were recorded as a result of BH attacks. During Yusuf's leadership, 304 deaths were recorded, under Shekau 10,985 deaths were recorded, and 1,560 deaths under the leadership of Daoud.
Table 4.1: Percentages and number of attacks of target choice under different BH leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target type</th>
<th>Leaders &amp; number of attacks with the breakdown of types of attacks (shown in percentages)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yusuf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airports &amp; aviation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>11 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists &amp; the media</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-state militias</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>22 (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens &amp; private property</td>
<td>56 (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political parties</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious figures and institutions</td>
<td>11 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecom</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 shows 15 target choices under the leaderships of Mohammed Yusuf, Shekau and Daoud. Given the information in both Figure 4.3 and Table 4.1, a total number of 10 attacks were carried out against four different target types and 304 people were killed under Mohammed Yusuf’s leadership. Under Shekau's leadership, 1,665 attacks were carried out against 15 target types and 10,985 casualties were recorded. Lastly, in 2015 under Daoud's leadership, BH undertook 310 attacks against nine target types with this resulting in 1,560 casualties.

Furthermore, it is interesting to compare the target selections of these three leaders. Under Yusuf, 56% of targets were citizens and private property, 22% were the police, 11% of attacks were directed against the government and 11% of attacks against religious figures and institutions. Yusuf attacked government officials in Borno state because he felt they had betrayed him by not honouring the agreement he had made with them about implementing a strict brand of Sharia law. He also believed
that government officials were using the state apparatus to terminate his movement and his goal for a Sharia state (more details about this are in chapter six). Yusuf’s reason for attacking the police was two-fold: he believed the police to be the primary instrument the government used to attack his followers, and he attacked police stations to free his group’s members. With regards to attacks on citizens and private properties, Yusuf felt that citizens were supporting the government and its forces, and this was coupled with historic land disputes - notably the Kanama clash (more details about this are in chapter six). Yusuf’s decision to attack religious figures and institutions was because they criticised his ideology and referred to his movement as *Kharijism* (rebellious Muslims), a highly offensive term to BH members. Added to this, he believed many religious leaders to be collaborators with the *Kafir* government (Mohammed, 2014: 11).

As BH leader, Shekau ordered attacks against the most diverse groups of targets, and he attacked all 15 targets noted in Table 4.1. He was the most violent of all BH leaders and arguably reflects the destructive millennial terrorism suggested by Crenshaw (2000). The majority of his attacks were against citizens and private property (45%), followed by the police (14%), the military (11%) and the government (8%). Under Shekau, attacks on the government spread from the Northeast to Northwest and to Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. Because Shekau was an expansionist, he attacked the government and its security agents to weaken the power of the Nigerian state, with his attacks on civilians being to undermine the legitimacy of the state. He combined his civilian attacks with the additional goal of conscripting civilians into BH in contrast to Yusuf’s style of recruitment through preaching.

Daoud most frequently targeted civilians (62%) and the military (17%). The targeting of the military was in reprisal for the robust clampdowns on the movement by Nigerian forces. The increasing attacks on civilians under Daoud’s leadership are perhaps indicative of Kydd & Walter’s (2006) argument that these are a sign of weakness.

Mohammed Yusuf, Shekau and Daoud attacked a range of targets with government and military targets being particularly prominent. However, they all attacked for different reasons and their targeting choices are further discussed in chapter seven.
4.8 Chapter conclusions
Leadership influence on the BH movement is complex and it cannot be explained using a single theoretical assumption or empirical fact. The findings of this chapter suggest that there are multiple explanations influencing the legitimacy of BH leadership. In addition, there are a range of factors that determine the division or unity of BH leaders and the chapter has outlined the influence of individual leadership on the intensity of BH violence.

A first important finding relates to the relevance of authentic leadership. This chapter illustrates how Mohammed Yusuf endeared himself to his followers through his actions and words, while wielding power through theological and dogmatic beliefs coupled with apocalyptic imagining. The chapter highlights out how Yusuf established the organisation and loyalty for his successors to assume their positions of authority.

Shekau became popular because he represented the aspirations and common radical views of the movement, and this earned him the Darul Tawheed. His favouritism towards his tribespeople was both a strength and weakness. It was strength because he had more local support than Nur and the Ansaru faction as BH dominated his Kanuri homeland, and as such he acted through ideology and ethnic entrepreneurship. However, his tribalism style of leadership contributed to the vitiation of his legitimacy, with this reflecting the notion of leadership ‘wrong-doing’ that Gurr (2015) espoused. Shekau’s legitimacy weakened over time because of his indiscriminate killings that did not spare Muslims. This and the disputes he had with the Ansaru faction reflect the argument of the role of leadership in group splintering (della Porta, 1995; Cunningham, 2011). Moreover, it furthers the argument about foreign support splitting movements, with the divisions between Nur’s faction stemming from them being more connected to Al Qaeda with Shekau being more aligned to IS’ expansionist agenda.

A second important finding of this chapter is that leadership decapitation against BH increased the intensity of its violence. Moreover, it paved the way for a more radical leader. The killing of Yusuf and targeting of Nur facilitated the emergence of Shekau. Moreover, the targeting of Nur and his self-imposed exile in fact resulted in him gaining more military training and forging more international connections with foreign jihadists. This suggests that the targeting of leaders of terror groups not only radicalises a group, it also strengthens avenues for the transnationalisation of terrorist groups. This chapter therefore challenges the argument
that decapitation creates internal turmoil within terrorist organisations (Jordan, 2009: 721; David, 2002) with BH splintering initially because of internal dynamics and then secondly because of decapitation. The targeting of BH leadership influenced the emergence of Nur who after his return from exile, attempted to take back his position of authority but was thwarted by Shekau. Regardless, Nur and Shekau continued to work together and their factions were later united. I would argue that this is because BH is connected by the instrumentality of political Islam, which enables it to pursue its political agenda through religion. Regardless of the individual differences between its leaders or of external pressures, BH appears bonded by an ideology that is derived from dogmatic eschatological belief.

In the next chapter the organisational goals of BH will be discussed, along with the reasons why BH works effectively as a group.
Chapter 5: Group Level Explanation

Chapter four examined the relationship between BH leadership and its followers. It discussed the variation of violence under five different BH leaderships. It also highlighted the implications of the Nigerian government’s decapitation approach with regards to BH. Chapter four therefore has laid the foundations for understanding the internal dynamics of BH and how external forces such as CT affects its entire group structure.

This chapter critically examines BH internally. It discusses the following components of BH: its organisational structure, its organizational goals and motivations, membership composition and the recruitment backgrounds of over fifty thousand members (Vanguard, 2015). It also discusses how the group coordinates its field operations. Furthermore, this chapter contributes to existing studies on BH by examining the implications these internal factors and changes in organizational structure have had over time. This group level explanation provides information on how the internal dynamics of violent organizations such as composition, division, cohesion and goals contribute to BH’s campaign of violence.

This chapter provides a broader perspective as to why individuals join BH instead of the conventional thinking that individuals join as a result of radical evangelism, poverty or illiteracy (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012; Agbiboaa, 2013; Hansen & Musa 2013). As noted in chapter Two, such notions are inadequate when justifying why people join terror groups. Moreover, this chapter provides new insights into understanding the internal dynamics of violent groups more broadly because investigating violent organizations (including BH) remains a difficult task due to their secretive and violent nature. To that end, the interview sources with local negotiators enrich this chapter with pertinent information. In contributing to the broader literature of terrorist group behaviour, this chapter also examines how BH’s recruitment pattern is different to existing studies of terror group recruitment and how this affects BH. The chapter additionally looks at how BH combines individual goals into a unitary goal and is crucial in understanding how a mix of internal and external factors such as CT and public support have shaped BH.

Scholars in the field of violence and conflict studies have applied different theories relating to civil wars, principals and agents of violence, rebel recruits and soldiers in an attempt to understand how violent groups’ organizational recruitment
and behaviours are applied while using terrorist tactics to achieve their goals. In order to understand BH’s organizational structure, recruitment types, goals and motivations, there is a need to engage BH in different theoretical and empirical debates within the broader field of terrorism while keeping in mind, the complexity of BH. This debate includes discussion of old and new terrorism, terrorist motivation and terrorist recruitment. Engaging BH in the debate about old and new terrorism is important because some scholars argue that the nature of terrorist groups in terms of their organizational structures, goals, lethality and transnationalisation has changed since the 9/11 attack in the USA, while others remain sceptical of such changes. The organizational structure of BH is reflective of both old and new terrorism, so investigating BH further expands upon this argument.

Old terrorism is believed to have existed from the 1960s to mid-1990s in the form of right- and left-wing movements and ethnonational and separatist movements who used violence to achieve their goals. Enders & Sandler (2000:310) suggest that such traditional terrorist movements share the features of secularism and rational political cause as their motivation for engaging in violence. Proponents of new terrorism argue that new religiously-oriented terrorism is motivated by lethal and indiscriminate violence (Juergensmeyer, 2000; Laqueur, 2003). In terms of organizational structures, Gunaratna (2002) and Neuman (2009) suggest that traditional terrorist organizations are hierarchically structured, whereas new terrorist organizations are more transnational with a loose network type of organizational structure in which cells are independent in terms of decision-making. However, other scholars debunk such claims. Crenshaw (2008) is sceptical about the concept of new terrorism and argues that even traditional terrorist groups such as the Red Army Faction (RAF) and Irish Republican Army (IRA) had loose organizational structures with many leftist groups being transnational in nature. BH is an organization that can be classified as new terrorism characterized by radical Islamism, and this chapter will investigate whether the organizational setting mirrors the organizational structure of new terrorism as argued by Neuman (2009) and other proponents of this notion.

Understanding the motivation behind people joining terrorist groups attracts wide debate in terrorism literature. The most popular reasons put forward for recruitment into violent groups are economic reasons or ideological indoctrination, but other studies argue that violent groups use force to get new recruits, particularly when recruiting child soldiers. However, Blomberg, et al, (2004) and Shafig & Sinno,
(2010) suggest that economic motivation has no connection with terrorism. Krueger & Maleckova (2003: 122) suggest that there is a linkage between terrorism and poverty (often as a result of illiteracy) and argue that terrorist groups pay compensation to the families of recruits. Li & Schaub (2004: 232) find that economic development reduces terrorism, but studies on religious beliefs such as jihadism or martyrdom suggest that individuals earning above national minimum wages join violent organisations for theological reasons (Sageman, 2008; Cole & Cole, 2009; Cotte, 2010). Sageman (2008) and Cotte (2010) highlight the world view of Salafist jihadism and explain the expansion of the Al Qaeda network and its violent ideology. Through his “bunch of guys” theory, Sageman explains the self-radicalization and transformation of individuals into violent extremists. The “bunch of guys” theory examines the evolution of the radical Salafist movement and the global spread of the Al Qaeda network. The theory emphasises how isolated individuals are collectively radicalised and become willing Al Qaeda recruits. Using the United Kingdom as a case study, Cole & Cole (2009) assess how Islamic fundamentalists recruit their members from young Muslims in the West. Cole & Cole (2009) suggest that a combination of psychological and social processes facilitate the recruitment of young British Muslims. They posit that such psychological and social processes include feelings of socioeconomic alienation, dogmatic views of Hizbut and Mouhajiroun reactions to the international war on terror, interactions with international jihadist organizations and an individual’s conscience to engage in acts of violent extremism.

In contributing to the extant arguments about why people join terrorist groups, this chapter examines more broadly why people engage in terrorism. Using BH as a case study, this chapter seeks to illustrate that terrorist groups switch or diversify their modes of recruitment so as to sustain their violent campaigns.

The evolving tactics of BH include the forceful recruitment of young people, particularly as foot soldiers. The use of child soldiers attracts numerous debates about its strategic advantages to violent movements. Violent groups often “threaten, abduct and abuse” child soldiers and so turn them into agents of atrocities (Becker, 2009; Beber & Blattman, 2013). Dallaire (2011) argues that areas with large populations of children enable violent movements to recruit more easily. In addition, children are also perceived as more easily indoctrinated, easily swayed into violence and less costly to maintain - especially if they come from poor backgrounds (Beber & Blattman, 2013). Scholars such as Boyden & de Berry (2004) suggest that children have the exuberance
and the physical capacity and agility to exact more violence on civilian targets; however, Wessells (2006) sees children as having insufficient capacity to sustain battles because of their age. Hence it is important to understand whether there are similar or distinct reasons as to why BH recruits children and how successful this has been for them. The sub section on recruitment examines the use of child soldiers by BH.

The rational choice theory’s application in this thesis is discussed in this chapter. The rational choice theory (RCT) is crucial in understanding how BH’s unitary goals and internal cohesion enable it to continue to carry out its campaign of violence, regardless of whether it is achieving its goals or not. Modern RCT argues that violent groups select from several alternatives, “each with given benefits, and costs the ones that would maximize their satisfaction” (Dugan, et al. 2005). RCT does not take into account individual preferences as it has similar attributes at a group level. The structure of terrorist groups (whether hierarchical- or loose-structured) does not deny individual preferences. Such preferences are similar and shared from the leadership to the followers of an organization, and if choices differ then the group divides and splinter-groups pursue a more unitary goal. However, chapter four of this thesis indicates that even though BH is divided into different factions and movements, it is committed to a common goal.

This chapter will look at BH’s recruitment patterns through two main approaches. Firstly, it will highlight the role of voluntary recruitment, which includes push factors such as grievances and pull factors such as religious identity. Secondly, it will discuss conscription as a method of recruitment, and in particular the use of child soldiers (boys and girls). Other methods of recruitment which do not fall within the aforementioned two categories will also be discussed

This chapter is organised as follows: the first part looks at the organisational structure of BH; the second part examines organisational goals and motivations; then the membership composition of BH and its strategies and opportunities for recruitment are discussed in the final section of the chapter.

5.1 Organisational structure
This section discusses the decision-making process of BH and its structure and presence in different Nigerian territories. It also points out how this structure is
weakened by both internal and external dynamics such as CT, international collaboration against BH and falling public support.

With regards to decision-making, BH is unlike other terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or IS which have loose organizational structures that are quasi-autonomous. BH is an organisation with a top-down command system but with clandestine cells (START Report 2014). It is headed by Amir ul-Aam (Abu Musab al-Barnawi) who is its leader and commander-in-chief, and he commands the movement’s members. Commands issued are either based on his decisions or on the advice of the Shura Council. Two deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II) assist him and they are also members of the Shura Council. There is not a great deal of information about the dynamics within the Shura Council except that it is a group of thirty elders of BH (Mahmood 2013: 2) that advises BH’s leader on the movement’s policy decisions (Smith 2015: 141). It is an advisory body that deliberates on issues that shape the decisions of the movement, but its recommendations are not binding upon the leader of the movement. Shekau’s authoritarian posture suggests that the commander of the group is vested with the power to singularly instruct followers of the movement.

Both the leader and the Shura Council have direct control of specialists or officers who are in charge of areas such as kidnapping, bomb-making, the training of new recruits, foreign relations and killing. Some of these specialists are also sub-national leaders who coordinate the state branch leaders where BH exists. For example, before the Nigerian forces killed Adam Kambar, he was both a specialist in foreign relations (he liaised between BH and AQIM, as well as Al-Shabaab) and a coordinator of operations in the North-West of Nigeria (Zenn 2014b: 24). Similarly, Kabiru Sokoto was a specialist in bombing churches and was the sub-national coordinator of North-Central Nigeria before his arrest (Premium Times 2012; Zenn 2014b: 25; Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16).

The structure of BH is designed to match the structure of Nigerian local authorities with BH cells being based on different regional (sub-national) authorities in Nigeria. There are ten major states (Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Plateau and Yobe) where BH has organized violence as well as in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. However, the structure in these states has collapsed gradually, largely as a result of a resurgent military campaign carried out by the Nigerian government in 2015 through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). At the next level, a state leader oversees the activities of BH leaders in local government areas.
(LGA). The LGA *Amir* controls the activities of BH cells in the towns and villages (DCCN, 2009: 14), with the cells being responsible for both carrying out attacks and the recruitment of new members. Figure 5.1 below shows the spread of the state and LGA branches while Figure 5.2 illustrates the organizational structure of BH.

Sambisa Forest is the main hideout of BH with the forest being strategic to the group because it serves as its headquarters with the leadership coordinating local cells from there. It has borders with major BH-dominated areas and Cameroon, and shares a boundary with the Ngadda River which stretches to Lake Chad. This thesis posits that the strategic location of Sambisa Forest in relation to the major town of Gwoza informed BH’s decision to make Gwoza its caliphate.
Figure 5.4 above shows a map of Nigeria with states that have been affected by BH. Before the 2015 MNJT robust operations, BH had a presence in the states marked with both the light shade and dark shade. The states marked with the light shade have had a BH presence beyond 2015 (see chapter seven for more discussion).

BH has a hybrid organisational structure consisting of a hierarchical (centralised) and cell structure. The organisational structure of BH is centralized in that the leader determines the activities of the group with regards to decision-making. The structure is hierarchical and bureaucratic with regards to divisions of labour. The leader has direct control of deputies, specialists and sub-national commanders, and the specialist and sub-national leaders in turn have direct control of the state Amir. The
state Amir has direct control of the LGA Amir while the LGA Amir has direct control of the cells. A cell is organized by individuals who regulate followers at a local level. Before its collapse, Ansaru was the strongest faction of all BH factions and coordinated its activities independently. However, it had ties with BH because of its leaders’ (Nur and Al-Barnawi) foreign connections to Al Qaeda. During his leadership, Shekau collaborated with Ansaru through an intermediary called Abu Mohammed. Mohammed assisted Ansaru (through Al Barnawi) with security cover (armed men) in the kidnapping of Westerners (Pantucci & Jesperson, 2015: 16).

BH cell structure is designed to not only carry out atrocities, but also as a strategy of survival. As argued by Neumann (2009:1), the organizational structure of ‘new’ terrorism has a cell structure because the compromise of a cell member will only destroy one cell and not an entire organization. For instance, Mudaisiru Jibrin (a.k.a. Namakele/Alarama) was operating in Yobe state and was the mastermind of the shooting of students at a Government Secondary School in Mamudo village near Potiskum, Yobe state in 2013. Investigations suggested that Jibrin also established a cell in Kano with 22 other individuals while he was being pursued by the Nigerian Department of State Security (DSS) in Kano (Vanguard, 2016a). Muhammed Hassan Idris (a Nigerien) and Baba Abdul Maina were arrested in the Panteka area of Abuja on 29th October 2015. They escaped and formed a cell in Abuja after their role in coordinating suicide attacks in Yobe, Plateau, Kano and Kaduna states (Premium Times 2015b). The arrest of Mudaisiru Jibrin and the 22 others suggests that a cell may constitute approximately 23 members. Moreover, the aforementioned arrested cell members were also perpetrators of attacks in BH strongholds of the Borno-Yobe axis, which suggests that more BH cells may have emerged in other regions due to increased pressure from state forces in the Borno-Yobe axis. The arrest of Hafsat Usman Bako, Zainab Idris and Aisha Abubakar, women specialized in recruiting females (Gigoya 2014), suggests that BH cells also include females. Thus a cell consists of both men and women who are specialized in coordinating attacks as well as recruiting individuals.

The arrest of Baana Fanay and two other officials by Chadian authorities suggests that BH has cells in the neighbouring countries of Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Investigations revealed that Fanay recruited individuals and purchased weapons for BH. These investigations also indicated that he trafficked weapons within Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon (Khamis 2016).
Figure 5.2 above illustrates the hybrid structure of BH with its hierarchical and cell structures. The figure illustrates a top-down and collaborative method of decision-making. The top-bottom nature of the group suggests that decisions come from a chain of command. The group is collaborative because in spite of the absolute power of the leader, he seeks advice from the Shura Council. Moreover, prior to any collapse of a
faction within the group, the leader reaches out to such factions. This thesis posits that the leader reaches out to such factions because they are influential and have international connections (see chapter four). This assertion is backed up by the Shekau having killed factions such as the YIM faction as well as Abu Zamira, who was alleged to have masterminded a coup against Shekau.

The organizational structure and spread of BH has altered over time due to both internal and external factors (December 2015-2016). Figure 5.5 below highlights significant factors that have led to the shrinking of BH’s organizational structure, with this having been reduced to the Borno axis since 2015. However, some of its foot soldiers remain in other Northern areas such as Kano state where they carry out occasional attacks.

**Figure 5.3: Reasons for changes in the organizational structure of BH**

Internally, Shekau’s authoritarian leadership caused the disintegration of the Ansaru and Yusufiyya factions (Mahmood 2013: 8), as well as the Abu Zamira Mohammed-led Shura Council. Abu Zamira Mohammed was thought to have replaced Shekau in August 2013 with there having been speculation that in 2013, Abu Zamira Mohammed plotted a coup against Shekau (Kalu, 2013). However, other narratives suggest that he wanted to replace Shekau, who was shot in Mali (ibid) during a joint operation with other jihadists (ibid).
Other factors shaping BH’s structure include tribalism among its members and the external factor of plummeting public support for the group. Tribalism in this context implies the prefrential treatment Shekau gave to Kanuri members of BH over non-Kanuri members of BH. Furthermore, during its early days, BH enjoyed public sympathy and covert support of locals who saw it as a form of liberation theology or a quest for the establishment of a Sharia state (Adibe, 2014 a&b). This support has subsequently weakened because of indiscriminate killings of members of the public. Additionally, the arrest and killing of key individuals such as Kabiru Sokoto Konduga and Habibu Bama have altered the group’s composition. The military strength of Nigerian forces and the MNJTF have pushed BH back to their main stronghold in Sambisa forest and to other villages within the states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. For example, the arrests of Sokoto in 2012 and Al-Barnawi in 2016 by the Nigerian forces countered plans to establish cells in the Taraba axis of the North-East (Premium Times 2012) and the North-Central respectively. Moreover, continued military pressure on BH has weakened its operational capacity. Thus both internal and external factors have reduced BH’s structure and network up to the Borno axis and very likely to the border towns of Niger, Chad and Cameroon as a result of the spillover of violence and BH collaborators within these countries.

Another reason to suggest that BH’s structure has altered over time is the reduction in its ability to attack in regions it once had structures. Chapters seven and eight suggest that the spread of BH has weakened. Between 2009 and 2015, BH (GTD) carried out 1,851 attacks with 231 being within Northwest and Northcentral Nigeria. In addition, 1,411 incidences occurred in the Northeast with 209 attacks being carried out outside of Nigerian borders. Interestingly, these attacks lessened in the Northwest and Northcentral in contrast to an increase in the border states of Adamawa, Borno and Adamawa, as well as countries in the Lake Chad region. Figure 5.4 illustrates the dominant presence of BH in the border regions between countries in the Lake Chad region. Chapter seven examines a number of factors that could explain the target selection of BH from a broader perspective.
Figure 5.4: Map of Nigeria showing Lake Chad region; the three border states and Nigeria's neighbouring countries (Cameroon, Chad and Niger) (created with QGIS software)

Figure 5.4 above indicates the concentration of BH violence in the Lake Chad region. The region includes Nigeria (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe), Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republics (see chapters seven and eight for more discussion).

5.2 Organisational goal and motivation
The overall organisational goal supported by the majority of BH members is the propagation of an ultra-Islamic ideology. They believe that a strict Islamic state will guarantee their needs which the current ‘un-Islamic and evil’ Nigerian system has denied them (DCCN 2009). BH followers have differing needs but share the same
preference for a strict Islamic system, and are determined to join and remain in the
group (discussed in chapter four) (ibid). The different methods of BH recruitment to
a large extent determine the motivations of its members with individuals being
motivated by theological/ideological, economical, revenge and marriage-based factors,
as well as other psychological needs. Indeed, Participant Ten (a former lawmaker and
attorney general) notes that:

There are multiple factors. Some look at it from an economic perspective and
some look at it from a religious perspective; but if you look at it holistically,
you will realize that many of these are interwoven.

Participant Ten is therefore suggesting that there are multifarious reasons motivating
individuals within BH. It can also be argued that to get more recruits, BH is in fact
deliberately designed to reflect differing individualistic goals in order to maintain this
collective preference. Participant Six (involved in the drafting of the National Counter
Terrorism Strategy) notes that:

They [BH] started preaching issues of radicalism initially because they were
talking about injustices in society with people getting rich without anybody
checking how. They were talking about people being deprived of many things
and when you bring up such issues alongside of religious narrative, these
becomes more potent. This kind of preaching started long ago before this thing
started that we now know as Boko Haram. Anybody who has visited Yobe,
Adamawa or Borno will know that these things are rapidly escalating and at
the end of the day, people might think that this is because of the killing of the
leader.

This statement shows BH as organizers of atrocities who radicalise their followers
with messages that contained both ideological and psycho-social goals. Given the
individual goals that bond BH as a group, it is fair to argue that individualistic goals
and motivations are pinned down to incentives, with these not always being
materialistic. However, other individuals are in BH not because of desired goals, but
because of fear, grievances and trauma. These factors remain seemingly unnoticed by
the government, yet a number of individuals have been radicalised because of the
indiscriminate killings of both BH members and civilians within BH affected
territories by government forces (see 5.4.2, 5.4.3 and 5.4.6 sub sections).

In spite of these individual motivations, it is arguable that BH individual goals
are secondary to the overall goal of the organization, with this being common in
terrorist groups. The modern rational choice theory offers explanations as to how unitary goals supersede individual goals within violent organizations. It suggests that regardless as to whether groups are either hierarchical or loose-structured, individual preferences are similar from the leadership to the followers and if there are no similar preferences, a group tends to break up and splinter- groups will form that follow a more unitary goal (Hinkkainen, 2014). It can be argued that preferences could dictate the choice of approaches to achieving a goal. Chapter four explains the divisions of BH leadership across leadership rivalry modus operandi (e.g. indiscriminate killings) and ethnicity. Furthermore, chapter four explains how the different factions are united by the common ideology of political Islam. In all the factions of BH, it is yet to be determined whether the group is divided on grounds of economic benefits. Notably, the former YIM and Ansaru factions and the present Shekau and Abu Musab al- Barnawi factions share a common ideology and perceived enemy, i.e. the Nigerian state, in spite of their divisions. Violent groups such as BH may be divided by leadership disputes or ethnicity yet be united in the same cause of political Islam. Again, this common goal of political Islam underscores the argument of RCT that a terrorist group’s shared utility is driven by the same political goal. This assertion does attract counter arguments such as the situation argued by Mitchell (2004: 50) where the goals of the principals may be at odds with the goals of the agents of violence, which could ultimately lead to in-fighting. However, chapter four emphasizes the significant role of leadership in the overall violent choices of BH.

5.3 Membership composition
BH members are great in number. Ahmed Salkida, a journalist who has established contact with BH, estimates that BH presently has close to 50,000 members (Vanguard, 2015). These members are predominately a group of Islamists who come from different tribes in Northern Nigeria. However, the majority of the members come from the Kanuri tribe (BBC, 2015d). Participant Four (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) suggests that BH is largely influenced by the Kanuri backgrounds:

By the common nomenclature, Boko means ‘Western education’ and Haram means ‘forbidden’ or ‘don't do it’, and that has been a long-standing practice of your average Borno Kanuri man. If you go to a Boko or Western school,
you change your culture, you change your religion and you don't behave ‘quote and unquote’ like a decent Muslim.

This statement by Participant Four suggests that such thinking by the majority of the Kanuri people has helped popularize BH’s ideology. Moreover, amongst all the interview participants, only participants four, five and eight (see chapter seven) were able to state the size of the Kanuri element within BH’s composition, which may conversely imply that the Nigerian government is unaware of the Kanuri ethnic component of BH. As Yusuf and Shekau have used the Kanuri tribe as one of their mobilizing platforms for recruitment (see chapter seven and eight), Hausa is the second major tribe from which members are drawn. Some scholars argue that a significant reason for the Hausa members within BH’s Ansaru faction was the attack on the ancient Hausa city of Kano (Mahmood, 2013: 8; Mohammed, 2014: 30). Moreover, data from GTD suggest that there was a series of attacks in Kano in the year Ansaru broke away from BH. Apart from these two major tribes, there are numerous other tribes in the 19 northern states of Nigeria (Onuaha, 2012:2) that are a part of BH for theological and ideological reasons. Regardless of this evidence about the composition of BH, it remains a Herculean task to quantify the ethnic composition of the group due to its clandestine nature.

BH appears to have evolved in terms of age and gender of members, even though no research has been carried out to date that identifies the precise age and gender composition of its members. Available information and events (e.g. attacks by BH members and arrests of its members by Nigerian security forces) suggest that individual leaders and their followers are young. In terms of gender, the majority of BH females are young girls who were forced to join the group. In terms of age, Participant Four (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) suggests that:

They [BH] mix themselves within a community and most of the time they don’t wear any uniforms or masks [turbans or signs of recognition]. You will also see that the younger ones that have been recruited are being motivated in the wrong belief that once you kill yourself you go to paradise, you die a martyr ...

A number of Participants suggest that BH members are youths for example, Participant Three (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert in conflict negotiation) notes that:
BH started more with persuasion and indoctrination, indoctrination to the point that many young graduates were completely indoctrinated. Participant Six (Involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) also says that:

If you notice, most of the radical clerics have followers mostly among the teeming masses, and when I say teeming masses, we have large number of young people that are not in school, that are not educated.

Participant Eight (An academic and security consultant who had several contacts with BH members) is of the opinion that:

They [BH] are manipulating and misapplying religion to mobilise the youth - unemployed and unskilled youths from the fringes and margins of society and those who are dejected and deprived of the very basic essentials of life.

Similarly, Participant Seven (A media practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria) suggests that:

Most young people attend the Almajiri school system where they are often left on their own roaming the streets and begging for food, and as you can imagine, these millions of young children grow up without any sound educational foundation.

The comments from these Participants suggest that the majority of BH members are youths. Interestingly, the founder of BH and his disciples started BH while they were in their youth (see chapter four). In addition to this, a number of suicide attacks have been carried out by girls and there are substantial numbers of female recruiters, also suggesting that BH has female members.

5.4 Strategies and opportunities for recruitment

The majority of violent groups recruit either through top-down or bottom-up methods (Hegghammer, 2006). The top-down approach is a process whereby terrorist organizations get recruits through an agent or agents, while the bottom-up method entails the willingness of individuals to join terrorist groups through personal self-radicalisation (ibid). While this chapter agrees that both approaches are applicable to the recruitment strategies of BH, it argues that the recruitment strategies of violent groups are highly dynamic in nature (see Figure 4 below). More specifically, terrorist groups can create situational factors such as fear, coercion or hypnotic affects to enlist the services of individuals, and that recruitment could be permanent or temporary (for
example, the use of mercenaries or informants). Participant Three (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert in conflict negotiation) gives a broader view about the various types of BH recruitment, suggesting that:

Initially, it started with persuasion in 2008 and 2009; in that period it started as more persuasion and indoctrination. Indoctrination to the point that many young graduates were so indoctrinated that they took up the position that Western education was truly undesirable and that it is a corruption of mankind. By this, meaning that if mankind lives in the pure state that God expects of us, then it should have nothing to do with Western education. But many Muslim clerics find fault with this because the very things that Boko Haram are using are products and by-products of Western education - the vehicles they are using and the moving from one place to another are products and by-products of Western education. The telephones they use are not from Arabic education, they are products of Western education. They are not walking naked, they are beautifully dressed, and this is also a product of Western education. Now things have changed in BH recruitment to include abduction, kidnapping, enforcement and forcible conversion to Islam that we [have] seen in the kidnapping of the Chibok girls, for instance. Many people have been abducted and there is the use of fear, intimidation and forceful conversion… and at the initial stage we were told that part of the indoctrination process included the use of date palms. This is extreme because date palms are being used for diabolic means as when taken, they hypnotize you and you don't become yourself again. These are some of the means used for indoctrination and maybe forced religious conversion.

The above account given by Participant Three highlights the different phases of the recruitment processes of BH that will be discussed further later in this chapter. Previous studies suggest that BH mobilises individuals through preaching, but Participant Three narrates how it has transcended to the use of force and how date palms, which are believed to be charmed by black magic, are used to initiate and then maintain the loyalty of recruits.
Figure 5.5 above illustrates different BH recruitment strategies and opportunities, and how they have evolved over time. These strategies and opportunities are discussed below.

5.4.1 Recruitment through preaching
In the early stages of BH, its members were men between the ages of 20 – 35 years old (in contrast to the age of Muhammed Yusuf and his successors). They were recruited through preaching. Such preaching involved critiquing government officials who were corrupt and lived in ‘opulence’ (Mohammed, 2014). The preaching made some poor and unschooled (lacking ‘western’ education) members of the society join BH because they saw Yusuf's creed (aqeedah) as an alternative of a corrupt system. Other recruits seemed to have been enticed by the oratory prowess and charisma of Yusuf. These characteristics of Yusuf encouraged them to enroll in his school (Madarasa) where they were radicalised in a formal setting (Dibal, 2009) through his creed and scriptural fatwa. The Almajiranci system in Northern Nigeria supports the recruitment process of BH to a large extent. Almajiri is a Hausa translation for "almuhajiroun", and it refers to an individual who migrates for the specific purpose of learning (Aghedo & Eke, 2013). This system has been in practice for many years in Northern Nigeria. It allows parents to give up their children from
the age of six to travel to other parts of Nigeria where there are *Mallams* (teachers). Their journey is for Quranic education and the learning of the Arabic language (Aghedo & Eke, 2013: 103; Oladosu, 2012). These children are given to Mallams who stand as their parents and nurture them to the age of maturity (Oladasu, 2012: 1821). The system is fashioned to teach these children the art of working for survival and it involves the collection of alms for their livelihood. The *almajiranci* (the practice of *almajiri*) system has changed over time. The teachers (*mallams*) who look after these children sometimes exploit them through forced labour and unpleasant living conditions (Aghedo & Eke, 2013). As a result, this forces the *almajirai* (*almajiri*; plural) into street hawking, domestic servitude, dangerous artisan mining and destitution (Aghedo & Eke 2013; Aluaigba 2009), with many becoming available for criminal entrepreneurs to recruit (ibid). It is important to note that presently this *almajiranci* system provides a platform for not only children but also young people to be strictly mentored by their teacher. BH has taken advantage of the *almajiranci* practice together with the burgeoning youth population in its recruitment and radicalisation processes. When describing the rise of BH, Participant Four (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) comments:

Yusuf was arrested; he had a bunker. We visited it in the old railway station in Maiduguri, Gonja. I can't remember the name of the place precisely, but it was his headquarters and he had gathered there not less than a thousand, maybe two or three thousand children pupils or almajiris at [that] time. He would give them food and you know what an average Nigerian needs, three square meals, he would give them food. We went to the place, [it was] real [and] typical of the military - a kind of centre or a regimental set-up. He had his bunkers and armouries - lots of these - underground.

5.4.2 Grievances
In examining other reasons for people joining BH, this chapter argues that individuals may join BH due to fear or grievances resulting from having been caught up in the violence between BH and the Nigerian Army within BH-dominated territories. An Amnesty International Report (2015) suggests that in 2014, over 1,200 people were killed extra-judicially and 20,000 arrested arbitrarily: "Hundreds, if not thousands, of Nigerians, have become victims of enforced disappearances and at least 7,000 people
have died in military detention as a result of starvation, extreme overcrowding or denial of medical assistance.” (Amnesty International, 2015a).

Before BH started using women for suicide bombing, Ahmed Salkida (a journalist with longstanding contact with BH), predicted that some aggrieved women would be willing to join BH. He narrates that a woman approached him in Maiduguri and said to him:

I was told you have access to Boko Haram. Please take my telephone number and give it to them. I lost my husband and two of his brothers at the hands of soldiers right before my eyes, and the trauma of this made me have a miscarriage. I want to kill as many soldiers as possible before they kill me. (Tijjani, 2016).

The quote above suggests that this woman suffered a miscarriage after seeing her husband and two of his brothers killed by Nigerian soldiers. This resulted in the woman becoming aggrieved and wanting to join BH to kill as many soldiers as she could. This example is one of the implications of indiscriminate killings by the Nigerian forces, yet this appears to have gone unnoticed by Nigerian CT officials. Moreover, it can be hypothesised that the military crackdowns in the main towns of Borno, such as Baga (Nossita, 2013) and the Bama massacres (Dearden, 2014) have also been instrumental in encouraging people to join BH. Rosendorff & Sandler (2004) argue that military actions by governments are capable of radicalising moderate individuals to become terrorists.

5.4.3 Soft loans and marriages
Due to the killing of many of its members and a decline in its capabilities, BH gives soft loans to local entrepreneurs such as butchers, traders, tailors and beauticians. These entrepreneurs are not bound to financially pay BH back within a specified period of time but are instead expected to pay by committing atrocities (Haruna, 2016). Participant One (A former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) confirms the use of soft loans by BH and suggests that:

The socioeconomic conditions of the regions where Boko Haram thrive are so pathetic; perhaps the North-east part of Nigeria can be classified as the axis of poverty in this country. Besides the fact that they lack natural resources, human resources are not well-developed to the extent that people are trying to survive in the face of extreme economic conditions. This is why some of them have been so easily enticed by these Islamic preachers. They don't just preach Islam,
they preach economic benefits. Some of these preachers encourage people to
go into small economic activities such as trading and they provide them with
soft loans to finance this. Sometimes these loans are not repayable but they
entice them with such loans and go on to say that, ‘He who pays the piper
dictates the tune.’ And so Islamic education is being combined with certain
economic benefits that tend to overshadow state Islamic interpretations.

Participant One further states that:
Well, there are various ways they recruit. Like I told you, first and foremost
they recruit by enticing people; trying to disorientate them about conventional
Islamic teachings and telling them that the Islam that they have been taught is
not the correct version of Islam. And so they introduce a new version of Islam
which imbibes violence as a modus... Secondly, like I told you, they give out
loans to these people, some of whom have never handled amounts like 300,000
or 400,000 Naira. Overnight you are giving people this kind of money, and it's
so tempting for them to accept that some of them get into BH in this way. In
contrast, others are abducted and forced into accepting this money just to
perhaps save their own lives.

BH uses women to recruit single women, particularly widows and girls. They lure
women by connecting them to young male BH members for marriage. This strategy
was discovered after Nigerian security forces arrested three women, Hafsat Usman
Bako, Zainab Idris and Aisha Abubakar, who were in charge of recruiting women. BH
also entices young men by giving them money and marrying them to captured women
(Gigova, 2014).

5.4.4 Self-radicalisation and violent extremism: martyrdom and religious duty
Willing recruits find ways to become members of BH or IS (Islamic State). Individuals
from affluent families sometimes for example, travel long distances to join BH. In
May 2016, 41-year-old Ibrahim Uwais, the son of the former Chief Justice of Nigeria
was killed in Syria while fighting for IS (Sahara Reporters, 2016b). On their way to
join BH, 21-year-old Ismaila Gambo and his sister were arrested by Nigerian security
forces (Dickson, 2015; Premium Times, 2015a). Gambo confessed to Nigerian
security agents that they were on a mission to perform a ‘public-service role’ that
included delivering food to a BH camp, providing intelligence to BH and also fighting
for them. He further stated that:
I did not just run with my sister. An Islamic State has been established and it is thus obligatory for every able-bodied male and female to fight to keep it. I wanted the comfort of a new Khalifah. (Premium Times, 2015a)

Gambo’s statement is reflective of Abrahams’ (2008) argument about terrorist incentives. He asserts that cohesion and solidarity motivate individuals to join terrorist groups, as well as to carry out atrocities. In other words, this sort of motivation is encouraged by feelings of belongingness and a sense of fulfilment. An army officer at the detention centre of BH suspects, Major Adegboyega Sam, notes that:

There are many of them here, children of influential Nigerians, and some we have been keeping for more than three to four years. We only await instructions from above; ours is to follow orders. (Hart, 2015)

This is not the first time individuals from affluent background have joined radical groups. In an AQAP attack (Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) in December 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the son of a Nigerian billionaire banker, attempted to detonate a bomb while on board Northwest Airlines Flight 253 en route from Amsterdam to Detroit. This trend of willing recruits joining BH has not been captured in early studies on BH; rather the studies rely on poverty as a causal or motivating factor for BH violence. As a determinant to violent extremism, poverty is a recurring subject of debate within the literature of terrorism. Moreover, poverty is also one of the gaps that motivates this thesis. Since these self-radicalised and violently motivated individuals are beyond poverty lines, what could be the factors that encourage them to violent extremism? To answer this question, we need to understand the role of martyrdom in the radicalisation and adoption of violent strategies by these willing recruits. Participant Four (Lawyer, Politician and Member of the former Presidential Committees on BH), Participant Six (a member of the NACTEST Drafting Committee) and Participant Seven (Author and Conflict Analyst) all confirm the role of martyrdom and religious benefits, with Participant Four (A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) suggesting that:

Two, when they went to Boko Haram, they..., which is number two, received very dangerous indoctrination that once you join their military circle, you fight against the constituted authorities or military or whoever they say, and if you are killed you go to paradise that is aljanaah. That is the kind of terrible indoctrination people have been given and then follow blindly!
Participant Six (Involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) has a similar point, also suggesting that the narrative of individuals who live above the national average income becoming involved in radical extremism started before the killing of Yusuf (BH’s founder):

You see, it's about ideology, and when we look at the meaning of ideology, it's a means of achieving a particular thing. But the problem is when you are at the extreme of ideology, you believe something is absolutely either this or that and so there is no room for negotiation at that point in time. And you see, turning to violence will not be the intention at the beginning but once people feel they can't get what they are looking for, the only way they will think they can is with this [violence]. Let me give you an example. Before Mohammed Yusuf, there was a case of a group of young people, children of rich people in the North-East, and they just took themselves into the bush and said they were carving out their own place. What did they mean? They were saying that their parents had made money through illegal means, and they didn’t want to be a part of that. But one thing is that they were not poor; they had access to money, to ammunition, to arms..., and of course the state would repress this and in fact they were repressed. But you see, this is what I mean by ideology. Now another tactic is being used: if you cannot get something then use the ideology of religion, and this is when Boko Haram comes in. The killing of Yusuf was a very good excuse to talk about using violence but to me, it was not the real cause.

When discussing BH and international jihadist groups, Participant Seven (a media practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria) was very clear in his explanations about the role of religious benefits. His comments also focus on individuals beyond poverty lines:

You will find that it is always very, very appealing; these kinds of philosophies are very appealing to young Muslims. And now, [it] is not just the alienated and the poor who are attracted by this as you can see from the example of the Mutallab boy, it is also the rich families whose boys are passionately convinced by such preaching of this... Islamic movement. They are convinced that they benefit both in terms of their religious belief and the belief that they are working for God, [and] that is a satisfaction in itself. That is why a very rich young boy from Bauchi, a millionaire's son, will sacrifice everything to
go into Boko Haram, so he will gain these benefits. The leaders of course invariably benefit financially from their [the] activities [of young willing recruits].

When considering these accounts by Participants about the role of martyrdom, it is important to understand why individuals who are not poor engage in self-radicalisation. Most of the factors that explain the role of martyrdom can be interpreted through the framework of Cole & Cole (2009). Cole and Cole explain how jihad and Islamic fundamentalism encourage young British Muslims to become willing recruits of Islamic fundamentalist movements. The authors argue that:

Psychological and social processes encourage radicalism and violent extremism through social and economic exclusion, extremist dogma, reactions to the global war on terror, association with global jihadist movements and the overcoming of an individual's conscience to participate in the act of taking life.

(Cole & Cole, 2009: 8)

In the case of BH, it cannot be argued that economic exclusivity is involved because some individuals contribute vast sums of money to BH (Dickson, 2015; Premium Times, 2015a).

Social identity is one important reason why people join violent movements. This is because violent groups influence both non- and self-radicalised individuals through propaganda. Violent groups consciously propagate reasons that justify violent behaviours. This situation causes both cognitive and emotional identification among willing recruits (Cole & Cole 2009: 21). The identity factor is supported by the belief and subsequent rejection of Western culture which is seen as being corrupt and evil. Thus, there is a need to ensure purity in Islam. These willing individuals seek to purify Islam through a violent form of jihad, which they see as a tool to fight for oppressed Muslims. They find justification in the ‘sword verses’ in the Koran (p.49). The sword verses say:

Give thou good tidings to the unbelievers of a painful chastisement; (3) excepting those of the idolaters with whom you made covenant, then they failed. You naught neither lent support to any man against you. With them fulfil your covenant till their term; surely God loves the god-fearing. (4) Then, when the sacred months are drawn away, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they repent, and perform the prayer, and pay the alms, then
let them go their way; God is All-forgiving, All-compassionate. (5) And if any of the idolaters seeks of thee protection, grant him protection till he hears the words of God.

The quote above literally suggests that unbelievers (in this case non-jihadists and in particular Judea-Christians) who agree with the believers (in this case the jihadists) have been absolved by Allah and the holy Prophet. It would therefore not be good for unbelievers who have repented to go back to their sinful ways. Idolators should be given good treatment through “painful chastisement” and that when the “holy months” are gone, unbelievers should be slain wherever they are found until they repent and when they repent, they should then be spared.

The sword verses generate heated controversy between radicalised and non-radicalised Muslims. Contrary to the interpretation of the jihadists, Holbrook (2010) suggests that the jihadists have de-contextualised the Koran to justify violence. The author observes that these verses are contextual to when the Koran was revealed by God to the Prophet Mohammed during the days of inter-tribal war, and that the verses were instrumental for the Prophet to establish Islam during his migration (hijjra) between Mecca and Medina. Holbrook (2010) argues that jihadists ignore the parts of the Koran that talk about peace, and that leaders of violent movements in fact edit medieval texts by inserting radical views to distribute to their various networks in order to promote jihadist propaganda.

The international war on terror, the ousting of Islamic political leaders and “genocides against Muslims” internationally are further factors that influence the radicalisation of individuals into violence. The United States-led war against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and the overthrowing of Saddam Hussein (Cole & Cole, 2009: 120) along with genocides in places such as Kosovo, Bosnia and Chechnya are examples of this. These situations can be connected to BH because BH changed its name from the Yusuffiya Movement to the Nigerian Taliban (Walker, 2016). Moreover, BH also shifted its allegiance from Al Qaeda to IS (Omojuwa, 2015; Lister, 2015). This thesis argues that the overthrowing of Muammar Gaddafi not only facilitated the activities of terrorist groups across Africa, it also encouraged the radicalisation of individuals. Gaddafi was seen as an influential Muslim figure across Northern Nigeria, having once suggested that Nigeria should split into Muslim-North and Christian-South. This suggestion invoked mixed reactions across Nigeria (Duodo 2010). The death of Gaddafi was mourned by many Nigerian Muslims, particularly in the North (Kron
Mujahid Asari Dokubo, a former militant and leader of the Niger-Delta People's Volunteer Force, who once claimed to be sponsored by Gaddafi, said: “[Gaddafi] spilt his blood as a martyr to rekindle the fire of revolution all over the world. The people of the world will rise up against this.” (Kron, 2011).

According to Cole & Cole (2009: 144), willing recruits are influenced by physical proximity and friendships translating from virtual to physical. This can be likened to the case of Gambo. Gambo and his sister were in contact with a BH recruiter over the phone. The Nigerian security agents discovered Gambo's plan because he mixed up the phone number given to him by his initiator to call a university lecturer (Premium Times, 2015a).

Another means for recruitment into violent movements is deliberate terrorist propaganda via DVDs, the Internet and other media sources (Sageman 2008; Cole & Cole 2009). Yusuf, the founder of BH, circulated several of his radical preachings via audio cassettes and CDs as well as (Loimeier 2012) on YouTube. Shekau's messages and threats are also loaded on YouTube. Participant Six (involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) suggests that:

People might be thinking of only financial motivation, but it's not just about financial motivation - it is also psychological. If you are following a path that everybody in society is condemning, you are likely to start having a rethink. But if you have people that are also on this path, this reaffirms your position: after all, I'm not the only one thinking this; you understand? Initially, there was no contact but now the sharing of ideas, particularly with the Internet, is very easy because the sources of information are so many now and no-one has control about what somebody else says or control about [over] the content. So no control over how they think coupled with the fact that the Nigerian government also does not have any serious national orientation policy, and you have a situation where some people feel they have obligations; first to my [their] religion before I [they] talk about the nation.

Participant Six suggests that the determinant of self-radicalisation and violent extremism is more of a psychological factor. Moreover, the emphasis is on the role of communication, notably this being through the Internet, with this highlighting an important factor that seems to have been unobserved by other participants. In support of the opinion of Participant Six, there is the example of eighteen-year-old Auwal Musa, a man from an affluent family from Borno, who was arrested for BH activities.
When the reporters visited Musa's mother for an interview, she angrily smashed a television to the ground. She said that as parents, they had tried to supervise how their children used the Internet (Premium Times, 2015a).

Since the media plays a significant role in encouraging willing recruits, it is important to explore what BH propaganda is. BH messages contain hatred for the West and its ‘allies in secularism’, including Nigeria. The messages also depict ‘Islam and Muslims’ as a superior religion with superior people and calls for violent evangelism. This causes emotional identification with BH because it portrays BH as a movement fighting against the depression of Muslims. Moreover, BH propaganda aims to present BH as an organisation with a strong military might and the ability to defeat its enemies. Below are three excerpts from the propaganda messages of Shekau that explain why willing recruits support the Nigerian, regional and international ‘jihad’. From a Nigerian perspective, Shekau says:

We hardly touch anybody except security personnel, Christians and those who have betrayed us. Everyone knows what the Christians did to Muslims, not just once or twice. Why I've come out to explain myself is because of the explanation Jonathan and the CAN [Christian Association of Nigeria] President gave on us, including the various versions people give about us that we are like cancer (a terrible ailment) in this country called Nigeria. No, we're not like cancer, neither are we evil. If people don't know us, God knows everyone. Everyone knows what happened to our leader. Everyone knows what wickedness has been meted out to our members and fellow Muslims in Nigeria from time to time in Zango Kataf, Tafawa Balewa, Kaduna, villages, Langtang, Yelwan-Shendam. Different things were meted out to Muslims in this country. (Sahara Reporters, 2011)

In this message, Shekau blames Nigerian security for killing members of his group unjustly under a Christian President (President Goodluck Jonathan). Shekau was also reacting to statements made by the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and some senior officials (BBC, 2011a; Cock & Ouah, 2011). In reaction to frequent attacks on churches in 2011/2012, the CAN President condemned BH and urged Christians to defend themselves. Shekau also recalls ethno-religious crises that happened in Zango Kataf, Tafawa Balewa, Kaduna, Langtang and Yelwan Shendam, claiming they were targeted mass killings of Muslims. The above statement made by Shekau is indicative of a fault line that Nigerian authorities seem unable to
acknowledge. Furthermore, it is this kind of propaganda that 18-year-old Musa Auwal drew his inspiration from. Auwal told Nigerian security officers that:

This nation is openly against Islam and Muslims, especially since Jonathan became President, and the evil of this country makes me sick, living in this land is haram. (Premium Times, 2015a)

BH’s propaganda against Africa (the Lake Chad region) can be observed through one of Shekau’s claims when he said that:

We never rose up to fight Africa. We rose up to fight the world; we are going to fight the world on the principle that whoever doesn’t obey Allah and the Prophet must either obey or die or become a slave. You send 7,000 troops? Why don’t you send 70 million? This is small. Only 7,000? By Allah, it is small. We can seize them one-by-one. We can seize them one-by-one.

This comment was Shekau's reaction to a regional alliance against BH in February 2015 (The Nation, 2015). Below is a comment where Shekau classified Western leaders and Nigeria's senior Muslim clerics, traditional rulers and politicians as infidels:

Niger-Delta, you are in trouble; Jonathan, you are in trouble…Ban Ki-Moon, you are in trouble; Bejjamin Netanyahu, you are in trouble; Queen Elizabeth, you are in trouble; Babangida, Kukwadoso, Shekara, Kashim, Buhari, you are in trouble. “Yahaya Jingir…the cleric of Jos, the advocate of ‘Boko Halal,’ right? We are Boko Haram, you are Boko Halal. You will see, bastard. We killed Albani of Zaria. We killed Albani of Zaria. Shekau killed Albani of Zaria. Tomorrow he will kill Jingir; the day after tomorrow he will kill Dapchia; the next day he will kill Wapchama. Next, he will kill Shehu of Borno, Ado Bayero. We rebel against you. Between us and you is enmity and rancour until you believe only in Allah. The reason why I will kill you is you are infidels, you follow democracy…Whoever follows democracy is an infidel. This is Shekau; this is why I’m in enmity with you. (Vanguard, 2014)

Cole & Cole (2009: 295-297) argue that violent extremists use words such as ‘kaffir’ (infidels) to ‘dehumanise’ non-members. Such dehumanisation encourages violent extremists to kill non-members. In the quote above, Shekau is referring to adherents of democracy as infidels. Generally, BH also identifies non-members as kaffirs and fasiqun (wrong-doers) (DCCN, 2009: 4; Onuah, 2012; 2), and as such, infidels are expected to be killed. It can be argued that these kind of messages motivated Ibrahim
Uwais who died fighting for IS, which is the main body of BH. (Sahara Reporters, 2016b)

5.4.5 Conscription
BH recruits through conscription of people, particularly women and minors, and this section looks at how and why BH recruits and uses child soldiers. BH has attracted global attention with the kidnapping and using of young girls in committing atrocities. Video footage was released by the AFP News Agency showing how more than 219 kidnapped school girls (Chibok girls) were taught how to commit atrocities. In explaining their ordeal, some of the girls who escaped described how they were conscripted. One of the girls said;

Every day at dawn they would come and throw water over us and order us to wake up and start praying. Then one day they brought in a man wearing uniform. They made us all line up and then said to me, ‘Because you are always crying, you must kill this man.’ I was given a knife and ordered to cut his neck. I said I couldn't do it. They cut his throat in front of me. That's when I passed out. (BBC, Africa 2015a)

The treatment of these young girls is similar to the training process of new recruits in Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) where they are indoctrinated, socialised to violence and taught how to carry out atrocities (Hegghammer, 2006). The above statement shows how these young girls were stripped of their humanity. It further corroborates revelations on how girls are forced into suicide bombings of soft targets against their will (Zenn & Pearson, 2014; The Guardian, 2014b; Searcey, 2016). Such soft targets include public gatherings such as mosques, markets, motor parks and IDP camps (internally displaced persons) (The Guardian, 2014b; Searcey, 2016). In a video released in 2014, Human Rights Watch interviewed 30 girls and women who had escaped from a BH camp:

They and many others they saw in the camps were subjected to physical and psychological abuse, forced labour; forced participation in military operations including carrying ammunition or luring men into ambushes, forced marriage to the captors and sexual abuse, including rape,” the report says. “In addition, they were made to cook, clean and perform other household chores. Others served as porters, carrying the loot stolen by the insurgents from villages and towns they had attacked. (Guardian, 2014b)
Zenn (2014a:6) sees the kidnapping of the Chibok girls as a turning point because it subsequently gave BH further incentive to abduct more girls and women. For instance, in April 2014, an unaccounted number of girls were kidnapped in Dikwa Borno state. In June 2014, 40 girls were taken from a village near Chibok, and 45 girls were abducted in Wagga, Adamawa state (ibid) in October 2014. Young women and teenagers are used as sexual slaves and sex is also used as a means of keeping these young females loyal to the group. A nine-year-old girl rescued from the BH camp embarked on a hunger strike as she wanted to return to her husband in Sambisa forest (Marama, 2016). Moreover, it is argued here that some captured girls partake in suicide bombing because of the trauma of sexual abuse and bitter jealousy from other BH wives, as well as stigmatism from their hometowns (Motlagh, 2016). Fati, a fourteen-year-old who escaped from the BH camp, recalls that:

They came to us to pick us, and they would ask, ‘Who wants to be a suicide bomber?’ The girls would shout, ‘Me, me, me!’" (Swails & McKenzie, 2016)

Fati’s statement indicates the girls’ desperation to be picked for a suicide mission. Fati also recalled that most of the abducted girls were eager to be chosen for suicide bombing so that they could escape from captivity. Some of the girls who were selected for suicide bombings would run to Nigerian soldiers to get help unstrapping the explosives they were carrying (Swails & McKenzie, 2016).

Another form of conscription that has not been given much attention by researchers and security experts is the use of young boys in carrying out attacks. This was noticed in 2013 particularly during the Benisheikh massacre in Borno state, where eyewitnesses testified to having seen children as young as 12 years carrying AK47 rifles (HRW, 2013).

Parents also voluntarily offer their children to join BH or to become tools for suicide bombing. In December 2014, a thirteen-year-old strapped with explosives was arrested in Kano. She confessed that her parents took her to a forest in Gidan Zana, a village on the outskirts of Kano city. In her meeting with BH members, she stated that:

They said, ‘Can you do it?’ I said, 'No', "[and] they said, 'You will go to heaven if you do it.' I said, 'No, I can't.' They said they would shoot me or throw me into a dungeon. (BBC, 2014c).

From the above findings, BH’s use of child soldiers mirrors Becker (2009) argument that child soldiers are abducted, threatened and abused. It also underscores the argument that child soldiers are in abundance, they are cheap to maintain (Dallaire,
2011), easily indoctrinated and cost less - especially when they come from a poor background (Beber & Blattman, 2013).

This thesis argues that the stigmatism of female victims by BH-affected communities could subject females to shaming and therefore a reluctance to return to their communities and even the possibility of committing suicide. Moreover, possible stigma motivates and drives female victims to carry out attacks. The kidnapping of girls by BH is strategic: BH takes girls because they can easily be controlled through sexual (intimate) attachment to male members of BH. In June 2016, when Nigerian forces invaded the Sambisa Forest they found not only a stockpile of arms, but also sexual enhancement drugs (Premium Times, 2016). As mentioned before, one of the female victims of BH undertook a hunger strike in order to go back to her BH husband. The use of conscription of young girls has the added benefit to BH of their being able to use these girls to entice more male recruits. The recruitment of women by BH started in 2013/2014 when there was a period of intense pressure on BH as key BH leaders and foot soldiers were being killed and captured (this is discussed in more detail in chapter six). Hence, it is argued that child soldiers can be used to augment foot soldiers in an organisation when there is a decrease in skilled fighters. BH uses young girls for suicide bombing because they appear harmless. The majority of the previous onslauxths on civilian populations were predominantly carried out by men who could be more easily identified by their appearance. The culture of wearing a hijab and of women and men not having close contact in public spaces or on transport in northern Nigeria such as the Adaidaita Sahu (an ethno-religious value orientation programme in Kano state) (Barde, 2005) has facilitated the use of women for suicide bombing.

BH’s choice of male child soldiers in combat is indicative of their belief that boys have more capacity and fortitude to fight on battlefields than the females, and that boys can be more easily detected in public if they are on a suicide bombing mission. It is also important to note that all of the known child kidnappings were in the Borno Yobe axis and not in Kano or other parts of the North-western state of Nigeria where BH once existed. This further indicates that the abduction and recruitment of child soldiers can be opportunistic due to their proximity to terrorist hideouts or host communities. Although Muslim child soldiers are also abducted, it is fair to argue that BH has predominately kidnapped children from non-Muslim and non-Kanuri speaking communities. For instance, Chibok town where more than 219
girls were abducted has huge numbers of Christians and speakers of the Kibaku language (Nossita, 2014). Targeting non-Muslims and non-Kanuri may have been undertaken in order to attack Muslim and Kanuri communities, with the attackers perhaps carrying out such attacks as a form of retaliation. Alternatively, attacking non-Muslim and non-Kanuri territory may be because the conversion of these young individuals changes generations. It changes generations by breaking down the fabric of these communities by reducing their motivation to fight back.

5.4.6 Other explanations
In addition to all the aforementioned forms of recruitment, individuals also join and support BH because of fear and international solidarity. In terms of fear, BH has overpowered Nigerian security forces by invading their barracks and taking the weapons of the Nigerian army and police. BH has also captured 21 major towns in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states (THISDAY, 2016a). Hence it is fair to argue that willing and aggrieved individuals may either be part of BH for self-protection or to revenge their grievances against the state through violence, or be too scared to say no to threats and blackmail.

BH enjoys international and local solidarity. The group employs the temporary services of fellow Mujahedeen (Weeraratne, 2015: 13) from countries such as Mali, Libya and Chad to engage in major attacks such as the seizure of territories in order to establish caliphates (this is discussed further in chapter eight). Locally, BH engages the services of non-members such as street hawkers, local artisans and other people in the streets to gather information about military operations (Zenn, 2013). It has also been discovered by Nigerian security that BH drug people to engage in their campaign. This strategy was used in May 2016 when a thirty-year-old was drugged and strapped with explosives and directed to bomb Kantin Kwari market of Kano (The Telegraph, 2016).

5.5 Chapter conclusions
This chapter has attempted to explain how BH is structured and organised, and it has described the bureaucratic nature of BH and the way in which field operations are coordinated. Moreover, it has investigated the internal dynamics of the group regarding their internal cohesion. It also has identified factors such as authoritarian leadership, internal division, decreasing public sympathy, counter-terrorism, internal pressures and a decrease in operational capacity that have altered the organisational
structure and spread of BH. Within the broader field of terrorism, these factors could be used to explain how the changing nature of terrorist group composition comes about and how it affects aspects of their campaign.

This chapter also contributes to the argument on old and new terrorism. Even though BH has the attributes of new terrorism in terms of goals and lethality in perpetrating violence, it does not reflect a clear-cut loose organisational structure as suggested by the proponents of the new concept of terrorism such as Neuman (2009). BH is a hybrid between a cell and a hierarchical structure with the cell being essential for the survival of the organisation. Moreover, it has been argued that the structure of violent organisations depends on their survival strategy. Chapter six explains the implications and causes of the hybrid structure of BH and also argues that BH has created a cell structure for survival as a result of not only pressure from the Nigerian forces, but also as part of an expansionist agenda.

This chapter has further challenged the argument espoused by Mitchell (2004) about the likelihood of a frosty relationship between the principals and agents of violence. It suggests that BH reflects the assumption of the unitary model of RCT and in reflection of Hinkkainen (2014), this chapter has argued that both the leaders and followers of violent movements have common preferences. Moreover, since violent movements are mostly elites fighting for the masses, it is difficult for followers to revolt, and so they would rather split and join a more unitary goal. However, it is argued that since the leadership of BH has a major influence on the movement, followers only divide due to leadership disputes caused by conflict choices related to operations and ethnic affiliations. In spite of these internal disputes, BH has shown that it is united by the common goal of political Islam.

This chapter identifies the Kanuri ethnic element of BH’s composition. This ethnic element implies that BH uses ethnicity in recruiting its members (chapter eight discusses in detail the use of Kanuri ethnicity by BH). Despite this, Nigerian authorities seem to overly concentrate on BH’s radical Islam.

This study has illustrated that BH’s strategy of using child soldiers is opportunistic, financially motivated and purely economical in its use to address decreasing numbers among its skilled members. It also has highlighted that the use of child-soldiers can be effective when they belong to a different religion and background to that of the terrorist. In addition, the study has outlined that the use of young girls for suicide bombing is effective when they are subjected to trauma and stigma.
Because girl recruits have less fortitude to engage in combat, male recruits are engaged in combat while the girls engage in suicide attacks. Moreover, female recruits attract more male recruits.

By understanding the group explanation for BH violence, this chapter has attempted to answer the research question about how BH is organised and who its members are. Moreover, the chapter has also analysed how these members are recruited and how the different recruitment strategies affect the group. The majority of early studies (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012; Agbiboa, 2013; Hansen & Musa, 2013) on BH have attributed religion and poverty as the main narratives and opportunities used by BH for recruitment. However, this chapter argues that that the strategies adopted by BH over time are highly dynamic and sophisticated (as illustrated in Figure 5.5), and it has identified some of the gaps in the overall explanation about the reasons and motivations of people joining BH. Alternatively, it suggests that there are multifarious ways in which BH recruit individuals. Moreover, this chapter has suggested that over time, BH has applied a broad range of recruitment types to sustain its violent campaign. Finally, the chapter has illustrated how BH started with recruitment through evangelism and then moved towards other forms of recruitment. These other forms of recruitments include, abduction, hypnosis, coercion, self-radicalisation/recruitment, fear, trauma, revenge (grievances) and solidarity with other international Jihadists. With regards to self-radicalisation, the Nigerian authorities’ attention to this appears to be insufficient. Consideration has not been giving to how BH’s propaganda through the media gradually radicalises and pushes individuals towards joining BH. Furthermore, Nigerian authorities also appear to have inadequate knowledge of how their indiscriminate killings influence individuals into joining BH. In fact, the consequences of indiscriminate killings make fear, trauma and grievances highly pertinent and instrumental in BH’s ability to recruit members.
Chapter 6: State Level Explanation

This chapter discusses two topics regarding the Nigeria’s counter-terrorism (CT) efforts. First, it examines the Nigerian state’s CT strategy and BH’s tactically violent responses; second, it assesses whether Nigerian CT is effective or counter-productive.

According to Lum et al. (2006: 491), CT involves, "prevention and alleviation of early risk factors, situational prevention of actual events, or post-event responses." (Kula, 2015: 27). In the case of BH, Nigerian CT focuses on a post-event response because BH was not perceived as lethal until 2011, resulting in the Nigerian government initially underestimating their capacity for violence. The majority of studies in the literature on BH (Agbiboa, 2013a; 2013b; Maianguwa 2014) suggest that the reaction of the Nigerian state to BH and the eventual killing of Yusuf, the founder of the movement, in fact facilitated BH’s eruption of violence. Initially, the Nigerian government started with a hard-line approach including the use of military action and the use of declared states of emergency, before they included a softer approach with the enactment of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2014. Nigeria had no clear-cut CT policies until 2011 when the Terrorism Protection Act (TPA) was enacted (later replaced by the 2013 TPA). Moreover, Nigeria had no CT strategy until 2014 (NACTEST), with this being revised in 2016. Even with the introduction of NACTEST, Nigeria appears to prioritise the use of an aggressive approach. State response to terrorist groups is divided into violent and nonviolent responses. Violent response refers to military actions that are enforced through targeted killings of terrorists, raids or the infiltration of terrorist groups. On the other hand, nonviolent responses are non-military defensive approaches that include the use of legislation, punishment or technology (Enders & Sandler, 1993). Therefore, this chapter will analyse both violent and nonviolent responses to BH by the Nigerian state.

To understand how BH has responded to Nigerian CT, the strategic model of rational choice theory (RCT) has been applied to examine changes in BH’s tactics over time. This model is suitable for explaining the ever-changing nature of terrorist strategies. The strategic model suggests that terrorism is a strategic use of violence by individuals and groups. It sees both terrorist groups and the state as players who seek to optimise their goals within existing constraints (Sandler et al., 1983). Sandler et al. (1983) argue that a government’s actions determine and are determined by actions, so both terrorists and governments act on and in anticipation of each other's actions.
chapter five, different individuals having different preferences, with these being secondary to organisational goals, were discussed. Thus BH can be analysed strategically as a unitary actor, and this chapter argues that BH is a strategic actor because of its attempts to achieve its goals by adapting to the Nigerian government’s measures. Furthermore, it argues that both the Nigerian government and BH are procedurally rational. This strategic model emanates from Classical Economic Theory (Simon, 1995; Abrahams, 2008; Van um, 2015). Moreover, it is concerned with how terrorist groups use violence against state forces, officials and civilians in order to achieve political concessions (Van Um, 2015). In relation to terrorism, the Contemporary Strategic Model is anchored on three assumptions, which stipulate that:

1. rational actors have relatively stable and consistent goals;
2. actors compare the expected costs and benefits of the options before them;
3. actors choose options with the most favourable utility.

Max Abrahams (2008) criticises these three assumptions of the Contemporary Strategic Model, and suggests seven puzzles that contradict its trifold position:

1. terrorists will not optimise their goals by attacking civilians;
2. terrorism is not a last resort and it is usually difficult for groups to transform into non-violent movements;
3. terrorists reject policy concessions offered by governments;
4. terrorists have unstable political platforms;
5. terrorists carry out anonymous attacks, making it difficult for a government to make policy concessions;
6. terrorist organisations with factions attack each other more than their enemies (i.e. governments);
7. terrorist groups resist disbanding regardless to whether they achieve or consistently fail to meet their goals.

This chapter adapts the three assumptions of the contemporary strategic model because terrorists’ actions are determined by both their goals and the environment, and this thesis would argue that the rationality of terrorists often accounts for their changing of strategies targets.

Acting strategically defines target choices of terrorists. Although some existing literature on CT suggests that terrorists’ ideology determines their target types (Drake, 1998; Engene, 2004), preferences are more likely to have initially been driven by
ideology but with an adaptation towards softer targets because of constraints CT has placed on the group - hence acting strategically.

Additionally, it is important to look at the target choice of terrorist groups by their ability and opportunity to attack particular targets whether these be state forces, state representatives or civilians. Hence it is important to explain the logic of BH’s campaign of violent response to the Nigerian state through Costly Signalling, as argued by Kydd & Walter (2006). This is important because it also highlights the additional reasons as to why BH attacks indiscriminately (including civilians and state forces). Kydd & Walter (2006) highlight five logics of Costly Signalling. They argue that because words are inadequate at conveying a message to a government or perceived enemies, violence is used to optimise a terrorist group’s preferred utility. Therefore, terrorist attacks are in the form of:

1. attrition to deter enemies from making certain policies;
2. intimidation of a population to demonstrate that the terrorists are stronger than the government in order to enforce obedience from a population;
3. provocation strategy (or “intending to”) to force a government to engage in indiscriminate violence which will push citizens towards support of the terrorists;
4. spoiling strategy which depicts the moderates on the side of the terrorists as untrustworthy in negotiations;
5. outbidding strategy as a way of convincing a population that one rival group is stronger than another.

As discussed in chapter five, BH attacks have pushed Nigerian forces to crack down on the towns of Bama and Baga, thereby enticing moderates to join BH. Moreover, BH also carries out attacks as a message or in response to someone or something. This chapter, along with chapter seven, gives more insight into this assertion.

Studies on CT are divided into two broad arguments. The proponents (Mesquita & Dickson, 2007; Jason, 2009) see it as a useful tool for degrading and ending terrorist groups. On the other hand, opponents (Byman, 1998; Rosendorff & Sandlers, 2004) of this approach assert that terrorists deliberately carry out attacks to get public sympathy, and then attract willing recruits due to government reaction. This increase in violence can turn moderate individuals into extremists. In a meta-analysis of over 20,000 studies conducted by Lum et al., (2006), only seven studies indicate that CT is effective in ending terrorist groups. In analysing how terrorism ends, Libicki & Jones (2008) studied 268 violent groups in existence between 1968 and 2006. The
findings of their study suggest that out of the 268 groups, 43% ended through political transition, 40% ended through policing and intelligence, 10% ended because the terrorist groups achieved their goals and 7% ended through the use of military force.

Libicki & Jones (2008) suggest that ending terrorism requires multiple approaches. In addition to the factors they studied, giving aid to countries dealing with terrorism, imposing economic sanctions on states supporting terrorism, discouraging terrorism by hardening targets and engaging in diplomacy are all essential tools for countering terrorism. Different countries have different ways of combating terrorism depending on the country’s background (Kula & Ciftci, 2015: 27). Moreover, different countries have distinctive institutional histories, constraints and histories in relation to terrorism. It is therefore imperative to understand the nature of Nigeria’s CT in the context of the Nigerian state. Explaining Nigeria’s CT policies helps when evaluating the effectiveness of such policies towards BH. Nigeria's CT approach against BH largely includes military force, with a lesser amount of a soft approach through the use of intelligence, regional and international cooperation and de-radicalisation; thus it is possible to compare how effective these different approaches are. Through the use of statistics from the GTD (Global Terrorism Database), this chapter gives a descriptive analysis of the Nigerian government and BH’s confrontation.

This study is different from other studies on BH because it examines the case of BH in depth to see whether CT impacts on the tactics of BH, as well as how and why it might do so. The contribution of this chapter to the study on BH also includes anecdotal evidence from local negotiators’ and senior Nigerian government officials’ interview data. These officials include those who drafted the NACTEST and can therefore account for the government’s perception of strategies being used against BH. State level investigation into the BH campaign is critical in understanding the Nigerian state’s role in triggering and exasperating radical extremism and violent reactions, as well as assessing the effectiveness of CT on BH. It is also important in explaining the changing tactics of BH in response to the Nigerian state. This chapter is structured under the following themes:

- Nigeria’s CT legislation and its complexities;
- NACTEST and the introduction of a softer CT approach;
- Nigeria and BH as strategic actors;
- assessment of the effectiveness of CT on BH.
In the process of analysing Nigerian CT, this chapter will also highlight how politics and links to Nigerian political elites have transformed BH into a full-blown terrorist group. The adoption of terror by BH can be likened to Weinberg’s (1991) observation about how political parties turn to violence. In the case of BH, it is not the structure of a certain political party that has turned to violence, but that some political actors have had failed agreements with the group (Falana, 2012).

6.1 Nigeria’s CT: complexities, policy and strategies

Why was Nigeria unable to design CT policies until the emergence of BH, in spite of the September 2001 resolution 1373 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)? Following the September 11 Attacks (9/11) in the US, UNSC resolution 1373 recommended that member states of the UN design domestic laws against terrorism. Nigeria was unable to create a timely anti-terrorism law because Nigerian policy makers saw terrorism as a new phenomenon. Also, there were political sentiments that encumbered the passage of the terrorism bill in both 2005 and 2006 (Sampson & Onuoha, 2011: 38).

Before the emergence of BH, the Nigerian state successfully used military action and incarcerations to end two violent extremist movements in the 1970s and 1980s - the Maitasine and the IMN (Islamic Movement in Nigeria). Given these past successes, Nigerian leaders underestimated BH. They saw BH as a violent group that could be destroyed quickly through the use of military action, with some participants confirming such thinking was common. Participant One (a former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) notes:

Well to a certain extent there was a degree of mismanagement of the crisis by Nigerian security, but this also goes to tell you that Nigerian security is being confronted with an unconventional issue. Never in the history of Nigeria or any African country have we come into contact with a group that operates like BH, and so our soldiers and security operators never envisaged that they would be confronted with the things they’ve faced. So, with this new phenomenon, of course they have had to update their knowledge by working alongside other countries that have had similar experiences.

According to Participant One, Nigerian soldiers did not receive training on countering terrorist groups because BH’s operational style was alien to the Nigerian military. The
soldiers specialised in direct combat and they therefore had to be updated in modern techniques for countering terrorist groups.

Similarly, Participant Six (involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) notes:

> Let me tell you this; the problem actually is the strategy itself, and I can say this authoritatively that until very recently - when I say recently I mean as recently as early 2014 - there was no documented counter-insurgency strategy for the country. I can say this because I participated in the drafting of the strategy! You will see that under such circumstances along with no a history of dealing with such an insurgency, it was an asymmetrical war and this is not the normal kind of thing for us. So I tell you that this initially jolted the military. It jolted the military, and the thinking that that you can simply use force was counter-productive. It should have been pari passu.

While Participant One concentrates on the military’s experience, Participant Six, a member of the NACTEST Drafting Committee, talks both about the military’s experience and Nigeria’s CT. Hence, it is important to note that initially, BH’s violent strategies were new to both security forces and Nigerian policy makers. In support of the views expressed by Participants One and Six, about 120 Nigerian Police Force (NPF) officers were trained by the US Department of State’s Anti-terrorism Assistance (ATA) in 2012 in how to detect and detonate IEDs. Customs and immigration also received training on how to tackle border security challenges (ibid).

Furthermore, Participant One (a former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) says:

> In this case, they [Nigerian forces] have to be trained in counter-terrorism and then trained in confronting counter-terrorism. I think one needs some time to have a very good grasp on how to go about this. Nigerian security is trying to minimise casualties in this fight because these people are embedded within our communities, so trying to weed them out and fight them puts the communities in which they are hiding in danger. So, Nigerian security is being very cautious; optimistic, but very cautious.

From the account of Participant One, it is fair to infer that initially Nigerian security personnel encountered difficulty in identifying BH members within local civilian populations. This is true because a combination of local hunters, vigilantees and volunteers called the Civilian JTF were formed to assist Nigerian security agencies in
identifying and fighting BH members within local communities in the Borno-axis (Fox News 2016). The Nigerian state was worried about the risk of killing non-combatant civilians, and this is also why security personnel training was being run across the Nigerian state. Despite this training, Amnesty International Reports (2015a, 2015b) for 2014 and 2015 suggest that unarmed civilians were killed and/or subjected to hardship by the Nigerian military. While both Participant One and Six admit that countering BH had been difficult and mismanaged, other participants remained silent on this issue. Participant One’s statement about minimising casualties indicates that there have indeed been indiscriminate killings by Nigerian forces, as confirmed by an Amnesty International Report (2015a, 2015b). This may be the reason why the participants still indicate their knowledge of aggrieved individuals joining BH because of the violent CT approaches of Nigerian forces.

Due to the Nigerian government’s inadequate knowledge of terrorism, Nigeria initially relied on Sections 15 and 46 of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commissions (EFCC) Act of 2004 to deal with terrorism before the enactment of their own CT policies. Section 15 clearly defines the act of collecting or supporting terrorist activities as an act of terrorism. Section 46 sees any act that is inimical to life and liberty or any intention or action that causes damage to the public, the environment or cultural heritage as being terrorism. Section 46 defines insurrection as terrorism, as well as any actions that disrupt the government’s ability to deliver public services. The Act also states that sponsorship and support of prohibited activities are criminal acts and therefore punishable. Moreover, the Act sees violations of either the criminal or penal codes as an offence against the Nigerian state. In the Southern part of Nigeria, the criminal code is used in the adjudication of justice, whereas the penal code is applicable in Northern Nigeria. Section 46 appears ambiguous because it notes that civic protest towards or resistance to governmental policies could be deemed as an act of terrorism, with such interpretations possibly leading to human rights abuse as well as disproportionate force being used against dissidents. I would argue that this law was used to justify the actions of the government against BH during and after several clashes between them and Nigerian forces. It is important to point out that the EFCC Act was not designed as a CT policy, but rather it was established to fight increasing levels of corruption in Nigeria.

The second reason Nigeria was unable to enact its CT laws on time was because after the establishment of the EFCC Act of 2004, there were two attempts in
2005 and 2006 to establish CT laws and both were unsuccessful. In 2005, a bill on CT could not pass through the second reading of the Nigerian senate as it was rejected by the majority of Northern Muslim senators who saw it as anti-Muslim (Country Report on Terrorism, 2005). In 2006, another bill was sponsored on the prevention of terrorism, but was rejected by both Northern and Southern senators. In this second attempt, the senators from the South saw the bill as a bid to criminalise the “just struggle” of the Niger-Delta region’s people (Sampson & Onuoha, 2011: 38). The Niger-Delta region’s people, otherwise known as the South-south region, see their struggle as a fight against under-development, environmental hazards, political alienation and a desire for control of their resources.

The severity of BH violence forced Nigerian lawmakers to enact the TPA (Terrorism Protection Act) in 2011, and this new law gave a broader definition of terrorism. The major difference in terms of the definition between TPA 2011 and Sections 46 of the EFCC Act of 2004 is in Section 1(2) of TPA 2011. This Section considers the intended and malicious aim to damage both domestic and international individuals and organisations as being terrorism. It interprets kidnapping and the seizure of aircraft or any other means of transportation as terrorism. Moreover, it charges the manufacturing of weapons for the purpose of such acts as terrorism. Additionally, TPA 2011 proscribed organisations from adopting terrorism as it sees the support of such groups as terrorism.

In 2013, TPA 2011 was amended with two main issues necessitating these amendments. Firstly, there were growing human rights concerns about how terrorism suspects were dealt with (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015). Section 25 of the TPA 2011 gave powers to the National Security Adviser (NSA) and Inspector General of Police (IGP) to search and arrest people without a warrant. Section 28 permitted the detention of terrorism suspects without access to any individual except for medical reasons. Omolaye-Ajileye (2015), a Senior Judge of Kogi State High Court, argued that such situations enabled the government to declare any opposition as being terrorism. However, section 28 (4) of the 2013 TPA (the current CT Act) stipulates that a suspect:

… may, on the approval of the Head of the relevant law enforcement agency, be placed under house arrest and be monitored by its officers, have no access to phones or communication gadgets, and may only speak to counsel after the conclusion of the investigation.
Moreover, the prosecuting powers that had been given to the NSA and IGP were relinquished and given to the Nigerian Attorney General of Federation (AGF) (Omolaye-Ajileye, 2015:40). This meant that the AGF under section 30(1) was able to apply CT laws when prosecuting suspects. Furthermore, TPA 2011 provided no single administrative structure to coordinate the fight against terrorism. The police, the military, the Department of State Security (DSS) and other Nigerian security outlets were individually trying to combat terrorism. The TPA of 2013 under section 2(1) empowered the ONSA (Office of the National Security Adviser) to be the national coordinating body in the fight against terrorism. This development paved the way for a more coherent strategy for combating terrorism. In 2014, Nigeria enacted its first ever CT called NACTEST, which Participant Six was involved in drafting.

6.2 The introduction of NACTEST and the inclusion of a nonviolent approach to Nigeria’s CT
Before the introduction of NACTEST, nonviolent approaches were used to try to halt BH attacks. Public places, organisations and buildings such as motor parks, spiritual centres, hotels or government buildings used portable bomb detectives to try to prevent suicide bombings. As well as military raids, army and police checkpoints were stationed within and outside of major cities and villages where BH had attacked. To some extent, the use of checkpoints was successful in pre-empting attacks such as the 8 October 2013 intercepted attacks which were planned to disrupt the Sallah celebrations in Kano city (The Herald, 2013). On 13 July 2013, the Nigerian army intercepted a fuel tanker in Kebbi state belonging to BH. The gas compartment of the truck was loaded with arms and ammunition (Onuoha, 2013); and on 29 August 2015, Abuja airport was targeted by BH (Reuters, 2015). The efforts of the Nigerian forces at forestalling attacks extended beyond the introduction of NACTEST However, I would argue that even as this strategy yields some amount of success, BH members can easily carry out attacks because they use more IEDs in suicide bombings than sophisticated military hardware such as grenades and mortar bombs. It is easy for BH members to pass through security checkpoints with different IED components, thereby rendering such checkpoints ineffective.

The significant achievement NACTEST brought to Nigerian CT policies was the application of intelligence in CT efforts, as well as the introduction of a psychological approach. NACTEST seeks to prevent individuals from participating in
terrorism, to secure lives and properties and to pre-empt terrorist plans and attacks. Additionally, it aims to manage the impact of terrorist attacks and to create a synergy among the three tiers of government and civil society organisations (CSOs) in fighting terrorism (NACTEST 2014 p. 2-5). NACTEST also involves the Counter Extremism and Violence Programme (CVE), which comprises the following four primary issues: de-radicalisation of convicted terrorists and accused individuals standing trial; government-to-society approach; building of strategic communication for the military and other security bodies and identification of the economic causes of terrorism and possible solutions. (Premium Times, 2014). NACTEST is the application of a “carrot and stick” approach in which both violent and nonviolent methods are applied. But more significantly, the introduction of NACTEST has incorporated a better-planned soft approach to Nigeria’s CT efforts. NACTEST also provides roles for all the Federal Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs), Faith-based Organisations (FBOs) and influential individuals to be able to contribute to the ending of terrorism.

NACTEST consists of four streams (NACTEST, 2014; Premium Times, 2014). Firstly, it seeks to de-radicalise suspected BH members in Nigerian prisons; secondly, it includes a broader inter-community counter violent extremism (CVE) programme within family, cultural and religious organisations; and thirdly, it focuses on communications between military/law enforcement agencies and civilian populations. It also seeks to counter the negative civilian perception narrative of law enforcement. This has to do with educating people that terrorism is not a part of Islam and that the Nigerian law enforcement agencies are not against Islam, with this also focusing on maintaining peaceful co-existence between Christians and Muslims. Fourthly, it concentrates on economic interventions in the Northeast of Nigeria, which has been devastated by government dereliction and BH’s violent campaign, and the Presidential Initiative for the Northeast (PINE) Programme, which is designed to rebuild the economy of this region (Premium Times, 2014).

Since the introduction of NACTEST in 2014, there is some evidence of its implementation. In an effort to gather reliable data about the identity of Nigerians, in 2015 the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) mandated all commercial banks capture customer bio-data (merged with the mobile numbers of customers) through a Bank Verification Number (BVN) registration exercise. The BVN registration was followed by the de-activation by various telecommunication companies of over 38 million
unregistered mobile lines belonging to Nigerians, with the consent of the NSA (National Security Adviser) (All Africa 2015). At a regional level, an intelligence coordination centre was set-up in Abuja to increase intelligence sharing within neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad Basin (ibid). Under the Multi-National Task Force, Nigeria established military cooperation with neighbouring countries to combat BH (BBC, 2014d). Nigeria also engages in international co-operation against terrorism, such as the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Islamic Countries Against Terrorism (ISMAT). Furthermore, Nigeria has received international support for the further training of security and judicial personnel to support the fight against BH. In 2014, the British government trained the Nigerian Judicial system in how to deal with terrorism cases (Country Report on Terrorism, 2014). In relation to the CVE, the ONSA initiated a prison-based de-radicalization programme. The programme was designed to train Nigerian Prison Services (NPS) officers to, “develop risk assessment and case management tools and writing detailed de-radicalisation programme guide and training manual” (Barkindo and Bryans, 2016: 6). The ONSA’s target was to gradually change the “belief, views, values and attitude” (ibid) of prisoners and BH suspects, and not just to disengage them from violence (ibid). In an attempt to achieve de-radicalisation, ONSA decided to conduct a pilot programme by using the Kuje minimum security prison to set up a facility that included a mosque, teaching rooms and sports equipment (ibid).

Why is ending the BH campaign harder than ending violent movements such as Maitasine (decapitating) and IMN (disengaging)? It is because BH is in many ways different to these two groups. It also demonstrates the failure on the part of the Nigerian lawmakers in making timely and effective policies that would counter BH or other forms of terrorism. Moreover, Sections 15 and 46 of the EFCC Act of 2004 did not adequately define what constitutes terrorism. Additionally, when the TPA 2011 emerged, it had few considerations for human rights, which also contributed to the radicalisation of individuals. Setting up a coordinating body for combating terrorism (ONSA) and the subsequent adoption of NACTEST made Nigeria’s CT more organised.

In August 2016, ONSA reviewed the NACTEST 2014 (Ajayi, 2016). NACTEST 2014 only specified the roles of ministries and MDAs, but no special desks had been designated within government institutions to coordinate and address terrorism issues. The major addition of NACTEST 2016 was that it set up a more
organised administrative structure within government institutions to help facilitate Nigerian CT efforts. As a result, government institutions each have liaison officers who monitor, evaluate and review the efforts of agencies periodically.

I would argue that NACTEST has not been fully utilised because of the Nigerian 2015 presidential elections and the selection of President Muhammadu Buhari, a former military ruler, who has a preference for an aggressive approach. During his inaugural speech, President Buhari immediately ordered the relocation of the Nigerian army control centre from the capital Abuja to Maiduguri in Borno state (Premuim Times, 2015d), and promised to end BH within seven months of his assumption of office (May 2015 - December 2015) (Nwabughiogu, 2015). Approximately 5,000 BH hostages were set free by the Nigerian Army in June 2016 (Reuters, 2016), and these freed captives were integrated back into their communities without undergoing any form of de-radicalisation programme. Added to this, 267 non-BH individuals being held in an army detention camp were released (Fox News, 2016). These people had been mistaken for BH members and were released without any apologies or compensation. The following statement of Nigeria’s National Security Officer (NSA) supports the argument about the under-utilization of NACTEST:

> The strategy has now been reviewed after two years of working and testing. The Office of the National security Adviser, ONSA, is now in full swing to implement the reviewed strategy with, of course, the participation and buy-in of relevant stakeholders as represented here by MDAs. ONSA has ensured the development of NACTEST desks and the appointment of Focal/Liaison Officers in MDAs. ONSA expects all MDAs to use these desks to ensure the driving of their roles as stated in NACTEST and there will be periodic checks and further liaison to enable room for further monitoring and evaluation. (Ajayi, 2016)

The above comment by NSA was on 17 August 2016 during a stakeholders’ meeting about the implementation of NACTEST 2016 in Abuja. NSA confirmed that following two years of NACTEST testing, the strategy would be implemented in full since it appeared productive. I would argue that CVE, de-radicalisation and economic intervention aspects of NACTEST may have reduced recruitment to BH (there is need for an empirical study to determine this), but it may soon be vitiated by factors such as the welfare and safety of the IDPs. These factors include the stealing of food donated for the IDPs by individuals, government and organisations (Magu, 2016), rape
and sexual exploitation of women in the camps (HRW, 2016) and the attacks on camps by BH. The poor welfare of the IDPs together with the 267 non-BH individuals who were released from the army detention camp (Fox News, 2016) may be forming a new set of aggrieved individuals.

6.3 Nigerian state versus Boko Haram
This subsection discusses actions and reactions caused by Nigeria’s CT actions and BH violence. It also analyses why BH has changed its tactics in its quest to achieve its goals. Additionally, it is important to understand how successful BH has been in applying violent tactics to meet its goals. Earlier research on BH (Adesoji, 2010; 2011; Maiangwa, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013 a & b) suggests that the use of extreme force by the Nigerian government has triggered further violence. However, the way in which BH responds to the Nigerian government’s different counter-terrorist strategies has not been widely examined. Moreover, existing literature does not give sufficient explanation to the evolving tactics of BH. However, Weeraratne (2015:1) noted that between 2009 and 2014, BH insurgency increased in, "frequency and severity of violence, geographic scope, target selection and tactical maneuvers". This chapter uses the rational choice theory (RCT) to examine the changing strategies of BH and to explain the face off between the Nigerian state and BH regarding maximising their individual goals. This chapter also discusses BH’s target selection. More broadly, this chapter examines BH over time as this is important in understanding the inter-dependence of BH’s campaign of violence to the government’s CT actions.
Table 6.1: Timeline of Nigeria’s violent counter-terrorism actions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Counter-terrorism action</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police crackdowns / clashes</td>
<td>July 2009 – 13 June 2011 (23 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat by Inspector General of Police</td>
<td>14 June 2011 (seven months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Emergency One</td>
<td>1 Jan – 18 July 2012 (seven months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspensions of State of Emergency</td>
<td>19 July 2012 – April 2013 (eight months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State of Emergency Two; designation of BH as a terrorist group by the US</td>
<td>May – November 2013 (six months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of State of Emergency (Third Phase)</td>
<td>November 2013-December 2014 (14 months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crackdown by Multinational Joint Taskforce (MNJTF)</td>
<td>Indefinite</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 2002, Mohammed Yusuf’s heightened dissatisfaction with the Nigerian secular state generated a heated debate between him and his former teacher, Sheik Ja’afar Mahmud Adam. Yusuf and his followers left the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri (Weeraratne, 2015; Comolli, 2015) and migrated to Kanama village in Yobe state where they formed an isolationist community away from modernity and syncretism, which they believe to be sinful and evil (Smith 2015: 77). In late 2003, BH had a dispute with the natives of Kanama over fishing rights (Weeraratne, 2015: 2; Smith, 2015: 77) and this dispute resulted in a faceoff between BH and the Nigerian police. In retaliation, BH razed the police station in Kanama (Loimeier, 2012: 150). Subsequently, the Nigerian Army raided BH’s hideout and killed numerous BH members as well as destroying BH’s settlement (Agbiboa, 2013a). This narrative illustrates the action and reaction dynamics between the Nigerian government and BH, with Participant Eight (an academic and security consultant who had several contacts with BH members) confirming that:

They are replicating the life of the Prophet in that area, and that is the movement. But unfortunately, when you move to the desert you still need to eat, so they started encroaching on people’s farms and this was the beginning of their confrontation with the police. The owners of these farms asked the police to deal with them and the arrival of the police and ensuing arrest of BH members resulted in this confrontation with the police. This was what led to the confrontations in Kanama, Gaidam and Bimary from late 2003 to
December 2004, and then again in early 2005. This began the metamorphosis or if you like, the embryonic stage of what is now known as Boko Haram.

In 2004, BH came out of isolation and started recruiting members and colluding with state officials (Smith, 2015: 28-29). However, the event that reignited confrontation between the Nigerian state and BH was a clash in February 2009. A large procession of BH members on motorbikes were travelling to bury some of their deceased members when the Nigerian police stopped them because of their non-compliance with the new safety helmet wearing policy imposed on motorcyclists (riders and passengers) by the government. The event led to a violent face off during the clash with several BH members being killed. In response, in July 2009 there was an uprising by BH members in Bauchi state, Northeast Nigeria, with a stockpile of explosives being discovered in one of BH’s camps by the Nigerian forces. The violent uprising spread to other parts of Borno and Yobe states - geographically close states. It was during this period that Yusuf was arrested, detained and then died in detention. Yusuf’s death was perceived to be extra-judicial by both BH and the public. After the destruction of BH’s camps, the group went underground (Umar, 2012; Mohammed, 2014; Weeraratne, 2015; Walker, 2016). Some members of the group left Nigeria for neighbouring countries within the Lake Chad region. These uprisings and subsequent clashes further complicated the conflict between Nigerian forces and BH, with attacks and counter-attacks by both sides intensifying, and then with BH joining Al Qaeda.

I would argue that the most significant reason why BH joined Al Qaeda was for the strategic purpose of fighting the Nigerian state. After the Kanama incident, the purpose of Yusuf’s exile was to get international support from other global jihadists. He then returned to Nigeria to negotiate with the principal political actors in the Borno state government about the spread of his ideology. The question this raises is, would terrorists apply violence if they had the opportunity to achieve their means through peaceful ways? Contrary to the belief that terrorists are mentally abnormal, it is appropriate to see terrorists as strategic actors in the application of violence against their opponents (i.e. governments). I argue that terrorists apply different strategies, including diplomacy in the form of pacification or politics, in order to achieve their goals. The ability of Yusuf to take advantage of his connection with Governor Ali Modu Sheriff to recruit and radicalise individuals with the aim of spreading BH ideology is an example of a rational game of politics. Moreover, political, religious and ideological goals often motivate terrorists (Sandler & Arce, 2003). Yusuf’s actions
and strategic interactions with both international jihadists and state actors confirm Sandler and Arce’s (2003). This argument also shows that there is a mutual preference within BH to be guided by political Islam (this argument will be further expanded in chapter eight), it also confirms the strategic model’s assumption that terrorists weigh up their options before choosing the one(s) that offer optimum utility. Furthermore, it is important to have different participants’ accounts of BH using politics as a strategy. It is also vital to understand how BH started its violent campaign and how the interdependence of violence between BH and the Nigerian state subsequently played out. Participant Four (a member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) notes:

These people became militant in their approach with the governor Senator Ali Modu Sheriff of Borno state, who was the governor I think from 2003 to 2011. What happened is that BH made it clear that they wanted to implement a new method of spreading the gospel of Islam, and that they wanted this to happen in a militant way. Initially we believe that the Borno state governor did not help matters because he used some of these boys politically, to gain political... [support] from them, but not really from them but from people. They are well-known militants and if the militants don't want you, they go to your ward; they go to your place to harass you and the people there. So Ali Sheriff started using them and he won his second tenure. They went to him and said, okay, you’ve won, so what’s next? As the pressure mounted on him, he gave the role of Commissionership to some of them, including even an in-law of the late Yusuf. After this, they were still not satisfied and there was then mounting pressure on getting government patronage...They started spreading not only in Borno but were coming to parts of Yobe of course, the Adamawa axis and not only that, but also Kano - another base for them to reach out with their gospel... and of course recruiting young members.

Participant Four’s account is more direct than that of Participant Three (a member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert in conflict negotiation). Participant Four connects the beginning of BH’s violence to BH’s disagreement with Ali Modu Sheriff, the former governor of Borno state (2003-2011), who used BH members as political thugs to win the governorship seat of Borno state.

Participant Five (member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present constitution of Nigeria) notes:
Like I said before, there were some groups that were political and they found some accommodation and collaboration with the group [BH]. In the process, the political class could not afford or accept, particularly in the zones in which they dominate, a situation in which they could bring [the] whole Islamisation to a region and therefore bring conflict. They may have been partners but it became impossible to satisfy the political motives of Boko Haram, and therefore they have grown apart. It is not unexpected that they grew apart when they started doing all sorts of things, with BH still having questions as to how and why Muhammed Yusuf died in detention.

Participant Five gives a similar account to that of Participants Three and Four. This Participant infers that BH thought that they could achieve their goal of establishing an Islamic state through collaboration with some political actors (e.g. Ali Modu Sheriff). However, the political actors were unable to support BH’s goal and BH remained dissatisfied with the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of BH, while in detention. Participant Seven (a media practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria) suggests that:

You will find that during political electioneering, people tend to form groups around themselves… to intimidate their opponents. [They] also mobilise support sometimes even to intimidate voters to vote for them. There are rumours and I think there is some truth to them as there is valid evidence to suggest that part of the people that form Boko Haram are actually part of ECOMOG which was formed by the former governor, Governor Sheriff. He formed ECOMOG to intimidate or to use in most cities in Northern Nigeria in Gombe, Karekusa or Suka.

Participant Seven confirms that such politics of thuggery are a common feature of Nigerian politics. He states that BH members were part of ECOMOG’s political thugs who Ali Modu Sheriff formed to enable him to capture the gubernatorial seat of Borno state. This Participant gave examples of other violent political groups in Gombe and Bauchi states of the Northeast.

Participant Eight (an academic and security consultant who had several contacts with BH members) comments:

Don’t forget that there were particular groups of Boko Haram that were created as political wings of a political party or of a particular elite individual. These groups have found succour and engagement in the activities of the rank and
file of Boko Haram and those that have ‘infiltrated’ Boko Haram, are basically the ones at the helm of affairs of Boko Haram. They are the ones referred to as ECOMOG and so these are the issues.

Participant Eight’s statement about ECOMOG is similar to that of Participant Seven. Their statements suggest that some members of BH are mixed in with other belligerents in order to be a part of the ECOMOG group.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that Governor Ali Modu Sheriff was sponsoring BH (African Spotlight, 2016). Other opinions suggest that he used BH as political thugs to win elections but then failed to keep his promise of establishing the group’s desire for strict Shariah law, instead using force to decapitate the group (Falana, 2012). Although the Nigerian courts have not proved these allegations, there are reasons to infer that Governor Sheriff had an agreement with BH. Firstly, the comments of Participants Three, Four, Five, Seven and Eight add weight to these allegations. Secondly, Buji Foi, a disciple of Yusuf, was one of the major financiers of BH in its early stages (Walker, 2012: 4) and was also a Commissioner of Religious Affairs in Borno state under Governor Sheriff until the Nigerian Police killed him. Foi might have been in Sheriff’s government to represent Yusuf’s interest. Thirdly, the Report of the Presidential Committee on the Security Challenges in the North under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Usman Galtimari suggests that BH violence erupted because of heightened political thuggery. The Committee recommended that the governments of Borno, Bauchi and Gombe state resolve their issues with various violent political groups in their individual states politically (Abah, 2012). These three states were affected by the violent activities of ECOMOG (Borno), Sara suka (Bauchi) and ‘Yan kalare (Gombe) political thugs (Abah, 2012). Both Sara suka and ‘Yan kalare groups were disintegrated successfully through negotiations after the elections. However, when force was applied to disintegrate BH, the group subsequently became violent. The attempts to erode BH mirror Weinberg’s (1991) suggestion that shocking events or deviation from goals make aggrieved individuals turn to the path of violence. The “betrayal” of Mohammed Yusuf by Ali Modu Sheriff also underscores one of the assumptions of the strategic models - that terrorism is the last resort. Moreover, the “betrayal” of Mohammed Yusuf debunks Abrahams’ (2006) criticism of the rational model in which he argues that terrorism is not the last resort.

A fact agreed by most scholars was that BH went underground after the death of their leader Mohammed Yusuf in 2009 (Walker, 2012; Loimeier, 2012; Umar,
This was a strategy by BH to reinforce itself against Nigerian forces. BH likened this approach to Prophet Mohammed’s Hijra (migration) from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE when the Prophet was targeted for assassination (Mohammed 2014). This was in fact the same strategy the Taliban adopted when the United States (US) invaded Afghanistan after the September 11 Attacks (9/11) in the US. The Taliban migrated to Pakistan for refuge and to re-enforce itself against the Afghanistan state. In 2010, BH started a new phase of war against Nigeria. It began with armed confrontation. BH created a cell structure organisation which is a typical tactic of so-called new terrorist groups. In such a structure, top leadership enjoys longevity because the arrest of a member of a cell only leads to its collapse and not the collapse of the whole movement (Neumann, 2009:1). In the case of BH, the cell system was also to ensure widespread movement and division of labour in the group, as well as to divide the attention of Nigerian security agents. These tactics of dividing attention may be the reason why Participant Nine (retired Nigerian Army General) asserts that:

But as I have always said, the Boko Haram issue is in a different dimension with regards to different groups coming in …. They borrow the name Boko Haram so that they can cover their own identity and that is why we cannot say where the command centre of BH is. This is where the leadership are based who say this is what we want and this is what we don’t want.

With regards to Participant Nine’s comment about the clandestine use of cells by BH, the researcher would argue that the resurgence of BH in 2010 marked the beginning of difficulty for Nigerian authorities in understanding the logic of BH. Moreover, it also highlights the implications of having forced BH into exile in the wilderness. Even though the participants do not suggest a specific year when BH’s adoption of terrorist methods became incomprehensible to them, they admit that BH’s campaign of violence was unclear to them initially. In the early stages after Yusuf’s death, BH focused on revenging the loss of its leader. Its major target choice was the Nigerian police and Nigerian prisons (Adesoji, 2010; Mohammed, 2014; Zenn, 2014). They attacked prisons to rescue incarcerated members from the clashes before and after 2009. Other targeted individuals were people the BH accused of collaborating with Nigerian forces to fight them and destroy their properties, or sometimes those who did not share their ideology (Adamu, 2012: 86). In September 2010, BH freed over 700 prisoners (Adamu, 2012: 87) by invading Bauchi prison. This attack was significant to BH because it greatly added to their population as well as being Shekau’s first
successful outing. During the assault they shared two leaflets with the “terrified residents” (Adamu, 2012:87). The message on the first page stated that, “Jama’atu Alhissunnah lidda’awati wal jihad is not Boko Haram.” This suggests that they did not want to be identified by the name BH but would rather be called “Jama’atu Alhissunnah lidda’awati wal jihad”. The second page of the leaflet said that:

Everyone can attest to the fact that since we started our activities about eight to nine years ago, we have never molested anyone. We only preach that it is forbidden to follow any path contrary to what Allah through his Messenger [Prophet Mohammed] commands us to follow. You are all witness to the sudden attacks on us in our mosques during early dawn prayers by this oppressive government, and to the shooting and killing and arrest of our members. And there are among our Muslims brothers, those who act as agents of the government and point us out for the government forces to kill or arrest. This serves as a general notice to all: fighting this government is mandatory for everyone. Whoever refuses this will be accountable to Allah. For us, we would rather die than fail Allah on the account of our deeds. Whoever can, join us; if not, shut up, for it does not concern you. Leave us alone, and watch what transpires. (Adamu, 2014: 87)

The group used this message to justify their violent attack on the prison as well as to make a threat. The group’s comment about “watch[ing] what transpires” suggested more retaliation for the crackdown on its members by the Nigerian government.

On 14 June 2011, the Inspector General Police (IGP) threatened BH, saying, “Boko Haram days are numbered” (Isaac, 2011). Two days later, BH responded with its first suicide bombing in Nigeria. The bomb detonated in front of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) headquarters in Abuja. The bomb was an attempt to assassinate the IGP (ibid). The bombing of the United Nations (UN) building in Abuja on the 26 of June 2011 followed this attack. The attack on the UN building was significant because it took place during the period of Ramadan. BH chose the Ramadan period in order to increase its growing support. The statement of the IGP and the reaction of BH can be seen as a strategic game between terrorists and government with “each side issu(ing) threats and promises to gain strategic advantage” (Sandler & Acre, 2003: 1). Moreover, BH’s response reflects the Attrition Strategy suggested by Kydd & Walter (2006), whereby terrorists attack to show that they are stronger than a government. The
targeting of the UN building was a deliberate act by BH to gain both local and international attention.

BH’s campaign of violence increased further when the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency. The state of emergency involved the deployment of a joint force involving all state security agencies. The military performed the primary function of combating BH members.

The state of emergency happened in two stages. Firstly, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency in 15 LGA’s of Borno and Yobe (Northeast) as well as Niger and Plateau (Northcentral) states from 31 December 2011 to 18 July 2012 (The Report, 2012: 21). During this period, the Nigerian military went in search of BH with Baga LGA being suspected of harbouring BH members. Consequently, the Nigerian army launched a crackdown in Baga town of Borno state with over 200 civilians being killed and several houses being burnt down by the Nigerian army (Nossita, 2013). I would argue that the presence of BH in Baga provoked the Nigerian army to engage in indiscriminate violence. Similarly, there was another crackdown in Bama where close to 600 people were killed. The Baga and Bama onslaughts by the Nigerian Army motivated aggrieved individuals to join BH (see chapter five). Perhaps the Nigerian forces engaged in indiscriminate violence because of their inability to identify BH members within civilian populations, but the ensuing backlash simply benefited BH.

The second stage in the state of emergency was in April 2013, after BH rejected an amnesty offer from the Nigerian government (BBC, 2013b). Although a six-month state of emergency had been declared in May 2013 in the whole of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, it was later extended to November 2013 (Campbell, 2014: 13). The state of emergency was accompanied by growing international concerns about the increased threat of BH. The affected states are border states where BH had easy access to other neighbouring countries. The states are also Kanuri states where BH had vast numbers of members.

In 2012, BH joined AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (Movement for the Oneness of Jihad in West Africa) and Ansaru to fight in Northern Mali. In 2013, BH’s increased atrocities, connections to Al Qaeda affiliates and kidnapping of Westerners made the US designate BH a terrorist group. This action was followed by renewed efforts by the Nigerian government to stop the financing of BH. As a result, BH devised more ways of self-sustenance. There were allegations
that BH was engaging in bank robberies and extortion (Zenn, 2014a), and that two state governors paid the group on a monthly basis to prevent their states from being attacked (Agbiboa, 2013a). There were also suspicions that BH was engaging in both drug and human trafficking across the West African region (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). In May 2014, Shekau justified the abduction of captives, saying, "God instructed me to sell them; they are his properties, and I will carry out his instructions" (BBC, 2014e). The kidnapping of young girls was also used as a source of raising money. Although the abduction of young women started in 2013, the abduction of the Chibok girls became a turning point of this strategy (Zenn, 2014).

Blockades on the external financing of BH may to some extent have been ineffective because the group devised new methods of funding itself. Additionally, BH has invaded military and police barracks such as the Giwa and Gwoza barracks to equip its members with more weapons. In addition to the seizure of military weapons, this action was designed to show the government as the weaker side, to gain more supporters, and to get willing as well as forced recruits to join them (see chapter five).

There are anecdotal accounts that while the world and Nigeria focused its attention on rescuing the Chibok girls, BH engaged in the silent abduction of young boys. Wall Street Journal writers Hinshaw & Parkinson (2016) reported that over 10,000 boys were kidnapped and trained in isolated villages close to Cameroon. 15 young boys who escaped from a camp told of how they were indoctrinated and taught how to fight in battles (ibid).

In December 2014, renewed military action was taken against BH by MNJTF (Multi National Joint Task Force). This action led to a decline in BH’s operational capacity and more Nigerian territories were subsequently reclaimed. However, the actions of MNJTF also triggered a spillover of violence in territories within the Lake Chad area, with frequent attacks in the Bosso and Diffa regions of the Republic of Niger and Mellia region of Chad (UN News Centre, 2016). Since the spread of BH has been reduced, BH has increased its attacks on soft targets and particularly on IDPs. The choice of attacking soft targets is either an indication of the decline in the power of the terrorists or a move to hurt the government. Additionally, the increased attacks on civilian populations are a message to civilians that BH is strong and the government is weak. This makes the civilian population fear and support BH, especially as the civilians are trapped with BH violence on one side and the brute force of the Nigerian army on the other side. (Amnesty International, 2015a; 2015b). More so, it illustrates
Kydd & Walter’s (2006) argument that terrorists carry out attacks as a form of intimidating civilians in order to gain their obedience.

In August 2016, BH made a strategic attempt to regroup and reinforce. On 4 August 2016, newly emerged BH leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi declared that his new agenda was to target Christians and churches and to exclude non-BH Muslims from future attacks (Ogbeche, 2016). On 14 August 2016, BH released a video. A man with a mask representing Abu Musab al-Barnawi appeared in the video together with over 20 Chibok girls. The leader blamed the Nigerian government for killing some of the Chibok girls and said:

We don't want to do anything with these girls; our demand remains the same. We want the government to release our fighters who have been in detention for ages; otherwise, we will never release these girls. (Blair, 2016)

In the footage, the masked man detaches a mini clip microphone from his body and asks one of the girls called Maida Yakubu to speak to her parents and the Nigerian government. Maida’s message was:

Oh you, my people and our parents, you just have to please come to our rescue. We are suffering here, the aircraft has come to bombard us and have killed many of us. Some are wounded. Every day we are in pain and suffering, so are our babies. Please go and beg the government of Nigeria to release the members of our abductors so that they can free us and let us come home. We are really suffering, there is no food to eat or no good water to drink here. (Fenton, 2016)

Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s avowed attacks on Christians is an attempt to whittle down Shekau’s legitimacy, which has been criticised for indiscriminate killings and running a more criminal than puritan movement. This decision was made to reignite public support for BH. Moreover, Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s video with the Chibok girls was to prove to both Nigeria and the world that he is in a position of authority and that the Shekau-led faction lacks legitimacy. There is evidence that the girls with Abu Musab al-Barnawi were the Chibok girls because Samuel Yaga, father of one of the girls, told BBC Hausa that he saw his daughter in the video (BBC, 2016). CT efforts may have led to the weakening of the top echelons of BH, but BH effectively used the video to trigger public pressure against the government so that they could get their members freed. Abu Musab al-Barnawi’s demand for the release of incarcerated BH leaders was significant not only for the rejuvenation of the movement, but in gaining the critical
loyalty of key leaders such as Kabiru Sokoto, Khalid Al-Barnawi and Ali Konduga, who are Al-Qaeda trained. Similarly, Shekau’s major mission during his assumption of leadership was the Bauchi jailbreak, which freed over 700 BH members (Walker, 2016). Because BH had been weakened, Abu Musab al-Barnawi decided to apply a more subtle approach where BH would have fewer constraints. The video also served as a distraction to the government and could have facilitated the relocation of BH without pressure from the Nigerian forces. The Daily Trust, a widely-read Northern Nigerian newspaper, confirmed anecdotal evidence that BH was relocating from Sambisa Forest in the Northeast to Burra Forest of the North West. Burra Forest is a vast forest connecting to areas such as Sambisa, Dansadau, Falgore Game Reserve and Birnin Gwari in Kaduna State. It also has borders with Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, Adamawa, Borno, and Jigawa States (Daily Trust, 2016). In reaction to pressure by civil society groups, human rights organisations and in particular the “#BringBackOurGirls” (BBOG) group, the Nigerian government accepted the demands of BH (Today, 2016). In October 2016, the Nigerian government released four unnamed members of BH in exchange for 21 of the Chibok girls. The swap was mediated by the Red Cross and the Swiss government (France 24, 2016).

Terrorists are therefore calculative in forcing a government to either grant political concessions or to act in a particular way. BH’s demand for a prisoner swap underscores two of the assumptions of the Strategic Model, which suggest that terrorists weigh up the costs and benefits of different options and then choose the option with the optimal expected results. The swap may seem like a short-term goal but it is significant to the group in achieving its long-term goals.

Using data from the GTD, Figure 6.1 below illustrates some of the major events or CT actions that have either triggered or exasperated attacks by BH.
Additionally, the figure above illustrates the severity of the BH violence in reaction to the Nigerian CT. In response to different police crackdowns and face offs, 469 people were killed as a result of BH attacks in the space of 23 months (July 2009 - 13 June 2011). After the threat by the IGP on 14 of June 2011, approximately 239 people were killed up until December 2011 (seven months). Even though the number of casualties reduced, the threat of the IGP led to the first BH orchestrated suicide bombing in Nigeria. Subsequently, other atrocities such as the bombing of the UN office and the THISDAY Newspaper House may have influenced Nigeria’s decision to adopt the first stage of a state of emergency.

The first state of emergency in 15 LGAs lasted seven months (1 January 2012 - 18 July 2012) and 782 people were killed. After the suspension of the first state of emergency, BH killed 785 people within eight months (19 July 2012 - April 2013). The ferocity of the attacks and the involvement of BH in the conflict in Mali in 2012, as well as growing international linkages of BH to other jihadists across Nigeria, made the Nigerian government declare another six-month state of emergency (May 2013 - November 2013), which also coincided with the US designating BH as a terrorist group. During this period, 1,087 people were killed. This rise in the number of casualties facilitated the elongation of the state of emergency in November 2013 with
no timeframe having been given for this renewal. Altogether, 6,650 killings were recorded up to December 2014 when the MNJTF then launched a military campaign against BH. Since the engagement of the MNJTF, BH has killed 6,991 people. The trend in Table 6.1 shows that BH has become more deadly and over time, their lethality might have been exasperated further by state actions taken against it.

6.4 Assessment of the effectiveness and efficiency of Nigeria’s counter terrorism approach on Boko Haram

Arjun & Scott (2013) suggest that CT is effective when it stops terrorist goals. More specifically, CT efficiency can be measured when CT policies prevent and eliminate, “terrorist groups at a reasonable cost that is in proportion to the size of the terrorist groups” (p.448) while at the same time halting a group from realising its goals. BH’s primary organisational goal is to establish an Islamic state, and it was successful in capturing 21 out of 65 territories (Local Government Areas) in the border states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. However, Nigerian forces have subsequently recaptured these. The costs of this are over two million people having been displaced and an estimated 40,000 people having been killed by both BH and the Nigerian forces, with billions of dollars having been spent so far to eliminate a group of over 50,000 members. Despite the resources allocated and the grievous consequences of these events, BH ideology appears unwavering and the group continues to attract willing recruits. Billions of dollars have been spent fighting BH (The Cable, 2014) and Nigerian forces have killed more than 1,200 innocent people. In addition, 20,000 people have been arbitrarily arrested with at least 7,000 having died in military detention centres (Amnesty International 2015a). BH has killed over 20,000 people, and about 2.7 million individuals have been displaced, with some settling in neighbouring countries and others in other Northern states of Nigeria (Reuters, 2016).

Some studies on BH attribute BH’s radicalisation and violence to Nigeria’s CT strategy (Agbiboa, 2013 a & b). All these narratives are important in understanding the effectiveness of Nigerian CT strategies. It is not helpful to classify BH completely as case evidence of a negative or positive consequence of CT because the timing and application of such policies were late and problematic. The complexity of the Nigerian government did not allow for proper legislation or implementation of CT policies. BH has been empowered with the ideology of violent jihadism since 2002 and is referred to as the Nigerian Taliban. The Nigerian state did not envisage Al Qaeda’s ideological
spread or global network expansion, and so no policies were designed to counter BH’s violent extremism until 2014. Apart from the government’s inadequate comprehension of the BH phenomenon, the military action in Kanama and the subsequent onslaught against BH emboldened Yusuf and his disciples to embark on a long-term plan to execute its goal of establishing Shariah law. The clash in Kanama came at the point when BH was in a period of radicalisation. The action of the Nigerian government at that time mirrors Feridun & Shabaz’s (2010) claim that governments often use aggressive approaches in fighting oppositional groups rather than addressing the root causes of the violence.

Lum et al (2006) posit that, “output effectiveness, outcome effectiveness and impact effectiveness” (p.3) are important in measuring the effectiveness of CT. Output effectiveness refers to the execution and compliance with CT policies by agents of the state. Outcome effectiveness is the short-term effect of CT policies on terrorist activities such as financing and recruitment. This usually depends on the behaviour of security agents implementing such policies or on the targeted group. Impact effectiveness is the result of long-term objectives of CT policies in decimating or ending terrorism. As noted, from the beginning of the rise of BH, the Nigerian state was not prepared to fight, Nigerian lawmakers were politically divided and most of Nigeria’s CT policies were initiated after BH had become a fully-fledged terrorist group. Moreover, the complexities of Nigerian CT laws also facilitated BH’s campaign of violence. Apart from these factors, both Presidents Jonathan and Buhari appear to have had insufficient knowledge of or a lack of strategy for combating BH. President Goodluck Jonathan (Nigeria’s President during the maturing stages of BH) had no clear understanding of the BH phenomenon and on three occasions offered different opinions on it. In January 2012, he said that BH had supporters within the government and the security forces (Mark, 2012; Aliyu et al., 2015); in June 2012, he stated that BH was a “faceless” (unknown leadership) organisation, while in February 2015 he described BH as a global phenomenon not peculiar to Nigeria alone (Premium Times, 2015c). Insufficient knowledge within President Jonathan’s government was accompanied by insufficient military capacity to contain BH. This weakness was as a result of corruption in the military (Vanguard, 2016), insufficient weapons to fight BH and the alleged infiltration of the Nigerian army by BH. In February 2014, Governor Kashim Shattima of Borno state and successor of Ali Modu Sheriff said:
Boko Haram are better armed and are better motivated than our own troops. Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram. (Reuters, 2014)

BH has been tactically efficient in overcoming all the Nigerian government’s blockades on its sources of funding and weapons. It has invaded military barracks where it has seized vast numbers of arms and also has engaged in kidnappings for ransom. In addition, the Nigerian state’s military approach has encouraged the recruitment and radicalisation of individuals to BH (as discussed in chapter five). On a positive note, the Nigerian government were able to reduce the strength and spread of BH from parts of Northern Nigeria to the Borno axis (a BH stronghold), especially following the December 2014 renewed multi-national military task force.

President Buhari’s declaration to end BH within seven months and his claim to have, “technically defeated” BH (Nwabughogu, 2015) shows that his government conflated both the insurgent and motivational aspects of BH. Clarifying these two aspects is important. Firstly, the insurgency is the physical annexation of Nigeria as well as an attack on the Nigerian state; and secondly, the motivational aspects are the beliefs, values and goals of BH.

6.5 Chapter Conclusions
The narrative about the changing tactics of BH shows BH as a strategic actor that knows how to optimise its goals in different situations. First, BH members enjoyed companionship in the wilderness (Kanama) before relocating to Maiduguri to attract more followers. Afterwards, the leadership of BH entered into an agreement that would have allowed them to achieve their goal without constraints. BH agreement with Ali Modu Sheriff at its embryonic stage shows that terrorist groups can apply diplomatic means to achieve political goals. After the group was unable to achieve its goal through an agreement, they targeted communities with violence and when they were overpowered, reorganised themselves. The violent path BH took reflects the theoretical assumption that groups use terror as a last resort. Hence it negates the argument of Abrahams (2008) about terrorism not being the last resort. Moreover, it highlights the turning point or linkage of political movements into violent movements.

With the release of 700 of their captured members in 2010, BH had engaged in significant propaganda efforts to get public support. In 2010, BH tactics and strategies along with the implications of forcing them into exile in the wilderness,
became too complex for Nigerian officials to understand. BH fought a war of attrition through which they weakened Nigerian forces by invading their barracks and gaining access to military intelligence. BH was also tactically self-reliant in sustaining its violent campaign with weapons and funding. While BH was invading military barracks and suppressing the military might of Nigerian forces, they also targeted civilians indiscriminately. This was a strategy they adopted to make people join them out of fear. This forceful recruitment by BH facilitated the annexation of Nigerian territories. Even though BH is yet to achieve its ultimate goal, it has achieved some instrumental goals regarding public support, willing recruitment, funding and media attention. This indicates that BH attacks both civilian and state representatives to weaken the Nigerian government and intimidate civilian populations.

The exchange of the Chibok girls for prisoners was a well-calculated action by BH to get its incarcerated members released through bargaining. The four freed members of BH may seem numerically small when compared to the first prison break in 2011 in which 700 BH members were released. Even though the identity of the four members is unknown to the public, I would argue that these individuals possess exceptional skills and influence and this was why BH sought their release.

BH switched its loyalty to IS for tactical purposes. Its allegiance to IS is tactical because political Islam guides both IS and Al Qaeda. The tactics of BH are a form of sophisticated warfare because it does not only apply brute force, but also deceit, spying and intelligence.

Regarding theoretical contributions, I argue that BH case evidence mirrors the three assumptions of the rational choice model because the group initially wanted a peaceful transition from a secular to a Sharia state. BH seems to weigh up most of its options before it carries out attacks, and then selects targets strategically to gain optimal utility. Even though Abrahams (2008) argues through his seven puzzles that the three assumptions of the Strategic Model are too simplistic, his arguments do not hold for BH.

From the foregone analysis, BH reflects four of the five principles of the Strategic Logics of Costly Signalling, as argued by Kydd & Walter (2006). These are attrition, intimidation, provocation and spoiling, but not outbidding where each splinter terrorist group uses violence as competition to display their supremacy to the public. Chapter four indicates that political Islam bonds BH splinter groups, and that
such groups often unite themselves to commit atrocities against civilians and state representatives.

This study has highlighted the weakness of Nigeria’s approach in curbing the violence of BH. Following the argument by Lum et al. (2006: 491), prevention and alleviation of early risk factors could have assisted in curtailting the radicalisation process of BH. The Kanama clash and subsequent crackdowns on BH by Nigerian forces could not prevent actual situational events that helped generate grievances. BH was a small radicalised group, and dangerous politics and the use of state paraphernalia of violence assisted in transforming this group into a terrorist group. Moreover, the inability of state actors to understand and efficiently resolve the BH debacle enabled the group to perpetrate atrocities. It is also fair to argue that corruption and human rights abuses are some of the factors that mitigate against the success of Nigeria’s CT efforts. Moreover, the combination of soft approaches such as dialogue and the use of force made by the Nigerian government appear deceptive to BH. The group may also be skeptical of any ceasefire agreement with the Nigerian government because of its previous experience with the government through Ali Modu Sheriff. Another lesson to be learned is that the level of BH violence increases simultaneously as a result of changing government action againsts the group. While the Nigerian government’s actions led to the sophistication of the group, its collaboration with the international community has helped reduce the strength and spread of BH.

Even though this is a case study and the findings cannot be generalised as such, this study of BH shows that apart from countries having a different approaches towards fighting terrorism (depending on their background) (Kula, 2015: 27), distinctive institutional history and constraints as well as insufficient knowledge about terrorism can make CT counter-productive. Additionally, the division of political elites can delay and impede the establishment of an effective and efficient CT as highlighted before the enactment of the Nigerian CT. Moreover, the lack of a well-planned and comprehensive CT can complicate the fight against terrorism.
Chapter 7: Sub-National Level

The previous chapter examined the implications of Nigerian counter-terrorism (CT) on Boko Haram (BH) with both BH and the Nigerian state as rational actors, and the action(s) of one triggering the reaction(s) of the other. Moreover, chapter six discussed how BH responds to Nigerian CT, and in this chapter the severity of BH activities precipitated in three specific border states will be evaluated. This chapter discusses the determinants of BH target selection and seeks to explain the variation in the frequency of violence at a sub-national level. It conducts a comparative analysis of three states in the Northeast region of Nigeria that have been most affected by the activities of BH. This chapter is important because it highlights the targeting behaviour of BH. Understanding BH target selection and frequencies of BH violence is important because it also highlights the reason for the intensity of BH violence.

This chapter begins by outlining the similarities between the three states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. It then studies possible explanations for the variation of BH attack patterns across these three states, with the last section of this chapter discussing the findings.

Different scholars give different accounts of how terrorists choose their targets and terrorist groups vary in their choices. They choose who their constituents and enemies are, and as such they target their enemies and avoid their constituents. Who their constituents and enemies are depends on the group; for example, for separatist groups, their constituents would likely be their ethnic kin whereas for leftist groups, their constituents might be everyone except the representatives of a perceived fascist capitalist state (Nemeth, 2010). With regards to BH, their constituents are Muslims who think like they do, and their enemy is the state and non-BH individuals.

Some studies argue that religion determines the target selection of BH (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Loinier, 2012; Agbiboa, 2013a & 2013b), but this does not explain the variation within BH’s target type frequencies. BH targets individuals based on four reasons: first, they target those they see as idolaters, that is those who support secularism and democracy, and BH believes that Christians are the major facilitators of secularism (DCCN, 2009: 3); second, they attack any perceived agents of Western education and Westernisation; third, they kill people working for an un-Islamic government; and fourth, they target any Muslim leaders who call them Kharijites. BH objects strongly to being called this, especially by Islamic scholars (ulama) in the three
regions they target (Mohammed, 2014:11) as it is calling them ‘rebellious Muslims’. The states with the highest number of Kanuri people such as Borno and Yobe have experienced the highest percentage of BH incidences, with this being because Salafist values are strongly connected to the Kanuri tribe (Pieri & Zenn, 2016).

Internal or external factors could influence the target selection by violent groups. Internal factors could include ideology, grievances and organisational dynamics; external factors could include terrorist environments, tactical choices and a group’s inability to differentiate between enemies and non-enemies (Nemeth, 2010).

Proponents of the internal factors of ideology or religious belief argue that these influence targeting by violent movements most especially in areas that do not hold the same ideologies or beliefs as the group (Drake, 1998; Engene, 2004). Furthermore, Juegensmeyer (2003) argues that extremists target areas which they believe are dominated by ‘agents of evil’, and that this condemnation of individuals or dehumanisation of people as kafirs creates a sense of moral duty to maim or kill. This argument also suggests that a terrorist group will not target members of its own ethnic group. For instance, this thesis would argue that the Hutus will attack the Tutsis, but not members of the Hutu ethnic group. Interestingly, although BH attacks areas with individuals who do not share their ideology, BH also targets individuals from their Kanuri ethnic group in BH’s epicentre - Borno state - which is home to a large number of Kanuris.

The role of grievances in terrorist target selection is due to political or economic grievances, or the killing of a group’s members by military forces (Nemeth, 2010). Goodwin (2006) argues that certain areas could also be targeted because actions taken by the region offend the terrorists. Therefore, a strained relationship between terrorists and the communities they live in also determines target selection. Political grievances may determine terrorist targeting, especially when mixed with ideology. However, economic reasons are insufficient in explaining the BH phenomenon because since the emergence of the group, it has not been internally divided on economic grounds, but instead on ethnic and political principles (Zenn, 2014a). Moreover, BH attacks do not appear to be targeting solely for economic purposes.

Strategic logic is an important factor in determining terrorist targets when examining the internal factors that can influence terrorist targeting. Because terrorist capacity to strike is constrained by factors such as capability, resources and counterterrorism (CT), they often select the easiest target (Sandler et al., 1983). Additionally,
terrorists target areas where they can maximise their goals of getting media attention and communicating to both a government and its citizens (Kydd & Walter, 2006). Moreover, terrorist goals could be immediate, for example demanding the release of members from prison or kidnapping civilians for ransoms. The changing logic and strategy of BH has been extensively discussed in chapter six, as BH appears to weigh up the cost of their options in order to choose the most beneficial one. Findley (2008) suggests that violent groups target different regions because of a power disparity between terrorists and the government, and he argues that because of imbalances in power, terrorists tend to shift their power from one region to the other.

Nemeth (2010) uses the bargaining model to suggest that terrorist choice of targeting depends on the nature of a government, public support and group-environmental factors, and that all these factors can work individually or congruently. Nemeth (2010) concludes that violent movements use targeting to achieve their goals as well as to survive in the environment in which they live.

Ideology is an important determinant of BH target selection, for example the rejection of Western education and secularism. Ideology plays a vital role in giving identity to BH, thereby creating a constituency of individuals who are motivated by dogmatic belief. Such dogmatic belief not only justifies violence, but also determines who the targets are. Drake (1998: 78) emphasises that ideology inspires and guides terrorists on how they interpret the actions of people and institutions, with these actions possibly being related to government or individual action against terrorists.

Since most of the literature on BH agrees that religion plays a critical role in BH’s target choices, what explanations are there for the variation in the frequencies of BH target patterns? To answer this question, this chapter argues that differences in BH’s target patterns across the region are determined by BH’s capability to attack. Moreover, it can be argued that, if a group cannot target hard targets such as diplomats, planes or presidents (Sandler et al., 1983; Kydd & Walter, 2006), then they will target soft targets, i.e. civilians. This chapter contributes to the broader argument on BH by further asserting the argument of chapter six (from a sub-national perspective) that BH is a strategic actor that weighs up the cost and benefits of its actions before acting.

This chapter uses the Most Similar System Design (MSSD) in assessing BH’s targeting variation. MSSD is used to identify the determinants for BH’s targeting differences within similar regions, for example in the Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states of the Northeast region. MSSD is usually applied to compare two to five cases.
that have similar attributes such as size, population, economy, ideology or climate (Landman, 2003: 405 & 406). When there is variation in the dependent variable, it is easier to identify what might determine such differences when the units are otherwise similar. The expectation is that the outcome of the discussion using the control variable will match the dependent variable of interest, given how similar the compared units are. The dependent variables include the number of attacks across target types while control variable refers to BH’s ability to attack. This chapter seeks to explain the variation in the frequencies of target pattern of BH, and it is proposed that the differences in each of BH’s target patterns across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe are determined by BH’s capability to attack. Therefore, this chapter adopts a comparative approach in order to address this question.

This study applies attack data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) to outline variation in target type frequencies. GTD is an open source database with 150,000 recorded incidents including information on targets, casualties, weapon-types, major terrorist groups and individuals from around the world between 1970 and 2015. For this chapter, BH attacks between 2009 and 2015 are included as 2009 was the first year in which the group appeared in the dataset.

7.1 Similarities between cases
There are several similarities between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. These three states are similar in population size, ethnic composition, geographical location, military presence, religion and ideology, and these similarities are discussed in more detail below.

Figure 7.1 illustrates the proximity of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states to each other, and also shows the closeness of these states to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. Table 7.1 outlines other similarities and indicators between these states such as population size, land size, poverty, unemployment and adult literacy levels. The indicators in Table 7.1 were obtained from the National Bureau of statistics (NBS). The NBS is Nigeria’s official agency that collects and publishes statistics about different Nigerian indicators. The statistics used in this chapter were collected between 2006 and 2011. There is not enough statistical data available about the indicators between 2009 and 2015. However, the ones used for analysis in this chapter are important because they reflect the early stages of BH’s campaign of violence. They are relevant to show how similar these states are, and even though it is not possible to
look at the whole of BH’s campaign, it is worth considering that many of the indicators may only slowly change over time.

**Figure 7.1: Map of Nigeria showing the proximities of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe to each other (created with QGIS software)**
Table 7.2: Similarities and deprivation indicators between Adamawa, Borno and Yobe (statistics data of the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics, sourced from Knoema website)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features and indicators of deprivations</th>
<th>Adamawa</th>
<th>Borno</th>
<th>Yobe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land mass (land area in square kilometres)</td>
<td>38,700.0</td>
<td>72,609.0</td>
<td>46,609.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of people living on a dollar or less per day in 2010</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of unemployed in 2011</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of adult literacy in any language in 2010</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.1 and Table 7.2 are important because they clearly illustrate pertinent indicators of each of these three states in the Sahel region. The Sahel region is a biogeographical zone with semi-arid lands. Countries such as Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad and Cameroon are also part of the Sahel region. A number of territories in these countries share similar cultures, religions and ideologies, as well as comparable standards of living (see chapter eight). Geographically, Adamawa, Borno and Yobe are border states that share boundaries with Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Yobe shares a boundary with the Niger Republic through Machena and Geidam Local Government Areas (LGAs). Borno is connected to Chad through Balge LGA, while Adamawa shares a boundary with Northern Cameroon Mubi LGA. As indicated in Figure 7.1, these states are all in the Sahel region and their close proximity to each other enables BH to operate within the Lake Chad region easily (see chapter eight for further details).

Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states combined have a population of circa. 9,671,393 people (2006, National Census of Nigeria). Borno has the highest population with a population of circa. 4,171,104 inhabitants and the largest land mass, this being 72,609.0 square kilometres (km²). Borno is the Kanuri tribe’s homeland. It has spread beyond its Nigerian borders and is regarded by some as the precursor state of Islam in Nigeria (further details below). Adamawa is the second most populated state of the three with circa. 3,178,950 people and the least land mass, this being 38,700.0 square kilometres km². Yobe is the least populated of these three states with...
an approximate population of 2,321,000 people and the second largest land mass, this being 46,609.0 km$^2$. There is a further difference between Borno and the other two states stemming from an administrative division by the Nigerian federal government. Yobe was created out of Borno (Mark, 2015), with the old Gongola state having been divided into Adamawa and Taraba states (Tukur & Barde, 2014).

These three states have similar levels of deprivation and standards of living. 74.3% of the Adamawa, 55.1% of the Borno and 68.9% of the Yobe populations lived on a dollar or less a day in 2010. In 2011, Borno had the lowest rate of unemployment at 29.1%, while Adamawa was at 33.8% and Yobe at 35.6%. In terms of literacy rates in all their languages, Adamawa’s was estimated to be 73.3%, Borno 58.6% and Yobe 68.9%, and these are similar when compared to non-border states of Nigeria (literacy in language implies the ability of an individual to speak and write in a particular language).

In addition to a similar geography and structural factors, these states also have close ethnic ties. Some of the Eastern parts of Adamawa were part of the Kanem-Bornu Empire (Barkindo, 1985), and Kanuri dialects are spoken across this state (Barkindo, 1985). The majority of the population of Adamawa are from the Fulani ethnic group (Mustapha, 2006: 11). Borno state is the epicentre of BH violence in the Northeast. It is significant to the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire and is widely regarded as the homeland of the Kanuri people (Louis, 1973). However, Borno is not solely Kanuris, and there are other minority indigenous tribes there such as the Marghi and Baburbura who occupy the southern part of the state (FFP, 2015). Although there are no accurate statistics about the overall number of Kanuris, Borno and Yobe have the highest number of the Kanuris, with the tribe making up 4% of the Nigerian population (West African Gateway, 2012). The Kanuris are mostly Muslims of the Salafist sect and they pride themselves on being the precursor of Islam in Nigeria, dating back to the Kanem-Bornu Empire of the 11th century (Pieri & Zenn, 2016). Islam first came to Nigeria through this region before the Usman dan Fodio jihad of the 19th century (ibid), and Nigerian Muslims widely regard dan Fodio as the reformer (Mujadid) who established Islam in Nigeria (Isa, 2010). However, a great number of Kanuris claim Islam had been flourishing long before dan Fodio (Barkindo, 2016).

The second highest Kanuri-populated state in Nigeria is Yobe, which was carved out of Borno state in 1992 (Mark, 2015). Apart from its close geographical proximity, Yobe also has significant ethnic ties with Borno. Yobe had a significant
influence on the Kanem-Bornu Empire through Ngazargam, which was one of the capitals of the Kanem-Bornu Empire. Ngazargam was highly influential until it was captured in the 19th century during dan Fodio’s jihad.

Islamic ideology is a significant feature within Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. Vast numbers of the Kanuri population belong to the Salafist ideology with the Salafist or Sunni ideology being the dominant brand of Islam in Northeast Nigeria. This historic background has enabled the emergence and growth of a radical strand of Salafism in the region (Onuaha, 2012). Although BH membership includes many Kanuris, it also has members from other tribes of the 19 Northern States of Nigeria (Onuaha, 2012; Barkindo, 2016). It is important to note that BH is a mix of different tribes and Borno is regarded as a centre of Islamic civilisation. Participant Five (member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present constitution of Nigeria) in his interview suggests that:

My own reading of the situation is that the Nigerian platform and in fact the platform on which Islam came to Nigeria and West Africa via the Kanem-Bornu Empire was Sunnist, so virtually every person that grew up in that axis is essentially Sunnist. Participant Five is suggesting that regardless of the tribes of the people within the Borno axis, people share a common Salafists ideology. In this context, Participant Five may also be referring to the radical strand of Sunnist ideology.

Another commonality between the three states is their military presence. Although the Nigerian Joint Task Force (JTF) is responsible for fighting BH (Global Security, 2016), the Joint Military Task Force is saddled with the primary responsibility of combating BH (Country Report on Terrorism). The declaration of states of emergency in 2012 and 2013 increased the number of military activities against BH (ibid). In 2013, seven infantry divisions were formed with their headquarters being in Maiduguri. In these new divisions, Adamawa remained as a brigade, Yobe was upgraded from a battalion to a brigade, and 900 soldiers were added to the divisions (Global Security, 2016). Although there are no publicly available figures about the number of troops in each of these three states, the military formation in them suggests that the number of military outlets is similar.
7.2 Variation in frequency of target types in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states

This section outlines similar BH targets and then quantifies and explains the variation in the frequencies of target patterns by the group. The statistics of BH incidences between 2009 and 2015 from the GTD are used to enable explanations about the differences in BH’s frequencies of target type across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe to be drawn. The section argues that the variation in the number of attacks on target type is dependent upon BH’s capability to attack. Thus, this section firstly explains why one area suffers more attacks than another; secondly, it explains the nature of BH attacks on different targets; and thirdly, it highlights reasons for the disparity in target types across the aforementioned states. The statement below by Participant Four (a member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official) suggests that the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have suffered the most from BH attacks since the onset of BH’s campaign of violence. He suggests that:

The most vulnerable states then and up to now have been the North-Eastern states, and particularly Borno, comprising about 23 local governments or thereabouts, Yobe, with about 15 or 18 local governments or thereabouts, and then Adamawa, part of which is also affected.

The Participant is suggesting that BH have had the capacity to attack the 23 local government agencies (LGAs) in Borno, and the 15 - 18 in Yobe state since the start of BH violence. The Participant did not specify the number of LGAs in Adamawa.

Between 2009 and 2015, BH carried out a total of 1,851 attacks across Nigeria. Adamawa experienced 139 (7.50%) attacks, Yobe 238 (12.9%) and Borno (55.86%) the highest number of incidences - 1,034 attacks. A total of 231 (12.48%) attacks were carried out in Northwest and North-central Nigeria while 202 (10.91%) incidences occurred outside of Nigerian borders. It is important to note that one attack can be aimed at multiple targets, for instance in the 22nd March 2013 attack of Ganye LGA in Adamawa state, BH attacked banks, taverns and prisons, killing 25 civilians. Therefore, the number of total attacks in a region differs from targeting, meaning that Adamawa experienced 139 attacks with these attacks aiming at 166 targets. Borno suffered 1,034 attacks with 1,143 targets, and 238 attacks with 271 targets were carried out in Yobe. According to GTD, BH has 16 target types, and these are noted in Table 7.2 below.
Table 7.3: Percentages and number of Boko Haram attacks on different target types (data obtained from the GTD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Adamawa</th>
<th>Borno</th>
<th>Yobe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airports/aviation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business</td>
<td>6(10)</td>
<td>4 (42)</td>
<td>8 (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational institutions</td>
<td>1(2)</td>
<td>4 (43)</td>
<td>10 (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food &amp; water</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government / diplomatic</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government (general)</td>
<td>10(16)</td>
<td>7.5 (82)</td>
<td>11 (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalists/media</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>7(12)</td>
<td>11 (128)</td>
<td>9 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0 (2)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>10(16)</td>
<td>8 (89)</td>
<td>19 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens &amp; private property</td>
<td>52(87)</td>
<td>54 (594)</td>
<td>25 (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious figures &amp; institutions</td>
<td>7(11)</td>
<td>6.5 (76)</td>
<td>9 (25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists/non-state actors</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (17)</td>
<td>0 (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>2(4)</td>
<td>2 (18)</td>
<td>3 (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>2(4)</td>
<td>1 (15)</td>
<td>3 (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violent political parties</td>
<td>1(2)</td>
<td>0 (2)</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>0 (3)</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1(1)</td>
<td>3 (30)</td>
<td>1 (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100(166)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100(1,143)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100(271)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the purposes of this study, the targets in Table 7.3 are classified into four categories (see Table 7.3 below). Firstly, all government forces as well as mercenaries are classified as ‘state forces’. This category encompasses the military, police and terrorists/non-state actors. The terrorists/non-state actors incorporate BH attacks against the Civilian JTF, a group of local hunters and volunteers that assist state forces in combating BH. Secondly, government buildings, agencies and non-military personnel are all classified under ‘government buildings and non-military officials’. These categorised targets include airports/aviation owned by the government, diplomatic branches of the government and the government more generally. Political
parties are also included because attacks have targeted political party offices and officials who form governments either at a federal, state or LGA level. Thirdly, all targets on religion and ideology are grouped together as ‘education/religious figures and institutions’. These targets include religious figures and institutions as well as educational institutions. Fourthly, citizens, private property and businesses are all classified under ‘citizens and private property’. These targets include telecommunications, transportation, citizens and private property, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), food and water, journalists, the media and businesses. Other attacks that are suspected to have been BH attacks or have had no casualties recorded are categorised under ‘others’. In grouping the targets, government buildings and non-officials could have been grouped with state forces because they are all representatives of the government; however, they are grouped with non-military government officials. Additionally, the categorisation of these attack types does not truncate the explanations about the target types in Table 7.2. For example, under the state forces categorisation in Yobe, out of 271 incidences, 51 (19%) attacks targeted the police while 25 (9%) were directed towards the military. The categorisations used give consideration to such disparities.

Table 7.4: Percentages of attacks in each target types across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Adamawa</th>
<th>Borno</th>
<th>Yobe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People and private property</td>
<td>63 (105)</td>
<td>55 (672)</td>
<td>38 (104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State forces</td>
<td>17 (28)</td>
<td>19 (234)</td>
<td>28 (77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education/religious figures and institutions</td>
<td>8 (13)</td>
<td>16 (119)</td>
<td>19 (51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government buildings and non-military officials</td>
<td>11 (18)</td>
<td>7 (85)</td>
<td>13 (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1 (2)</td>
<td>3 (33)</td>
<td>2 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total percentages and numbers of attacks</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (166)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (1,143)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100 (271)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4 shows that Borno has suffered the most attacks, followed by Yobe and then Adamawa. Statistics on BH incidences suggest that states close to countries with weak CT have fewer incidences of BH. For instance, Adamawa has had fewer incidences among the three states being discussed (Borno and Yobe), while Cameroon has had more attacks (128) than the Niger (46) and Chad Republics (28). The CT measures within these countries are important because they have helped destabilise BH’s safety
Borno has had more attacks because the Chad Republic has stronger CT measures than the other countries in the Lake Chad region (see chapter eight for further details on the spillover of terror). Table 7.3 shows that Borno has the highest number of attacks, thereby making it the epicentre of BH activities because of its significance not only within Islamic civilisation, but also that it is the homeland of the Kanuri. Moreover, BH’s radicalisation and campaign of violence erupted from Borno and as such, this enabled BH to establish a caliphate. Similarly, Yobe has had the second highest number of incidences because it is the second most significant area for the Kanuris and for Islamic civilisation (Barkindo, 2016). The below comment of Participant Five (member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present constitution of Nigeria) also supports this argument, with him suggesting that:

> Somehow along the line, Borno in the Northeast assumes, and correctly too, that they are the precursors of Islam in Nigeria and probably in West Africa and that the emergence of the Fulani jihad in the 19th century is far more recent history. And probably if we understand this history, there may also be a context in which we might say that Boko Haram has emerged to assert a dominance or a relevance of Islam in Nigeria and probably West Africa.

With this statement, Participant Five is attempting to explain why BH is trying to dominate the Kanuri homeland of Borno. Yobe is the second most BH affected state because it was previously a significant administrative centre within the Kanem-Bornu Empire (Barkindo, 2016), with this altering with the formation of the Nigerian state. The Nigerian government carved out Yobe state for administrative reasons.

Table 7.4 above illustrates that the attacks in Yobe were evenly distributed across all targets, and this can be attributed to the number of Nigerian forces deployed to each state. Yobe has less of a military presence than Adamawa and Borno (more details about this are included in the State Forces Section).

The nature of BH attacks is intriguing. Although the group may have a primary target in mind when carrying out attacks, there are instances when an attack affects more than one target. For instance, on 23rd of April, BH killed both civilians and members of the Nigerian forces in Marte LGA of Borno state. Additionally, business centres, government officials and police were attacked on 24th of April 2012 in Damaturu Yobe state (GTD). The percentages and number of attacks for each target types are discussed below.
7.2.1 People and private property
The highest number of incidences are related to attacks on people and private property. In the early stages of BH, its major targets were Nigerian forces and government representatives, but subsequently the group has focused on multiple targets for strategic reasons. As noted in chapters five and six, attacks on civilians were to capture Nigerian territories and conscript people into the group, which was a sign of BH being weakened by Nigerian forces. People and private property experienced the most frequent attacks with there being 105 (65%) people and property attacks out of 166 attacks in Adamawa, 672 (55%) out of 1,143 in Borno and 104 (38%) out of 271 in Yobe, with the percentage of attacks varying within each state. The paragraphs below highlight the major differences and similarities in these targets.

The nature of attacks in Adamawa was slightly different from Borno and Yobe because most major areas attacked were border towns which are highly commercial in nature. Such towns include Mahai, Madagali, Song and Mubi. Although Mubi was one of the commercial LGAs of Adamawa (Yola, 2014), it can be argued that consecutive BH threats have scared business people and that the ultimatum given by BH to the Igbos may have reduced economic activity within the region (Yola, 2014).

Because Borno is the epicentre of BH activities, it has more complicated reasons for attacks on its people and private property. Firstly, Borno has more border towns than the other states; secondly, its brand of Islam is appealing because of the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire; and thirdly, BH has overpowered Nigerian forces in several battles as well as raided military barracks such as Giwa, Gwoza Monguno and Bama (Ekott, 2015). These successes seem to motivate BH to attack more civilians with the attacks being a strategy for forcing individuals to support BH. Alternatively, the ability of BH to forcibly capture Nigerian territories suggests that civilians are likely to be targeted. The weakening of BH in 2015 by the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJT) and the JTF encouraged BH to focus its targets on civilians, and this could be why several Internally Displaced Camps (IDPs) in Maiduguri were attacked (Fox News 2016).

In Yobe state, BH carried out direct attacks on businesses such as pubs and taverns. There were also two incidences in which the attacks involved multiple targets including businesses (GTD). I would argue that both ideology and strategy motivated these attacks. Ideologically, BH regards places such as hotels and taverns as places that promote idolatry (Mohammed, 2014). Strategically, it can be argued that these
attacks were a strategy to promote the propaganda that BH is destroying the ‘Western capitalist system’ most particularly in an area that has been affected by Islamism

Despite the aforementioned differences, these states share similar reasons as to why people and private property suffer more attacks than other target types. Borno has suffered the capture of more of its territory (14) with BH seizing four border towns in Adamawa including Mubi, Madagali, Michika and Maiha LGAs, and capturing the towns of Buni Yadi and Bara in Yobe. (The Guardian, 2014). A further point to argue is that the targeting of telecommunication installations and transportation is for strategic reasons, i.e. to get public attention.

7.2.2 State forces
The attack on state forces is the second highest target within all three states being discussed. Adamawa experienced 28 (17%) out of 166 attacks, Borno experienced 234 (19%) out of 1,143 and Yobe 77 (28%) out of 271 incidences. In raw numbers, Borno suffered more attacks than Adamawa and Yobe combined.

There are several reasons for the differences in the frequencies of attacks across these three states. Boko Haram violence started in the Borno-Yobe axis and at that time, the major targets of BH were the police (Agbiboa, 2013a). After the group came back from exile in 2010, they expanded and created cells across these states (Walker, 2016). By May 2011, the group was moving between Borno and Yobe as a form of tactical manoeuvring. As such, they had clashes with the police in Yobe and by August 2011, the group had battled with the military in Song LGA of Adamawa. Because of BH’s level of sophistication, the Nigerian government deployed more soldiers to Borno, which was a hotbed of BH. Because the Nigerian forces were not well-equipped nor well-informed about fighting terrorism, BH had sufficient capacity to overpower them. This is evidenced by the raiding of different military establishments in Borno such as Giwa and Gwoza barracks (Ekott, 2015). However, it is interesting to note that before 2013 when the 7th Infantry Division was formed, Adamawa had a brigade and had more soldiers than Yobe. Yobe had a battalion as its main military structure (Global Security, 2016), but BH attacked more military and police in Yobe than Adamawa (77 times compared to 28). It is argued that this could also be possible because of BH’s ability to manoeuvre between Borno and Yobe as this facilitates their ability to attack more security forces. Added to this, Yobe has close proximity to Borno and Adamawa and so the deployment of state forces is likely to affect Yobe.
It is important to note that attacks on state forces vary significantly between the military and the police as targets. Because the military was saddled with the primary responsibility of combating BH, it had numerous installations across Adamawa, Yobe and particularly in Borno state that BH could target, with there being a great deal of difference between incidences against the police and the military. In Adamawa, 16 (10%) attacks were carried against the police and 12 (7%) against the military out of 166 attacks (see Table 7.2). In Yobe, out of 271 attacks, 51 (19%) were carried out against the police and 25 (9%) against the military. This can be connected to the Kanama and subsequent clashes between the Nigerian police and BH in Yobe at the early stages of BH’s development (Walker, 2016). Secondly, these figures may be attributable to low military deployment in Yobe state compared to that of Adamawa and Borno. This means that the police supplemented the Nigerian military in securing Yobe state and as such, this increased the chances of the police being targeted. These reasons may also suggest that BH sees the police as more of an enemy than the military or that the police might be perceived as an easy target.

7.2.3 Education/religious figures and institutions
Education and religion are low as targets in all BH attacks across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe. Out of a total number of 166 incidences, 13 (8%) attacks targeted education and religious figures and institutions in Adamawa; Borno suffered 199 (16%) out of 1,143 attacks, and Yobe experienced 51(19%) out of 271 attacks. Borno and Yobe tended to have similar percentages when compared to Adamawa and this difference is discussed below.

Targeting of educational institutions is a strategy to destroy Western education and encourage the spread of BH ideology, especially in the Borno and Yobe axis. Moreover, Yobe is the second most populated Kanuri state and that is why it is the second most attacked area. It is argued that such attacks are an approach by BH to get more public support from those who oppose Western values or education within the Borno-Yobe axis, as the region is perceived to be the precursor of Islam.

In similar fashion, BH spreads its attacks on religious centres and figures across the three states being discussed. In 2010 BH went into exile until August 2010 (Walker, 2016). It had carried out three attacks in Maiduguri (Borno) with the first being at the house of a senior Islamic cleric, Sheikh Bashir Mustapha (GTD), in October 2009. The other two targeted the Church of Christ and the Baptist church in December 2009 in Maiduguri (ibid). In 2011, the number of BH incidences increased
because of its renewed campaign of violence against the Nigerian state, with the number of incidences of attacking churches and Islamic preachers also increasing, as they were suspected of collaborating with the government against BH (HRW Report, 2012: 52). The preaching by non-BH Islamic clerics against BH ideology may also have decreased out of fear because BH targets clerics who criticise its ideology (BBC, 2011b). I would argue that the attacks on religious figures and institutions are vital for BH to spread its ideology, as well as to counter any other version of Islam that could hinder the spread of radical Islam. More so, Borno state is the most targeted state because of its significance in the spread of Islam in Nigeria, with Participant Eight (an academic and security consultant who had several contacts with BH members) affirming that:

Islam came to Borno before any other part of Nigeria because of the greatness of the Kanem-Bornu Empire and the Sefawa Dynasty which embraced Islam in the early, I think 13th or 14th century. So, Islam was in the Borno Empire, and of course in the North, Islam existed..., Borno was a very significant centre for Islamic proselytisation and education as a result of its long history of Islam. Participant Eight suggests that since the 13th or 14th century, Borno has been a centre for Islamic evangelism. It is this kind of thinking that makes BH want to destroy ideologies contrary to its belief. I would argue that Adamawa has had the least religious attacks because the ultimatum (Reuters, 2012) that BH gave to Christians and Igbo settlers may have yielded a result, with anecdotal evidence suggesting that some individuals have left the Mubi Maiha and Yola towns of Adamawa (Reuters, 2012). The attacks on religious leaders and institutions subsequently reduced across the states because the Nigerian government deployed security personnel to guard places of worships (HRW Report, 2012: 58) and support the security guards at worship centres. Secondly, worship centres began using metal detectors in their entrances (BBC, 2012) and vehicles were not permitted to park in the premises of worship centres to reduce the risk of explosions.

7.2.4 Government buildings and non-military officials
In the number of targets across states, government and non-military officials have experienced the least number of attacks. Adamawa had 18 (11%) out of 166, Borno experienced 85 (7%) out of 1,143 and Yobe 34 (13%) out of 271 attacks. These were directed at government buildings and personnel, but are less significant because BH targeted state officials in its embryonic stages. State officials and government property
in Borno were attacked in the early stages of BH formation because the group felt betrayed by the senior government officials in Borno state (see chapter six).

7.2.5 Other incidences
There are several attacks that are suspected to have been BH attacks with some of these having had no casualties. This implies that the targets for which the attacks were meant remain uncertain. Adamawa experienced 2 (1%), Borno suffered 33 (3%) and Yobe was affected by 5 (3%) such incidences.

7.3 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter examined the reasons for the differences in target frequencies across Adamawa, Borno and Yobe, the three most affected BH states. Using MSSD, the chapter hypothesised that BH’s capability to attack is responsible for the variation in the frequency of BH target patterns. Some similarities between these states were identified and these included geographic factors, deprivation levels, ethnic composition, religion and similar military attacks. The findings of this chapter demonstrate that Adamawa has less deprivation (demonstrated in Table 1) compared to the other two states. However, it appears that the state with the highest number of Kanuris experienced more attacks. Moreover, the number of attacks on different target types in each state is in ranking order of states with high Kanuri populations, i.e. states with more Kanuri suffer more attacks. In all target types, Borno is the biggest state and it has the highest incidences (1,143), followed by Yobe (271) and then Adamawa state (166). This does not suggest that BH has a Kanuri agenda, but instead that BH uses both ethnic and religious narratives in its campaign of violence. This argument reflects the arguments of Barkindo (2016) and Zenn & Pieri (2016) that there was an attempt by BH to establish an ultra-Islamic and Kanuri homeland. Moreover, it can be argued that the quest for this agenda may be the reason why Shekau is biased in giving Kanuri members of BH preferential treatment (Zenn, 2014b) (as argued in chapter four).

Geographical location also plays a significant role. States close to countries with weaker CT experience fewer attacks. Borno has had more attacks because the Chad Republic has the strongest CT, with Yobe being the second most affected by attacks because Niger is the second strongest country in terms of CT. Adamawa is the least affected because Cameroon has the weakest CT (More details in chapter eight).
In terms of the variation of frequency in target types, different reasons were outlined as explanations for these disparities. Regarding the number of attacks against state forces, the weak nature of the Nigerian forces enabled BH to carry out raids on military installations. Government buildings and non-military officials suffered more attacks because at some point (2009/2011) BH felt that senior government official in Borno had broken their promises. With regards to people and private property, the attacks in Adamawa state were more business-targeted because the border towns of Mubi, Madagali, and Mahai were commercial in nature. In Borno state, attacks were directed on civilians first as a way of instilling fear to encourage possible recruitment and second, because of the weakness of BH. With regards to education/religious figures and institutions, the narrative of Islam and rejection of Western values or education within the Borno-Yobe axis explains why Adamawa has suffered less attacks. The breakdown of attacks in Yobe state suggests that the variation of attacks in different target types was more than in Adamawa and Borno. This can be attributed to a number of reasons including a lesser military presence compared to the other states, as well as grievances with the police.

In conclusion, I would argue that in most cases of targeting, BH do not target their constituents; they target those who do not share their ideology. These targets include both civilians and state forces. As such, the discussion in this chapter agrees that dogmatic belief contributes to the logic of BH’s target selection. BH is a group of ideologues that classifies the society in which they live into believers, non-believers (kafirs) and ‘traitors’ within Islam who collaborate with kafirs. It is this kind of classification that explains the frequency in targeting state forces, government buildings and non-military officials, people and private property and education/religious figures and institutions. However, this classification means that degrees of ethno-religious background may influence the variation in targeting. This suggests that targets of historical significance to ethnicity and religion tend to be targeted more frequently because of the terrorists’ quest for ethno-religious revival. The variation of terrorist attacks in different targets can also be attributed to strategic logic where terrorists attack because of their capability.

The next chapter discusses international levels of explanation about BH. It highlights the spill-over of violence from Nigeria through the previously discussed three border states to Cameroon, Chad and the Niger Republics. Finally, both chapters
seven and eight illustrate the nature of BH activities between neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region.
Chapter 8: International Influences

The previous chapter examined the three Nigerian states most affected by BH. These states share borders with Nigeria’s neighbours within the Lake Chad region and as noted in chapter seven, Borno state has close proximity to the Chad Republic, the Niger Republic shares borders with Yobe state and Adamawa shares boundaries with the Republic of Cameroon. Chapter seven also explained how these three states and their neighbouring countries are connected by the Kanem-Bornu Empire. This geographic proximity is often cited as an explanation for the spillover of violence to these countries; however, this is arguably overly simplistic, and it would appear that this spillover of violence is actually quite complex and involves multi-dimensional factors. This chapter therefore seeks to examine this complexity by firstly, discussing international factors that import Islamic radicalism to Nigeria; secondly, by examining international factors that motivate the linkage of BH to violent extremists as well as factors that facilitate BH. In terms of linkage, it is noteworthy that it is difficult to highlight direct resource transfer (arms and funds) from international jihadists such as Al Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) because BH is a resource-wealthy group that engages in robbery, ransom and raids on military barracks to obtain weapons (2014a). Another challenge in identifying such resource transfer is the porous borders between Nigeria and countries in the Lake Chad region (2014a). However, this chapter draws attention to the linkage between international Jihadist from a symbolic perspective. Thirdly, this chapter highlights factors responsible for the spillover of violence from Nigerian territories to countries neighbouring Nigeria. In order to understand the complexity of BH and the spillover of the group’s violence to outside of Nigeria, as well as to engage in a discussion about this, a review of previous studies on similar spillovers is important as this case study may either refute or confirm some of these.

BH’s ideological perspective can be argued to be indicative of the spread of global Salafist jihadism. The narrative of terrorism has changed remarkably since the beginning of the 21st century, particularly with the bombing of the World Trade Centre in the US (9/11) and the rise of Al Qaeda. The wave of global jihadism since then has received increasing attention, with a significant number of studies focusing on Al Qaeda (Gunaratna, 2003; Cottee, 2010; Sageman, 2004; 2008). After 9/11, a wave of radical Islamism and terrorism spread globally to the Middle East, Western Europe and Africa, with both Al Qaeda and IS waging attacks on Western Europe. Even
though there had been a history of radical Islam in Africa (sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb), civil wars involving governments fighting conventional rebel armies were the more common type of conflict. However, in 2009/2010 the nature of political violence changed from civil wars to religious terrorism (Forest & Giroux, 2011), particularly with the rise of groups such as AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab and Ansaru. A significant number of studies exist about Al-Qaeda and the spread of Salafist jihadi, and Sageman (2004; 2008) provides insight into the network of the Salafist jihadists. Sageman’s (2008) analysis on the evolution of the radical Salafist movement highlights how an emasculated Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan formed a loose network across different continents or regions in international arenas such as the Middle East, Europe and Africa. He found that kinship and friendship facilitate the spread of such networks (2004). Additionally, he suggests that the radicalisation of individuals happens on a collective platform where individuals meet as friends and comrades and then agree on a shared ideological position. Furthermore, Sageman (2004) explains how a Salafist jihadist can become a node or branch of the Al-Qaeda system through the “bunch of guys” theory. This theory suggests that a Salafi jihadist is part of a movement of exiles alienated from their communities who choose to live in isolation from their host communities while enjoying each other’s companionship, which increases the rejection of their society of origin. Such isolation and friendships ultimately lead to radicalisation and violence in solidarity with jihadist ideology. Moreover, the “bunch of guys” theory also suggests that the way in which small jihadist groups join larger jihadist movements is based on a bottom-up approach, and not the opposite (Sageman, 2004; 2008). BH’s relocation to the wilderness in Kanama, their adoption of a violent strategy and their subsequent linkage to Al-Qaeda (and more recently IS) reflects Sageman’s (2004) explanation, but with regards to BH, the “bunch of guys” theory appears insufficient to explain the radicalisation process of a collective of individuals and in particular, collective radicalisation. Already, the history of radical Islam in Northern Nigeria is providing a fertile ground for the mobilisation of BH recruits or members.

There has been a wave of Islamic radicalisation across Northern Nigeria both in the 9th the 19th centuries during the Kanem Bornu Empire and Usman dan Fodio jihad respectively (Alao, 2013). There have also been significant religious crises such as the Bulunkutu, Kaduna and Jos crises, and the emergence of radical Islamic movements such as the Maitatsine and the IMN. As such, the Northern region has
been most affected by radical Islam with the spread of Al-Qaeda or IS being linkable to BH’s internationalisation. This is because already radicalised individuals in Nigeria were further inspired by the tactics and religious motivation of other international radical Islamic movements.

Prevailing studies on the spillover of terror mainly focus on factors such as external interventions (Addison & Murshed, 2005), weak neighbouring states (Bosker & de Ree, 2009) and government/terrorist capabilities (Buhaug, 2009). Other arguments include the movement of refugees (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), the media (Salvatore, 2011) and ethnic links (Braha, 2002). The most discussed factor is external support or intervention, with studies suggesting that violence might spillover to a third-party country due to its support of a warring faction that might include government and/or anti-state militias (Addison & Murshed, 2005; Beardsley, 2011). Proponents of this argument posit that such interventions increase both the expansion and duration of violence across boundaries within and outside of conflict zones. In addition, violent groups may perceive foreign intervention as an additional enemy (Tony & Mushed, 2002). External interventions by a country are often influenced by a government’s fear of the influx of neighbouring conflict into its territory. Such fear makes countries more proactive in defending their territories by fighting terrorists from countries outside of their borders, but such actions in themselves can further encourage a spillover of violence (Danneman & Ritterer, 2013). Additionally, military support or other contributions from countries fighting terrorists across their borders can in some cases have a negative effect, with the intervening countries experiencing the growth of extremism back home. For instance, Western nations are now facing homegrown extremists because of their participation in the international fight against radical Islam. With regards to the implications of this on countries rendering external support, the studies of Cole & Cole (2009) suggest that young British jihadists can become motivated to fight against the United Kingdom, even though this is their own country. In contrast to this, other arguments suggest that multilateral interventions in a conflict zone can end existing tensions (Byman & Pollack, 2007). However, other scholars such as Richard (1994) posit that the argument on whether external interventions expand or resolve conflicts depends on their timing. Timing in this case refers to a mutually hurting stalemate, i.e. a stage in a conflict when either of the warring parties will sustain further losses if they proceed with violence. Moreover, stalemate arises when both warring parties reach a point in a conflict where they have
no chances of winning and continuing the war will ultimately result in grave consequences for both warring parties.

Some studies suggest that weak and unstable government facilitates a spillover of conflict (Bosker & de Ree, 2009). This issue of state fragility is a common feature in Africa where there are examples of political instability. Bosker & de Ree (2009) suggest that the proximity of one country to another enables an easy flow of conflict from one region to another, which is how the Lake Chad region has contributed to the growth of BH. It is further suggested that porous borders across regions facilitate the weakening of already fragile states (Atzili, 2007).

A further factor that influences a spillover of violence is the capabilities of both a government and terrorists. The inability of state forces of a host state to suppress terrorist incursions enables a spillover of violence (Buhaug, 2009), and the movement of refugees into host states can also be a cause of spillover of violence. Scholars such as Salehyan & Gleditsch (2006) argue that in contrast to the conventional thinking that refugee movement is an outcome of violence, refugee migration in itself can be a factor for the transnationalisation of violence. They argue that refugee movement expands rebel networks, spreads ideology and competes for economic situations that will in the long run create conflict. Similarly, Danneman & Ritterer (2013) also suggest that refugee camps can serve as recruitment grounds for rebels.

The media also plays a motivational role in the spillover of conflict. Some studies suggest that it could be influential most directly through social media (Salvatore, 2011), with Khondker (2011) suggesting that the media helps instigate the violence of individuals within neighbouring countries over time.

A final factor for the spread of violence can be ethnic linkages. These can spread conflict across borders through the solidarity between citizens of different countries who belong to a common culture or ancestral lineage (Braha, 2002).

This chapter consists of three sections. The first section explores the influx and spread of Islamic radicalism to Nigeria from a historical perspective. The section illustrates how external factors and events within Nigeria influenced the radicalisation of BH. The second section highlights how international factors have motivated and increased the capability of BH. Then the third section looks at the numerous factors that have contributed to the spillover of violence outside Nigeria - particularly in the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The third section uses different arguments from the literature about spillovers of violence to examine how BH’s
campaign of violence has affected Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. As highlighted above, the major debates in the literature about spillovers of violence include factors such as external interventions, weak neighbouring states and government/terrorist capabilities. Other factors include the media and ethnic links.

8.1 Radicalisation of BH: combinations of state, regional and international narratives
This section explains the diffusion of Islamic radicalisation into Nigeria and how it has laid a foundation for different types of religious violent movements, including BH. It also discusses how these external factors have combined with events within Nigeria to radicalise BH. The effect of the radicalisation of Islam in Nigeria has manifested itself through inter-sectarian conflict, inter-religious violence or terrorism (Adesoji, 2010; Loimeier, 2012). This section focuses on how it has manifested itself through group terrorism, especially with regards to BH. The section illustrates how international factors mixed with local grievances have snowballed into BH violence. The majority of previous studies have traced the radicalisation of Islam in Nigeria from an internal perspective, but have focussed less on the international factors that have influenced such internal ideology.

This section looks at international major events and how they are reflected in Nigeria. It looks at connections between the Fula jihad and the Usman dan Fodio jihad, as well as the emergence of the Mahdiyya movement in the 19th century. Secondly, it analyses the impact of Muhammed Marwa’s (a Cameroonian) ideology that gave rise to the Maitatsine movement of the 1970s in Nigeria. Thirdly, it discusses the impact of the fragmentation of the Islamic Brotherhood in Nigeria and the 1979 Iranian Revolution. These events motivated radicalism through the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) in the 1980s. Lastly, it discusses the impact of 9/11 and the prominence of Osama Bin Laden in Nigeria.

Previous studies on BH trace the history of Islamic radicalism in Nigeria to either the Usman dan Fodio jihad of 1900 (Isa 2010) or the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) in the 1980s. Although some historians argue that the dan Fodio jihad installed a “just society” (Paden, 2008; Isa, 2010), it did in fact use violence to establish a theocratic system of governance in Northern Nigeria. However, it is essential to pin the motivation of the dan Fodio jihad to the Fula (Fulani) jihads in West Africa and particularly in Futa Bundu (in Senegal), Futa Tooro (Southern
Mauritania and Northern Senegal) and Fouta Djallon (the Republic of Guinea) (Hunwicks, 1960; Hill 2009). The dan Fodio jihad also inspired the jihads in Mali (the Masina and Toucouleur Empires) (ibid). The Fulani jihads existed between the 17th and 19th centuries until the era of colonialism (Isa, 2010: 6). In line with previous arguments about the rise of radical Islam in Nigeria (Hunwicks, 1960; Hill 2009), I would argue that the Qadiriyya (Salafist ideology: Abdul-Qadir Gilani’s school of thought) militant movement (under the leadership of dan Fodio) introduced radical Islam to Nigeria. Even though the jihad established non-violent Islamic movements, it inspired other violent movements such as the Mahdiyya, the Maitatsine and the Shiite movements in the 1980s, as well as Boko Haram.

After the dan Fodio era, the Mahdiyya movement from Sudan (Paden, 1973:170) and became an offshoot of the dan Fodio jihad. The Mahdiyya movement did not last long because the British colonial authorities swiftly curtailed it (Isa, 2010). Even though the Maitasine movement was not a Salafist movement, it was inspired by dan Fodio’s philosophy of Mujaddid (reformer; explained in chapter four) (Adesoji, 2011). After the departure of the British, Nigeria witnessed the birth of two Islamic radical groups - Maitatsine and the IMN. The founder of the Maitatsine movement, Mohammed Marwa (a Cameroonian and resident of Nigeria), established the movement in Northern Nigeria because of the established background for Islamic radicalism there. The IMN was an umbrella organisation of the Shiites in Nigeria, and it broke away from the Islamic Brotherhood Movement in Nigeria during the 1980s. The Iranian Revolution of 1979 inspired the radicalisation of the IMN, and they engaged in clashes with the Nigerian government.

It is also argued that IMN significantly influenced present radicalisation in Nigeria (Isa, 2010; Adesoji, 2011). In concurrence with Loimeier (2012), I would argue that the theological disputes and violent clashes between the Yan Izala Salafist movement and other sects of Islam (Shiites and Sufis) have contributed to the radicalisation of individuals in Northern Nigeria. The internal conflict within Islam leading to this radicalisation is a reflection of the global Islamic schism between Sunnis and Shiites, because both the Muslim Brotherhood and Shiites are global movements that seek to spread their ideologies, particularly around the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Maghreb. All these events and movements (from the dan Fodio jihad to BH) have a common rhetoric: fighting an un-Islamic state (i.e. the
Nigerian secular state) and the establishment of a state guided by the injunctions of Islam.

Aside from the common language radical Islamic movements adopt, they have different interpretations and motivations about the way in which they intend to achieve their goals. The Usman dan Fodio jihad captured several territories and established a caliphate in Sokoto, which is still symbolic and influential to the Islamic *umma* (community) in Nigeria. The *Mahdiyya* movement was a continuation of the dan Fodio agenda. The *Maitatsine* movement and the IMN of the 1980s shared a similar ideology of fighting westernisation, but had different theological interpretations. Marwa (the founder of *Maitatsine*) saw himself as a reformer and a prophet (Adesoji, 2011), and the IMN was a Shiite-oriented movement influenced by the Iranian Revolution of 1979. It is important, therefore, to note that these events and movements facilitated by global dynamism provided a fertile ground for the radicalisation of individuals across Northern Nigeria before the advent of BH. Participant Seven (a media practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria) confirms that international factors such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and then Al-Qaeda have influenced the radicalisation of BH:

Radicalism started, or Islamism was fuelled, actually by events outside of this country. By the turn of the 1980s, that is between 1979 and 1980…, the Iranian Revolution had taken place and from there you start to see the influence of the Shiites. First, … the Shia led by El-Zazzky started striking targets and then before you knew it, in Zaria and in Kano, and they became massive in these areas. They were influenced first by international events. As… time went on, organisations like Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab and whatever, started showing Muslims that they could do more. They could do more by fighting so-called Western civilisation and Christianity by embarking on terrorism, armed conflict and the radicalisation of Islam in Nigeria. This was partly influenced by external developments.

Participant Seven is explaining the impact of global Islamic radicalism within Nigeria and how global dynamism propelled the radicalisation of BH. The Participant further suggests that millennial terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have emboldened BH and made them believe that they can realise their ideological objectives.
Significantly, 9/11 in 2001 and the rise to global prominence of Osama Bin Laden renewed levels of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria. It also motivated several groups to turn to violence. The advent of Bin Laden motivated BH and came as an awakening to its members, who then became known as the Nigerian Taliban (see chapter six). This name was significant because Mohammed Yusuf saw Bin Laden as his mentor. Apart from the role of Bin Laden, BH is to some extent a reflection of the increasing influence of ideologies of popular radical Islamic figures. Modern militant Islam takes its ideological motivation from four charismatic figures: al-Banna, Sayyid Mawdudi, Sayyid Qutb and Ayatollah Khomeini (Kepel 2002: 5). The concept of *Mujaddid* is also a contributory factor to the radicalisation and militancy of Islamist groups. Islamic theologians and jurists such as Al Ghazali, Abdul-Qadir Gilani, Ibn-e-Arabi, Ibn Taymiyya and Osama Bin Laden are regarded as Mujaddid. (Weimann 2015; Flannery 2015:102) (see chapter four for further details). I would argue that the radicalisation of Islamist groups in Nigeria is also a reflection of the thoughts of some of these Islamic jurists and theologians. The Qadiriyya movement under dan Fodio was conceived out of the thinking of Abdul-Qadir Gilani, while Khomeini motivated the Shiite movement. BH is theologically driven by the jurisprudence of Ibn Taymiyya and is politically and practically motivated by Bin Laden. The argument about the role of charismatic figures is not to generalise Islam within the same notion of radical Islam, but rather to more appropriately treat BH as a sub-culture of Salafist ideology (Cottee, 2010; Witorowicz, 2006).

BH is a millennial terrorist group as a result of 9/11 and the subsequent spread of Al-Qaeda ideology. Gregg (2014: 40) suggests that the tripod of apocalyptic, theocratic and religious cleansing goals motivates millennial terrorist groups. These goals are reflected in BH’s desire to replace the Nigerian secular state with Sharia law. Furthermore, these goals do not work alone; they are supported by “real world threats and internal disputes” (Mayer, 2001 Gregg, 2014: 40). In the case of BH, local grievances that have emanated from clashes with the Nigerian state as well as local Islamic rivalry have contributed to the heightened radicalisation of BH into a violent movement. Aside from the aforementioned explanations of the international dynamics of radical Islam, it is more appropriate to contextualise BH within the existing wave of global Salafist jihadism. I would therefore posit that the religious and political ideologies of Ibn Taymiyya and Bin Laden are the fulcrum and guiding principles of BH.
Figure 8.1: Factors responsible for the radicalisation of Boko Haram

Figure 8.1 above illustrates how different international factors as well as local grievances and Islamic rivalry have led to the radicalisation of BH. Local grievances became the turning point for BH radicalisation, and such grievances include clashes between BH and locals and the police in Kanama. Other grievances include the so-called betrayal of BH by political actors within Borno state, arguments and internal disputes within Islam and the killing of Yusuf. It is important to note that even without local grievances, Northern Nigeria was already radicalised and this had manifested itself in previous religious crises (Adesoji, 2010); however, in the case of BH, local grievances have been a key factor to radicalisation.
Understanding the narrative of BH radicalisation gives additional explanation as to why it was easy for BH to join the global Salafist movement (Al-Qaeda / IS). Moreover, such explanation helps with understanding why BH leaders went into exile and sought further training, motivation and support. In BH’s initial stages, the exiles Mohammed Yusuf, Mamman Nur, Khalid al-Barnawi, and other leaders served as an important meeting point between BH and Al-Qaeda. I would argue that this meeting between BH and Al-Qaeda was motivated by both ideology as well as the desire to fight back against the Nigerian state. This assertion is also supported by Participant Ten (a former lawmaker and attorney general) who notes that:

It’s simply a brotherhood, it’s simply a solidarity of brotherhood in distress. They [BH] have a common faith that we [Nigerians] no longer belong to the same common wealth.

Participant Ten is suggesting that since BH members feel that the Nigerian state does not accept their ideology, they need to find support from groups across Nigeria who do share it. Similarly, Participant Five (member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present constitution of Nigeria) suggests that:

Radical Islamic groups across the world are related in terms of ideas, ideas in trying to predominate the societies they find themselves in is a general one. But then there are others that are related in terms of sect understanding, and that is why it’s easier to link Boko Haram with ISIL as they can relate easily to each other. So you find the situation in which all radicalised groups are essentially meant to arrive at some point contextually, and what we are saying is that in the context of Nigeria, the groups are concerned about how they can move the Islamic faith [radical Islam] forward in terms of establishing an influence regionally and finally nationally.

Participant Five also believes that ideology bonds radical Islamic groups within an international context. As such, the desire to unite towards strengthening and spreading ideology allows for an easy connection between BH and other radical Salafist groups such as IS and Al-Qaeda. The argument of Participants Five and Ten relates to BH’s expansionist agenda of capturing more Nigerian territories and targeting other countries within the Lake Chad region.
8.2 Opportunities for violent extremism
The previous section outlined the international factors that have led to the radicalisation of BH. This section highlights international factors that have facilitated the growth of BH. These factors include international terrorist groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and IS. Other factors include the ‘international war on terror’ and major international events such as the killings of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Ghaddafi.

Numerous studies suggest that BH has connections with international jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and IS across the region. However, it is important to examine the reasons why BH switched its loyalty from the former to the latter, bearing in mind that both Al-Qaeda and IS are guided by the same ideology of political Islam that is in turn guided by the theology of radical Salafism. Initially, BH identified with Taliban ideology even before the Taliban expanded its movement to Sub-Saharan Africa. When the Al-Qaeda network spread to the North and West of Africa, BH saw it as an opportunity to connect with Al-Qaeda to realise its agenda of establishing a Sharia state in Nigeria. The network of Al-Qaeda spread across Africa through movements such as AQIM, Al-Mourabitoun, Ansar Dine and al-Shabaab. It also spread via Al-Qaeda loyalists in West Africa cooperating with each other, for instance Al-Mourabitoun’s leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar had connections with BH’s Nur and Khalid al Barnawi (Zenn 2014b). In 2012, BH also participated alongside the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in Northern Mali (ibid).

Participant Three (a member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert in conflict negotiation) confirms that:

… and at a point in time, Boko Haram didn’t hide it. They confirmed to us that they had sent their people for training under Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda then said that they were training people from Boko Haram and also al-Shabaab. Some went to Somalia and some of them from Somalia went to Al-Qaeda. So they... share the same vision of theology so morally, [they draw] inspiration… from one another, [as well as] financially. Certainly, they have some... funding that comes not only from within, but a lot probably from outside. That is why if you remember, that the [Nigerian] President said that the sources of such funds must be identified and blocked so that they would not have access to these. So yes, financially, they have that motivation so as long as the financial source flows; it keeps them on and then... physically they have a lot of arms that are
sent to them … and they are also being trained in using these arms and they find ways [of] bringing them into… Nigeria.

From the discussions of the Presidential Committee on BH, Participant Three is suggesting that BH has both ideological and physical connections with international and regional militant Islamists, and that BH enjoys support for training and funding. Similar to Participant Ten (a former Lawmaker and Attorney General), Participant Three sees BH’s interactions as those of solidarity or brotherhood cooperation.

In support of Participant Three (former member of the Presidential Committee on Boko Haram and Conflict Analyst), Participant One (a former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) says:

> It is evident from their modus operandi that they operate like other groups outside and some of their... activities are sophisticated and beyond the local knowledge of those people we tag as Boko Haram. They are technically highly sophisticated, and that is why they can manufacture Improvised Explosive Devices by themselves; and that is why they can adapt certain weapons and make them more sophisticated and more powerful than the conventional weapons our army uses ... I think they have learned such things from sophisticated terror groups outside. They get their funding also more from those groups than locally, and this is very dangerous.

There is a marginal difference between the statements of participants One and Three. Participant Three suggests that the connection between BH and international terror groups is more material in terms of funding and weapons; whereas Participant One sees BH as a group that can generate funds locally (probably within Nigeria) and manufacture weapons such as IEDs with the help it gets from international terror groups. Regardless of these differences of opinion, what is pertinent is that both accounts suggest a connection between BH and terror groups outside of Nigeria. The claim by Participant One about the sophistication of BH is important in the understanding of one of the physical (tactical) reasons as to why BH interacts with takfiri (a takfiri is a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of apostasy) groups across Nigeria. BH’s external relationship with such groups is strategic. From a strategic perspective, I would argue that just as states cooperate with each in the international system, ideologically-bonded groups work with each other not just for the spread or defending of their ideologies, but for survival. Moreover, such groups have a high sense of solidarity. Training, funding and volunteering as mercenaries in each other’s
conflict suggests that all such jihadist groups across international boundaries are united in the same goal of spreading a common ideology, with local narratives largely determining the variation of attacks across their selected targets as well as their evolving tactics.

In 2014, BH declared its allegiance to IS. This declaration was received with great scepticism among security experts. However, in 2015 Ahmed Al Assir, a key IS official, was arrested by the Lebanese authorities while he was on his way to Nigeria (Odunsi, 2015). Moreover, in August 2016, IS announced the new leader of BH, to which Shekau protested (Ogbeche, 2016). I argue that the reason BH switched its allegiance from Al-Qaeda to IS was strategic – a view shared by Participant Seven (author and Conflict Analyst) who notes:

Yeah, I think they must be also financially [connected] because we heard, and we have been hearing that they are now calling themselves ISIS in West Africa, Islamic State in West Africa, so they... apparently have been benefitting from a lot of sponsorship and arms shipments from other countries.

There are further arguments also suggesting that BH’s switch of loyalty from Al-Qaeda to IS was strategic. Firstly, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Africa had been decimated; secondly, other BH factions had more connections to Al-Qaeda than Shekau; thirdly, Shekau’s desire to capture Nigerian territories coincided with the 2014 expansionist agenda of IS; and fourthly, several groups in Africa had defected from Al-Qaeda to IS, especially in Libya (Lister, 2016).

Another opportunity for BH violence was the international war on terrorism. The decimation of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates (ibid) as well as the blockade of its funding and incarceration of its key leaders (Lister, 2016) forced BH and other groups to join IS as it had more operational capacity than Al-Qaeda. In 2015, Al-Qaeda launched a series of attacks in West Africa including the attacks on Radisson Blu and Splendid Hotels in Ouagadougou and Bamako respectively. These attacks signified Al-Qaeda’s desire to woo more supporters from IS. In contrast, the global war on terrorism and the weakening of Al-Qaeda forced BH to look inwards for self-sustenance, which is why it engaged in attacks on banks and military barracks within Nigeria to support its operations (Zenn, 2014a), and then declared its allegiance to IS.

The adverse impact of international politics and in particular the fall of the Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi regimes, facilitated an increase in extremism and the operational power of BH. Furthermore, the invasion of Iraq and the Syrian
conflict not only created regional tension in the Middle East, but also contributed to the birth of IS. Some accounts suggest that the death of Saddam Hussein created a political power vacuum that could not be managed by his successor. Other analysts believe that political alienation and grievances related to Saddam Hussein’s death snowballed into the birth of IS (Harris, 2014). Saddam Hussein’s death provided an opportunity for the rise of IS, with the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s government providing a safe haven for IS members and its affiliates to operate across Africa. The fall of Muammar Gaddafi additionally created anarchy in Libya (Danahar 2013), and I would argue that this, as well as the breakdown of the disarmament programme in Libya (Chivvis & Martini, 2014), contributed to the smooth flow of weapons across North and Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Moreover, the situation in Libya provided a smooth transition for IS to then establish it as the centre for coordinating its activities.

8.3 Spillover to neighbouring countries
The previous section highlights how international factors strengthened BH and it also gave an account of the internationalisation of BH. This section discusses six different factors that enabled the spillover of BH’s violence to the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. These factors include historical ties and geographical proximity, similar narratives of Islam, regional instability, geographical features, external intervention and the media. The role of the media is discussed under the advancement of technology because of BH’s preference for it. In order to understand the reason for this spillover, it is important to establish the historical ties and geographical proximity between these countries and Nigeria. These ties and geographical proximity illustrate that Nigeria and these neighbouring countries are the same region regardless of the borders of each country. The spillover of violence has been determined by a similar narrative within Islam and Kanuri ethnic identity in the Lake Chad region, the spread of Al-Qaeda and the global expansionist agenda of IS in 2014, with political instability around the Lake Chad region also attributable to this diffusion of violence. This section argues that geographical features such as the Mandara Mountain and Sambisa Forest are contributory factors to the spread of BH violence, as well as the role of the advancement of technology in the spread of BH violence across different regions – thereby also fostering IS expansionism. How external intervention has triggered BH violence is discussed, statistical data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) have
been applied to illustrate the implications of the spillover of BH violence to countries in the Lake Chad region.

8.3.1 Historical ties and geographical proximity

Before the advent of colonial rule and the 1914 amalgamation of the Southern and Northern protectorates into a country called Nigeria, Islam experienced a remarkable spread across the West African region, especially in the 8th and 19th centuries. Islam spread widely as a result of sub-Saharan trade across the region (Hill, 2009). These factors created porous borders across the countries in the region with a resulting smooth flow of people, goods and services. The free flow of individuals across borders also encouraged social integration within countries. Participant Nine (a retired General in the Nigerian Army) analysed the role of Islam and migration on contemporary Borno society, and suggests that:

There is another fact you should know… if you go to Borno, Maiduguri in particular, [out of] virtually… ten families, you will find out that at least five or six of those families have relations in Cameroon, Niger or Chad. There are inter-marriages - and what caused this? Most of the Islamic clerics that came when Islam came then stayed in Nigeria and they came from Chad and Cameroon. [They came] as teachers you know, and these people had children. Participant Nine is suggesting that because of how Islam flourished, individuals from the Republics of Chad, Cameroon and Niger migrated to Nigeria as teachers. Such individuals established themselves within Nigerian society through marriage, and Participant Nine also suggests that there were inter-marriages among people within the Lake Chad region. Such inter-marriages bonded communities from different countries. Participant Nine suggests that these conditions make it easier for individuals from neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region to come to Borno state in Nigeria for a better standard of living, and also to the Northern part of Nigeria (this is discussed further below). Moreover, this social integration was supported by Nigeria with these countries being bound by a common religion and culture, given the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire that encompassed border towns between Nigeria, North-eastern Nigeria, the Republic of Chad, Eastern Niger, Northern Cameroon and Southern Libya (Barth, 1858; Hill, 2010).

Additionally, the influence of the history of the Kanem-Bornu Empire on the expansion of BH has played a significant role in the spillover of BH’s violence. BH has exploited the history of the Kanuri ethnic group not only to recruit, but to expand
its influence across Nigeria’s neighbouring countries in the Lake Chad region. The Kanem-Bornu Empire (8th-19th century) was founded in Kanem (between Tripoli and Lake Chad region), in the north-east of Lake Chad during the 8th century (Bobboyi, 1992; Levtzion, 2000). It existed under the rulership of different kings (Mai; Kanuri language) of the Muslim Sayfawa dynasty (Barkindo, 2016), and the Sayfawa dynasty was regarded as the greatest power in the region (ibid). Under the Sayfawa dynasty, the Kanem Empire expanded to west of Lake Chad in the 14th century, and the king’s court was moved to Bornu while it maintained control of Kanem (Bondarev, 2005). The Sayfawas established a new capital at Birnin Gazargamo in present-day Yobe state, Nigeria (Barkindo, 2016). Birnin Gazargamo developed into a prominent hub for Islamic learning and it attracted scholars from the Sudan and North Africa (Bobboyi, 1992).

The Kanem-Bornu Empire was penetrated by Islamic and Arabic influences, and its trans-Saharan trade routes facilitated such influences (Hunwick and O’Fahey 1995). Under Mai Idris Alauma (1564-96) of the ruling Sayfuwa dynasty, who took the title Amir al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), the Empire flourished and reached its peak. Mai Idris Alauma enforced Islam as the official religion of the Empire (Levtzion, 2000; Barkindo 2016), and this created a theocratic state with an Islamic identity. Barkindo (2016) suggests that the Kanem-Bornu Empire became characterised by its mixture of Islam and Kanuri ethnic identity and that Islam, Kanuri and Arabic became the languages of commerce. Under Mai Idris Alauma, the Empire further expanded through military conquest, trade and diplomatic relations with other Muslim states. The Empire occupied Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, as well as the Kwararafa kingdom in the Middle Belt region (Northcentral) of Nigeria (Barkindo, 2016).

During the 17th century, the Empire controlled trans-Saharan trade routes. It established garrisons for its security and had pacts with rulers in North Africa (Barth, 1858). Additionally, in 1852 the British monarch, Queen Victoria, signed a treaty with the ‘Sovereign Kingdom of Borno to enable her to trade without barriers and difficulties’ (Kirk-Greene, 1959: 335; Barkindo, 2016).

In 1846, the Kanem-Bornu Empire under the Sayfawa dynasty rule was conquered by Muhammad al-Kanemi, and Kukawa became the new capital (Brenner, 1971). The conquest established the al-Kanemi dynasty, which still reigns as the ruling dynasty in Borno state. However, the al-Kanemi rule almost ended, having been
weakened in 1893 by the Rabeh Fadlallah invasion (Cohen, 1967). Rabeh was a Muslim warrior and slave trader belonging to the old Funj Sultanate of Sinnar in present-day Sudan (Cohen, 1967). France rejected the invasion in defence of its ally (the ruling al-Kanemi). To the surprise of the Kanuri population of Kanem-Bornu, the British government supported Rabeh. In 1901 Rabeh was killed by French forces at Gubja, and his death left the Empire without a ruler (Mukhtar, 2000; Barkindo, 2016). The Kanem-Bornu territory was then shared between France, Britain and Germany (Barkindo, 2016).

BH uses this history to create a narrative that facilitates its ideology and campaign of violence. The group argues that the Kanem-Bornu Empire (9th - 19th) was the definition of an ‘ideal’ state as characterised by Islam, that was not distorted by the corruption, idolatry and other forms of un-Islamic practices that are supported by Westerners through education and secularism (Barkindo, 2016). The group compliments the Sayfawa for expanding and promoting Islam, and condemns the al-Kanemis for colluding with Western ‘infidels’. BH also notes that partitioning the Kanem-Bornu territories to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria as being disastrous for Muslims within the Lake Chad region (Barkindo, 2016).

BH links the history of Kanem-Bornu to the broad history of Islam. The group asserts that the Prophet Mohammed established an Islamic state in Medina through Sharia, and that Sharia ensures justice and equality (Mohammed, 2014). It further argues that Islam eventually spread through the Ottoman Empire, but the West scuttled the Empire in 1924 using Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey (Barkindo, 2016). With this narrative, BH implies that Islam, as founded by the Prophet Mohammed, ensures justice and equality and that it flourished in the Ottoman Empire, but then the West collaborated with Atatürk to destroy it. Moreover, BH asserts that similar Western conspiracy was also applied to destroy the Kanem-Borno Empire, which was a flourishing Islamic state. BH argues that Islam in the region is also being eclipsed by Western civilisation through Judaeo-Christian values, democracy and education.

It is misleading to associate the Kanuri ethnic group in its entirety to BH. However, it is undeniable that BH uses Kanuri ethnic identity to facilitate its objectives, and that BH’s exploitation of the Kanem-Bornu narrative is supported by the Lake Chad region’s cultural environment (Barkindo, 2016). The region is highly populated with ethnic Kanuris who also occupy other countries including Cameroon, Chad,
Niger and Nigeria. In other words, the Kanuri ethnic group is spread across territories beyond those of colonial creation.

The majority of BH recruits are Kanuri. Along the Lake Chad region, BH uses the Kanuri language for recruitment and mobilisation (International Crisis Group, 2017b), and the language is instrumental in the movement of arms across the region (ibid). Furthermore, as a means of exploiting the Kanuri identity, in 2013 BH sent threatening letters to Kanuri soldiers warning them not to fight for the Nigerian government as they would be killed (Barkindo, 2016).

The instrumentalisation of Kanuri history by BH is strategically important for the expansion of BH to other countries in the Lake Chad for two reasons. First, Kanuri is intertwined with Islam and BH, thereby making it easy for BH to promote its ideology. Second, the researcher argues that because BH identified the role of the West (Britain, France and Germany) in the ‘destruction’ of the flourishing Islamic and Kanuri state, this has elicited a sense of nationalism, especially with regards to the reclamation of the former Empire.

8.3.2 Similar narratives of Islam
The arrival of Al-Qaeda along with the spread of global Salafist jihadism created a new narrative of radical Salafism in the region. Individuals from countries sharing similar views with BH were willing and able to support BH because of geographical proximity and a pre-existing history of cultural fluidity. Nigeria is arguably a big power in West Africa both economically and politically. It is one of the most influential countries in Africa, with human and natural resources that attract people from other countries. Additionally, Nigeria has influential Muslim clerics such Ibrahim El-Zazaky, Dahiru Bauchi Albani Zaria, Kabiru Gombe who are recognised internationally, and these clerics also cross-national boundaries to evangelise. These multifarious factors put Nigeria in a different leadership position from those driven by political, economic and religious goals. They have provided a background that has propelled BH forward and therefore attracted individuals to it within the region. I would argue that this background has also been instrumental to the connection between BH and IS. BH’s status as a province of IS in West Africa is the mandate that has enabled BH to spread Salafist ideology through campaigns of violence within countries, particularly neighbouring ones where they have historical ties. Moreover, this status highlights the severity of BH attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger in 2014 (see Table 8.1 on external interventions against BH), and I would argue that BH’s
adoption of the expansionist agenda of IS in 2014 (Lister, 2016) was responsible for both the seizure of Nigerian territories and the intensity of attacks in the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

8.3.3 Regional instability

Another factor that has contributed to the spillover of violence is regional instability with notably, the political instability in Chad and Niger during the 1980s and 1990s having facilitated an influx of violent and non-violent individuals. Northern Nigeria became a refuge for people fleeing war-torn countries, and historical ties of religion, ethnicity and inter-marriages facilitated this migration. Consequently, unaccounted for numbers of nationals across the region migrated to Nigeria. Climate change has also been a contributory factor as the Republics of Chad and Niger have more arid lands than Nigeria. Political instability in the Republic of Chad started in 1965, but during the 1980s and 1990s, the power tussle between Presidents Habre and Deby deeply divided the country and forced many Chadians out of their country (CRS report, 2008).

Participant Nine (a retired General in the Nigerian Army) confirmed that:

> We knew Nigeria used to be attacked by foreigners…, there used to be some banditry by foreigners within Nigerian territories, by foreigners in the early to the middle of the 1980s. Nigeria had to task its military to push those people back. Unfortunately, when those people left, there were a lot of them who really wanted to join not as mercenaries [but] as members of the armed forces of North African countries. As Nigeria was grappling with the issue of Boko Haram up to 2011, when these countries due to the Arab Spring broke up, people from different neighbouring countries such as the Republics of Chad, Cameroon and Niger, along with even some from Nigeria, joined the armed forces or even the rebel groups and left those places with their arms. When they left with their arms, they couldn’t go to Europe; if they had stayed in their countries, there would have been nothing for them there. So I believe that elements of these people might have trickled into the border areas of Nigeria and the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, and may have infiltrated through those borders to commit some of these [crimes].

Participant Nine is suggesting that the political crises of the 1980s may have made some of the rebel forces from the Republics of Chad, Niger and Cameroon engage in armed banditry in Nigeria for economic purposes, with some of the rebels (including Nigerians) joining military forces in Northern Africa. Participant Nine suggests that
the Arab Uprising forced some of these elements to come to Nigeria with their weapons. This suggestion is supported by a statement from the Nigerian Chief of Army Staff (CAS), who notes that:

While the Boko Haram [insurgency] can be said to have started in Nigeria, by and large as at today, I can say that almost 60 per cent of the insurgents are from our neighbouring countries. (Buratai, 2016)

The claims by both Participant Nine and the Nigerian CAS suggest that there are individuals with weapons at their disposal because of the instability of the Middle East and Nigeria’s neighbouring countries, and that such individuals find Nigeria conducive to committing crimes.

8.3.4 Geographical features
In addition to historical ties, religion and political instability, geographical features also facilitate the spillover of violence. The arid desert terrain that stretches from the countries in the Lake Chad region to the Borno/Yobe axis provides easy manoeuvring opportunities for militants. This terrain also contributes to BH tactical operations, particularly around Nigeria’s border with the Republic of Niger. Sambisa Forest provides a buffer and major hideout for BH militants and is thus strategic to BH operational activities. It has proximity to other BH dominated towns such as Askira/Uba, Jere, Damboa and Konduga, with its border being close to the Ngadda River, one of the tributaries to Lake Chad. Sambisa also stretches to Gwoza Hill (Mandara Mountain), which is close to the Nigeria-Cameroon border. Mandara Mountain and Sambisa Forest along the Nigerian-Cameroon border may be an explanation as to why Cameroon suffers more BH attacks than the Republics of Chad and Niger (see Table 8.1). For BH, this geographical location is ideal and in 2014, BH made Gwoza its caliphate.

8.3.5 Technological advances
Media technology plays a role in BH spillover and has done so even prior to the escalation of BH violence. Audio and visual materials containing the radical preaching of clerics were circulating across Nigeria and border towns of countries close by, with such messages preaching the need to abhor westernisation and unite in order to facilitate the revival of Islam through radicalism (Loimeier, 2012). I would argue that the spillover of violence to countries neighbouring Nigeria was also triggered by solidarity for BH among radicalised individuals from these countries fighting against their own governments in retaliation for ‘interfering’ in the regional war against BH.
With social media, information travels exceptionally fast and this may have provided BH with a medium to spread its propaganda (as discussed in chapter five). Moreover, there is evidence to suggest that BH connects with other international terror groups via the Internet. In 2015, the allegiance of BH to IS was announced through *Afriqiyah*, a jihadist website connected to IS (Omojuwa, 2015; Lister, 2015). Furthermore, the announcement of Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the new leader of BH in 2016 came via the official newspaper of IS, *al-Nabaa* (Associated Press, 2016). This illustrates how instrumental advance technology has been in the coordination of BH activities and foreign terrorist groups. Moreover, these connections imply that IS and BH have both used the advance technology to promote their expansionist agenda across the three countries being discussed from the Lake Chad region.

**8.3.6 External intervention**

The slow intervention of the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger to the regional security threat posed by BH may have facilitated the growth of BH’s campaign of violence across the Lake Chad region. There was also variation in the number of attacks across these countries because of the different dynamics within these countries. Initially, countries neighbouring Nigeria were not involved in the fight against BH and their non-intervention could have been that they saw BH as being a Nigerian problem. In addition, the Republic of Cameroon was slow to respond to the threat of BH because of its long-standing political disputes and ‘cold war’ with Nigeria (International Crisis Group, 2017a). Before the diffusion of BH violence to the Republic of Cameroon, far Northern Cameroon was already a fertile ground for BH violence because the area contains border towns. Additionally, a report by the International Crises Group (2016) suggests that not only does this region have more deprivation than other parts of the Republic of Cameroon, there is also increasing evangelism of radical Islam. Added to this, it was noted that the Kanuris in the region were being stigmatised and accused of being BH members (Crises Group, 2016).

Another additional factor related to the initial lack of external intervention by Nigeria’s immediate neighbours was the high crime rates on the borders, and BH took advantage of this to indoctrinate individuals and store their stockpiled weapons in the region (ibid). The efforts of the Cameroonian government to then get rid off BH’s stockpiled weapons triggered BH’s violence in the region in 2013 (ibid).

The Republic of Niger was a safe haven for BH before 2012. In 2009, some members of BH went into exile in the Republic of Niger because of the crack down
by Nigerian forces on its members, and the group then stockpiled weapons, fuel and food there (International Crisis Group, 2017a). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the government of the Republic of Niger had a non-aggression pact with the group. However, BH’s growing preaching and recruitment across the Diffa region along with its support for jihadists in the 2012 Mali conflict became of concern to the Nigerien government, who worried that BH could escalate its campaign of violence in the Republic of Niger. As a result, Nigerien forces started gathering information and then arresting BH members in 2013 (ibid). A senior Nigerien government commented that:

Many officials believed they [Nigerien authorities] should focus on gathering intelligence and maintaining public order rather than mobilising the military against Boko Haram. (International Crisis Group, 2017a).

This comment suggests that the government of the Republic of Niger were mindful that taking military action against BH could escalate violence in their country. However, BH reacted to the arrests in 2013 with two attacks (GTD). BH attacks in the Republic of Niger then became even more severe after the Nigerien government decided to take full military action against BH (International Crisis Group, 2017a).

The Republic of Chad’s government’s excessive use of force explains why BH sustained its attacks in that country. There were specific factors that underpinned the actions and responses of BH and the Chadian government. BH exploited both human and geographical features for recruitment and tactical manoeuvring in the Republic of Chad as it had historical ties to the Kanuri ethnic group and the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which BH exploited. An International Crisis Group’s (2017b) interview with a Chadian of Kanuri descent confirmed this exploitation when the interviewee said they enjoyed the preaching of BH at its early stages because, “It did us good to hear the word of God in our own language.”

Another reason for the face-off between the Chadian government and BH was BH’s continued raiding and looting of traders in Chadian territories (International Crisis Group, 2017b). When comparing the Republic of Chad to that of Niger, the Republic of Chad has stronger CT, and its CT approach is mainly based on the use of military force. Interestingly, it experienced only one BH attack in 2014 compared to multiple attacks in 2015. This rise was because of increasing BH attacks on traders, and I would argue that because BH needed to sustain itself economically and stockpile food and fuel as it had been under constant attack in the Republics of Niger and then Chad. In addition to this, the excessiveness of the Republic of Chad’s CT combined
with its decision to join the MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force) also increased the number of BH incidences in the country.

From a broader perspective, BH expanded its violence to Nigeria’s neighbouring countries not only for tactical and financial reasons, but also for ideological and ethnic support. With regards to tactical reasons, BH used Mandara Mountain, Sambisa forest and the desert areas close to Machenna and Geidam as hideouts. In sourcing finance, the group received funding from affluent individuals in the form of ‘charities’ (Zenn, 2014b), and because the group had a significant number of members from the Kanuri language, it drew support from across different countries. These factors are what led the governments of Nigeria’s neighbouring countries to carry out proactive actions to pre-empt the group from spreading within its territories. The pre-emptive measures involved taking decisive steps against BH through military cooperation between the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Benin and Nigeria under the umbrella of MNJTF (Multi-national Joint Task Force). The Republic of Benin appeared not to be so affected by the spillover of BH violence because of its greater geographical distance to Northeast Nigeria. In addition, the Republic of Benin has no historical ties with the Kanem-Bornu Empire, which the Republics of Cameroon and Niger share with Nigeria. The continued intervention of the aforementioned countries was followed by more BH attacks in them and in January 2015, Shekau confirmed the group’s desire to increase its attacks in neighbouring countries in response to their taking part in the MNJTF (BBC, 2015b). Following Shekau’s threat, the intensity of attacks increased notably by 2015 and Table 8.1 below shows the number of casualties and attacks by BH outside the borders of Nigeria from 2013 to 2015.
Table 8.1 notes the number of attacks and casualties resulting from BH’s campaign of violence across the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger between 2013 and 2015. When the violence of the group spilled outside of Nigerian territory between 2013 and 2015, a total of 202 attacks were carried out across these three countries, with a total of 2,757 casualties having been orchestrated by BH. Between 2013 and 2015, the Republic of Cameroon suffered 128 attacks with 1,766 casualties; the Republic of Chad experienced 28 attacks and 328 casualties, and the Republic of Niger suffered 45 attacks and 663 casualties. Interestingly, Table 8.1 illustrates that in all of these countries, BH violence increases each year. Below is an explanation for the increase and variation of violence across these three countries.

In the Republic of Cameroon, BH’s first attack was in Dabanga village where they abducted a French family who were later released after payment of a ransom (GTD, Zenn 2014a). I would argue that this source of money contributed to more frequent attacks in Cameroon, for example in February 2013, French citizens were kidnapped in Waza park in Cameroon while on holiday, and BH released them for the sum of US$3.15 million, which was paid by the French and Cameroonian governments (Zenn, 2014: 8). The number of BH attacks increased in 2014 because of the Cameroonian government’s decisive action in dismantling BH’s weapon stockpiles and addressing criminal activities such as kidnapping (International Crises Group, 2016). In 2014, BH intensified its violence and demanded a ransom for the release of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1,912</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the abducted Vice Prime Minister of Cameroon and the Emir of Kolofata, but it remains unknown as to whether the Cameroonian government made payment to BH (Etahoben, 2014). It is argued that as BH lost some of its income sources, it resorted to ransom money as an alternative source of revenue. Thus, the intensity of and increase in BH violence in 2015 was as a result of weak unilateral actions by countries in the Lake Chad region.

The first BH attack in Chadian territory was in Dubuwa village in 2014. The Dubuwa attack was a small-scale one, with further more deadly attacks being carried out in 2015. The Ngouboua attack of February 2015 signified the severity of the BH threat in the Republic of Chad (BBC, 2015c). The attack was significant because it appeared to be in reprisal for the January crackdown on BH by the MNJTF. Apart from the relative effectiveness of Chadian CT in reducing the intensity of BH violence, the Republic of Chad shares the smallest border with Nigeria through Balge (a town within Borno state), where BH experienced resistance from and battles with local hunters and vigilantes. BH was forced to retreat in the Kala-Balge battle of May 2014 with more than 200 BH members being killed by local hunters and vigilantes (BBC, 2014f). Although Balge was later captured by BH, I would argue that its resistance to BH reduced the influx of attacks into the Republic of Chad.

BH launched its first attack in the Republic of Niger in 2014 and in 2015 it attacked Bosso (a town in the Diffa region) where more than 100 people died (GTD). There is vast arid land between the Republic of Niger and Nigeria that is greater than the Republic of Chad, with the boundary between Niger and Nigeria being the second largest in landmass in comparison to Cameroon and Chad. Out of the three countries, the Republic of Chad has the strongest military force and the intensity of BH violence in 2015 in Nigerien territories was reduced by the Chadian forces, with Chadian forces launching a massive crackdown on BH in February 2015 within Nigerian and Cameroonian territories. Additionally, Chadian forces reclaimed the Nigerian territories of Baga, Damask, Dikwa, Malam Fatori and Ngala from BH. This crackdown was seen as a turning point with regards to regional cooperation against BH (LWJ, 2015). However, it is important to note that the MNJTF crackdown in 2015 on BH triggered a sharp increase in BH violence in Nigeria’s neighbouring countries.
8.4 Discussion/conclusion
This section summarises and discusses the findings of this chapter. It explains the implications of BH activities and the slow intervention of the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger in comparison to Nigeria’s CT. Finally, it links the chapter’s findings to the broader debate in the literature regarding the spillover of violence in order to highlight the complexity of BH.

To understand international influences on BH, it is important to understand the background of radical Islam within the region. The existence of different movements across Nigerian boundaries at various times in history means that it is possible to penetrate Nigeria because of local dynamics, for instance the Fula jihad moved into Nigeria because of the “corrupt and un-Islamic” society that existed in the 19th century. Moreover, the Mahdiyya movement then came to maintain the structures of the dan Fodio jihad as well as to fight colonial domination. The 1979 Iranian Revolution influenced the Shiite movement in the 1980s and 1990s in fighting westernisation, and this coincided with heated debate among Nigerian Muslims about capitalism, socialism and the need to make Sharia law a part of Nigerian law (Isa, 2010). BH thus emerged at a time when there was strong global radical Salafist revivalism and ideological expansionism, with local grievances and a radicalised background providing fertile conditions for the emergence and growth of BH. Although, the evolution of BH reflects the theoretical account of Sageman (2004; 2008) that BH became an isolationist movement and connected with Al-Qaeda gradually, it differs on the issue of collective radicalisation. The history of Islamic radicalism sets the background for easy mobilisation of individuals into violence. Additionally, it is fair to argue that international terrorist groups can also provide inspiration to local movements. IS replaced Al-Qaeda as the deadliest international terror group within only half a decade. While BH pledged allegiance to IS for survival purposes, it became inspired by the IS expansionist agenda in 2014, and this has coincided with factors that have led to the spillover of violence across Nigerian borders.

This chapter also examined international factors that have influenced the growth and expansion of BH within the Lake Chad region. The chapter highlighted three international factors in particular, with these including international terrorist groups such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and IS, the international war on terror, international politics and major events such as the killings of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Ghaddafi. BH is ideologically motivated and affiliated with international
terrorist groups with the killing of Saddam Hussein contributing to the emergence and growth of IS. The killing of Muammar Ghaddafi encouraged the influx of IS to Africa, with the weak nature of the Libyan state allowing IS to establish regional provinces in Africa, including those of BH. BH was inspired by the declaration of a global expansionist agenda by IS, and this is reflected in its capture of Nigerian territories and its subsequent allegiance to IS in 2015. The effect of this allegiance on BH is that it was renamed the Islamic State in West African Province (ISWAP), and I would argue that this has increased BH’s desire and mandate to expand into Nigeria’s neighbouring countries.

Multiple factors have contributed to the spillover of BH to other countries in the Lake Chad region. Among these factors, historical ties and the close proximity of Nigeria to countries in the Lake Chad region plays an important role, with shared history along with the movement of people thereby rendering international boundaries less important. Moreover, a diffusion of conflict penetrates different countries because of similar religious beliefs, and this has made it easier to spread radical ideology influenced by Al-Qaeda and IS through the ranks of BH. Added to this, a long-standing history of political instability around the Lake Chad region has swelled the diffusion of BH violence because of the availability of weapons and trained fighters who have survived other political violence. Furthermore, geographical features in the Lake Chad region such as Mandara Mountain and the Sambisa Forest have provided buffer zones for BH and helped them in tactical manoeuvring, while the advance technology has been instrumental in encouraging the spread of BH violence across different regions by helping spread its radical ideology and connection to IS. This has thereby facilitated BH expansion into Nigeria’s neighbouring countries. Finally, the chapter has identified international intervention as being a major triggering factor in BH violence in the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger.

Apart from the multiple broader factors that have been instrumental in the spillover of violence to the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, each of these countries has its own unique factors that have determined the intensity of violence in their territories. The Republic of Cameroon appears to be the weakest among the three because of its loose border, which BH took advantage of to stockpile weapons. The group was then triggered to violence when the Cameroonian government attempted to dismantle these stockpiles of weapons. Cameroon has more deprived border towns being more likely to support and join BH for economic reasons. The targeting of the
Republic of Cameroon was also motivated by economic purposes and such activities there have included kidnapping and human trafficking (Zenn, 2014a; International Crisis Group, 2016). The frequency of violence in the Republic of Chad was also determined by economic reasons with these being related to BH’s sustainability as it uses crime such as the raiding and looting of local traders. The severity of attacks in the Republic of Chad was because BH had carried out reprisal attacks in response to the strong military campaign by the Chadian government against it. The intensity of attacks in the Republic of Niger was determined by the Nigerien government’s resistance in allowing BH to continue to stockpile its weapons, food and fuel in their country. Aside from these specific differences, the increase in violence in all of these countries in 2014 was determined by their individual military actions against BH, and in 2015, BH’s attacks in these countries rose because of military cooperation by countries in the Lake Chad region through the MNJTF.

One of the implications of BH activities in Nigeria’s neighbouring countries is the limiting of the effectiveness of Nigeria’s military campaign against BH. Although Nigeria failed to unilaterally resolve the BH crisis before it escalated, its neighbours’ slow responses to counter BH activities in their territories also contributed to the strength of BH. For example, the Nigerien government’s slow action against BH allowed BH to use its country as a depot to store food, fuel, and weapons that it then used to sustain its fight against Nigeria. Weak border security in the Republic of Cameroon allowed BH to manoeuvre across the region and carry out kidnappings in order to finance the group. In contrast, the Republic of Chad appeared to have been more decisive in curbing BH with the Chadian forces helping to reduce the BH violence within the Lake Chad region in 2015 (International Crises Group, 2017b).

With regards to the broader literature about spillover of violence, BH is a complex case that reflects multifarious argument about violence spillover. Arguably, no single argument can be used to explain the spillover of BH violence beyond Nigerian borders. With regards to external intervention, Danneman & Ritterer (2013) argue that the fear of conflict spreading into neighbouring countries makes neighbouring countries more proactive, but this is different in the case of BH. For instance, Nigerien authorities allowed BH activities in some of its regions for some time (Crises International Group, 2017a), and this may be attributable to the fear that taking military action against BH would result in BH violence spreading more widely. Contrary to Danneman & Ritterer (2013), BH’s overspill illustrates that because of
fear, countries may in fact initially overlook the activities of violent groups in their countries so that they are spared from their violence, with other neighbouring countries intervening or taking military action in the face of what they perceive as eminent danger. Similarly, Tony & Mushed (2002) see the military intervention of Nigeria’s neighbouring countries and especially the MNJTF, as an additional problem given Shekau’s declaration that more attacks are to be expected in these countries (BBC, 2015b). Furthermore, the spillover of BH into Nigeria’s neighbouring countries can also be attributed to poor timing of interventions in carrying out both unilateral and multilateral decisions against BH when the group was increasing its territories outside of Nigeria. In spite of poor timing, the expansion of BH could have been reduced unilaterally by Nigeria during the early stages of the group’s development (see chapter six), and in fact Collier et al., (2004) argue that effective unilateral action is capable of stopping the spillover of violence to other countries.

Weak states and political stability are also attributable to the spillover of violence to Nigeria’s neighbouring states (Bosker & de Ree, 2009), as too are porous borders (Atzili, 2007). An empirical evaluation of BH suggests that a long history of political instability in the Lake Chad region has enabled the circulation of weapons and trained combatants that can easily become tools for different forms of violence, including that of BH. Moreover, BH reflects the arguments of ethnic links (Braha, 2011) and the media (Khondker, 2011) as important factors in contributing to the spillover of violence. Kanuri influences have helped in the recruitment of more individuals for BH, and media technology has been instrumental in the radicalisation of individuals across countries in the Lake Chad region, as well as connecting BH with IS. This has resulted in the expansion, promotion, spread and mandate of the group across Nigeria, thereby implying that media technology is key to the internationalisation of a violent movement.

In conclusion, this chapter suggests that a spillover of violence depends on the background from which a group emerges. The background could include a combination of historical ties (both religious and ethnic), geography, ideological motivation and physical support from international ideological groups (Al-Qaeda and IS), political dynamics, CT and multilateral military action.
Chapter 9: Conclusions

The previous chapter discussed the last level of analysis used within this thesis. This chapter now draws together all the previous chapters by highlighting the findings and contribution of this research, as well as its policy implications. In addition, this chapter assesses the utility of all the levels of analysis used in this thesis, with these having been used to underpin discussions about the distinct aspects of BH behaviour over time.

This thesis began by noting that previous studies of BH have primarily focused on the causes and consequences of BH terrorism. Most BH scholars agree that the group escalated because of the extra-judicial killing of the founder of the movement by Nigerian forces, and that BH seeks to impose an ultra-orthodox version of Islam in Nigeria (Barkindo, 2016). However, BH was radicalised before the death of its leader. Moreover, the transnationalisation of BH has been underestimated, with BH having transformed from a small isolationist movement to a far larger and deadlier group.

This study posed two questions: first, it asked how and why BH matured into a fully blown terrorist group; and secondly, it asked about the external and internal factors that have influenced the development of BH. The arguments presented in response note that other studies are overly simplistic in explaining the behaviour of BH over time, and that a more systematic approach was required deploying different levels of analysis to provide a more robust explanation as to the development of BH. These units of analysis formed the framework for chapters four to eight of this thesis. Moreover, these levels of analysis were used rigorously with the additional incorporation of semi-structured elite interviews with senior government officials, local negotiators and experts on BH. The interviews make this thesis distinctive to other studies because they are indicative of a level of access to state officials that is not easily obtained. The interviews provide information about the thinking of state officials in relation to BH, and thus reveal more detailed as well as new information about BH.

This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the findings of this research and the second highlights policy implications of the research. The third section identifies avenues for further research, and the fourth highlights how a multi-level analysis of BH contributes to the body of literature and knowledge about this group. It is important to note that even though the findings of this research cannot be
generalised, aspects can be used to inform future studies on terrorism generally, as well as the Nigerian government’s future policy decisions. The findings of this research can also be used to help reduce common misconceptions about BH among Nigerians, bearing in mind that BH’s campaign of violence has deeply divided Nigerians across both sub-national and religious lines.

9.1 Findings
One of the major contributions of this thesis to the literature on BH is the finding that BH is a rational actor using strategic logic to achieve its goals. The longitudinal approach used in this study indicates how BH has transformed over time. This subsection highlights key events about the evolution of BH, as well as emphasising the attributes of BH as a strategic actor.

Mohammed Yusuf founded BH in 2002 (Loimeier 2012; Mohammed 2014). In 2002, Yusuf had an acrimonious dispute with his former teacher, Sheik Ja’afar Mahmud Adam about the secular nature of the Nigerian state. Yusuf and his followers left Maiduguri (Comolli, 2015) and settled in Kanama village in Yobe state where they formed an isolationist group that was not a part of a secular society as they perceived these as being sinful (Smith 2015).

In 2003, BH had disagreements with Kanama natives over fishing rights (Smith, 2015). This dispute transcended into a faceoff between BH and the Nigerian police (Loimeier, 2012). Yusuf subsequently engaged in violent confrontations with the Nigerian authorities (Agbiboa, 2013a), and then fled to Saudi Arabia for safety (Mohammed, 2013). He returned in 2004 after negotiations with senior government officials from the Borno State government (African Spotlight, 2016).

On return from exile, Yusuf revived and spread his ideology through preaching. Yusuf mobilised economically-disadvantaged and individuals enticed with his ideological arguments. His activities caused a renewed confrontation with the Nigerian forces led to the 2009 BH popular uprising, his arrest and then subsequent killing by Nigerian forces.

After the death of Yusuf in 2009, Mamman Nur, who was third-in-command in BH, took over as interim leader. Nur and the majority of BH members could not contain the pressure of the Nigerian forces and went into exile. Shekau emerged as leader. Shekau spent half of the decade (2010-2015) as the leader of BH and his tenure transformed BH into a more lethal group. In September 2010, BH staged a comeback.
by attacking Bauchi prison to free BH members being held in custody (Adamu, 2012). The Bauchi jailbreak was Shekau’s first successful outing as a leader and was significant in that over 700 BH members were freed (Adamu, 2012).

Increased BH attacks elicited great concern within security agencies. On 14 June 2011, the Inspector General Police (IGP) threatened BH by declaring that, “Boko Haram days are numbered” (Isaac, 2011). Two days later, BH reacted with its first suicide bombing in Nigeria. The bomb exploded in front of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) headquarters in Abuja, with this being an attempt to assassinate the IGP (ibid).

The resurgence of BH enabled it to spread across ten states across Northern Nigerian. In reaction to BH’s increased campaign of violence, the Nigerian government declared a state of emergency. The state of emergency empowered the military with the primary task of combating BH members and it was declared in two phases: the first was in Borno and Yobe (Northeast) as well as Niger and Plateau (Northcentral) states from 31 December 2011 to 18 July 2012 (The Report, 2012). The second phase of the state of emergency was declared in April 2013 (BBC, 2013b). A six-month state of emergency was enforced in May 2013 in the whole of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, and was extended to November 2013 (Campbell, 2014). The state of emergency was also in response to increasing international apprehension about the growing threat of BH especially in 2012, when BH joined AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb), MUJAO (Movement for the Oneness of Jihad in West Africa) to fight the French-led military offensive in Northern Mali. Additionally, BH also elicited further international concern that resulted in the United States (US) designating it as a terrorist group in 2013 (Zenn, 2014b).

Furthermore, the Nigerian government prohibited any form of BH financing (Zenn, 2014a). However, this financial blockade was ineffective because BH devised different ways of sustaining its campaign through for example, bank robberies and extortion (Zenn, 2014a). It engaged in drug and human trafficking across West Africa (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). BH adopted a further tactics including the kidnapping of individuals, especially girls. The abduction of girls in the town of Chibok in 2014 became a milestone in BH’s operation. This millstone became efficient for BH as a means of gaining money from ransom (Zenn 2014b), source for suicide bombing (ibid) and also for marriage to BH recruits. Furthermore, BH raid military barracks to gain access to weapons, and they invaded Giwa, Gwoza Monguno and Bama barracks (Ekott, 2015). By gaining access to military equipment, BH became lethally strong,
and this helped in supporting their violent campaign and emboldening them to seize 21 territories of the Nigerian state.

The seizure of the above noted territories was supported by the expansionist agenda of IS. This agenda was declared in 2014 with it being a quest to widen the spread of IS from Iraq, Syria, Iran and the Levant in an attempt to globalise IS (Roggio, 2014). BH switched its loyalty from Al Qaeda to IS in 2014. Al-Qaeda and IS hold similar radical Salafist ideologies, but BH switched loyalty to IS because they were growing in strength, with this switch of allegiance being possible to attribute to the decimation of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates across Africa (Zenn, 2014b).

In 2015, a military action was launched against BH by a Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which decreased BH’s operational capacity and resulted in the reclamation of Nigerian territories (LWJ, 2015). However, the MNJTF’s action contributed to a spillover of violence within Lake Chad region (Republics of Chad, Cameroon and Cameroon) (UN News Centre, 2016). Additionally, the effect of the MNJTF further motivated BH to increasingly exploit the Kanuri identity to recruit members across the Lake Chad region (International Crisis Group, 2016; 2017a; 2017b).

This thesis has demonstrated that through its evolution and behaviour BH has reflected the three major assumptions of the strategic model of the rational choice theory (RCT). These assumptions suggest that: (1) rational actors have relatively stable and consistent goals; (2) actors compare the expected costs and benefits of the options before them; (3) actors choose options with the most favourable utility.

The different stages of BH’s evolution reflect the group as being a strategic actor. First, after the Kanama incident and the subsequent exile of Yusuf, Yusuf established international support from other global jihadists. Yusuf’s return to Nigeria and his ability to negotiate with political actors in the Borno state government gave him the opportunity to spread his ideology without constrain. Yusuf’s ability to reach an agreement with the Borno state political actors poses the question as to whether terrorists will adopt violence if they have space to achieve their goals through peaceful means. It can be argued that terrorists incorporate different strategies, including diplomacy in the form of pacification or politics, to achieve their goals. Yusuf’s decision to use his connections with Governor Ali Modu Sheriff to recruit and radicalise individuals as well as expanding BH’s ideology is a rational game of politics; thus terrorist goals are motivated by political, religious and ideological factors.
(Sandler & Arce, 2003). Additionally, Mohammed Yusuf’s actions mirror the strategic model’s assumption that terrorists weigh up their options before choosing the one(s) that gives optimum utility. The “perfidy” of Mohammed Yusuf by Ali Modu Sheriff also accentuates an assumption of the strategic model about the use of terrorism as last resort.

Second, BH is a rational actor because it chooses options that have the most favourable utility, as well as comparing the expected costs and benefits of the options before it. The 2010 Bauchi jailbreak in which over 700 hundred members of BH were freed, signifies that BH choose an option that would increase its capacity to operate. However, the killing of BH members by the Nigerian forces as well as the prohibition of the financing of BH made the group adopt a costless approach to achieving its goals. Firstly, the group adopted criminal methods to fund itself such as bank robbery, kidnapping for ransom and drug trafficking. Secondly, because the group found that suicide bombing and the use of radicalised girls had few constraints, they orchestrated suicide attacks on soft-targets, especially in places where there were lots of civilians such as markets, mosques and churches. Furthermore, the 2016 attempt by BH to reinforce itself was different from the Bauchi jailbreak in terms of cost, with the Bauchi jailbreak using firepower instead of propaganda and ransom. BH used propaganda to pressure the government via the public in order to gain concessions, and BH then collected its ransom to free its captives and have its members released.

Thirdly, BH’s target selection suggests that BH uses violence for strategic purposes and as a means of communication. For instance, the attack on the IGP was a response to a threat to BH as well as a sign to show that the group is stronger than the Nigerian government. Additionally, the assaults on civilian populations are a message to civilians also to show that BH is stronger than the government, and these are attempts by BH to gain support from civilians populations through the use of fear. This is observable with the civilians in the Borno-Yobe axis who were caught between BH violence and the brute force of the Nigerian army (Amnesty International, 2015a; 2015b). As argued by Kydd & Walter (2006), terrorists’ attacks on a civilian population are aimed at intimidating civilians in order to gain their obedience.

When considering the above in a broader perspective, BH’s presence in rural and wilderness areas is a strategy with favourable utility. It is central for the group’s emergence, survival and use of tactics. BH has shown its desire to stay in urban areas by establishing a mosque in Maiduguri, the Markaz Ibn Taymiyyah (Walker, 2016),
and creating clandestine cells (START Report 2014). However, the group went underground after the 2009 uprising to its safe havens in rural and wilderness areas in border regions around the Lake Chad region, while still indicating its quest to spread across major cities in Northern Nigeria. This is evident in BH’s expansion of its branches and cells. BH spread in seven more Nigerian states apart from Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states (START Report 2014), with the implications of this asymmetrical approach and clandestinity creating a complex situation for the Nigerian forces when trying to fight the group. This may also be the reason why Participant One (a former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) admits that, “Nigerian security is being confronted with an unconventional issue.” Moreover, this has also contributed to the spread of BH across Cameroon, Chad and Niger (International Crisis Group, 2016; 2017a; 2017b).

One of the assumptions of the strategic model is that rational actors have relatively stable and consistent goals. This is true with BH because regardless of the group’s Kanuri ethnic identity members, it still maintains its goal of spreading radical Salafist ideology. As demonstrated in this thesis, the use of violence by BH is instrumental, but the group’s aim is to promote the spread of radical Salafist ideology. This goal began with Mohammed Yusuf and has been fostered by his successors and followers.

This thesis finds that BH is a rational group that adopts a strategic use of violence, but that Nigerian policy makers and senior government officials were initially unaware of the BH tactics and so did not appreciate the rationality of BH. First, Nigerian lawmakers were politically divided about enacting a CT act to address BH activities until BH became a fully-fledged terrorist group (Sampson & Onuoha, 2011: 38). In fact it was only after the maturity of BH that the Terrorism Protection Act 2011 was enacted and then reviewed in 2013. Second, Participant One (a former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state) admits that, “there was a was a degree of mismanagement of the crisis by Nigerian security”, and that Nigerian security forces were confronted with an unconventional war (see page 134). Participant Six (involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy) also confirmed that because the fight against BH was “not normal” to them, they had to initiate a CT strategy in 2014 which was the first CT strategy designed to counter terrorism since the birth of BH (see page 135). Furthermore, there were complications for the government in understanding of BH, for instance during his term in office,
President Jonathan made three different statements about BH. In January, 2012 he said BH supporters were within the government and the security forces (Mark, 2012; Aliyu et al., 2015); in June 2012, he noted that the BH leadership was unknown; and in 2015, he stated that BH was a global phenomenon not limited to Nigeria alone (Premium Times, 2015c). These multiple statements are problematic in understanding how the government sees BH. Another confusing statement made by President Buhari, President Jonathan’s successor, was his avowal to end BH within seven months and then his declaration to have “technically defeated” BH (Nwabughiogu, 2015). These statements were made because Nigerian territories were reclaimed, but they did not give consideration to the ideological aspects of BH or their asymmetric tactics. There were also a number of issues that the Nigerian government official appeared to be unaware of such as mismanagement and insufficient knowledge having caused a great number of casualties, especially through indiscriminate killings by government forces. Nigerian government officials did and do not seem to understand that the trauma, fear and grievances resulting from such indiscriminate killings is pushing individuals into joining BH (see chapter five). Furthermore, the majority of Nigerian officials do not seem to understand the BH propaganda; BH adopts Kanuri ethnicity to increase its numbers and expand its territorial influence around the Lake Chad region, but the thinking of the majority of Nigerian policy makers remains centred on attributing BH to radical Islam. Finally, the majority of Nigerian officials also seem to be unaware of the role of communication, and especially the advanced technologies used by BH to spread their propaganda (see page 120).

This thesis has also provided a multi-level analysis of the evolution and behaviour of BH. Chapters four to eight examine individual, group, state, sub-state and international explanations for the emergence and development of BH.

In chapter four, findings about the relationship between leadership and followers in BH, as well as the implications of leadership decapitation, suggest that individual leaders assume positions of authority because of pre-existing loyalties to a vicegerent or hereditary leader. Furthermore, the chapter found that the leadership of BH commands loyalty through religious and ideological factors. These factors are anchored on the eschatological belief of mujaddid and Mahdiyya. The chapter identifies ethnic entrepreneurship by BH leadership as being both a factor in mobilising BH members to violence, as well as being part of the cause for the splintering of BH. The chapter found that the external influences of both Al-Qaeda
and IS have created rivalry among BH leaders as well as internal factions, and that the leadership approaches of BH leaders have also contributed to factions within the movement. With regards to leadership decapitation, one strand of this thesis states that leadership decapitation creates internal turmoil that gradually leads to the collapse of a terrorist group. However, even though BH members were divided by both the decapitation strategy of the Nigerian government as well as internal dynamics, BH factions collaborated with each other in spite of their divisions. This implies that regardless of internal and external factors, BH members remain bonded by political Islam. The shared goal of BH further confirms the assumption of the unitary model of the rational choice theory (RCT) that was used in chapter five to explain common preferences of BH members.

The findings in chapter five are related to organisational structure and goals, motivation, membership composition and recruitment. With regards to its organisational structure, BH is a hybrid of a cell-like organisation and a hierarchical structure. The cells are for the survival and spread of the organisation, and to ensure that as the group spreads to different parts of Nigeria, the destruction of any cell will not destroy BH as a group. This study found that BH has over 50,000 members comprising of a majority membership from the Kanuri tribes, with other members from the 19 Northern tribes, who are adherents of radical Salafism. The BH interpretation of Islam is guided by the radical beliefs of Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th century Damascene scholar, jurist and Islamic figure. The chapter revealed that the structure and spread of BH was reduced as a result of authoritarian leadership within the group, internal divisions, decreasing public sympathy, counter-terrorism and a decrease in operational capacity. These findings can inform future studies on how violent groups can weaken over time. Moreover, the chapter identified additional recruitment patterns used by BH other than those noted in more conventional thinking, i.e. that religion and poverty are exclusively used by BH for recruitment (Adesoji, 2010 & 2011; Maiangwa et al., 2012; Agbibo, 2013a; Hansen & Musa, 2013). Other methods of recruitment identified include abduction, hypnotism, coercion, self-radicalisation/recruitment, revenge, fear, marriage and solidarity with other international jihadists. This reveals that individuals above Nigeria’s national minimum wage join BH, with the further finding that BH’s utilisation of child soldiers and especially of girls, is opportunistic and economically cheap. The group needs to use children to carry out attacks because most of its skilled operatives are either dead or have been imprisoned by the Nigerian
authorities. Additionally, girls are used for suicide bombings following subjection to trauma and stigmatisation. Furthermore, recruited girls are also used to attract more male recruits through the promise of marriages, with the study additionally finding that because girl recruits are considered to have less fortitude in combat, male recruits are used for combat and the girls for suicide attacks.

The findings in chapter six suggest that BH is a strategic actor, and that the timing and approach of Nigeria CT influenced the transformation of BH. BH is a strategic actor because it uses a sequential approach in pursuing its goals: it started with diplomacy and then moved to propaganda, violence, kidnapping with demands for ransoms and spying on Nigerian forces. The chapter also identified that BH’s transfer of allegiance from Al-Qaeda to IS (Islamic state) was for strategic reasons that were in reaction to Nigerian CT efforts. Al-Qaeda and IS share a similar ideology but BH switched loyalty to IS because they were growing in strength, whereas Al-Qaeda and its affiliates across Africa were being decimated (Zenn, 2014b). These findings also suggest that BH initially wanted a peaceful transition from a secular to a Sharia state in Nigeria, that it weighs up its options before it acts and that it selects its targets strategically to gain optimal effect. In its strategic use of violence against the Nigerian state, BH’s logic of attacks reflects Kydd & Walter’s (2006) notion of the costly signalling of carrying out attacks for reasons of attrition, intimidation, provocation or spoiling. BH in fact attacks to weaken state forces, coerce people into joining them and force governments to carry out indiscriminate violence against them so as to radicalise and encourage individuals into joining BH. BH does employ a strategic approach to enable it to survive the strength of the Nigerian forces and as mentioned above, child soldiers are used to address the shortfall of skilled operatives in the movement. Moreover, BH attacks prisons to free their members and in a situation where they have less military strength available, they adopt a costless approach by exchanging some of their civilian captives for their incarcerated skilled operatives.

The nature of Nigerian CT has facilitated the transformation of BH. This chapter posits that its findings point to the failure of the Nigerian government to address the prevention and alleviation of early risk factors that may have in fact prevented the radicalisation of individuals. The heavy military crackdowns on BH by Nigerian forces led to a situational events that exasperated an already radicalised BH. Nigerian CT against BH was initially weak and thus allowed BH to transform, bearing in mind that BH became prominent in 2009, but Nigeria had no CT laws until 2011.
and its first CT strategies were not initiated until 2014. The interview data in this chapter also reveals that the Nigerian government was not familiar with or suitably prepared for BH’s style of terrorism. The chapter found that the intensity of BH violence was also determined by increased military action being taken against it, especially the declarations of a state of emergency in 2012 and 2013 by the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN).

Chapter seven’s findings relate to the variations in target frequencies of BH. The findings suggest that similar to the majority of terrorists, BH do not target their constituents; they instead attack civilians and state officials who are at odds with their ideology. This study observed that dogmatic belief determines BH target selection, and as such this belief enables BH to categorise individuals into believers, non-believers (kafirs), and ‘traitors’ within Islam who collude with non-believers. This categorisation can be further divided into state forces, government buildings, non-military officials, people, private property, and educational/religious figures and institutions. The findings suggest that BH targeting is more prevalent in territories with higher ethnic and religious historical significance because of the group’s quest for ethno-religious revival. Additionally, the findings observed that BH’s ability to attack determine the variation in the frequencies of attacks on specific target types.

Chapter eight’s findings relate to the influx of radicalism into Nigeria, the factors that have helped in internationalising BH and the spillover of violence out of Nigerian territory to countries in the Lake Chad region (i.e. the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger). The study observed that Islamic radicalism came to Nigeria at different times. The Fula jihad across West Africa was reflected in Nigeria through the Usman dan Fodio jihad of the 19th century, with the Mahdiyya movement (from Sudan) attempted to continue with the dan Fodio legacy between the 19th and early 20th century. Another major influence was the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which inspired the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN). The transformation of BH from a small isolationist movement to a full-blown terrorist group was as a result of local grievances combined with the revivalism of a global radical Salafist movement. Furthermore, there were three major external factors that influenced the growth and internationalisation of BH: international terrorist groups (the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and IS), the international war on terror and international politics and major events such as the killings of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Ghaddafi. The killing of Saddam Hussein contributed to the rise and growth of IS, whereas the killing of Muammar
Ghaddafi weakened the Libyan state and therefore allowed for the smooth inflow of terrorists and weapons across Africa. This influx of militants and weapons resulted in IS creating provinces in West Africa. BH was inspired by the expansionist agenda declared by IS in 2014, with this offering a reason as to why BH engaged in seizing Nigerian territory in 2014 and then declared allegiance to IS in 2015. Chapter eight noted that some BH members who carry out attacks are not Nigerians, but are instead from Nigeria’s neighbouring states. It further identified that multiple reasons have contributed to the spillover of BH to other countries within the Lake Chad region. These factors include historical ties (religion and ethnic affiliation), geographical proximity and long periods of political instability around the Lake Chad region that have helped create the availability of weapons and trained fighters. Geographical features in the Lake Chad region in addition to proximity to Nigeria were also noted as providing safe sanctuaries for BH members, for example Mandara Mountain and the Sambisa Forest.

The study identified the advance technology as being instrumental in the spread of radical ideology, especially in the Republic of Cameroon. Initially the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger considered BH to be an entirely Nigerian problem and moreover, allowed BH to carry out activities in their territories because of their fear that BH might declare war on them if they opposed them. As a result, BH utilised such opportunities to not only further radicalise people in neighbouring countries, but to also stockpile weapons, fuel and food in the Diffa region in Niger in order to sustain its war with Nigeria. The thesis then observed that international intervention became a major factor vis-à-vis BH violence in the Republics of Cameroon, Chad and Niger, because in 2014 these nations were concerned about the increasing popularity of BH activities. Each declared military action against BH with the result that BH saw them as enemies. Furthermore, military cooperation by countries in the Lake Chad region through the MNJTF in 2015 dramatically increased the severity of BH incidences.

The frequency of attack variance among these affected nations is related to the strength of their military or geographical borders. For example, the Republic of Cameroon has been the most affected of these three nations by BH attacks. It has a loose border and its border towns are relatively deprived and as such, deprived individuals are potential recruits to BH because of perceived economic benefits. The targeting of the Republic of Cameroon was also motivated by the additional economic
reasons of kidnapping and human trafficking. In contrast, attacks in the Republic of Chad were more of a military reprisal as BH encountered more difficulty in attacking Chad because of the strength of its forces.

9.2 Policy implications
The levels of analysis approach used in this thesis provides a broad perspective for policy intervention. The thesis recommends that to address the threat of BH and to prevent religious radicalism, both internal and external factors need to be considered. Internal factors include the thinking of BH, and this could be addressed by the Nigerian government through robust collaboration with religious bodies. Although the state and religion need to be kept separate, religious bodies in Nigeria collaborate with the government in areas such as conflict management or public orientation about specific government policies. In addition, there is collaboration on public health issues such as polio, Ebola and other disease outbreaks. External factors are both indirect and direct. Indirect factors include relative poverty, corruption, deprivation and grievances. External factors affect the Nigerian government’s CT efforts, with these being either proactive or nonviolent approaches in an attempt to prevent and ultimately end terrorism.

Theology plays an important role in the radicalisation of individuals. Chapter four of this thesis identified the role of eschatological beliefs and scholarly works by figures such as Ibn Taymiyyah as being factors that contribute to extremists thinking. The counter-violent extremism (CVE) aspect of Nigerian CT could engage with influential Islamic organisations such as the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (NSCIA), Jama’atu Nasrîl Islam (JNI) and the Da’awah Coordination Committee of Nigeria (DCCN), with terms of reference both reflecting and countering each group’s ideology. Some of the aforementioned scholarly works are outdated and not in tune with modern society, for example the radical views of Ibn Taymiyyah are contextualised within the resistance to the Mongolian invasion of the writer’s Damascene homeland in the 13th century. Moreover, the Emir of Kano, one of the most senior Islamic and Hausa leader in Northern Nigeria, suggests that:

We have adopted an interpretation of our culture and our religion that is rooted in a 13th century mind-set that refuses to recognise that the rest of the Muslim world has moved on. (Sanusi, 2017).
The Emir’s call for general reform in Northern Nigeria with regards to its culture and religion reflects his belief that a more liberal society would ensure more development in this region. In this context, the Emir was concerned about the adherence to orthodox Islam in Northern Nigeria and its knock-on effect on the under-development of the Northern region, thereby implying that certain scholarly works used as guides by some Northern Muslims need to be discarded. As knowledge is dynamic, certain assumptions and facts need to be challenged in order to reflect modern society, and findings indicate that numerous ancient Islamic texts have been altered to better align with extremist ideologies (Holbrook, 2010). Such literature may be in circulation in Nigeria as events indicate that there is growing self-radicalisation in Nigeria. Such events include the attack on the Shiites by non-Shiite Muslims in the Northern cities of Kaduna, Kano, Katsina and Sokoto (THISDAY, 2016b), and attacks on Christians who were eating outside during the month of Ramadan (Cable, 2016).

Preaching also plays a vital role in spreading radical ideologies, with secularism being another aspect that needs more modern Islamic interpretation. This encompasses areas such as apostasy, infidel, jihad, Mahdi (rightly-guided one), mujaddid (reformer or reviver), takfīr (a Muslim who accuses other Muslims of apostasy) (see chapter four for more information about these concepts). These concepts appear in the majority of radical Islamic rhetoric and are used by radical preachers to demarcate society between Islamic and un-Islamic. Similarly, Cole and Cole (2009) find that words such as kafir are used to dehumanise individuals who do not share the same ideology as that of radical Islamists. In countering such narratives, the Nigerian government could collaborate with Islamic bodies to license Islamic preachers, in the same way that preacher licencing is currently practised in states such as Niger and Sokoto in Northern Nigeria (Punch, 2014; THISDAY, 2013). The licencing of preachers could help in reducing propaganda and hate messages being spread, and it can be further argued that such engagement in robust actions in order to prevent radical and inciting messages from spreading is important when countering extremist narratives.

This research has identified a number of external factors (indirect and direct) that have aided BH’s campaign of violence. Indirect factors have contributed in the mobilisation of BH members, as argued in the recruitment section of chapter five. BH uses deprivation and relative poverty to also motivate its members through for example, soft loans and marriages. Hence it is important for the Nigerian Government
to enunciate a welfare policy that would lift individual poverty and deprivation, especially in the Northern part of Nigeria where Islamism exists. Other aspects of intervention include corruption and grievances. There is a need for the Nigerian Government to address the issue of corruption because individuals become aggrieved and believe funds that should be used to develop society are been siphoned by those in power. In addition, this is one of the reasons that BH rejects democracy and secularism because it sees it as a corrupt system that facilitates corruption (DCCN, 2009). As argued in chapter six, the extrajudicial killing of BH leaders and the subsequent killings and torturing of moderates (Amnesty International Report (2015a, 2015b) have contributed to the recruitment and support of BH, as argued in chapter six. The Nigerian Government needs to give far more attention to human rights while combating BH through CT strategies because of their indirect implications. The direct factor refers to the direct CT actions of the government. The Nigerian government’s proactive CT identified the Sambisa Forest as BH’s main hideout. In 2016, it announced its capture of the Sambisa Forest, yet BH still carried out attacks around the Borno axis. Chapter six of this thesis suggests that BH in fact uses several geographical areas as sanctuaries including the Burra Forest in the Northwest of Nigeria. The Burra Forest connects Sambisa, Dansadau, and Falgore Game Reserve to Birnin Gwari, and it is close to Bauchi, Gombe, Yobe, Adamawa, Borno, and Jigawa states (Daily Trust, 2016). This sort of geographical proximity facilitates BH’s tactical manoeuvring.

In the aspect of nonviolent CT approach of the Nigerian government, more attention needs to be given to the social media as well as technological advances because of their continuos contribution to the spreading of radical ideologies. Both audio and visual types of media have influenced the spread of radicalism inside and outside of Nigeria, with radical preaching of clerics having been publicised (Loimeier, 2012). Moreover, with the aid of modern media such as Facebook and Twitter, information now travels far faster across countries and the recent examples of Gambo and Uwais (see chapter five) show how easy it is for individuals to self-radicalise. With preaching in local languages being easily accessible on YouTube, extremist ideas are being shared in modern and sophisticated ways. This makes it increasingly important that the PREVENT approach of NACTEST develops a special unit to monitor such uploaded videos or audio materials in order to reduce the influence of the media in radicalisation. In addition to this, the role schools can play in
radicalisation is also important. Since the Nigerian education system allows religious studies in its curriculum in both primary and secondary schools, this part of the curriculum should contain elements of Peace Studies. Certain aspects of the Bible such as the wars in the Old Testament (Thomas, 2013) and the battles in the Qur’an as well as concepts such as jihad, *shirk* (idolatry; punishable by death) and *shahid* (martyr or one who dies for the sake of Islam; often justified by suicide bombers) that legitimate the use of violence (Mitrev, 2012) need to be addressed by introducing topics about hermeneutics in order to curb the puzzle of contextual interpretation. Peace Studies should be introduced as a compulsory aspect of the school curriculum, or as part of the general studies curriculum (GSTs) in Nigerian universities. Peace Clubs should be created and fully supported by the Ministry of Education and the National Orientation Agency (NOA) of schools and tertiary education in order to promote unity and enhance peer-to-peer learning and awareness. The ‘speak out, act right’ (SOAR) initiative of Ahmadu Bello University Zaria provides a model for establishing peer-to-peer enlightenment, with the SOAR initiative being a programme where students are sensitised towards all forms of extremism within and outside of their educational worlds (Ojo, 2017).

This study found that the root cause of violent extremism has been mainly as a result of the Nigerian government’s neglect of early signs of radicalisation, and then heightened radicalisation following their decapitation strategy. Between 2016 and 2017, the arrests and long detentions before going to trial of the Indigenous People of Biafra leaders (IPOB), a separatist movement in eastern Nigeria, emboldened members of the group as well as people from the Eastern region to threaten the unity and security of Nigeria (Segun, 2017). Another identified area of concern is that war on BH might form a new narrative for future conflicts, because people have been trapped between the violence of BH and the excessive force of the Nigerian state. Added to this is the lack of de-radicalisation of BH-held captives, for example approximately 5,000 people held captive by BH were freed by the Nigerian Army in June 2016 (Reuters 2016). These captives were released without undergoing any kind of de-radicalisation. Additionally, about 267 non-BH individuals mistakenly detained by the army were released without apology or compensation (Fox News, 2016) (chapter six). Finally, although the Nigerian government partners with a number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) involved with internally displaced people (IDP) camps, such groups are not included in rehabilitation or reintegration processes.
9.3 Avenues for future research
An understudied area related to BH is its utilisation of the social media and internet in communication and propaganda, and most especially its use of the internet. Bertram and Ellison (2014) suggest that terrorist groups in sub-Saharan Africa, including BH, rely on the Internet for propaganda, yet in-depth studies have not been carried out to understand how the media has contributed to the growth of BH over time. The influence of the media on BH is discussed in chapter five, and it was concluded that there is a need for broader research in this area. First, further studies need to be conducted on how BH has used media platforms to increase its popularity, as well as why reporting on BH is predominately by foreign rather than local media. Second, studies need to be carried out on how BH uses the Internet for recruitment either through propaganda or direct contact with potential new recruits. Third, more studies need to be conducted on how the Internet facilitates connections with international terror groups, for example there are indications that BH has connections with Afriqiyah media, a jihadist site with a link to Islamic State (IS). The reason for this suggested connection is that BH’s application to join IS was announced by Afriqiyah media in 2015 (Omojuwa, 2015; Lister, 2015). Thus, there is a room for further empirical investigation into how media such as the Internet facilitates the transformation and operations of terrorist groups, with findings perhaps being able to contribute to the broader field of terrorism studies.

One aspect that has not been widely discussed in this research but which could inform future studies on terrorism, is how the public has helped support the emergence and transformation of BH (chapter five), with Participant One noting:

Let me tell you, at a certain point great numbers of leaders and opinion moulders were interested in what Boko Haram was doing because they thought it was a fight against the infidels or non-Islamists. A number of them wanted to join BH until things changed and they realised the futility of trying to support this group. This is why fighting BH is very difficult because they claim these people are their children, their brothers and sisters, and they are not prepared to disclose any information to help security operatives arrest them. Participant One is suggesting that when BH started, a number of locals (including community leaders and influential individuals) in the same communities as BH members supported them because they thought that they were fighting a just cause for the propagation of religion. Other inhabitants considered BH members to be a part of
their family or community, and were therefore not willing to assist security operatives by divulging any information about BH. Participant One also suggests that such support for BH has faded because of the intensity and indiscriminate killings orchestrated by the group.

It can be argued that such public support could be justified by some of the writings of ancient Islamic figures that are used to promote Islamic radicalism. As such, even though it is difficult to identify the amount of Islamic literature in circulation, studies could be conducted about the content of Islamic literature across Northern Nigeria, and a comparative study could be conducted on Islamic literature between North and South-West Nigeria. Even though there are no statistics on the number of Muslims in either of these regions, anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a considerable number of Muslims in South-West Nigeria who practise moderate forms of Islam. Conducting a study about how public support influences BH would contribute to the field of terrorism by exploring how public support facilitates the transformation of terrorist groups.

9.4 Contributions
The longitudinal approach applied in this thesis highlighted the strategic logic of BH behaviour and transformation. Even though the findings of BH cannot be generalised but, longitudinal study of a terrorist group may demonstrate the logic of its strategies and evolution.

Furthermore, because the behaviour of terrorist groups is complex and needs to be studied at a micro unit level, examination of the existence, development and dynamics of BH through the levels of analysis offers important perspectives that can inform future research. Terrorist groups are dynamic in nature and their behaviour varies both internally and externally. This is why using the levels of analysis gives in-depth explanations about a group and its uniqueness. It also allows for the rigorous study of a terrorist group in a comprehensive manner. Moreover, the study of BH over time can be used to understand the reasons for the ever-changing nature of a terrorist group behaviour. Additionally, it shows that different aspects of terrorist comportment are dependent on each other and that without one of these, explanations will be incomplete.

This study suggests that in order to understand how terrorists operate it is important to understand different terrorist behaviour in terms of leadership, group
structure, goals, targeting, intensity, variation in violence tactics and recruitment. These aspects do not work in isolation, but instead they inter-connect with each other and also change over time because terrorists want to achieve their goals while responding to external factors. Moreover, some of these aspects of behaviour are manifestations of internal dynamics within terrorist groups. Therefore, this fact underscores the importance of using a levels of analysis approach. Accordingly, the individual level highlights the inter-personal relationships of individuals that form the building blocks for collective action, and these can be understood through leadership/follower relations, leadership dispute, group splintering and how different leadership determines the intensity of violence. However, the individual level does not work in isolation as the leadership depends on its group for loyalty and the furtherance of shared goals. Studying terrorist groups at a group level reveals the goals, thinking, internal dynamism and effects of external influences on a group. External influences may come from the environment where terrorists live, from state CT, support from international terror groups or international military cooperation against the terrorist group. A combination of all of these factors explains terrorist tactics, target selection, variation in target selection, recruitment and spillover. In turn, because terrorist groups are secretive, the nature of terrorist violence can also be used to understand a group’s strength and thinking. For instance, a terrorist group’s target type may explain whether they are outbidding a rival group or fighting people out of their constituency. The variation in target selection helps us to understand whether a group is responding to government forces, is more concerned about ideology/ethnicity or if this is a sign of weakness. The advantage of the levels of analysis is that each unit complements each other and that with the neglect of one, the strength of the study is reduced. Moreover, each of these behaviours is better examined under one unit of analysis.

Studying the development and behaviour of terrorism often challenges existing theoretical assumptions or empirical facts, as it suggests that a single theory or empirical study is insufficient because of the dynamic nature of terrorism. For example, in chapter four numerous accounts about the leadership of violent movements were used to explain BH leadership, and in chapter eight a number of empirical arguments were incorporated to explain BH spillover of violence to other countries. Another contribution of this study is that it can inform future studies about different perspectives in terrorism and political violence including the cause, motivation and
consequences of terrorism, recruitment and mobilisation, terrorist targeting, CT, spillover of violence and conflict process.

This thesis suggests that a mixed methods case study with multi-level analysis allows for a rigorous and systematic investigation of a terrorist group. In other words, the multi-level analysis has strong methodological backing in which the weakness of one method is addressed by the strength of other. Because investigating terrorist groups is a challenging task given the security risks and clandestine nature of such groups, a combination of different explanations and a number of sources is required to understand the complex nature of a terrorist group.

9.6 Concluding remarks
Understanding the evolution, development and behaviour of terrorists is complex because of the ever-changing nature of terrorism. Terrorist behaviour is dynamic: it varies both internally and externally. This research could contribute both theoretically and empirically in understanding the development, evolution and behaviour of terrorist groups. This thesis can also contribute in terms of approaches and methodologies in terrorism research. The findings can also be useful in resolving the ongoing campaign of violence by BH.

The approach used in this research has engaged different theories such as rational choice theory (both the unitary and strategic models) and the ‘bunch of guys’ theories. The empirical facts from this study can also be used to understand different aspects of terrorist behaviour in areas such as leadership, groups and their composition, targeting and the transnationalisation of terrorist groups.

The methodology used in this thesis could also be useful in terrorism research because of its flexibility, which allows for a number of methods, theories and empirical debates to be utilised when investigating a complex group.

The different aspects of terrorist behaviour examined through the levels of analysis could also be important for CT action because it highlights areas in which governments can take actions that could end terror groups. In other words, understanding the internal dynamics within a terrorist group and the changing strategies of terrorists, as well as other aspects that propel the success of terrorist groups, could help governments better identify appropriate CT actions in order to curtail all the components of terrorist behaviour.
The understudied areas on BH such as its growth in communication and propaganda through the help of social media and the Internet could give more in-depth information about BH if investigated further. Other avenues for further research such as public support and Islamic literature in circulation (which this thesis has suggested as factors that help support the radicalisation and motivating factors of BH) could be investigated in order to gain more information about BH.

The researcher hopes that this study contributes in a small way to improving the theoretical, empirical and methodological study of terrorism and is of help in ending BH.
Bibliography


Aljazeera report (2011) *Africa and the Arab world after Gaddafi*. Available at:  


Aminiya (2014) Bar’a ce maganin azzaluman Najeriya Available at:  

Amnesty International Report (2015a) *Op-ed: Stars on their shoulders, blood on their hands*. Available at:  

Amnesty International Report (2015b) *Boko haram at a glance*. Available at:  


CRS (Country Report on Terrorism) (2005) Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of States. Available at: 

CRS Report (2008) *Instability in Chad*. Available at: 

CRS (Country Report on Terrorism) (2013) Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of States [online] Available at: 

CRS (Country Report on Terrorism) (2014) Bureau of Counterterrorism, US Department of States [online] Available at: 


Daily Nation (2009) *Hundreds of bodies in streets after Nigeria unrest*. Available at: 


Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd (Accessed 30 June 2017)


GTD (Global Terrorism Database) Available at: https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?search=boko+haram&sa.x=56&sa.y=14&sa=Search (Accessed 7 March 2017)


Khondker, H. H. (2011) *Role of the new media in the Arab spring*,” Zayed University, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. 18 November.


Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 7 (3) 335.


LWJ (Long War Journal) (2015) *Hundreds killed as Chadian military overruns Boko Haram strongholds*. Available at: 


National Strategy on Counterterrorism (NACTEST) (2014)


QGIS (Quantum Gis) (undated) Available at: http://www.diva-gis.org/gdata (Accessed 19 June 2017)


Reuters (2016) *Nigerian army says it freed over 5,000 people held by Boko Haram.*


Sampson, I.T. and Onuoha, C. F. (2011) ‘Forcing the horse to drink or making it realise its Thirst’? understanding the enactment of Anti-Terrorism Legislation (ATL) in Nigeria. *Perspective on Terrorism*, 5 (3-4) 33-49.


258


Terrorism Protection Act (TPA) (2011 &2013).

The Cable (2014) *The All Progressives Congress (APC) has urged the National Assembly to demand from the executive, an account of “the billions of dollars” spent on prosecuting the war against Boko Haram.* Available at: https://www.thecable.ng/apc-billions-spent-on-boko-haram-must-be-probed (Accessed 8 August 2016).


The Telegraph (2016) *Kidnapped, drugged and strapped into suicide vest: Nigerian mother describes how Boko Haram tried to force her to do their killing.*


The Report (2012) *Nigeria 2012.* Available at:
[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=zDKiPotbfygC&amp;pg=PA21&amp;lpg=PA21&amp;dq=Nigeria+declares+state+of+emergency+in+local+government+areas+of+yobe+in+2012&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=ixd3DFJ5SA&amp;sig=vfp5d0FfUU1lDDDmlq3kc8CuB4&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiqvayV4cHPAhWKaD4KHWgURLAgAQ6AEIViAJ#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false](https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=zDKiPotbfygC&amp;pg=PA21&amp;lpg=PA21&amp;dq=Nigeria+declares+state+of+emergency+in+local+government+areas+of+yobe+in+2012&amp;source=bl&amp;ots=ixd3DFJ5SA&amp;sig=vfp5d0FfUU1lDDDmlq3kc8CuB4&amp;hl=en&amp;sa=X&amp;ved=0ahUKEwiqvayV4cHPAhWKaD4KHWgURLAgAQ6AEIViAJ#v=onepage&amp;q&amp;f=false) (Accessed 4 October 2016).

THISDAY (2013). *Sultanate council: only licensed Islamic preachers will be allowed to preach.* Available at:

THISDAY (2016a) *Military captures Boko Haram’s spiritual home, Alargano* [Online] Available at:


Appendix 1: Interview participants (description, location and dates of interviews)

Below is a table indicating the description of each participant. While the identity of the participants remains anonymous, it is important to describe the participants in order to highlight their relevance to the research on BH.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Location &amp; Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant One</td>
<td>Abuja, 1.7.15</td>
<td>A former top government official in a Northern Nigerian state. He was in government during the emergence of BH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Two</td>
<td>Minna, 14.7.15</td>
<td>A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and knowledgeable in Islamic theology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Three</td>
<td>Abuja, 11.8.15</td>
<td>A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and expert in conflict negotiation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Four</td>
<td>Abuja, 21.7.15</td>
<td>A member of the former Presidential Committee on BH and senior government official.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Five</td>
<td>Wamba, 9.815</td>
<td>Member of the erstwhile committee of the drafting of the present constitution of Nigeria (1999 Constitution).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Six</td>
<td>Jos, 19.8.15</td>
<td>Involved in the drafting of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Seven</td>
<td>Jos, 13.08.15</td>
<td>A media practitioner and conflict negotiator within Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Eight</td>
<td>Zaria, 18.815</td>
<td>An academic and security consultant who had several contacts with BH members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Nine</td>
<td>Kaduna, 23.7.15</td>
<td>A retired General in the Nigerian Army. He served as Commandant of several army units during his service days.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant Ten</td>
<td>Lafia, 6.7.15</td>
<td>A former lawmaker and attorney general.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: A sample of the interview request letter

27th June 2015

... Nigeria.

Dear Sir,

Letter for Interview Request

I am Solomon Anjide, a PhD student in International Relations at the School of Social and Political Science, University of Lincoln. My PhD thesis investigates the birth of Boko Haram and the path to terror. I am presently in Nigeria to conduct interviews and I will be doing fieldwork in Nigeria until August.

This research project is solely for educational purposes and uses Boko Haram as a case study in examining the causes and motivations of violence.

You have been selected as a participant in the interviews due to your vast knowledge on the Nigerian state, Islamic Theology, and experience in public service. Moreover, this research seeks to inquire more information from you as a member of the committee of the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) which is mandated to dialogue with Boko Haram.

In order to preserve confidentiality, your name will not be made public and your personal data will be processed with due regard for data security. Anonymity is guaranteed by following the University of Lincoln research ethics policy.
To ensure data protection, the file containing personal data will be kept in secured cabinets, electronic data will also be encrypted and stored in a safe. I will strictly adhere to the University of Lincoln ethics guideline in line with the Data Protection Act, and the data will only be accessible to me as a researcher. I am very aware of the ethics and responsibilities under the Data Protection Act. In case you wish to withdraw your participation, your data will be destroyed safely and securely.

For any further enquiries, please do not hesitate to contact me via email at sAnjide@lincoln.ac.uk, via mobile on +447448763385 (UK), +2348033897356 (Nigeria) or by post at; School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lincoln, Brayford Pool, Lincoln, LN6 7TS, United Kingdom.

Thank you in anticipation for your kind response.
Appendix 3: Interview schedule

Below is a sample of the interview schedule. All participants were asked the same set of questions. The participants were also asked similar probing questions. However, where the researcher needs more information, the interviewees are asked follow-up questions.

Interview session

Interviewer: Solomon Anjide

Interviewee: (Name)

Date:

Interviewer: Good day Mr..., my name is Solomon Anjide, I am a PhD student studying International Relations in the School of Social and Political Science at University of Lincoln United Kingdom.

I am presently on a fieldwork research on the topic, "the birth of Boko Haram and the path to terror". Given your years of experience in the public sector, your deep knowledge as a security expert (negotiator, Islam e.t.c), understanding and dedication to the survival of Nigeria, I have come to acquire in-depth understanding on the cause and motivation of Boko Haram violence.

Let me also reiterate my earlier assurances on anonymity and privacy. In presenting the findings of this research, you will be given a pseudonym and, any electronic material used will be highly encrypted material while written material will be locked in secured cabinet.

While I crave for your esteem indulgence and generous time, may I proceed with my questions?

Interviewee: (reply)

Interviewer: Thank you very much. Sir, the Interview consists of two sections, section 1 focuses on the cause of Boko Haram while section 2 concentrates on its motivation to violence. is it fine to discuss on both?

Interviewee: (reply)

Interviewer: Thanks

Part 1: Cause of Boko Haram Violence.

1. In your view what are the principle causes of Boko Haram

   a. What is the role of poverty?:

      PQ1 (Probing Question) : corruption ?

      PQ2: Climate ?
b. What would you suggest is the role of political factors such as exclusion and discrimination?
PQ1: Sir would you think it is politically motivated?
c. There are confusing versions about the role of religion, how instrumental do think religion is to the group's violent disposition?
d. Some version opine that Boko Haram is influenced by the Salafist ideology, can you clarify this notion please?
e. Another version suggests that BH originated from Izala movement and that they both believe in the Salafiyya doctrine, in your opinion can you explain the main theological differences between the two?
f. Another version says Boko Haram is influenced by international radical groups. How closely related do you think Boko Haram is to those groups, are there ideological similarities?
PQ1: can you say Boko Haram relates with these international radical groups for strategic survival?

Part 2- Motivations to violence

1. some groups might use for example religion to justify their campaigns but in the end it may have originated from economic and political discrimination could this be the case for Boko Haram?
PQ1: In the course of dialogue with them, what did they say is their choice for the violence? (for those who had contact with BH)
2. What do you think explains the changes in the levels of violence Here is a timeline of Boko Haram attacks, what do you think explains the relative highs and relative lows?
PQ1: Some people blame the military on the escalation of violence, in your observation, did some military actions such as Baga, Bama massacre explain such changes?
PQ2: What will you say about the Civilian JTF (Joint Military Task Force)?
3. how do you think/ know they recruit members? Why do you think people join?
PQ1: Who do you think does the recruiting?
4. Do you think that the leaders have been important in recruitment, mobilization and, choice of violence?:
5. Have you observed differences in the leadership strategies? if so, how, why and what has been the consequence?

6. Is there other additional information you will want to add?

**Ending the Session:**

**Interviewer:** Sir it is great and educative listening to you, once more thank you very much for your time and willingness to participate in this research I remain grateful.

**Interviewee:**
Appendix 4: Sample of the consent form

Name of interviewee:

Names of interviewer: Solomon Anjide

Title of the project: The Birth of Boko Haram and the Path to Terror

I confirm that I am willing to participate in the research project named above.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, or not to answer any individual question posed, without specifying a reason.

I confirm that I am willing to allow the interview to be recorded.

I understand that the transcript of the interview with myself, will be used by the student named above as part of a PhD research Project.

I understand that my name and identity remains completely anonymous and confidential.

I understand that as the transcript will be submitted as part of PhD thesis, that it will be read not only by the student named above but also by his supervisors. I also understand that as part of the PhD examination process, an external examiner might read the project and transcript.

Signature of Participant:  
Date:

Signature of Researcher:  
Date: