DEPENDENCY AS TWO-WAY TRAFFIC—COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANISATIONS AND NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS IN THE NAMIBIAN CBNRM PROGRAMME

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ABSTRACT

The Namibian community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programme has been hailed as the leading wildlife conservation initiative on the African continent. Based on the dual objective of achieving both rural development and nature conservation on communal land, CBNRM has become the principal model for large-scale Western donor-funding for biodiversity conservation in sub-Saharan Africa. Forming local community-based organisations (CBOs) is the essential precondition for rural residents to receive rights over their natural resources. Since the late 1990s, an extensive network of international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) has successfully secured substantial funding to support local CBOs in the endeavour to protect and benefit from wildlife. Namibia’s national CBNRM policy explicitly recognises NGOs as key support organisations tasked to help create and strengthen CBOs, build their management capacity and link them to funding sources. Furthermore, they are the principal facilitators of joint-venture tourism partnerships between CBOs and private investors. Tourism, the Holy Grail of Namibian CBNRM, generates approximately 70% of CBO income and as such constitutes a principal livelihood strategy for communal area residents.

This thesis explores the implications of substantial, ongoing NGO support to CBO development. Grounded in a critical realist research paradigm, empirical data collection has been driven by the quest to uncover and explain the underlying mechanisms that enable and/or constrain the establishment of independent CBOs. This research was motivated by the desire to unpack the Namibian CBNRM success story. It is argued that the often prescribed dichotomy of powerful outsider vs. compliant development receiver, fails to recognise that at local level development intervention more closely resembles ongoing development interaction. A more refined understanding of how NGO support is consumed and negotiated by CBOs is important to further scrutinise the effectiveness of exogenous development.

Adopting an overall inductive approach, a case study methodology was chosen to investigate the CBO-NGO exchange relationship. Located in regional tourism hotspots in Kunene and Zambezi Region, two CBOs that have received massive—yet differently structured—NGO support since their inception were purposefully chosen. During two three-month fieldwork periods in 2013 and 2014, multiple sources of qualitative data were collected.

The findings indicate that NGO support is highly unequal; systematic inclusion and exclusion of CBOs is mostly determined by their economic potential originating from the occurrence of wildlife. The key exchange modality between CBOs and NGOs is the continuous provision of training, where the latter impart essential knowledge on the former. While NGOs have effectively monopolised the CBNRM service provision, CBOs have simultaneously
devised individual strategies to secure maximum future support. By conceptualising their on-going interaction as a client-provider relationship, the reciprocity of CBO-NGO dependency becomes evident. The heavy promotion of joint-venture tourism partnerships in particular, shows that NGOs rely on success stories to promote the Namibian CBNRM programme, and thus continue to shield “their” CBOs from the associated risks. A key implication of the research findings is that, paradoxically, continued service provision has enabled the development of financially self-sufficient CBOs, while at the same time it has likely encouraged prolonged self-insufficiency by CBOs which have matured into demanding, experienced consumers of rural development projects.
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ABBREVIATIONS

ADMADE  ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT DESIGN
AGM    ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING
CAMPFIRE  COMMUNAL AREAS MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME FOR INDIGENOUS RESOURCES
CAQDAS  COMPUTER ASSISTED QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS SOFTWARE
CBNRM  COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
CBO    COMMUNITY BASED ORGANISATION
CDSS   CONSERVANCY DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT SERVICES
CMC   CONSERVANCY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
CRB    COMMUNITY RESOURCE BOARDS
DRFN  DESERT RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF NAMIBIA
FIRM   FORUM FOR INTEGRATED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
GAT    GESPRÄCHSANALYSIS TRANSKRIPTIONSSYSTEM
GDP    GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT
GFU    GROOTBERG FARMERS UNION
GIZ    GERMAN CORPORATION FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (FORMERLY GTZ)
HMA    HOTEL MANAGEMENT AGREEMENT
HWC    HUMAN WILDLIFE CONFLICT
ICDP   INTEGRATED CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
IIED   INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
IUCN   INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE
IMF    INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND
IRDNC  INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATURE CONSERVATION
JMC    JOINT MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
LIFE   LIVING IN A FINITE ENVIRONMENT
MAWRD MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, WATER AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
MCA    MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT
MET    MINISTRY OF ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM
MFMR   MINISTRY FOR FISHERIES AND MARINE RESOURCES
MLRR   MINISTRY FOR LAND RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION
MRLGH MINISTRY OF REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, HOUSING AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
NACSO  NAMIBIAN ASSOCIATION OF CBNRM SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS
NGO    NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATION
NNF    NAMIBIA NATURE FOUNDATION
NRM    NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
PLAN   PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY OF NAMIBIA
PRA    PARTICIPATORY RURAL APPRAISAL
RALE   REPRESENTATIVE AND ACCOUNTABLE LEGAL ENTITY
SAP    STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
SARDEP SUSTAINABLE ANIMAL AND RANGELAND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
SME    SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES
SWAPO  SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE’S ORGANISATION
UN    UNITED NATIONS
USAID  UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
WCED  WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
WTTC  WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL
WWF    WORLD WIDE FUND FOR NATURE
ZAWA  ZAMBIAN WILDLIFE AUTHORITY
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Auf die fernen Lieben.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research Objective and Rationale

Community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) is an approach to resource management practice in rural areas which has been heavily promoted by international development agencies since the late 1980s. Participation by local communities, one fundamental principle of CBNRM, is well-aligned with the anthropocentric participatory discourse that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (Chambers 1983, Leach and Mearns 1996). CBNRM rests on the assumption that local communities living close to natural resources are their best managers (Child 2004a, Leach et al 1999) and share a collective interest in conserving resources upon which their livelihood depends (Thakadu 2003, Tsing et al 1999). Especially in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, CBNRM practice has heavily emphasised wildlife management based on the logic that if rural communities receive tangible benefits from wildlife they will protect it (Child 2004b, Martin 1986, Thakadu 2003). Namibia’s national CBNRM programme is commonly cited as one of the leading wildlife conservation initiatives on the continent (App et al 2008, Boudreaux 2007, Boudreaux and Nelson 2011, Jones and Mosimane 2000, Pellis 2011, Pellis et al 2015, Massyn 2007) and has been referred to as “a global model for CBNRM” (Jones 2010:119). The fact that Namibia’s CBNRM programme is the only one which has sustained substantial external donor funding for more than two decades since its inception in 1993 is often less clearly articulated.

Local institutions are an essential precondition for CBNRM. Ribot (2002a) argues that the state depends on them to realise its development agenda as they are a means to legitimise central government intervention in rural areas. Likewise, other external agents like non-governmental organisations (NGOs) need representative and accountable legal entities (RALE) at community—not household—level to implement conservation objectives set by international donors. In 2000, Corbett and Jones noted that the “new institutionalism” (2000:18) has dominated the debate on communal resource management for nearly a decade. Commonly referred to as community-based organisations (CBO), in the Namibian context local CBNRM institutions are called conservancies. As per CBNRM legislation, rural communities can register to form a conservancy based on a number of key requirements such as defined membership, undisputed boundaries and benefit distribution to members (Jones 2010). The first four conservancies were registered in 1998. Since then the programme progressively expanded to 42 conservancies in 2005 and 82 by the end of 2014 (NACSO 2014) (see communal conservancy map, Appendix 1). An extensive network of national and international NGOs, organised under the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO), provides significant financial and in-kind (training workshops for CBNRM capacity building) support to emerging conservancies (Hoole 2010, Lyons 2013). Once established, many
Conservancies continue to receive substantial NGO support, for example extensive technical assistance for tourism enterprise development to so-called “target conservancies” with high tourism potential. Contributing more than 70% to conservancy income (IRDNC 2015a, NACSO 2015b), joint-venture tourism partnerships between conservancies and private operators have been heavily promoted by NGOs as the principal development path—and thus as a key livelihood strategy for communal area residents.

Despite the acknowledged significance of CBOs as both precondition and the principal vehicle for community-based conservation, there is no corresponding, systematic assessment of structural CBO design, voting procedures, (financial) management and governance mechanisms within the CBNRM literature. As such, the workings of the conservancy as a local institution largely remain a black box. Similarly, despite the fact that NGOs mostly initiate and provide continuous support services to conservancies, “explicit attention to ‘external agents’ and subject-object relationships has been virtually absent in community-based conservation” (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003:430). Hence, there is a gap in the knowledge at the very interface of CBNRM project delivery and consumption as there has been no focussed, systematic analysis of the relationship between conservancies and their support NGOs.

This thesis seeks to expose the underlying processes that structure the exchange relationship between CBOs and NGOs in the Namibian CBNRM programme. Ultimately, the research aims to discover and conceptualise the “generative mechanisms or structures” (Reed 2005:1623) that enable and constrain ongoing conservancy and NGO interaction. In order to do so, three principal research questions have been tackled:

1. What are the structures and processes of CBNRM support provision by NGOs?

2. What are the defining organisational structures of CBOs and where are the principal points of interaction with NGOs?

3. What are the implications of providing significant CBNRM support services to CBOs and in what way are NGO support services conducive to, and where do they hamper, the establishment of independent CBOs?

This study explores the mechanisms and implications of planned intervention in a developing country context. It is grounded in the domain of development studies and draws on core concepts, for example participation and capacity-building, within this subject area. The primary focus being CBO-NGO interaction in community-based conservation, this thesis contributes to the body of knowledge on the patterns of social exchange in rural development projects, in particular to the understanding of actor-centred perspectives within development studies. The key contribution pertains to the actual delivery of rural development based on the critique of the “participatory orthodox” (Cleaver 1999, Gaventa 2006, Michener 1998, Mosse...
2001, Twyman 2000) in externally-driven community capacity-building. Furthermore, it is argued that the constraining and enabling conditions for interaction at micro level are embedded in and determined by the structural properties of CBNRM design at macro level. This thesis assesses the underlying structures of Western donor-funded biodiversity conservation, therefore, subordinate contributions are made to the subject area of planned intervention using the frame of a neoliberal approach to conservation. Hence, this study adds to the understanding of how NGO-led, modern scientific (as opposed to indigenous) knowledge constitutes “appropriate” community-based conservation practice and how this knowledge is administered through training workshops and technical assistance, and thus reflecting “depoliticisation” as one of the core criticisms within the domain of development studies where underlying structural issues are often ignored and tackled mainly through technical/financial assistance (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1990, Islam 2009, Phuthego and Chanda 2004, Taylor 2012). Lastly, by revealing how community-based conservation is effectively grounded in an enterprise-based approach, this thesis echoes critical voices as it demonstrates how development assistance for biodiversity conservation pushes local institutions into a commodification and commercialisation paradigm for capitalising on their natural resources (Brockington et al 2008, Büscher and Whande 2007, Silva and Motzer 2015, Sullivan 2006, Turner 2004, Twyman 1998).

The rationale for this research is in accordance with a number of conditions taken to be true. Firstly, this thesis assumes that CBNRM, despite advocating endogenous, bottom-up development, is essentially a form of “induced development” (Uphoff et al 1979) as it is generally initiated and implemented by outsiders. This research seeks to deconstruct the notion of wholly pre-planned and executed projects; in other words, it seeks to “demythologise the idea of intervention” (Long 2004:27). Therefore, the research contributes to the body of knowledge on development studies as it critically questions the notion that development projects are not simply executed but constantly renegotiated between NGOs as project implementers and CBOs as project consumers.

Secondly, interaction between CBOs and NGOs, for example during capacity building workshops and training, is regarded as the specific project interface where planned intervention actually happens. Considering the general absence of empirical research on the actual nature of the exchange relationship between development providers and consumers, this research aims to break down the “developer and to-be-developed” divide (Finnström 1997, Hall and Tucker 2004, Hobart 1993) where local actors are often portrayed as passive, powerless receivers while a powerful outsider somehow brings development. Hence, the thesis seeks to improve the understanding of project knowledge by receiving communities—and how they use this knowledge to negotiate future NGO support.
Thirdly, this thesis rests on the assumption that planned intervention is, in fact, a form of interaction—and is thus reciprocal. By adopting an actor-oriented view of development (Long 1992, 2004, Mosse 2001), the capabilities of CBO and NGO representatives to influence each other within the CBNRM framework will be exposed. The received wisdom that NGOs, albeit unintentionally, create dependency on their support (Newmark and Hough 2000) is challenged insofar as NGOs are believed to be equally dependent on functioning conservancies to secure ongoing donor funding. This research, therefore, expands on the unidirectional analyses of community organisations’ dependency on NGO support, which has generally overlooked the condition that CBOs could exist without NGOs, while NGOs cannot exist without CBOs.

Considered both targets and beneficiaries, rural communities are, almost by default, primary CBNRM research subjects. Agrawal and Gibson argue that “a focus on institutions rather than “community” is likely to be more fruitful” (1999:629) when assessing CBNRM dynamics. Naturally, different perspectives and perceptions of “the community” will frequently surface throughout this thesis. However, the focus lies on individual community members formally holding conservancy positions.

The Namibian CBNRM programme provides an ideal testing ground for the above assumptions as there are CBOs that have received ongoing support for over 15 years and where NGOs continue to act as key facilitators for local institution and tourism enterprises. Contrary to many research accounts about conservancies, this thesis gives a voice to CBO members and how they perceive and negotiate NGO support. Hence, this research makes a contribution to the understanding of community-based institutions which, after 15 years of CBNRM intervention, have matured into sophisticated consumers of rural development projects. Through the critical analysis of Namibian CBNRM which “is in the midst of the greatest African wildlife recovery story ever told” (WWF 2016), the research provides insights into the multi-faceted nature of dependency at the very interface of internal-external relations in development projects. By exploring the implications of heavy, ongoing NGO support, this thesis helps government and non-government agencies to revaluate CBNRM practice based on extensive exogenous facilitation.

1.2 Background to the Study

Administered under the South African apartheid regime, Namibia gained independence in 1990. The influence of the United Nations and primarily Western states on Namibia’s “progressive and modern” constitution (Erasmus 2000:87) is well-acknowledged (Amoo and Harring 2009, Diescho 1994); furthermore, Namibia incorporated environmental protection into its constitution, being the first African country to do so. With the end of the Cold War, aid
and development assistance by international donor agencies was now aligned to—largely Western ideals of—good governance. In this context, Erasmus describes Namibia’s hailed constitution as the country’s “international ticket” (2000:100) for securing large-scale international development assistance. In the 1990s there was significant political support for CBNRM legislation; one of the key policies passed in 1996 extended conditional ownership rights over wildlife to communal area residents, previously only granted to private landowners (Jones 2010, Jones and Murphree 2001).

Namibia’s reclassification from lower-middle to an upper-middle income country in 2011 has been criticised on the basis that the high per capita income of US$10,800 (2014 estimate, CIA 2015) masks one of the world’s most uneven income distributions. The Namibian population of 2.2 million consists of 87.5% blacks, 6.5% mixed and 6% whites, the last-mentioned are estimated to control about 70% of the economy (Amoo and Harring 2009). Land rights and distribution, a key determinant for CBNRM, strongly reflect high inequality between black and white Namibians. Commonly recognised as the “structural legacy of settler colonialism” (Melber 2003a:13), the former black “homelands” established under South African rule are now communal land (43% of total land), whereas private land, mostly white-owned, is almost identical in size (44%), and 13% is state land (see Map 1). More than half (53.4%) of communal land is under conservancy management containing 175,000 communal area residents (IRDNC 2015). While rural Namibians are the lawful occupants of communal areas, current land policy and land tenure legislation does not allow them to hold comprehensive titles to their land (Amoo 2014), thus ultimate ownership of communal land is vested in the state. By systematically establishing two different lands—white, privately-owned farmland and communal land—with different production and governance schemes, foreign rulers firmly established the dualism of land and entitlement to it that persists in contemporary Namibia some 25 years after independence (Amoo 2014, Mamdani 1996, Sullivan 1998).
Once gazetted, the conservancy automatically acquires the rights over wildlife and commercial tourism\(^1\) on their land from the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET). Tourism has been heavily promoted by donors and NGOs; in 2015, 39 out of 82 conservancies have joint-venture tourism partnerships with lodge operators and 44 have trophy hunting agreements with private hunters (IRDNC 2015a). Tourism is often the principal or exclusive source of conservancy income (Mulonga and Murphy 2003). Overall, the travel and tourism industry constitutes the third-largest foreign exchange earner for the Namibian economy\(^2\). In 2014, the sector contributed 15%\(^3\) to the gross domestic product (GDP), and with total

\(^1\) 1995 Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas Policy

\(^2\) Mining is the country’s lead industry (especially gem-quality diamonds, uranium and zinc) contributing 11.5% to its GDP and 50% of foreign exchange earnings. Despite its economic significance, the mining sector only employs 2% of the Namibian workforce while more than 60% work in the service industry (CIA 2015). With more than 1,500 km of South Atlantic coastline, Namibia has access to one of the richest fishing grounds in the world. However, processed fish as a key export has been hit by dwindling stocks (World Bank 2009).

\(^3\) Total contribution includes investments and related domestic purchases. Direct contribution of travel and tourism in 2014 was 3% (forecast for 2025=5.2%), 80% was leisure spending. Here nature-based tourism is most significant (WTTC 2015).
contribution estimated to rise by an average 7% annually to 22% in 2025, Namibia has the biggest growth rates on the entire continent (WTTC 2015). As a common characteristic in southern Africa, more than 90% of registered Namibian tourism businesses are white-owned (Lapeyre 2011d), one quarter is foreign-owned (Jänis 2014). Although the economic contribution of conservancies to the overall tourism industry has gone somewhat under-appreciated, communal area tourism is frequently acknowledged as an important catalyst for black economic empowerment (Ashley and Garland 1994, Jänis 2014, Snyman 2012) and the protection of wildlife (Child 2004b, Hulme and Murphree 2001a, Thakadu 2003), one of the key attractions of the Namibian tourism product. Furthermore, the government formally uses CBNRM as an indicator for environmental sustainability which constitutes one of Namibia’s National Millennium Goals (Jones 2010).

The (touristic) commodification of natural resources is firmly grounded in the neoliberal conservation discourse according to which markets ensure an efficient utilisation of natural areas (Child et al 2004). Strategies such as CBNRM have put nature under increasing pressure to “pay its way” (Adams and Hulme 2001:17, Holden 2013:80). In this context, de la Harpe et al emphasise economic incentives for local people to engage in conservation projects as one of the “single most important practical issues” (2004:189) in international biodiversity conservation. Expected to achieve “conservation through production” (Turner 2004:55) and social development, integrated conservation and development projects (ICDP) became the new leading ideology (Brandon and Wells 1992) of Western donor-funded development intervention. With the widespread implementation of ICDPs from the 1980s grew their academic study (Alpert 1996, Brandon and Wells 1992, Hughes and Flintan 2001, Newmark and Hough 2000). The crucial difference between ICDPs and CBNRM is that the former is dominated by conservation objectives on public land, that is protected areas, with an element of community participation built into projects (Humavindu and Stage 2015). Contrary to that, CBNRM rests on a strong socio-economic development paradigm and applies exclusively to communal lands. The massive output of “early” CBNRM literature in the 1990s clearly reflects the irresistible rhetoric and “discursive power” (Blaikie 2006:1954) of the CBNRM concept, somewhat obsessively making reference to its economic rationale and anticipated benefits to the rural poor (Blaikie 2006, Jones and Murphree 2004). Subsequent empirical research, primarily on a case-by-case basis, has had a somewhat sobering effect as benefits were mostly “low value and low volume” (Suich 2013:441) and CBNRM projects often failed in the light of the multi-faced, often conflicting objectives of different stakeholders (Measham and Lumbasi 2013, Swatuk 2005) or ceased when funding phased out and support NGOs withdrew (Manyara and Jones 2007).
1.3 Methodological Approach and Choice of Study Locations

This thesis adopts a critical realist paradigm and is thus grounded in the belief that the underlying structures of a phenomenon under study constitute observable, causal mechanisms which generally enable or constrain human agency (Bhaskar 1986, Reed 2005). The causal-explanatory fixation of critical realism is well-suited to assess the nature of the two-way exchange relationship between CBOs and NGOs. The research design is based on a qualitative–inductive approach (Silverman 2010) where specific themes emerge as an outcome of the data analysis instead of being assumed. A case study methodology was chosen as it is both exploratory and explanatory in nature (Easton 2010). Advocates of actor-oriented perspectives of development (Long 1977, Mosse 2001) argue that development project knowledge is the product of social interaction and “must be looked at relationally” (Long 2001:19). For empirical research, this implies close engagement with actors. In order to investigate the social processes of development interaction in communal conservancies two three-month fieldwork periods were conducted in 2013 and 2014 respectively. While the first trip served essentially as a networking exercise and a filtering tool for narrowing down the research focus, the second was guided by information-oriented data collection for the two chosen case studies. The multiple sources of data collected consist of 30 in-depth interviews (amounting to a total of approximately 40 hours), ethnographic data based on “passive unobtrusive observation” (Robson 1993:159) logged as field notes and case-specific documents shared by CBO and NGO representatives.

In order to connect the analysis of the particular relationships to the more general phenomena of development intervention, the causal-explanatory mechanisms that structure CBO-NGO interaction were then conceptually related based on the following format: observed patterns $\rightarrow$ evidence in data $\rightarrow$ generative and constraining mechanisms $\rightarrow$ conceptualisation.

Two Namibian conservancies, ≠Khoadi //Hôas in southern Kunene region and Wuparo in eastern Zambezi Region (formerly Caprivi⁴), were purposively chosen; they are “mature” conservancies as they belong to the first ones registered in 1998 and 1999 respectively and have received significant financial and in-kind support by NGOs since. Both cases are generally considered “CBNRM success stories” (Jones 2006, Angula and Shapi 2004); due to wildlife monitoring by community game guards, previously high occurrences of poaching on communal land have been diminished and both conservancies received donations of rare wildlife species for reintroduction and rehabilitation in the area. Furthermore, they have joint-venture agreements with private hunters and lodge operators and generate considerable income.

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⁴ On 8 August 2013, the Namibian President announced the renaming of Caprivi to Zambezi Region. While the new name will be applied throughout the thesis, when referring to the region’s historical context (mostly in chapter 4) “Caprivi” will still be used.
The Grootberg Lodge joint-venture between ≠Khoadi //Hôas and a private management company, and Wuparo’s Nkasa Lupala Tented Camp agreement, will feature prominently in the analysis as both tourism enterprises were established with substantial NGO support and because they represent two fundamentally different types of joint-venture agreements. Nkasa Lupala is 100% owned and managed by a private operator who employs people from the community. Wuparo Conservancy rents out their land and receives a monthly payment which is essentially a lease fee. These “classic” joint-venture partnerships (Ashley and Jones 2001, NACSO 2012c) are generally favoured by NGOs and represent the lion’s share of joint-venture agreements as they are considered a low-risk (all associated business risks are carried by the operator) and secure monthly income model. Contrary to that, the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy is the 100% shareholder of Grootberg Lodge and carries both assets and operations while management and marketing are outsourced to a private operator who earns a set fee per month. ≠Khoadi //Hôas’ Grootberg Lodge model is unique as it is the only lodge in the country owned by black Namibians.

Another crucial selection criterion constitutes the manner in which the conservancies received NGO support. While Wuparo has one “mother NGO” that has been assisting the conservancy since (pre-) registration, ≠Khoadi //Hôas never had a stable support agency but rather sourced support from various different national and international NGOs.

Located in southern Kunene and eastern Zambezi Region (see Map 2), both case study areas are in “conservancy hotspots” closely aligned with scenic highlights and touristic infrastructure. Industry and formal employment in both regions are restricted and tourism constitutes one of the larger sectors, especially in the rural areas. According to the National Planning Commission (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2015), the mostly rural northern regions are the poorest countrywide, with some people living on less than N$12 per day (~ less than US$1). Their report ranks the Khorixas Constituency in Kunene and the Linyanti Constituency in Zambezi, both in close proximity to the respective study locations, repeatedly amongst Namibia’s five most deprived. Map 2 illustrates pockets of multiple deprivations clearly demonstrating that the darker coloured areas with a higher deprivation index are concentrated in the rural north.
Both case study regions were, and continue to be, heavily affected by their recent colonial past, especially in terms of land distribution and administration but also with regards to shaping regional social identities. Under German colonial rule, the “Police Zone” (Miescher 2012, Werner 1993), a physical border and veterinary fence (also known as the Red Line, see Map 1), separated white settler country, progressively expanding from around Windhoek, from the northern territories then considered a “remote useless outpost” (Lenggenhager 2015:468). During subsequent South African rule, the territories north and south of the Red Line were administered differently: The northern regions (including Zambezi Region where Wuparo Conservancy is situated) were maintained under indirect rule through traditional leaders (Behr et al 2015, Kangumu and Likando 2015) who were recognised and “installed” by foreign powers to control people and land. The terrain south of the Police Zone (where #Khoadi //Hôas is located) was under direct administrative control in favour of European settlement. The

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Footnote 5: Contrary to indicators of absolute poverty measuring the lack of financial resources to satisfy needs, the Namibia Index of Multiple Deprivation captures the lack of access to particular services and products; the index is based on two population and housing censuses conducted in 2001 and 2011 where the following five key domains of deprivation were assessed: material deprivation, employment deprivation, health deprivation, education deprivation and living environment deprivation (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2015).
Zambezi and Kunene case studies will demonstrate how the national CBNRM programme is deeply intertwined in the historical repercussions of communal land administration, especially with regards to the legacy of traditional leaders as “local level lawmakers” (Keulder 2000:150) pertaining to land allocation and natural resource use.

1.4 Organisation of the Thesis

This thesis is organised into eight chapters. Apart from the introduction and the conclusion, each chapter is introduced by a short overview. The somewhat unwieldy abbreviation “CBNRM” is essentially an augury to a defined body of literature which is crowded with (often country-specific) abbreviations. Hence, in addition to the list of abbreviations, they will be spelled out once when used at the beginning of every new chapter. Furthermore, “CBO” and “conservancy” are used interchangeably referring to local CBNRM institutions.

Chapter 2 reviews the CBNRM literature focussing on the “popular” sub-Saharan African country programmes of Botswana, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The initial sections trace how CBNRM became “an established policy goal of rural development” (Blaikie 2006:1942) and which paradigms and higher level concepts it follows. It then moves on to examine the “epistemology of intervention” (Sachs 2010:33), specifically how previous studies have methodologically and conceptually approached research on CBOs and NGOs and their interaction. Instead of targeting the respective subject areas of development, neoliberal conservation, rural sociology and community-based tourism, I deliberately “worked the other way around” to be able to point out from where the CBNRM literature borrows most concepts and insights and where the gaps in knowledge exist.

Chapter 3 details the methodological considerations of this research project. From ontological assumptions to actually doing research in rural Namibia, this chapter explains how the research objective guided the entire process of knowledge creation and aims to illustrate that methodological considerations resemble a “balancing act between the desirable and the practical” (Wield 2002:42).

Chapter 4 contextualises actors and key issues within Namibian CBNRM to “‘hold’ the very qualitative and often slippery ‘furnishings’ that bring the narrative [the case studies] alive” (Stephens 2009:119). CBO–NGO interaction is a post-independence phenomenon and the chapter emphasises the CBNRM programme-building since the 1990s. However, structural challenges such as the dualism of statutory and communal law cannot be properly assessed without acknowledging the consequences of the country’s colonial legacy. Furthermore, this chapter illustrates how conservancies are economically grounded in the business of tourism and how NGO’s are the principal facilitators of joint-venture tourism partnerships.
The two case studies are presented in chapter 5 (Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy in Kunene) and chapter 6 (Wuparo Conservancy in Zambezi Region). At the beginning of each chapter, historical, environmental and social-cultural aspects are introduced to illustrate how “new” institutions for resource management are affected by old, existing dynamics in which they operate. In order to define what produces, enables and maintains spheres of influence, (project-)knowledge and dependency (Sayer 1992) between CBOs and their supporting NGOs, the two case studies tackle the exchange relationship based on three key enquiries (Gubrium and Holstein 1994):

- **Who** is the research target (how does the “black box” CBO actually work)?
- **What** is happening (how are the common NGO–CBO interfaces structured)?
- **How** does NGO support affect CBOs and vice versa?

The two case study chapters are largely descriptive. By incorporating emerging themes from interview data and observations of the social fabric in local settings, descriptive writing is understood as being “also critical and challenging” (Stephens 2009:127). Drawing on the ethnographic approach of “thick description” (Geertz 1973, Ryle 1949) observations are interpreted and contextualised within the social fabric of the study locations established in the previous chapter to facilitate “understanding and absorbing the context of the situation or behaviour” (Ponterotto 2006:539). Both studies are concluded by highlighting the case-specific, relational dependency characteristics and by exposing where mutual dependency exists.

Chapter 7 is the discussion chapter that brings the two case studies together. Causal explanations as the “most fundamental aim” (Easton 2010:122) of critical realism guide the conceptualisation of the CBO–NGO relationship in the discussion. Initially, the structuring properties of CBNRM are recapitulated, which demonstrates that overall CBOs are largely excluded from being able to actively shape their future in the national CBNRM programme. Conversely, looking at actor-centred perspectives at local project level, CBO members powerfully emerge as skilful, knowledgeable agents who strategically use 15 years of accumulated project knowledge to secure future support. Ultimately it is shown that NGO support is both enabling and constraining independent CBOs—and that NGOs heavily depend on compliant CBOs to implement the CBNRM conservation agenda.

The conclusion, chapter 8, is structured to address two overall aspects: what was learned and what remains to be learned. The former reacquaints the reader with the key empirical findings and highlights their implications for rural development practice, CBNRM policy and contributions made to the relevant subject areas within development studies. The thesis is then concluded by emphasising communal conservancies’ two principal future challenges, growing wildlife conflicts and increasing pressure for marketization, and recommends directions for future research.
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this literature review is to establish a critical understanding of the existing body of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) literature. It will be shown that CBNRM is an inherently hybrid field of study ranging from macro level theories, such as political economy/ecology, to micro level conceptualisations of participatory development. Thus, instead of examining the wider literature of rural development, for example, relevant insights from the respective fields of enquiry will be woven in.

In accordance with the research objectives, this review puts an emphasis on a number of essential CBNRM features. Section 2.2 traces the origins of CBNRM in the neoliberal conservation paradigm emerging in the 1980s. Igoe and Brockington caution that the term “neoliberalism” is at risk of getting hijacked by academics “who like to criticise things that they do not like about the world” (2007:445). Therefore, this section seeks to distinguish more common observations from the CBNRM-specific maxim of making wildlife conservation self-financing by means of pushing private (tourism) sector involvement in communal areas. It thus demonstrates how wildlife conservation in the well-researched southern African CBNRM country programmes is—almost by default—justified, based on the equation that tourism translates into benefits and community development.

Sections 2.3 and 2.4 highlight the fact that local institutions are a precondition and key unit for administering CBNRM, at the same time, they show that their systematic assessment has been largely missing in the growing body of literature. Section 2.5 illustrates the dominant conceptual and methodological approaches to studying CBNRM and the extent to which these have tackled the relationship between community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Section 2.6 examines how external agents have profoundly shaped conservation practice and natural resource management approaches in southern Africa and it reviews the models used to conceptualise participatory, NGO-driven development and local community tactics to deal with them.

2.2 Merging Development and Nature Conservation: The Origins of CBNRM

2.2.1 Neoliberal Conservation and the Commodification of Nature

In the first decade of the 2000s, during a peak of CBNRM research, Blaikie remarks that “(almost) all roads lead to CBNRM” (2006:1944). The driving forces behind CBNRM initiatives mushrooming in many developing countries, particularly in southern Africa, since the early 1980s can be traced in the literature as the coincidence of a number of macro developments. The fusion between dominant neoliberal discourse and growing environmental concern highlighting the global nature of environmental problems (Holden 2013, Sachs 2010,

The origin of the widespread adoption of mechanisms for neoliberal conservation in sub-Saharan Africa is generally attributed to the 1980s structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by major international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Büscher and Whande 2007). Structural adjustment lending sought to tackle African developmental states’ economic development issues through key neoliberal features such as withdrawal of state subsidies for basic commodities (Harvey 2005, Heidhues and Obare 2011). The development literature reflects the dramatic shift in (re-)structuring international development towards the end of the cold-war era by increasingly merging with the political economy literature (Islam 2009). Particularly prominent strands of this merger pertain to the powers of multilateral financial institutions such as IMF and World Bank enforcing privatisation and marketization (Büscher and Whande 2007, Igoe and Brockington 2007); the domain of (Western planners’) power, knowledge and intervention, often grounded in Foucauldian postmodern development critiques (Escobar 1995, Ferguson 1990, 2006) and Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony, where Western dominance functions as a vehicle of control legitimising and normalising development interventions. Assessing the Namibian CBNRM programme via the conceptual orientation of Western biodiversity conservation, Sullivan illustrates how community-based initiatives are inseparably linked to a neoliberal conservation discourse where international donor support is bound to the condition that local communities “agree to construct themselves as ‘suitable’ custodians (managers) of internationally valued biodiversity, particularly animal-wildlife” (2006:118).

The following principal characteristics of neoliberal conservation noticeably mirror certain structural features of the Namibian CBNRM programme (1) Withdrawing state involvement and control through market liberalisation and privatisation are fundamental

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6 Actual impact and effectiveness of export and market-led development, privatisation of public sector activities, cutting back social service provision etc. continues to be heavily debated. Key criticism refers to economist solutions ignoring/obscuring structural problems such as social and racial inequity and institutional weakness of many African countries (Heidhues and Obare 2011, Mkandawire and Soludo 1998).
principles of the neoliberal political economy. In the context of neoliberal conservation, this implies that the state withdraws from funding and managing natural resources, thus saving taxpayers money, while “markets” ensure an efficient utilisation of natural areas (Child et al 2004). The drastic reduction in public spending and service provision for natural areas and the simultaneous increase in protected areas such as national parks led to a situation where “nature has to become self-funding or commodified” (Franklin 2013:81). Turning “nature” into “environment” (Sachs 2010), that is into tradeable natural resources constitutes the core aspect in the neoliberal conservation literature where previously untradeable natural areas were transformed into commodities (Büscher and Whande 2007, Castree 2003). The “construction of nature as service provider” (Sullivan 2009:23) resulting in the increasing pressure on nature to “pay its way” (Adams and Hulme 2001:17, Child 2000, Holden 2013:80) is well-acknowledged. By devolving rights over natural resources, the Namibian government is also passing down the responsibility to cater for wildlife as conservancies are expected to “internalize the cost and benefits of land use” (Child and Barnes 2010: 285). As such, CBNRM effectively enables the state to withdraw “from the costs of maintaining public sector services in remote and difficult environments” (Sullivan 2006:124, also Jones and Barnes 2006, Sullivan 2002).

(2) The need for nature to become self-funding paved the way for a “conservation through production” agenda (Turner 2004:55) which is reflected in the significant growth of integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) and CBNRM country programmes. Achieving both conservation and development became the new leading ideology (Brandon and Wells 1992) financed largely through indirect investments by Western donors. Referring to “conservation by distraction” Ferraro and Simpson (2001, 2002) point out that while conservation initiatives in developed countries are increasingly built upon direct investment, for example for land purchases and leases, developing country projects are at the more indirect end of the spectrum where biodiversity protection is encouraged by social benefits such as educational and medical infrastructural development. Regarding the cost effectiveness of such indirect payment schemes, Ferraro and Kiss argue that despite being elusive, supposedly self-financing conservation activities are "the Holy Grail for the international conservation community” (2002:1719). Generating economic incentives for local people to engage in environmental services production is deemed one of the “single most important practical issues” (de la Harpe et al 2004:189) in international biodiversity conservation. Referred to as “payments for ecosystem services” (Büscher and Whande 2007, Engel et al 2008) innovative, market-based mechanisms for biodiversity protection are increasingly being discussed as profitable means for using natural resources. In this context, the Namibian CBNRM model has been presented as “a large-scale PES programme, making it one of the world’s longest-standing..."
schemes” (Naidoo et al 2011:445). Similarly, Barnes and Quail consider communal conservancies in Namibia as “carbon conservancies”, that is “the holding unit for carbon property rights that are formalized in a carbon cadastre/registry” (Barnes and Quail 2011:100).

(3) Commodification and resulting commercialisation of natural resources create investment opportunities and market potential and “‘need’ for private sector involvement in biodiversity conservation” (Büscher and Whande 2007:31). “Neoliberal conservation is particularly reliant on private tourism enterprises” (Silva and Motzer 2015:49) as a principal catalyst through which nature can be capitalised on. Despite mainly resembling exogenous, top-down development dynamics, tourism, traditionally an industry-driven sector, is commonly associated with having the potential to generate direct community income, thus directly facilitating social and economic development (Butcher 2007, Duffy 2002, Holden 2013, Wearing and McDonald 2002). Kiss (2004) shows that by the mid-1990s, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) financed 105 community-based conservation projects with ecotourism components totalling US$2 billion; from 1988 to 2003, 32 out of 55 World Bank projects supporting protected areas included community-based tourism components. There is a significant body of critical tourism literature scrutinising the industry’s potential for enabling equitable, sustainable development. Especially in the context of developing countries in the periphery, critics stress how tourism can enforce dependency on the core generating regions and that great proportions of tourism income and benefits are prone to be hijacked by local ruling classes (Britton 1982, De Kadt 1979, Dieke 2000, Duffy 2002, Hunter 1997, Mowforth and Munt 2009, Milne and Ateljevic 2001, Reid 2003, Telfer 2002). In the context of Namibian tourism and CBNRM, Lapeyre (2011b, 2011d) points towards the sector’s highly competitive and buyer-driven global commodity chain which is controlled by international tour operators where “previously disadvantaged Namibians lack economic leverage to be fully involved in the largely white-dominated tourism sector” (2011d:63). Similarly, Silva and Motzer find that neoliberal conservation based on tourism is “largely incompatible” (2015:67) with equitable, community-wide development. Nevertheless, there is a somewhat uncritical adoption of safari tourism and trophy-hunting as core CBNRM activities due to a lack of alternatives (Sebele 2010). CBNRM (case) studies assessing community-based tourism ventures frequently expose that negative tourism impacts are likely to intensify inequity at local level, mainly through elite capture (Manyara and Jones 2007, Mowforth and Munt 2009, Silver and Motzer 2015). More business-oriented issues such as late returns from joint-venture agreements, high risk and high entry barriers for private operators to engage in tourism enterprises in communal areas have been largely neglected (Kiss 2004). Likewise, the very nature of the fickle tourism business, for example high opportunity costs, seasonality and
tight profit margins, have not been thoroughly scrutinised in terms of viability to rural communities.

### 2.2.2 People and Nature: Approaches to Natural Resource Management

Central to this literature review is the discourse of the dimension of human involvement in conservation objectives and essentially their role in natural resource management. A number of scholars have analysed the dualism between people and nature in natural resource management approaches: Humphreys (2009) in connection to international forest policy, Büscher and Whande (2007) examined the hegemony of neoliberalisation from a critical economy perspective, Adams and Hulme (2001) scrutinised the dominant narratives in African conservation practice, Leach and Mearns reviewed the cycles of “received wisdom” (1996:445) in development policy in connection with scientific theory and methods, Roe (1991) evaluated development narratives and their counter-narratives and Berkes (2004) analysed the conceptual shifts in ecology against the background of local participation in conservation practice. The common observation in all these studies is the shift from a biocentric to an anthropocentric paradigm. Here, local people’s relation to nature and their role in conservation has been reassigned along the continuum: From inherently incompatible (Hutton et al 2005) to indispensable allies (Hulme and Murphree 2001b). Until the 1980s, the historically exclusive approach of pure protection was dominant, which is reflected in the literature as the “fences and fines approach” and “fortress conservation”, especially in connection with protected areas such as national parks. These “socially illegitimate” (Hulme and Murphree 2001a:7) conservation policies marginalising the rural poor are commonly described as the legacy of suppressive colonial administrations (Büscher and Whande 2007). Even after independence, they still influenced policy in many African states (Brockington 2002).

Biocentric conservation needs ignored the connection between ecological issues and people’s livelihoods (Meyer and Helfman 1993, van der Duim and Caalders 2002). There is consistent evidence about the supposedly unhealthy relationship between nature and rural people who usually have been portrayed as a handicap (Franklin 2013) to conservation efforts. Barrow and Murphree (2001) argue that meaning and practice of conservation are at odds with rural people’s needs although they are expected to exercise protective measures. Similarly, Büscher and Dressler note “the myth of the ecologically friendly locals” (2007:587), Igoe and Brockington incorporate the role of markets in ‘new’ conservation pointing out that

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8 Top-down imposed protected areas have been also referred to as “ecological imperialism” (Crosby 1986), “biosecurity” Telfer (2013:223) and “ecofascism” Holden (2013:281).
communities are perceived as having “fundamentally flawed relationships to both nature and the market” (2007:442). It is believed that the equation of people being a threat to nature and inherently incapable to use natural resources in a sustainable manner can be traced in the wider academic literature connecting poverty and natural degradation (Roe 2008, Sanderson 2005, Sherbinin 2008) portraying the rural poor as “agents of destruction” (Sachs 2010:27). While biodiversity conservation and poverty alleviation are two separate goals, it is argued that the former is unlikely to be achieved if the latter is not sufficiently addressed (Adams et al 2004).

The literature provides several explanations for the shift from a philosophy and practice of exclusion to one of inclusion based on utilitarian views on natural resources to benefit local people: pressures from Western donors and development agents (Brockington et al 2008, Büscher and Dressler 2007) resulting in the “greening of aid” (Butcher 2007) and the neoliberal orthodoxy focussing on markets (Harvey 2005). Excluding local people from managing their natural resources has been shown to be counterproductive in terms of protecting wildlife, e.g. regarding poaching (Newmark and Hough 2000). On a more practical level, the realisation that African states do not have the human and/or financial resources themselves to enforce or uphold exclusive protected areas (Büscher and Dressler 2007) is cited as a significant catalyst for change. As a consequence of these various forces, community-based conservation became the “right” development truth, shifting conservation authority from the state to local communities (Adams and Hulme 2001, Hulme and Murphree 2001a, Western and Wright 1994).

2.3 Underlying CBNRM Principles

2.3.1 The Orthodoxy of Participatory Development

CBNRM is not a defined state but rather based on a set of objectives, underlying assumptions and core concepts as detailed in Table 1. The leading contributors to the CBNRM literature all stress the multi-objective nature of CBNRM. There is, however, a strong consensus on the three building blocks of (1) devolution of state power to enable (2) collective community participation and proprietorship of land/custodianship over wildlife and (3) sustainable utilization of tradable natural resources (Child 2004a, Hulme and Murphree 1999, Kellert et al 2000, Jones and Murphree 2001, 2004). Murphree’s (1993) principles for communities as natural management institutions provide one of the first sets of CBNRM objectives, which have been referred to as “Murphree’s laws” (Martin 2009). CBNRM’s first reference is made in Martin’s (1986) policy document on land-use patterns under the first CBNRM programme in Zimbabwe. There are virtually no academic CBNRM publications before the early 1990s. The first decade of the 2000s produced a massive CBNRM research
output during which these early defining principles were compressed to the equation of markets, participation and devolution. Child’s (2004a) hypothesis states that if natural resources are valuable and marketable (price), and if this value is captured by local people as landholders (proprietorship) who organise themselves in local institutions (subsidiarity), then there is a high likelihood that natural resources will be conserved by community landholders. This continues to be the state-of-the-art CBNRM logic today (Child et al 2014, Measham and Lumbasi 2013). The benefit-centred CBNRM paradigm inherent in this equation strongly reflects the economic rationale of CBNRM projects (Murphree 2009).

Table 1: Unpacking CBNRM

| Set of CBNRM objectives | Principles for managing natural resources: “focused value” to the people living with natural resource, differential benefits, positive correlation between magnitude of management and quality of benefit, the unit of proprietorship should be as small as possible and it also should be the unit of production, management and benefit, the unit of proprietorship (Murphree 1993:5-6)  
|---|---
|  | New conservation is based on free market thinking, sustainable development and decentralization (Hulme and Murphree 1999)  
|  | Participation, power devolution, property rights (Kellert et al 2000)  
|  | Sustainable use, economic instrumentalism, devolutionism, collective proprietorship (Jones and Murphree 2001, 2004)  
|  | Price-Proprietorship-Subsidiary Hypothesis (Child 2004a)  
|  | Economic viability of natural resource, devolution of rights by central government and micro-governance by local people (Child et al 2014)  
| Underlying assumptions | People living close to natural resources are their best managers (Child 2004a, Leach et al 1999, Tsing et al 1999)  
|  | Local communities share a collective interest in conserving natural resources upon which their livelihood depends (Thakadu 2003, Tsing et al 1999)  
|  | If people receive tangible benefits from wildlife they will protect it (Child 2004b, Hulme and Murphree 2001a, Jones 1999a, Martin 1986, Thakadu 2003)  
|  | Devolution (Ribot 2002a, 2002b)  
|  | Collective proprietorship and common property organisations (Agrawal 2001, Ostrom 1990)  
| Conceptual linkages | Benefits (Murphree 2009, Shackleton et al 2002,)  
|  | CBNRM design and policies (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Child 2004a, Hulme and Murphree 2001b)  
|  | Customary law (Behr et al 2015, Berat 1991)  
|  | Traditional ecological knowledge (Sullivan 1999b, Berkes et al 2000)  
|  | Source: Author’s research

Sustainable utilisation of natural resources comprises a wide range of revenue generating activities. Trophy hunting as the principal form of consumptive tourism (Bond 2001, McGranahan 2011, Murphree 2001, Samuelsson and Stage 2007) and non-consumptive tourism activities such as lodges and photographic safaris (Sebele 2010) generate the lion’s share of CBNRM research. Community-based tourism activities, often in partnership with the private
tourism sector (Mbaiwa 2008, Mbaiwa and Stronza 2010, Murphree 2001, Roe et al 2001, Snyman 2012) are considered the highest-yielding activities (Barnett and Patterson 2006, Nelson and Agrawal 2008, Samuelsson and Stage 2007). From 1989 to 1996, more than 90% of CBNRM income in Zimbabwe came from sport hunting leases (Bond 2001), almost three quarters of conservancy income in Namibia stems from joint-venture lodges (45%) and trophy-hunting (27%) (NACSO 2015) which reinforces the significance of markets in CBNRM. The other main category of revenue generating activities fall under the umbrella of agricultural utilisation of veld products, such as devil’s claw harvesting (Jones 2006, Phuthego and Chanda 2004, Suich 2010), beekeeping (Nel and Illgner 2004) and other non-timber forest products (Shackleton and Shackleton 2004) often in cooperation with (international) NGOs and private companies (Swatuk 2005).

Participation by local people is one core principle of CBNRM and is thus well-aligned with the anthropocentric participatory discourse surfacing in the 1970s and 1980s (Chambers 1983). The development of “participation” becoming the core component—and panacea—to empowering local people in rural development projects has been well-documented (Cleaver 1999, Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003, Cornwall 2008, Michener 1998, Pretty 1995, Uphoff et al 1979). Rahnema stresses the political dimension of participation as a vehicle for providing development with a “new source of legitimation” (2010:134) opening up new sources of investment as a fund-raising device and thus enabling the “private sector to be directly involved in development business” (Rahnema 2010:131). Despite the development of participation typologies, for example Arnstein’s (1969), the IIED’s (1994) and Pretty’s (1995) active versus passive participation and White’s (1996) continuum between nominal and transformative participation, its application is often normative or ill-defined where the ambiguities about “its causes and effects, and its amounts and distribution” (Cohen and Uphoff 1980:218) remain unclear. Rahnema (2010) criticises the disembeddedness of participatory development projects and the potential for hijacking this ideal state for manipulative purposes. He concludes that the prevailing participation discourse pushes local people into predefined projects. Edwards and Hulme lament that NGOs as development agents commonly treat participation and development as “axiomatic” (1992:22). In this context, the dilemma of external domination (by government and non-government actors) of participatory development processes ruled by endogenous expert knowledge has been repeatedly criticised (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003, Johnson and Wilson 2000, Michener 1998, Wearing and McDonald 2002). Mansuri and Rao (2004:1) diagnose the “naïve application” of complex participatory concepts in CBNRM projects being “endemic” among external development agents.

The logic behind community-based conservation largely rests upon core assumptions detailed in Table 1. They are inherently related to and strongly influenced by participatory development ideals. While there are valid reasons for supporting their rationale, a number of
principal criticisms on the participation orthodox can be detected within the CBNRM literature.

Critique I: There is no such thing as “the community” but rather communities of interest. Various authors have stressed the need to differentiate the community (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Cleaver 1999, Rozemeijer and von der Jagt 2000, Koch 2004, Twyman 1998, 2000) in order to enable any meaningful, distinguished analysis for its involvement in CBNRM activities. Kaschula et al (2005) lament that CBNRM, conceptually as well as practically, has taken an overly simplistic view of communities, failing to acknowledge them as “complex entities” (Beeton 2006:61). Others criticise the imposing nature of CBNRM projects in which local communities are largely portrayed as passive or rather submissive, compliant receivers of development (Kumar 2005, Michener 1998, Twyman 1998) where development is “somehow happening to them”.

Critique II: The Western romantic notion (Wels 2004) which tends to assume egalitarian ideals (Child et al 2001), individual behavioural change and personal sacrifices from the rural poor in favour of collective benefits (Michener 1998) presents another obstacle to the assumed voluntary participation logic. In terms of differentiating individual versus collective benefits, there is growing evidence that tangible, individual benefits from CBNRM are low or even non-existent. Suich’s study of CBNRM projects in Mozambique and Namibia concludes that “incentives offered are not inappropriate but are insufficient”, stressing that few people benefit directly and that benefits are generally “low value and low volume” (2013:441). Mbaywa (2004) argues that CBNRM benefits do not reach disadvantaged social groups such as women, elderly and youth. Other studies indicate that the anticipated trickle-down effect does not spread to household level (Murombedzi 2001, Turner 2004). Analysing twelve different resource evaluation studies incorporating 8.000 households, Shackleton and Shackleton (2004) determine that the gross direct-use value of natural resource utilisation by rural people amounts to US$450 per household per year and is thus significantly higher than benefits received from CBNRM projects.

Critique III: Costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation are not evenly distributed. Community perceptions of CBNRM benefits, often distinguished as tangible and intangible\textsuperscript{9}, received substantial scholarly attention (for example Bandyopadhyay et al 2004, Boggs 2004, Jones and Murphree 2004, Mbaywa 2004, Shackleton et al 2002, Silva and Mosimane 2014). While the benefit-centred research is still dominant, only a few studies have systematically

\textsuperscript{9} Intangible benefits include the distribution of game meat (Bandyopadhyay et al 2009, Lendelvo et al 2012, Mbaywa and Stronza 2010), pride and identity (Shackleton et al 2002, Silva and Mosimane 2014), exposure of communities to private sector entrepreneurial skills (Forstner 2004), counteracting HIV infection rates (Naidoo and Johnson 2013) and contribution to gender equity since women are primary resource users (Khumalo 2012, Lendelvo et al 2012, Flintan 2001).
assessed the high costs\textsuperscript{10} of biodiversity conservation (Adhikari and Lovett 2006, Emerton 2001). In particular, the costs of living with wildlife are often not sufficiently acknowledged by CBNRM project designers or, in reality, outweigh the benefits (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Emerton 2001, Hara 2004, Hulme and Murphree 2001b, Magome and Fabricius 2004, Sebele 2010, Suich 2013). Virtanen’s (2005) study shows that people are reluctant to participate in conservation activities potentially compromising other traditional livelihood activities. Subsistence farming is one of the principal livelihood activities in the rural north and especially the conservation of large mammals represents “heave costs for indigenous pastoralists utilizing communally managed rangeland” (Sullivan 2000:144). Crop damage, as well as loss of livestock due to wildlife, poses a real threat to the poorest community members (Fabricius et al 2004, Jones and Mosimane 2000, Suich 2013). One of CBNRM’s dilemmas is that where wildlife is protected and their numbers are growing, so are incidents of human-wild-Conflict (Nott et al 2004). Although several CBNRM projects include reimbursement schemes for wildlife-induced losses to individuals, they rarely cover the actual value of loss or damage incurred (Jones and Mosimane 2000, Nott et al 2004). The fact that the poorest members of the community are likely to be the ones who carry the greatest share of the cost (Adhikari and Lovett 2006, Turner 2004) further complicates the assumption that “the community” will protect wildlife as an essential part of their natural resource base.

That CBNRM provides—largely collective—benefits is commonly agreed on. However, the crux lies in the allocation of benefits and the authority over their distribution (Child and Barnes 2010, Scalon and Kull 2009, Silva and Mosimane 2013). Referring to Zambian CBNRM programmes, Child (2004b) differentiates between first- and second-generation CBNRM, the latter being more rigorous in terms of accounting and enabling higher community decision-making powers. Nevertheless, misrepresentation in decision-making structures where already powerful local elites hijack new or existing institutions for income distribution from natural resource management present a recurring pattern (Béné et al 2009, Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Kamoto et al 2013, Koch 2004, Rihoj et al 2010, Rozemeijer and van der Jagt 2000, Sebele 2010, Sithole 2004). Studies of Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE model, one of the most thoroughly studied CBNRM programmes, show that benefit distribution is skewed in two respects. On the one hand, there is a steep decline from CBNRM benefits due to local elites capturing high proportions (Balint and Mashinya 2006, Rihoj et al 2010). On the other hand, there is an extremely uneven distribution of the overall CBNRM revenues within the Zimbabwean districts (Sibanda 2004). Here, 97% of all CAMPFIRE wildlife revenues are created in twelve out of the total 37 districts (Frost and Bond 2008).

\textsuperscript{10}Emerton (2001) differentiates between three types of cost: (1) management cost such as equipment and wages (2) cost to other activities such as livestock loss and crop destruction and (3) opportunity cost such as alternative land use and personal time.
Critique IV: The oversimplification of the equation that benefits from resources translates into peoples’ willingness to protect them. Several authors argue that sufficiently large wildlife numbers are critical in terms of income generation for “successful” CBNRM projects (Murphree 2001, Samuelsson and Stage 2007, Steiner and Rihoy 1995). At the same time, various studies illustrate that the assumption that benefits from wildlife automatically translate to changed community behaviour, for instance positive attitudes and active protection, is wrong (Michener 1998, Songorwa 1999). Boggs’ (2004) study of two projects in the Okavango Delta shows that 60% of local community members did not understand (or rather “see”) the relationship between benefits and wildlife resources (also Child 2004a, Gibson and Marks 1995, Emerton 2001). The systematic analysis of 39 community conservation projects by Salafsky et al (2001) refuted the hypothesis that if people financially benefit from resources they will automatically take actions to protect them. Similarly, Scalon and Kull also question the benefits equal conservation maxim, arguing that the relationship between benefits, distribution mechanisms and socio-economic and ecological aspects are “uncritically melted together” (2009:76).

Critique V: Participation is a free exercise. Generally there is little mentioning in the CBNRM literature about (the cost of) community participation in CBOs regarding both individuals’ time and effort as well as collective gatherings for annual general meetings (AGM), area and sub-area meetings (an exemption is Humavindu and Stage’s (2015) analysis of opportunity costs for society and labour). Corbett and Jones argue that CBNRM programmes “are littered with committees and sub-committees” (2000:18) imposed by project requirements from government and non-government agents. In this context, they stress “the huge demands upon individuals” (Corbett and Jones 2000:18) for attending those meetings. Moser (1993) emphasises that especially women in developing countries are burdened with time-consuming livelihood tasks which may explain their underrepresentation in most CBNRM decision-making structures (Lendelvo et al 2012). Exploring gendered aspects of natural resource practices by women in north-west Namibia, Sullivan (2000) asserts that community-based conservation overall consolidates male control.

So-called “sitting allowances” to compensate elected committee members for their time and effort have been scarcely mentioned. Child and Barnes (2010) criticise the considerable amounts of “community money” that are consumed to disburse committee members. Mbaiwa deems the high sitting allowances “not fair” (2004:50) and Twyman proposes that they “have in themselves become a livelihood option” (1998:765). Nott et al (2004) take a different stance on the issue emphasising that committee members are usually full-time employees elsewhere but are expected to oversee complex joint-venture contracts, manage CBO staff, finances and regular feedback to their constituency and thus volunteer their time.
The above criticisms demonstrate that the problems relating to participation as the underlying rationale for “successful” community involvement are well-reflected in the CBNRM literature. As such, they draw on the wider rural development literature where the participatory orthodox is generally seen as a hegemonic device to secure local peoples’ support and compliance (Cleaver 1999, Taylor 2001) and control dissent (Hildyard et al 2001, Mosse 2001). Michener refers to this as “planner-centred perspectives” (as opposed to people-centred) where “the motivation for popular participation is that beneficiary involvement makes projects more likely to succeed” (1998:2106). The tendency of NGOs to facilitate local institution-building and managerial knowledge based on “’toolbox’ of procedures and techniques” (Cleaver 1999:608), where planners’ technocratic view implies standardised management (Taylor 2001), is less well-articulated in the CBNRM literature.

2.3.2 Devolution in Natural Resource Management

CBNRM’s second core concept, devolution11, essentially means the transfer of authority over natural resources from central state to community level. In practice devolution also pertains to the intertwined, ultra-complex themes of local democratic representation and tenure rights in post-colonial African societies (Koch 2004, Massyn 2007, Murphree 1995). The CBO as an accountable and representative local level unit is critical for any meaningful devolution of authority (Ribot 2002a). In practice, the state would delegate management rights and collective legal titles to local communities through the CBO (Igoe and Brockington 2007). Barrow and Murphree (2001) underline the significance of tenure as the key variable for enabling community conservation. Similarly, Lapeyre (2011c) finds that the reallocation of secure property rights is the precondition for allowing rural communities to benefit from tourism activities on their land. However in reality, rural communities have weak property rights over their communal lands. In terms of attracting private tourism operators to invest on communal lands, uncertainty over land rights and insecure tenure remain one of the greatest obstacles (Massyn 2007). Hence, the terms “proprietorship” and “common property institutions” (MET 1995) are in actual fact misleading.

11 In the CBNRM literature, often the terms “devolution” and “decentralisation” are not clearly delineated. Decentralisation is “any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and intuitions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” (Ribot 2002a:4, 2002b). While decentralisation refers to lower level public authorities (generally government bodies), devolution specifically relates to natural resource management by local people/communities/institutions “located within and outside of government” (Edmunds et al 2003:1). Larson states that even if “definitions make strict distinctions, the lines become blurred when referring to village level bodies that operate as a form of local government” (2004:3).
Referring to devolution in CBNRM without clear differentiation of national programme contexts inevitably leads to superficial reference to the concept. Koch (2004) notes that the common CBNRM vocabulary as well as the general discursive rhetoric mask the substantial differences regarding the structural and administrative principles of devolving user rights in the different CBNRM country programmes. Table 2 lists a number of key defining aspects of the four most popular (in terms of scholarly attention) CBNRM programmes in southern Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Benefit sharing and devolution in popular southern African CBNRM programmes (as of 2015)</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Initiation/Programme</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Government authority</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Lowest level CBO</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Core representative body</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Wildlife quota</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Benefit sharing</strong></td>
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Reviewing the CBNRM policy literature shows that country programmes are principally based on sectoral CBNRM policies where the respective government departments are usually concerned with wildlife. The principal policies listed in Table 2 specify the degree of devolution and the local institutions necessary to administer benefit distribution. Namibia

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12 The actual composition, for example the amount of committee members, election criteria, term times and voting procedures, of the representative bodies in the respective country programmes greatly varies. A focussed discussion on people and procedures of Namibian conservancy management committees (CMC) will be given in section 4.6.1.
and Zimbabwe display strong parallels regarding their respective CBNRM legislation with regards to wildlife utilisation. In 1975 both passed legislation that granted freehold landowners authority over wildlife on their land. Enabling largely white-owned, commercial farms to benefit from their wildlife led to the fast recovery of the dwindling wildlife stocks on private land. Post-independence, both countries amended their legislation to provide communal area residents with the same rights (Jones and Murphree 2001). Similarly, policy reforms in Botswana and Zambia enabled local communities to participate in natural resource management. Generally, policy reforms can be differentiated according to what degree rural communities are empowered to actively generate revenue as opposed to passively benefitting from the mere redistribution of financial benefits (Jones 2010).

Nelson and Agrawal argue that the degree of devolution is “strongly conditioned by the institutional incentives facing political decision-makers” (2008:558). Their comparative study of seven CBNRM programmes in southern and East Africa shows that the higher the share of wildlife revenue captured by the state, the stronger is the disincentive to devolve authority over these revenue streams. Botswana and Namibia both retain 100% of benefits at local community level, the other two country programmes are based on quota revenue sharing between communities and government where the latter receives approximately 50% (see Table 2). Murphree (1995) and Ribot (2002a) underline the dilemma of effective decentralisation being reliant on the favourable attitude of central government while, in most instances, it holds the greatest resistance to surrender authority. Ultimate decision-making authority regarding wildlife quotas always lies with the state. However, the degree of community involvement differs. Whereas under the Zambian CBNRM programme, there is de facto no real community participation in quota setting, registered CBOs in Namibia are consulted by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism during quota setting audits (Stuart-Hill et al 2005).

Various authors commented on the condition that community proprietorship under CBNRM is based on conditional—as opposed to statutory—ownership of wildlife (Boggs 2000, Gibson and Marks 1995, Musumali et al 2007, Phuthego and Chanda 2004). CBNRM policies devolve resource rights but not land rights (Jones 2001). Against the background of transferring actual land rights, Sibanda notes that Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme is merely “a watered-down substitute” (2004:250) for an equitable land allocation, unable to compensate for the lack of thorough land reform. Decentralising authority over natural resources to district councils, as opposed to community level, is repeatedly criticised as an obstacle for real community empowerment and community willingness to fully invest in projects (Bond 2001, Sibanda 2004). Twyman’s analysis of wildlife management areas in Botswana’s Kalahari region concludes that the “ideology of modernist top-down development prevails in Botswana, and across much of Southern Africa” (1998:767). She stresses the paternalistic, imposing nature of CBNRM projects exemplified by the condition that if
communities decide to utilise their land exclusively for subsistence purposes, they cannot lease land from the government because they do not meet the state’s requirements for commercial activities. Similarly, Reid and Turner (2004) reason that the South African Makuleke community’s successful land reclaim was bound to the condition that they would use their land for conservation purposes. In Namibia, the state is still the decision-making body for the allocation of tourism concessions on communal lands (Ashley and Jones 2001). Murphree (2004) coined “aborted devolution” as the umbrella term for the collective failings and inability of governments to effectively devolve rights to community level (also Hulme and Murphree 2001b, Nelson 2010, Ribot et al 2006). As half of the income remains at district level, Murombedzi (1999) argues that there is no real devolution in the Zimbabwean CAMPFIRE programme. Corbett and Jones note that as a consequence of aborted devolution “communities will believe they are being cheated” (2000:14).

As Ribot (2002a:1) has noted, “transferring power without accountable representation is dangerous. Establishing accountable representation without power is empty”. The second part of Ribot’s devolution principles, in particular, illustrates CBNRM’s unresolved devolution dilemma. Declaring devolution a core concept but ignoring the wider political environment—such as statutory property regimes and political incentives to transfer rights and authority—CBNRM merely serves a politically attractive rhetoric (Murphree 1995, Rihoj et al 2010, Virtanen 2005).

2.4 Community-Based Organisations as New CBNRM Institutions

There is surprisingly little systematic research on CBOs per se. For example, no empirical research assessing the underlying dynamics of CBO composition and continuity of leadership, selection requirements and voting procedures (an exception are Angula and Shapi 2004) could be discerned. Three out of the four most cited texts on CBNRM in (southern) Africa do not list “community-based organisations” in their index. In Fabricius and Koch’s (2004) book “CBO” is listed twice, both times solely in the context that CBOs need to be formed in order to be eligible for receiving wildlife quotas. In Child’s (2004a) book index “communal institutions”, “CBNRM institutions” and “organisational development” are all linked to the same pages in Jones and Murphree’s (2004) chapter on CBNRM lessons and directions, stressing the importance of representative and accountable local CBNRM

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14 The fact that different CBNRM country programmes use different terms has been taken into consideration. Searching for “trusts” in Botswana’s CBNRM programme, “village action groups” in Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme and “community resource boards” in Zambia led to similar outcomes.
institutions. Nevertheless, there are numerous publications pertaining to the underlying mechanisms that structure CBO institution-building through NGO support. The following, as well as section 2.6.2, demonstrates which CBO-specific aspects have been tackled in the CBNRM literature.


Structural features and subsequent degrees of devolution of community organisations are discussed in detail by Campbell and Shackleton (2001), who distinguish four institutional types in southern African CBNRM: district-level (Zimbabwe), village organisations supported by sectoral departments (Malawi), authorities outside state hierarchy, often driven by traditional authorities (Zambia) and corporate organisations at village level (Botswana and Namibia) where local communities receive proprietor/user rights over their resources. Generally, the CBNRM literature on community organisations is dominated by institutional dynamics pertaining to governance issues in the context of environmental entitlements (Fabricius and Collins 2007, Koch 2004, Leach et al 1999, Mearns et al 1998). More recent publications assess CBOs based on Ostrom’s (1990) seminal work on design principles for robust common property institutions (Child et al 2014, Cox et al 2010, Gruber 2010, Hoole 2014, Saunders 2014), Lapeyre (2011c) and Pellis (2011) deliberate on the issue of reallocating property rights and how this affects CBO institution building to benefit from tourism activities on communal land. Sullivan and Homewood (2004) discuss the vital components of common property resources from an indigenous pastoralist perspective in East and southern Africa.

Local organisations need to have the mandate to function as representative, legal bodies which are elected by their constituency in order to present their interests. The term “representative and accountable legal entity” (RALE) has been mostly used in the context of Botswana’s CBNRM programme (Boggs 2004, Thakadu 2003) but in principle applies to all CBNRM designs. It signifies an organisation at community level that is registered in accordance with national law to act as the administrative body to govern natural resource management and all related activities such as benefit distribution and joint-venture partnerships with private sector partners. Mbaiwa describes the elected CBO committee as the “supreme
governing body in each CBNRM project” (2004:47). CBOs may represent single or multiple villages within designated wildlife management areas (Child and Barnes 2010). Typically they represent between 500 and 5,000 adults (Child et al 2014). Single-village CBOs, as opposed to one institution representing multiple villages, are deemed more “successful” (Child and Barnes 2010). While there are positive examples for benefit sharing by CBOs representing multiple villages (Child et al 2014), there is largely consensus that the smaller the social unit of representation the more effective it is (Jones 1999a, Jones and Murphree 2001, Murphree 1993), or vice versa, the greater the number of people, “the more the issue of representation becomes problematic” (Jones 2001:169).

In the CBNRM literature, local CBOs are repeatedly referred to in the context of their constitutions as “organisational manifestations” (Mearns et al 1998:10). In order to prevent “floating committees” (Child et al 2001:49), governing bodies need to be accountable to their constituent community, hence equitable and accountable institutions need “rigorous procedures” (Child and Barnes 2010:287) anchored in constitutions spelling out governing principles and which are legally binding. The constitution as precondition for CBO registration is often mentioned in a rather generic context (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Child 1996, Fabricius and Collins 2007, Jones 2001, Jones and Murphree 2004). Given their significance as de facto CBNRM constitutional law, there is surprisingly little research on constitutions, their development, actual contents and cultural embeddedness (an exemption are Corbett and Jones 2000). A number of studies simply mention the constitution as prerequisite for CBO formation and that it was drafted with NGO support and community participation (Jones 1999a).

CBNRM knowledge, as well as CBO governance, are both situated in between—and often confronted by—the old/traditional and new/modern paradigms and institutions. Regarding CBNRM knowledge the traditional versus modern divide is reflected in the contrast between indigenous socio-ecological knowledge and modern scientific knowledge which largely constitutes expert-led, exogenous knowledge (Islam 2009, Phuthego and Chanda 2004). The literature on indigenous knowledge, and more specifically its subset of traditional ecological knowledge, illustrates the historical continuity of natural resource utilisation by primarily indigenous, tribal societies (Berkes et al 2000, Sullivan 1998) and its potential for integrating it into modern community-based conservation projects (Hoole 2014, Kaschula et al 2005). However, a substantial proportion of empirical CBNRM research supports the criticism that CBNRM largely ignores traditional environmental knowledge and is, in fact, eroding traditional management systems. Mbaiwa (2011) describes how CBNRM causes a decline in traditional livelihoods activities and accompanying skills and knowledge in the Okavango Delta, Phuthego and Chanda refer to Botswana’s official position on traditional ecological

15 The realisation that social representation works best in small units while effective biodiversity conservation relies on larger spatial dimensions (Child and Barnes 2010, Newmark and Hough 2000) presents a serious CBNRM design dilemma.
knowledge as “still worrisome” (2004:74). Shackleton and Shackleton (2004) illustrate how traditional livelihood management systems in South Africa are broken up by the introduction of new schemes; Gibson and Marks (1995) show how CBNRM ignores important aspects of traditional hunting practices; Kellert et al argue that “the pattern of deficiency” (2000:710) in incorporating traditional knowledge into CBNRM projects was most evident in case studies from developing countries compared to developed countries. Most studies that are critical about CBNRM have in common that they question the underlying dynamics where expert-led projects are based on modern environmental knowledge.

Strictly speaking, “new” CBNRM institutions carry in fact limited novelty in terms of managing and utilising natural resources economically. Historically the traditional authority presented the legitimate, formalised institution to allocate land and resources and, albeit to different degrees, Chiefs and headmen continue to have considerable influence as custodians of the land in many southern African countries (Jones and Murphree 2001, Turner 2004). As such, they hold great powers that can easily stifle efforts of newly established committees (Madzudzo 1995), unless they are beneficiaries themselves. Child cites a situation from Zambia where local chiefs strongly resisted plans to introduce a new revenue sharing scheme where they “stood to lose the most” (2004b:238). “Modern” CBOs governed by elected committees potentially take away or undermine decision-making powers from traditional, customary institutions (Madzwamuse and Fabricius 2004, Nott and Jacobson 2004, Pellis et al 2015). The fact that “modern” CBNRM is building new institutions which are inclined to challenge traditional ones has substantial conflict potential. Referring to Namibian conservancies Corbett and Jones (2000) note that whereas traditional leaders are mainly elder males, elected CBO committee members are often made up of younger, often female, community members who are generally more open towards tourism venture on communal land while traditional leaders are generally more suspicious. Campbell and Shackleton (2001) argue that the objective of devolution introduces the competition for “new” benefits. Based on Ostrom’s (1990) work on governing the commons, Bond (2001) reasons that new local institutions will only be supported and recognised by their constituency if they offer greater net benefits than their traditional counterpart. Using the example of the Namibian Anabeb Conservancy, Pellis (2011) illustrates how members within the same constituency favour different—traditional vs. modern—ideas of community conservation, thus creating overlapping and conflicting rules and responsibilities.

Mearns et al argue that new local organisations are anticipated to replicate and reproduce “the assumed effectiveness of a ‘traditional’ past” (1998:11). There is, however, no consensus on the underlying question of which system is “better”, that is more effective in administering CBNRM projects, but there are certain camps within the literature offering insights. One the one hand, traditional structures are referred to as being more robust and actually known and recognised by the majority of community members (Anstey and de Sousa
On the other hand, traditional authorities were often found to be hijackers of collective benefits based on old patterns of distribution favouring their status. Koch (2004) identifies tensions between traditional authorities and new, elected management committees representing CBOs as one of the six principal types of conflict in CBNRM projects. Incorporating old elites into new projects has been a well-intended strategy of project planners. Based on the example of recently established CBNRM institutions in the Okavango Delta, Mbaiwa (2003) indicates that the inclusion of the village chief as well as other traditional leaders on the board of trustees considerably increased the new CBO’s credibility. Hulme and Murphree (2001b) exemplify the opposite based on Zambia’s ADMADE programme where project planners decided against the introduction of new CBNRM institutions. Retaining the traditional authority as the core natural resource management unit sought to speed up project implementation while reducing costs for new institutional development. The subsequent elite capture of benefits prompted critics to refer to “chief-based conservation” (Hulme and Murphree 2001b:294) as opposed to “community-based conservation”. Referring to Zambia’s South Luangwa National Park, Musumali et al (2007) describe how they witnessed one of the chiefs firing the local CBO’s chairman which was not questioned by the community members. The authors underline the fact that although the CBNRM programme design provides for traditional authorities a ‘patrons only’ status, their de facto powers are much greater. Ribot (2002b) concludes that central government and NGOs as project planners often target traditional authorities as an institutional vehicle for project implementation despite the evidence that they are rarely democratic. The manner in which traditional leaders can strategically influence new CBNRM institutions will be discussed in detail in section 4.3.2, taking into account the historical fabrication of chieftainships and their role in today’s CBNRM policy design.

2.5 An Inventory of Theory and Method in CBNRM Research

The reliance on qualitative case studies as preferred research design for community-based conservation for more than three decades is striking (Castree 2008a, Nyahunzvi 2010). Case study design in CBNRM research appears to be legitimised by actual practice and volume of published output. While Agrawal (2001) agrees with case study design per se, he stresses the need for more careful consideration of methodological issues such as actual design and sample selection and a shift from studying single cases to comparative and statistical analysis. Similarly, Twyman (2000) laments the scholarly tendency to report CBNRM success

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16 Generally, up to two thirds of the chapters of the most cited (cf. Google Scholar) edited books on CBNRM are based on case studies.
stories. With these CBNRM flagship projects on one end of the continuum, there is a vast number of (case) studies highlighting how modern CBNRM stimulates conflict and competition at local level, often due to the uneven distribution of benefits (Gibson and Marks 1995, Hulme and Murphree 2001b, Koch 2004, Newmark and Hough 2000) at the other.

In order to systematically assess CBNRM research methodologically and thematically, the 20 most cited research articles (1990—2014) were identified using Google Scholar analytics. Using the exact keyword string “community-based natural resource management”, abstracts were then screened to provide evidence for primary research (Appendix 2 lists details on author(s), university affiliation, research location and objective, relevant theories, methodology and samples). The criteria for reviewing the “procedures and canons” of the largely qualitative studies are based on Strauss and Corbin’s (1990:424) specifications on how to evaluate research publications.

The sample contains publications from 1998 to 2010 with the majority of papers (13 in total) published between 2005 and 2010. The most frequently quoted paper by Kellert et al (2000) has 597 citations. Authors’ affiliations with academic institutions are with six author(s) each mostly located in southern Africa, western Europe and the United States, plus one author team each from Fiji and Laos. The geographic locations of data collection show a clear predisposition to southern Africa with eleven out of 20 research areas (two more studies in East and West Africa). All but two United States studies are set within a developing/less developed country context. The thematic background of the different journals clearly reflects the different but related focal points of academic CBNRM research. Eight articles are published in human and ecological development journals, six are issued in environmental journals, and four are published in geographic journals.

Methodologically, the sample reflects case studies as the preferred research method in CBNRM. In total, twelve articles are based on single or multiple, often comparative, case studies. Three studies are quantitative, survey-based, while another three used mixed methods. The majority relies on qualitative, often ethnographic methods such as informal, unstructured interviews, participant observation and focus group discussion. Half of the qualitative studies specifically refer to participatory rural appraisals (Chambers 1983, 1997). The most commonly applied method in quantitative studies is coding techniques to analyse contents from a large number of previously published case studies. Where sampling techniques are detailed, random household surveys in different village settlements, snowball and convenience sampling are most frequently mentioned. Naturally, sample sizes vary greatly according to the study’s scope,
for instance from a total of 1078 semi-structured interviews (Kellert et al 2000) to an average of 20 to 40 interviewees, and approximately 170 households.

Screening the specifications regarding data collection in the sample studies, a somewhat laissez-faire attitude to methodological considerations is apparent in about half the cases. Five case studies hardly mention research procedures and simply refer to “fieldwork conducted”. Although rationales for case-specific research are frequently given, there is rarely mention of the actual limitations of case study research design. For instance, Wainwright and Wehrmeyer acknowledge the small sample size but argue that the “study is morphologically very similar to a large number of other CBNRM projects, which make the results probably more applicable than originally anticipated, and which justifies the general comments on CBNRMs” (1998:934). While reliability and especially validity of the chosen research design are somewhat neglected in a number of case studies, there is frequent, detailed explanation on case-specific as well as broader (mainly historical and cultural) settings affecting the phenomenon under study. Strauss and Corbin deem the consideration of these “microscopic” and “macroscopic” (1990:426) conditions a key criterion for empirical grounding and theoretical finding.


Naturally, the sample studies were also assessed in terms of their relevance to this thesis’s research focus. None of the publications specifically mentioned the relationship between local institutions and NGO involvement. Out of the 20 publications, 14 make no reference to NGO involvement at all, which is somewhat surprising considering the donor-driven nature of CBNRM projects. Although not specifically mentioning NGOs, two research teams distinguish local communities and supporting organisations as local and non-local actors (Lauber et al 2008) and internal–external stakeholders (Cox et al 2010). The remaining studies
refer to donor-driven CBNRM programmes at macro level. Wainwright and Wehrmeyer (1998) express concern about heavily expert-led development projects, Campbell and Shackleton point out that NGOs are “largely responsible for pioneering CBNRM in Namibia” (2001:98) while questioning replicability of the expensive facilitation and uneven power relationship between CBNRM implementers and consumers. Nelson and Agrawal (2008) acknowledge the donor-driven nature of CBNRM, however, they also reason that in reality donors have no real leverage to influence southern African states and their CBNRM reforms.

Half of the publications make no reference to community-based organisations. Campbell and Shackleton assess policy and commercial contexts in southern Africa to determine the “new locus of authority” (2001:89). Evaluating success factors for CBNRM, Mbaiwa (2004) regards the formation of CBOs as ground-breaking. At the same time, challenges for long-term feasibility remain (mis-) management of CBOs and committee members’ lack of entrepreneurial skills. Others refer to the complexity of local institutions and hybrid governance models as a difficult necessity for enabling efficient community organisations (Clarke and Jupiter 2010, Kellert et al 2000). Related to this, issues of responsibility and accountability of management committees (Fujita and Phanvilay 2008, Wainwright and Wehrmeyer 1998) and the importance of community members’ understanding of such institutions (Musumali et al 2007) are mentioned. The dichotomy of new and traditional resource management institutions is referred to in terms of its incompatibility (Phuthego and Chanda 2004, Kellert et al 2000), where the latter maintains customary powers over natural resources (McCall and Minang 2005) and where representation of traditional authorities on new CBNRM governance committees is a significant success factor (Mbaiwa 2004).

While the foregoing illustrates where CBOs are mentioned, it seems enlightening to point out where they are not. Fabricius and Collins (2007) define strategies and challenges for “success” based on four CBNRM case studies. They lay emphasis on governance and formalised decision-making structures and the need to have dedicated community representations but they do not mention community-led institutions. Gruber’s (2010) analysis of 23 research papers results in the coding of 222 success factors resulting in twelve organisational principles. While they indicate the significance of devolution and local empowerment for instance, legitimacy and accountability, and legal, representative community organisations per se are not mentioned.

Overall, the systematic analysis of key publications shows that qualitative, ethnographic approaches dominate; methodologically, case studies appear to be the state of the art research design. Tackled from different disciplinary perspectives, the most frequent study locations are in southern Africa. While CBNRM publications, in general, have been accused of deploying success stories and alluring rhetoric, all research articles elaborated on the shortcomings of CBNRM’s practical realities. Remarkably, research findings clearly
undermine the very fundamental underpinnings of CBNRM (uneven cost/benefit distribution, insufficient community involvement/participation and symbolic devolution only). The fact that neither CBOs as the principal vehicle for participation and devolution, nor NGOs as key initiators and CBNRM drivers, are even mentioned in half of the publications, underlines that there is a gap in knowledge pertaining to the understanding of one of the principal CBNRM interfaces.

2.6 CBNRM as Exogenous Development Intervention

2.6.1 NGOs as External Agents

Large-scale funding for biodiversity conservation in the post-structural adjustment environment in sub-Saharan Africa paved the way for the rise of a new powerful actor: NGOs as the brokers of rural development projects. The neoliberal orthodoxy of public is bad, private is good (Edwards and Hulme 1992:20) lead to the continuous withdrawing of state involvement of service provision which was filled by NGOs who became “the darling of social service delivery” (Jordan and van Tuijl 2006:4). Giddens explains NGO growth in terms of the disillusionment of traditional political channels and the decline of Left and Right, giving way to the “rise of politics of the environment and of the community” (1995:37). Sollis (1996) summarises the three core expectations by international donors who increasingly deployed NGOs to channel aid money to community level as alleviating the impacts of adjustment on disadvantaged groups, strengthen post-adjustment policies to develop human resources while pushing environmental protection and intensifying democratisation processes and advancing civil society. There are numerous references in the (CBNRM) literature stressing NGOs’ positive impacts on rural development projects: their effectiveness at creating positive impacts at local level (Edwards and Hulme 1992, Jordan and van Tuijl 2006, Sollis 1996), being inclusive of the poorest, most vulnerable groups within communities (Carroll 1992, Fisher 1993, Forstner 2004), facilitating capacity development (Chambers 1992, Simpson 2008, Taye 2008) and their significance as intermediaries between communities and the public and private sector (Ashley and Jones 2001, Forstner 2004, Fowler 1985, Kamoto et al 2013, Wearing and McDonald 2002).

Bratton cites NGOs as “leading practitioners in rural development in Africa” (1990:2). His observation mirrors the conventional wisdom at that time when NGOs were deemed more effective than the state in delivering public services (Jordan and van Tuijl 2006). Wood (1997) referred to this condition as “franchise state” as the state responsibilities are effectively outsourced to NGOs. NGOs’ new role as distributors and implementers of development is reflected in their growth and through the massive amounts of funding administered through them since the 1980s. With regards to geographical scope and organisational size, Gordenker
and Weiss refer to large international NGOs as “a new breed of super NGOs” (1996:217) which are almost entirely funded by northern governments. After the first decade of NGO-administered development aid, Clark (1991) observed that they move more funds to the South than the World Bank group. Chapin (2004) and Brockington and Scholfield (2010) point towards the dominance of a small number of large environmental NGOs “controlling” the majority of funds.

The interventionist nature of the vast majority of CBNRM initiatives is well-acknowledged in the literature. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was one of the chief supporters for CBNRM programmes in the 1980s and 1990s in southern Africa. CAMPFIRE alone is estimated to have received USS30-40 million from USAID and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) between 1990 and 2003 (Child and Barnes 2010, Rihoy et al 2007, Taylor 2009). Despite the high aid-dependency of sub-Saharan Africa and leverage of development agencies (Adams and Hulme 2001), it has been stressed that CBNRM programmes in Namibia and Zimbabwe (as opposed to Botswana and Zambia) were national initiatives led by state technocrats (Child and Barnes 2010, Nelson and Agrawal 2008). However, especially Namibia and Zimbabwe relied on NGOs as technical advisors and implementing agents which is in line with the preferred structure for rural development support built on international NGOs and private consulting firms channelling funds to their southern counterparts; that is national, often field-based NGOs (Lyons 2013, Hoole 2010).

Often summarised under the umbrella “external agents”, expatriate NGO staff, consultants and scientists, become the dominant group in natural resource management practice legitimised through their expert knowledge (Büscher and Whande 2007, Dryzek 1997, Hulme and Murphree 2001b, Mosse 2011). Thus, “environment empowered a newly politicised scientific fraternity” (Franklin 2013:76). The role of supporting NGOs in CBNRM projects is repeatedly cited as significant. Often NGO involvement is criticised for creating a “dependency syndrome” on their support (Hara 2004, Hoole 2010, Jones 2001, Twyman 2000). In terms of the ascribed significance, it is perplexing how little systematic research about NGO involvement in CBNRM projects exists. However, there are a number of recurring issues in the wider rural development literature primarily concerned with the actual impact of NGO involvement:

NGOs are facing a definition—representation dilemma. The fact that the term “non-government organisation” is negative, poses the question of what NGOs actually are (Fowler 1985). Vakil (1997) attributes the often non-specific use of the term to the interdisciplinary nature of development literature tackling various policy areas and the multifaceted nature of NGOs themselves. Although different scholars produced categorisations predominantly based on NGOs’ organisational attributes (Elliott 1987, Fowler 2002, Salamon and Anheier 1992,
Wolch 1990), Vakil maintains that classifying NGOs remains a “perplexing dilemma” (1997:2057). One of the consequences of the ambiguity of what they are is the question of who they actually represent—and thus how NGOs make themselves accountable to their “clientele” (Edwards and Hulme 2002, Jordan and Tuijl 2006, Kovach 2006, Lehmann 2005).

Especially with regards to the growth of big international NGOs, Kovach describes the lack of evaluation as “extremely worrying” (2006:197). Pressed for the need to deliver success stories to secure continued funding, there is a tendency to camouflage failures through secrecy and missing transparency (Bennett 1995, Goodwin and Bah 2013, Robinson 1992, Sullivan 2003). Fowler (1985) argues that NGO accountability\(^\text{18}\) has two dimensions, upwards to funding sources and downwards to beneficiary groups. While no examples could be located within the CBNRM literature mentioning the importance (or practice) of a supporting NGO being accountable to the community it supports, there are a few studies pointing towards the need for transparency in mediating development projects.

The interrelation between non-government and government organisations is another recurring issue in the development literature. Generally, there is agreement that their relationship is likely to be constrained by mutual distrust and suspicion at varying degrees (Gordenker and Weiss 1996, Jones 2001, Sollis 1996). Bratton (1990) compares the relationship of African governments and NGOs to one of cat and mouse. There is, however, fewer consensuses on the respective scope of power. On the one hand, NGOs are described as de facto replacing government’s role and authority in certain areas or “crowding out governments” (Bennett 1995:xii) by offering more competitive salaries (Jones 2001). On the other hand, “by definition NGOs are peripheral to the systems they are trying to change” (Edwards and Hulme 1992:22), hence NGOs are portrayed being at the mercy of the government they are trying to influence (Gordenker and Weiss 1996). While NGOs play a significant role in the initiation and implementation of CBNRM projects, Nelson and Agrawal argue that NGO efforts can be “completely annulled” (2008:578) by governments not providing the necessary policy reforms. This issue connects to the wider criticism of NGO interventions often tackling “technical issues” (Navarro-Flores 2011) and thus taking place in a political vacuum and ignoring—or depoliticising—the broader structural inequalities (Banks and Hulme 2012, Cleaver 1999, Feldman 2003, Ferguson 1990, Hulme and Murphree 2001b, White 1996).

\(^{18}\) Accountably issues prove to be one of the most enduring themes in NGO-led development projects (Edwards and Hulme 2002, Lehmann 2005). Kovach’s (2006) study of intergovernmental organisations and transnational corporations showed that international NGOs are the least transparent sector.
2.6.2 NGO-CBO Interaction in CBNRM Projects

Several different interfaces of community–NGO interaction at different project stages have been discussed in the literature. Here, NGOs’ roles in consciousness and awareness raising activities have been stressed (Ashley 1998, Esman and Uphoff 1984). De Kadt (1979:26) refers to this as conscientización. Michener (1998) points out that these conscious forming sessions are used to push local people into believing that conservation concerns by external development professionals are also their concerns. Once this common vision had been established, NGOs provided mainly two modes of assistance: technical and financial. The latter has been questioned largely in the context of introducing dependency through externally funded assistance to communities (Jones 2001). Masking the real cost of community-based projects increased the non-likeliness of long-term economic viability (Twyman 2000) and is thus a “recipe for disappointment” (Bergin 2001:102). Technical assistance comprises capacity building through workshops and training to facilitate business development, leadership and governance structures, natural resource development and assistance in project proposal writing (Manyara and Jones 2007, Taye 2008).

Only a limited number of Namibian CBNRM case studies pertain to rural communities’ perceptions regarding their designated support NGOs. Snyman’s (2012) study on the joint-venture partnership of a Namibian CBO enquired about their perceptions of NGO support and found that 48% of respondents had heard of their supporting NGO. Out of those, with 26% the biggest share, they identified “training” as the NGO’s main support to the CBO. With regards to community capacity building, Lapeyre asserts that income generation from tourism significantly depends “on the efficient support of both NGOs and donors” to create a “shared understanding about the tourism sector” (2011c:309). Research by Pellis et al (2015), Sullivan (2003) and Taylor (2012) tackles the complex relationship between post-independence environmental NGOs and ethnic divisions within communities they serve—and how they likely contribute to “the hardening and politicising of ethnic difference” (Taylor 2012:1).

There is consistent evidence within the CBNRM literature assessing the reasons for projects failures that point out mismatched expectations from both project receivers and projects implementers (Boggs 2004, Funda 2013, Michener 1998, Twyman 2000). More specifically, different researchers observe that NGOs, often unintentionally, create unrealistically high community expectations, especially in the context of engaging in community-based tourism enterprises (Lapeyre 2010, Measham and Lumbasi 2013, Silva and Motzer 2015). Boardman (2006) emphasises the importance of exit strategies from supporting NGOs to ensure that communities are not continuously relying on their development agents. He stresses that exit strategies are a crucial part of planning project phases. With the exemption of a few authors mentioning the need of exit strategies (Jones and Weaver 2009, Raburu et al 2012, Saunders 2011), they are overall non-existent in the CBNRM literature.
Regarding the level of intensity of NGO intervention, the Namibian CBNRM programme sought to provide “facilitation based on light touch adaptive management” (Jones 2001:170, 1999). The “light touch” is claimed to be less interventionist where NGOs primarily act as knowledge brokers opening up avenues of decision-making by explaining the advantages and disadvantages of different development paths (Barrow and Murphree 2001, Child and Barnes 2010). Using the example of the government-led Botswana CBNRM programme, Twyman (1998) notes that while the community choice was implied in discussing the possibility of a joint-venture lodge, it was apparently the only option which was fully explained by government representatives. Another reality of rural development projects is that marginalised communities are seldom in the position to reject CBNRM projects which are being promoted (Kovach 2006, Mosse 2001). Also, there is usually one specific NGO working in the geographic area and hence the only provider of support services to the community. The Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DRFN) finds that where different NGOs offer support services based on different donor requirements this “creates confusion, unhappiness and at times resentment in the community, even leading to the community playing service providers off against each other” (DRFN 2003:20).

Given the importance of the development provider and consumer connection, there is surprisingly little empirical research in the CBNRM literature on the actual nature of the relationship between external agents and community stakeholders. Kontinen (2004) notes that if mechanisms of power are emphasised in conservation research they are usually concerned with impacts rather than character. At a more conceptual level, drawing on the literature of postcolonial theory and development, the dichotomisation of the representation of the developers and the to-be-developed (Hobart 1993), active Westerners and passive non-Westerners (Finnström 1997) and, more generally, givers versus receivers of development (Hall and Tucker 2004) becomes evident. Common defining features of these deceptions are that local people are the objects whose practices need to be changed or optimised (Hobart 1993) while direction and scope of change are usually determined by modern, scientific knowledge of people governing development “by virtue of their expertise” (Franklin 2013:76). In this context, Islam notes that, when projects fail “blame goes to the victims and their culture, not the planners” (2009:29). Drawing on the work of Michener (1998), Twyman (2000) highlights the usefulness of distinguishing between people-centred and planner-centred approaches to assess levels of participation by poor people. Not surprisingly, the more externally-driven the intervention is, the more planner-centred it becomes, leaving local people as mere development objects and passive receivers.

In the “developer and to-be-developed” equation local actors are passive and powerless whereas the drivers of development are actively “bringing development” through initiation and implementation. The considerable scholarly output on assessing the reasons why community-
based tourism projects fail (Choi and Sirakaya 2005, Blackstock 2005, Halstead 2003) often seemingly reinforces the construct of the passive community. Inability to take initiative, lack of local leadership, weak or no community mobilisation/support and apathy are frequently cited as socio-cultural constraints to “successful” community-based tourism projects (Blackman et al 2004, Manyara and Jones 2007, Sebele 2010, Wearing and McDonald 2002, Wilson et al 2001). A number of researchers argue that apparent powerlessness is, in fact, a chosen, rather powerful strategy. In this context, non-participation (on a spectrum from lack of enthusiasm to active boycott, see Sullivan (2003) for a detailed account of community-led resistance to a CBNRM support NGO) constitutes a powerful strategic bargaining tool for communities (Scott 1985, 1990 Michener 1998). Chambers argues that “apparent ignorance and stupidity are part of the strategy of lying low” (1983:107). This suggests that non-participation is not the result of the community’s inability to grasp the project objectives but rather the result of having accumulated consumer experiences of development projects where incentives for participation were unclear or needed to be negotiated (Schneider and Libercier 1995).

This argumentation questions the somewhat established connection between local communities and NGOs where the former are largely destined to be dependent on the latter. Various CBNRM studies describe this situation where donor-funded projects create or prolong dependency syndrome (Barrow and Murphree 2001, Dressler et al 2010, Hara 2004, Hulme and Infield 2001, Lapeyre 2010, Newmark und Hough 2000, Sebele 2010) leading to the collapse of projects once NGO support ceases (Manyara and Jones 2007). Others ascribe reluctance on the side of NGOs to hand over full project management responsibility to communities based on the assumption that they are “not ready” and they should be exposed to as little risk as possible (Broadman 2006, Hussein 1995, Michener 1998, Twyman 2000). The CBNRM literature largely reflects a very much one-dimensional view of dependency. The wider NGO and development literature suggests that NGOs are equally dependent on “successful” projects to secure continued funding (Bennett 1995, Boardman 2006, Goodwin and Bah 2013) which may even lead to a situation where different NGOs compete to be associated with certain success stories or best practice cases (Michener 1998).

Hoole’s study on power dynamics in Namibian joint-venture tourism partnerships on communal land finds that “most of the power that develops under CBNRM is externalized to national and international operations of NGO and private enterprise partners” (2010:93-94), yet he does not indicate what is meant by power or how conservancies can (not) exercise it. Social theory, and more specifically political sociology, produced “massive literature concerned with the concept of power” (Giddens 1979:88), however, its application in research has not evolved correspondingly, likely owing to the condition that the “literature on power tends to particularly high levels of abstraction and terminological subtleties” (Avelino and Rotmans 2009:548). Two of the most cited empirical studies of power dynamics in development are Gaventa’s study on
American mine workers where “patterns of power and powerlessness can keep issues from arising, grievances from being voiced, and interests from being recognised” (1980:vii); his work is based on Lukes’ (1974) three-dimensional view of power. Drawing on the Foucauldian conceptualisation of power as regimes of truth, Ferguson (1990) illustrates how funding bodies, development institutions and dominant narratives “create” rural development projects in Lesotho that often fail in terms of their stated aims but, paradoxically, are accompanied by a growth of the development apparatus.

Lukes’ and Ferguson’s case studies offer valuable insights to studying the dynamics of power and dependency in the Namibian CBNRM context in that they examine how global forces affect local level development. Ferguson’s primary objective is not the rural poor as development targets per se but rather the development apparatus itself by which he means “massive internationalist intervention” executed by a “cosmopolitan swarm of expatriate ‘experts’” (1990:7). Focussing on how development discourse deploys “devspeak” and “devthink” (1990:260) to produce and reproduce unacknowledged (power) structures, he demonstrates how rural development plans are not congruent with the actual project outcomes. Gaventa’s (1980, 2006) approach to studying relationships of power within an organisation is grounded in the belief that power lies at the centre of our understanding of concepts and practices of participation. His emphasis on how participants perceive processes of power and especially the distinction between “power over” (the ability of the powerful to affect actions and thoughts) and “power to” (the capacity to act and exercise agency) is considered particularly useful to assessing CBO-NGO interaction.

2.7 Conclusion

In the 1980s, CBNRM’s empowerment ideology based on local participation, devolution and collective ownership became the leading approach in combing rural development and conservation efforts on communal lands. The early scholarly hype celebrated success stories at project and national level, especially the Namibian and Zimbabwean CBNRM programmes were hailed for their “outstanding economic and ecological success” (Jones and Murphree 2004: 64). With consolidation and maturation in the 2000s, the CBNRM literature displays an obvious divide between CBNRM’s irresistible conceptual rhetoric and the often bleak reality, primarily studied on a case-by-case approach. Subsequent publications on the “CBNRM crisis” (Adams et al 2004, Dressler and Büscher 2008, Dressler et al 2010, Measham and Lumbasi 2013, Swatuk 2005) acknowledged the multi-faced, often conflicting nature of CBNRM objectives, frequently resulting in project failure.
Locating CBNRM within the neoliberal conservation discourse ought to reflect how the interplay of markets, rural communities and natural (communal) areas has turned the latter into units of production. De-regulating nature results in an actual re-regulation (Brockington et al 2008, Dressler and Büscher 2008) where authority and responsibility need to be reorganised (Hulme and Murphree 2001a). Reviewing the restructuring processes of different southern African CBNRM programmes, the “epistemology of intervention” (Sachs 2010:33) of participatory community development was stressed. It was shown that CBNRM projects advocating bottom-up, endogenous community development are in actual fact “induced development” (Uphoff et al 1979), primarily initiated by outsiders (Twyman 2000). Research on NGOs as implementers of CBNRM projects is patchy. This review illustrated the discrepancy between the evidence of positive, localised impacts at micro level and critiques of the uncontrolled extension of NGOs at macro level. Especially in the context of NGO-driven community-based tourism projects as primary sources of revenue, the worrying correlation between relying on technical, financial, industry-specific support and no or very little research into the viability of expert-driven projects was stressed (Blackman et al 2004, Hawkins and Mann 2007, Lapeyre 2011b, McCool 2009, Wearing and McDonald 2002).

CBOs are both precondition and principal vehicle for effective community participation and devolution of authority over natural resources. The CBNRM literature seems somewhat preoccupied with community dynamics, frequently resulting in token reference to the importance of establishing accountable, legal community organisations. While their necessity *per se* is stressed (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Leach et al 1999), a corresponding, systematic assessment of organisational CBO design and governance is largely missing in the CBNRM literature. The conflict potential of newly elected committees undermining power and authority of traditional leaders, historically the custodians of land and resources, clearly emerged as a core structural CBNRM issue. The identified gaps in the CBNRM literature relate to the actual role and structure of CBOs. Are committee members comparable to elected politicians, mandated to equally represent their voters? Or do they rather resemble a board of directors, governing complex community (tourism) enterprises, obliged to deliver dividends—benefits—to their shareholders? Can one expect committee members’ participation to function on a voluntary basis? What are the measures ensuring continuity and capability of committee members to govern CBOs?

External development agents are often the driving force behind CBO formation (Manyara and Jones 2007, Michener 1998). Yet “explicit attention to ‘external agents’ and subject-object relationships has been virtually absent in community-based conservation” (Campbell and Vainio-Mattila 2003:430). Despite its participatory ideology, the CBNRM literature often reproduces discursive stereotypes of passive project receivers and active implementers bringing development to the former. It was shown that the literature frequently
acknowledges NGOs’ role as initiators, knowledge brokers, technical advisors and intermediaries, however, there is a perplexing gap of knowledge pertaining the actual relationship between these two main protagonists in rural development projects.

As stated in the introduction, it is argued that a more refined understanding of CBOs and NGOs and the conditions that shape their relationship is needed as the dichotomy of powerful outsider – compliant receiver fails to recognise the reciprocal nature of development intervention.
CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

What are the underlying mechanisms that produce and enable, as well as constrain, the exchange relationship between community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)? Initially, this chapter presents the rationale for adopting a critical realist stance in the empirical research process and discusses the methodological considerations for assessing social relations within the community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) system. Throughout, the challenge of combining the objective of pursuing causal explanations of the phenomenon under study while deploying a pragmatist approach of doing research will be emphasised. Table 3 details the conceptual framework that guided the empirical research process.

Table 3: Conceptual framework for empirical research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research paradigm</th>
<th>Critical realism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Concept</td>
<td>Structuration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach</td>
<td>Inductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Qualitative/exploratory, case studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methods</td>
<td>Multiple methods in the two case studies: in-depth interviews, observation, field notes/memos and thick description</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s research

Section 3.3 determines how the preliminary three-month field trip in 2013 paved the way for actual data collection; a second three-month fieldwork period in 2014. It shows how access, physically to remote places and interpersonally to conservancy members, was navigated. Furthermore, it will be emphasised why exploratory case studies were chosen and what informed theoretical sampling of the two selected cases. Section 3.4 demonstrates how raw data from interviews and observed procedures and events were processed by means of two coding cycles to reach the reduced state of more abstract, conceptually related patterns. The part on research ethics illustrates how the guiding principles for an ethically sound conduct are essentially affected by pragmatic choices and their real life consequences. Finally, limitations of research are reflected upon. It will be argued that analytical—as opposed to statistical—generalisation in case study methodology is indeed possible if context-dependent knowledge is theoretically embedded.
3.2 The Interplay Between Critical Realist Paradigm, Inductive Approach and Case Study Methodology

All empirical research is based on ontological assumptions. Critical realists assume a real world “out there”, existing independently of our theory-laden and often fallible knowledge of it (Bhaskar 1975, Sayer 1992). Firmly rejecting the positivist supposition that “theory-independent sense data” can create scientific knowledge (Reed 2005:1629), critical realists believe that knowledge is largely—but not exclusively—linguistic (Sayer 1992). Language thus serves to construct reality (as opposed to absolute knowledge) and how it can be known (Scott 2005). Reed (2005) formulates three principal ontological assumptions of critical realism. Firstly, underlying structures and mechanisms shape the phenomenon under study and produce “observable patterns of events” (Reed 2005:1630). Secondly, due to their covert undiscerning nature, structures need to be theoretically constructed and uncovered through the process of iterative abstraction to conceptualise their generative mechanisms (Allen 1983, Sayer 1981). This process, known as “retroduction”, is essentially the transition from “the description of some phenomenon to a description of something which produces it or is a condition for it” (Bhaskar 1986:11). Thirdly, critical realists insist that the underlying structures are in fact causal mechanisms that can enable or constrain human agency. Thus, the causal-explanatory fixation of critical realism marks a clear departure from an interpretivist ontology denying the “possibility of discerning causality” (Easton 2010:118).

Being firmly based in the concept of structuration (Giddens 1979, 1984), any empirical research following a critical realist paradigm is automatically caught up in the structure–agency dilemma, that is the debate about whether or not social structures pre-exist, and thus hamper, individual self-determination (Scott 2005, Harvey 2002). Since critical realists “reject the reduction of structure to agency or vice versa” (Reed 2005:1633), this knowledge paradigm is well-suited to assess competing explanations of the complex exchange relationship between CBOs and NGOs in the broader context of a neoliberal conservationist agenda.

Although this research design follows a qualitative–inductive approach where the specific research questions are largely emergent, pure induction is believed to be a myth since any systematic analysis is “conceptually embedded” and questions are “theoretically informed” (Silverman 2010:86, Miles and Huberman 1984). However, data analysis is essentially inductive as data are not coded for specific, pre-determined themes; rather themes are the outcome of the coding process (Saldaña 2009).

Easton (2010) argues that the explanatory nature of case studies is particularly well-suited to critical realist enquiries. Essentially tackling the how and why questions of social phenomena, case studies offer distinct advantages. They enable greater “proximity to reality” (Flyvbjerg 2006:236) and thus allow the researcher to observe social practices in depth and, most importantly, case studies provide the opportunity to reveal the causal relationships between different entities (Easton 2010, Gray 2004, Yin 2003). This thesis is built upon two
cases that exhibit maximal variation (Silverman 2010) in terms of how NGO support, CBO governance and ownership of tourism ventures are structured. Interview data, ethnographic observational data and case-specific documents are the multiple sources of evidence collected (Robson 1993). By adopting a “linear-analytic structure” (Yin 1994:138), this case study design follows the standard approach for studying specific issues and subtopics within a set case, evolving from the particular to the abstract-conceptual. In accordance with the inductive approach, the case studies are exploratory, as opposed to largely pre-structured, confirmatory studies testing suggested relationships between variables and entities (Creswell 1998, Robson 1993).

Various authors postulate the same critical condition for effective case study research, that is, clearly defining the boundaries of the phenomenon, narrowing down the topic, specifying what to include—and what to exclude (Miles 1979, Robson 1993, Silverman 2010, Stark and Torrance 2005). Considering the complexity of CBNRM and the different actors’ reciprocal powers to affect one another, one (the?) key methodological challenge is to balance the need for clear boundaries and “a sense of completeness” (Yin 1994:148). Figure 1 visualises how I contextualised CBO–NGO interaction which, at macro level, is inevitably caught up in the global neoliberal nature conservation paradigm giving rise to CBNRM in southern Africa (chapter 2). Tightening the focus, chapter 4 unpacks the various dynamics influencing the core unit of analysis at micro level. Here, it will be demonstrated how the two chosen cases are embedded in the spheres of influence of customary rule in communal areas, market-driven joint venture partnerships, donor-driven wildlife conservation and the state’s ultimate ownership of resources.

**Figure 1: Contextualising CBO–NGO interaction**
3.3 Field Research and Data Collection

3.3.1 First Fieldwork Period

The rationale for conducting an early, preliminary field trip was grounded in a number of related conceptual and methodological choices. First and foremost, this trip served as a networking exercise where personal connections were sought to enable access and pave the way for a more focused fieldwork period one year later. Secondly, it was anticipated to aid the process of “crafting” research questions following Allen’s stance that “questions are produced, not found” (2003:12). Thirdly, this preliminary field trip was understood as a filtering tool for narrowing down potential case study sites and data collection methods which were both appropriate and feasible, considering the realities of doing social research in remote rural areas.

The initial research focus was on intermediaries and “development brokers” more generally, therefore the role of the public and private sector in terms of influencing and facilitating the development of community-based tourism enterprises within different CBNRM programmes in southern Africa was also considered. Table 4 lists the four basic questions guiding the interviews. Probing questions were used to tailor questions to the respective target groups, that is government staff and policy context versus private sector and different joint-venture models.

From January to March 2013, 44 interviews were conducted in South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia (see Table 5 for a detailed overview of interviewees’ affiliation). NGO employees made up the lion share of the sample (42%), government, university and private sector representatives are somewhat equal with an average of 16% each. Low CBO representation (9%) is due to the fact that they are the most inaccessible group to outsiders.

Table 4: Core questions of largely unstructured interviews during first fieldwork period

| Q1: Please explain your role in assisting community-based tourism activities/enterprises. |
| Q2: What are your experiences in terms of supporting CBO formation/institutionalisation? |
| Q3: To what extent do CBOs depend on external support, especially in terms of tourism development? |
| Q4: Comparing your national CBNRM programme to neighbouring country programmes, what makes your programme more effective or potentially weak? |

Source: Author’s own research

The sampling process was largely led by snowball sampling based on a number of lead contacts established via email in late 2012. Towards the end of an interview, I would always enquire about other relevant informants based in the locations on the itinerary (see Map 3). Following up on these referrals proved to be very efficient in generating new interview appointments. Interviews typically lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. About one third of the interviews were digitally recorded, during the remaining, notes were taken and complemented.
immediately after the appointment. Sacrificing preciseness for informality and a more relaxed conservational flow was the main reason for non-recording.

Table 5: Overview of interview sample from first field trip

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Actor – Organisation – Job title/function</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Race</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Africa (8)</td>
<td>NGO – Pearce Parks Foundation (PPF) – CEO</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – Fair Trade Tourism South Africa – MD</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – PPF – Programme Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – African Safari Lodge Foundation (ASL) – CEO</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – ASL – Education and Training Coordinator</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – Africa Foundation – CEO</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV – South African National Parks (SANParks) – Tourism Programme Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNI – University of KwaZulu-Natal – Lecturer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia (19)</td>
<td>NGO – WWF Namibia – CBNRM Specialist</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – ASL Namibia – Executive Director</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – IRDNC – Co-Director</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – WWF Namibia – Tourism Business Advisor</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – NACSO – Director</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – WWF/MCA donor – Programme Leader</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – IRDNC Zambezi Office – Advisor</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – IRDNC Zambezi Office – Tourism Coordinator</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBO – #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy – Manager</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNI – University of Namibia (UNAM) – Head of Dept. Geography, History, Environmental Studies</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNI – UNAM – Lecturer/CBNRM Researcher</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNI – UNAM – Lecturer/CBNRM Researcher</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNI – UNAM/Multidisciplinary Research Centre – Research Fellow</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Researcher – Independent/CBNRM WILD Project</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DONOR – MCA – Research Analyst</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS/joint-venture partner – Nkasa Lupala – Owner/Manag.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS/joint-venture partner – Journeys Namibia – Director of Finances</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS – Wilderness Safaris – Community Liaison Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS – Mashi River Safaris – Owner/Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana (8)</td>
<td>GOV – Kavango Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area (KAZA TFCA) – Country Liaison Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV – Botswana Tourism Org. – Tourism Dev. Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV – Department of Tourism – District Tourism Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBO – Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT) – Chairman</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBO – CECT – General Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBO – CECT – Programme Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNI – University of Botswana – Lecturer/CBNRM Res.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS – Kakumba Island Lodge – Owner/Manager</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia (9)</td>
<td>NGO – African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) – CEO</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – AWF – Researcher</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – WWF Zambia – CBNRM Coordinator</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO – WWF Zambia – Programme Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV – Zambian Wildlife Authority (ZAWA) – Area Warden</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV – ZAWA – Compliance Officer</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV – KAZA TFCA – Country Liaison Officer Zambia</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV – Ministry of Tourism and Art – Head of Dept.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS – The Bushcamp Company – Managing Director</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>W (expat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGO (42%)</td>
<td>M (77%)</td>
<td>B/black (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GOV/government representative (18%)</td>
<td>F (23%)</td>
<td>W/white (48%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNI=academic/researcher (17%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PS=private sector representative (14%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CBO (9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s research
In addition to the interviews, a number of highly relevant activities produced valuable insights and contacts. The invitation to attend a two-day workshop in Windhoek (F), organised by two leading Namibian NGOs, to enhance the relationship between conservancies and their joint-venture partners turned out to be networking paradise. On-site visits to three different CBOs in Namibia and Botswana (see stops G, I and J) where managers explained in great detail the workings of their complex social enterprises refuted the notion of the passive, anti-entrepreneurial community still prevalent in the tourism literature in particular (cf. section 2.6.2). Furthermore, the fact that the rainy summer months are low season led to a fair number of invitations to stay overnight in lodges and safari camps in Namibia, Botswana and Zambia. Many natural conversations with private sector operators about their opinions on partnering with rural communities and negotiating access with traditional leaders were invaluable to grasp the realities of doing tourism business on communal lands.

This preliminary trip generated considerable amounts of data, such as several hours of recorded interviews, written protocols, field notes and memos. After gaining some distance from this intense first trip packed with experiences and input, data analysis was guided by the following: Being open about and “getting lost in” the data in order to (re-) discover the actual research objective and reducing a large amount of qualitative data and thus to discern underlying patterns of meaning to assist the creation of actual research questions.
A thematic analysis sought to achieve the desired state of reduction by focusing specifically on the narrated building up of relations, interactions and interdependencies. Based on Titscher’s (1998) different heuristic clusters or “families” (C-families are grouped into causes, consequences and conditions; process-families into stages, phases and progression etc.) core themes between actors emerged. Three transcripts and two detailed written protocols were selected for in depth analysis based on maximum variation of respondents’ characteristics such as affiliation, nationality and gender. The remaining transcripts and protocols were then cross-checked for the identified themes.

Ownership of community-based enterprises, further differentiated into ownership of resources, land, assets and business operations, was the key theme. In this context, joint-venture partnerships between CBOs and private sector operators were emphasised. A key outcome was that higher community ownership translates into considerably higher NGO support and technical assistance which, ironically, may reinforce dependency on external support. Dependency as the other thematic emphasis unfolded in an unexpected way: NGOs’ dependency on “successful” projects—referred to as “flagships”, “donor darlings” and “success stories”—to justify their ongoing presence and to attract funding was emerging from the data. A third topical pattern evolved around the CBO itself as it become clear that governance, influence and leverage of community institutions often remain uncertain. The data reflects CBOs as both backbone and black box of CBNRM.

Ultimately, it was decided to not include data from the first trip for further analysis/in the following chapters for a number of reasons. Since only about one third of interviews were digitally recorded, the majority of interview data consists of handwritten protocols during interviews, additional issues deemed relevant were added after the conversation. As such, these interview protocols (as opposed to full transcripts of recorded interviews) are highly selective and subjective in terms of what was considered important or not at the time. Furthermore, the pragmatic sampling process was opportunistic and overall weakly defined. The openness of the largely unstructured interviews often resulted in the “trailing off” of respondents. Although this generated some fantastic insights, it made a conceptually grounded analysis rather difficult.

In view of my personal PhD development, the defining moment influencing the direction of my research was in Windhoek, six weeks into this first field trip. Once I started to see through the Namibian NGO jungle, an armada of national and international NGOs, and the various CBOs as their expanding client base, I became truly fascinated by this multifaceted exchange relationship. As such, this first field trip enabled me to detect my research objectives in the field, not in the academic literature.
3.3.2 Second Fieldwork Period

3.3.2.1 Theoretical Sampling

Whereas sampling during the preliminary field trip was largely intuitive, data collection during the second visit was guided by information-oriented theoretical sampling for and within cases (Flyvbjerg 2006, Silverman 2010). As it is anticipated that there is a causal relationship between scope and intensity of external facilitation and the robustness and long-term viability of CBOs, the two chosen cases were purposefully chosen as they are fundamentally different in terms of how NGO support is structured. A number of overall sampling parameters relating to setting and processes (Miles and Hubermann 1984) were applied: Both CBOs have been operational for more than a decade during which they have received extensive financial and in-kind support. Further selection criteria were functioning joint-venture tourism agreements and, due to the CBNRM’s strong focus on wildlife conservation, both cases needed to exhibit higher than average wildlife numbers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Determinants for theoretical sampling of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Registration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wildlife intensity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tourism enterprises</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint-venture agreement</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NGO support</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on NACSO’s conservancy summaries (2008, 2012a, 2015a)
KHODI //Hôas Conservancy is unique as it is the only Namibian conservancy which has adopted an approach where support services are “mixed and matched” from different NGOs. Thus, it never had one constant supporting NGO, but rather a changing, dynamic NGO support forum. Also, the actual conservancy formation and registration process happened with very little NGO support (Jones 2006). The KHODI //Hôas case is therefore considered an intrinsic or “extreme” case study because of its unique structure, whereas Wuparo Conservancy resembles an instrumental (as in typical) case (Creswell 1998) as it is representative of the vast majority of Namibian conservancies receiving constant support from one “mother NGO” since inception (cf. section 4.4.2, regions are, albeit unofficially, divided amongst different NGOs who then represent conservancies’ core support NGO). The unique versus typical/common dichotomy is also reflected in the respective joint-venture agreements: KHODI //Hôas is the only Namibian conservancy with 100% community-ownership of the joint-venture lodge, Wuparo has a “classic” (sometimes also referred to as “traditional”) joint-venture agreement where a private operator is the sole investor who leases land from the conservancy for a monthly fee.

Sampling within cases was again led by ensuring variation in terms of respondents’ backgrounds and viewpoints combined with anticipated ratios, six CBO and NGO representatives each per case. Apart from these core respondents, other actors19 deemed critical were traditional authority representatives, area wardens of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) and the joint-venture partners. A total sample size of 30 interviewees was anticipated to ensure both feasibility and diversity as well as the opportunity for qualitative data saturation. Table 7 lists all interview partners, the number in brackets is the main reference used in the following chapters (for example Interview 27=NGO Tourism Coordinator). NGO interviewees sought to represent both field and Windhoek-based staff. Based on insights from the previous trip, NGO employees were chosen based on their history of involvement in providing support to the chosen case study conservancies. Selected CBO representatives hold crucial positions such as conservancy manager and game guard, conservancy staff with specific tourism knowledge are also represented in both cases. Probably most striking is the underrepresentation of CBO committee members (chairperson, treasurer, secretary etc.) in the Wuparo case. Essentially due to real life constraints such as availability and willingness to participate, the two case studies do not resemble entirely matched samples.

19 While the CBO-private operator relationship is a key research interest, the connection between the CBO and actual tourists is not. Especially in the upmarket joint-venture lodges—as opposed to community campsites—the operator is the “critical” tourist/tourism connection (distribution, marketing and bookings). Although, naturally, interaction between tourists and local community members working in the lodges (as receptionists, waitresses and tour guides) takes place, this thesis overall assumes a “non-connection” between CBOs and tourists.
Table 7: Overview of multiple sources of data collected

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study I – ≠Khoadi //Hōas Conservancy</th>
<th>Case study II – Wuparo Conservancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Formal interviews (n=30)—digitally recorded and transcribed</strong></td>
<td><strong>Formal interviews (n=30)—digitally recorded and transcribed</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBO Manager (1)</td>
<td>• CBO Manager 2007-2012 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBO Chairperson (2)</td>
<td>• CBO Bookkeeper (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBO Secretary (3)</td>
<td>• CBO Enterprise Officer (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBO Campsite Manager (4)</td>
<td>• CBO Field Coordinator (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBO Game guard I (5a)*</td>
<td>• CBO Founding Member (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• CBO Game guard II (5b)*</td>
<td>• CBO Senior Game Guard (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Traditional Leader (6)</td>
<td>• Traditional Leader (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• MET Warden Kunene (7)</td>
<td>• MET Warden Zambezi Region (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint-Venture Partner (8)</td>
<td>• MET Deputy Director North Eastern Regions (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• EU project consultant Grootberg Lodge (9)</td>
<td>• Joint-Venture Partner (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGO (NNF) CDSS20 Project Coord. Kunene (10)**</td>
<td>• NGO (IRDNC) Co-Director (25)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGO (NNF) Director (11)</td>
<td>• NGO (IRDNC) Director Zambezi Region (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGO (WWF) Tourism Business Advisor (12)</td>
<td>• NGO (IRDNC) Tourism Coordinator (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGO (WWF) CBNRM Specialist (13)</td>
<td>• NGO (IRDNC) Manager Institutional Support (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NGO (NACSO) Director (14)</td>
<td>• NGO (IRDNC) Financial Advisor (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* The two game guards asked to be interviewed together, thus differentiation in 5a and 5b.</td>
<td>*** The only Windhoek-based NGO representative, all others are based at IRDNC regional office in Katima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>** The only field-based NGO, lead support to ≠Khoadi //Hōas, all others are senior, Windhoek-based NGO staff.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Participant observation—descriptive field notes and memos**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study I – ≠Khoadi //Hōas Conservancy</th>
<th>Case study II – Wuparo Conservancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Daily routine at conservancy office</td>
<td>• Daily routine at conservancy office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Introduction to traditional leaders</td>
<td>• Formal introduction to traditional leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Visits to Grootberg Lodge and Hoada Campsite, various informal chats with staff members</td>
<td>• Visits to Nkasa Lupala Lodge and Nsheshe Craft Market, various informal chats with staff members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Event Book21 audit, lunch with committee members</td>
<td>• Bi-annual Zambezi conservancy meeting (3-day event)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• NNF guard dog training</td>
<td>• Long bicycle rides and walks through the conservancy with the former manager and the senior game guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Slaughtering of oryx, meat distribution to staff</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Case-specific documents—hard copies or photographs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case study I – ≠Khoadi //Hōas Conservancy</th>
<th>Case study II – Wuparo Conservancy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Constitution of ≠Khoadi //Hōas Conservancy</td>
<td>• Constitution of the Wuparo Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Access to documents at head office such as job descriptions and work plans</td>
<td>• Access to conservancy files available at head office such as financial statements and work plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Natural Resource Management Performance Review by WWF</td>
<td>• Conservancy reports at IRDNC office in Katima</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s field research

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20 The Conservancy Development Support Services (CDSS) Programme, provided training and technical assistance to selected conservancies from 2010-2014, further discussed in section 4.4.2.

21 The annual Event Book audit by the MET determines the wildlife quotes, further discussed in sections 4.6.1. and 5.2.1.
3.3.2.2 Multiple Sources of Data

Three different types of data were collected as shown in the above table. Interview data comprise 30 in-depth, semi-structured interviews, each lasting 45 to 90 minutes. An interview guide was compiled with the purpose of “encoding and foreshadowing of ideas” (Creswell 1998:93). “Ideas” were theoretically informed and organised into five core issues: inception and evolution, CBO–NGO interaction, agenda-setting, dependency and rights and responsibilities. Topical subquestions tackled case-specific information for mostly descriptive analysis—for example committee structures and formal modes of interaction—whereas issue subquestions are “intricately wired to political, social, historical, and especially personal contexts” (Stake 1995:17). Table 8 exemplifies a CBO interview guide; amended versions were used for private sector, government and non-government respondents. Issue subquestions generated the lion’s share of interview data, emphasising respondents’ individual involvement and experiences.

Table 8: CBO interview guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core issues</th>
<th>Topical subquestions</th>
<th>Issue subquestions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inception and evolution</td>
<td>Who drove the conservancy formation? How is the management committee structured? What/how are the modes of interaction between conservancy staff, traditional leaders and the community?</td>
<td>Your own history of involvement as CBO member? How is tourism influencing the conservancy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO-NGO interaction</td>
<td>What are modes/ intervals/formal mechanisms of interaction? How has interaction changed over time?</td>
<td>How do you feel about your supporting NGO? How do you like the training? How are NGOs facilitating your joint-venture tourism partnership?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda-setting</td>
<td>Who initiates interaction? Who proposes meetings? Who decides on the actual contents of training/workshops?</td>
<td>Do you feel NGOs are influencing decision-making? What sort of advice are you getting from NGOs regarding your tourism joint-venture?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependency</td>
<td></td>
<td>What happens if NGOs leave tomorrow? (Where) do you feel you are still dependent, to what extent? Are NGOs also depending on you?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights and responsibilities</td>
<td></td>
<td>How would you describe your relationship (“the marriage”)? What do you expect from your NGO? Do you feel you/the conservancy owe/something to the NGOs?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s research

During the first trip, I was confronted with the challenge of enabling a relaxed, conversational interviewing style. When asked to introduce myself and my project to a group of game guards, naturally I used the rather technical language of dependency in interventionist

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22 Issues relating to the use of language and reciprocal understanding are discussed in section 3.6 “Limitations of research”.

54
development projects. My desired target respondents just looked at me, their responses hardly longer than one or two sentences. This was a valuable lesson! I overcame this dilemma by introducing my research interest in CBO–NGO partnerships using the metaphor of a marriage where two entities team up based on mutual interest. Regardless of whether I spoke to CBO or government representatives, this metaphor always triggered a smile and thus a more relaxed interview atmosphere and, most importantly, based on the common understanding respondents actually talked. Also, the marriage metaphor prevented me from asking my research questions “too directly”, which, Silverman (2010:197) stresses, avoids “lazy research” and potentially affecting responses due to heightened awareness.

Robson stresses that a pre-structured interview guide should allow modifications since the “case study relies on the trustworthiness of the human instrument (the researcher) rather than on the data collection techniques per se” (1993:160). The original interview guide was not a static, pre-defined agenda for enquiry; rather it evolved as re-emerging issues were integrated. Conducting the actual case studies first and spending almost two months in rural conservancy territory enabled me to grasp case-specific issues and controversies. Fresh insights from the field were then addressed during the last round of interviews with mostly senior NGO staff in Windhoek. Figure 2 illustrates the four major stages of data collection from January to March 2014.
January: Preparing field research, Windhoek
Almost three weeks are spent in Windhoek doing field research logistics: Repeat visits to the Ministry of Home Affairs to endorse research permit, organising camping equipment and obtaining quotes for rental car, negotiating the time of my visit with my hosts, gathering input from supportive individuals familiar with the case studies, e.g. current CBO issues, road conditions etc.

Late January to mid-February: #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy
Two-week stay in Grootberg village participating in the head office routine, interacting with game guards and other conservancy staff on a daily basis. Extensive consultation with field-based NGO advisor, observation of various key events like the annual Event Book audit, meat distribution and NGO training. Accompanying my host/the manager on numerous trips to different conservancy areas.

Mid-February to early March: Wuparo Conservancy
Three stages of data collection: (1) One-week stay in Sangwali Village with daily visits to the head office, conducting formal interviews and observation of conservancy routines and events; (2) ten-day stay in Katima Mulilo, the reginal capital, interviews with different staff members of the “mother NGO” IRDNC and MET representatives; (3) camping at the three-day bi-annual conservancy meeting attended by all conservancies in the Zambezi Region.

Mid-March: Windhoek-based interviews
Last round of formal interviews with Windhoek-based senior NGO staff/directors, CBNRM consultants, donors and joint-venture partners. Searching the archives at the National Library for Namibian CBNRM research reports and relevant historical background information on the two case study regions.

Source: NACSO 2014
Interviews are complemented by ethnographic data based on “passive unobtrusive observation” (Robson 1993:159), see Table 7 for events and activities. Detailed field notes logged on a daily basis sought to systematically capture what is going on by identifying and following processes in the everyday routine at the conservancy office (Emerson et al 1995). The other emphasis was put on how people interact, who is involved and what are the key aspects structuring the interfaces between different groups (Miles and Huberman 1984). Apart from observing procedures intrinsically related to the workings of the CBO, this method also allows for “working a bit at the peripheries” (Miles and Huberman 1984:42). It enabled me to gather opinions from community members who were not directly involved with the conservancy but were very much influenced by its decision-making. There were numerous opportunities for informal interaction while staying on-site: Post-church talks on Sundays, travelling by minibus doing errands, visiting the local school talking with teachers and students or just taking a break during the afternoon heat chatting with conservancy residents. Observations were recorded by means of descriptive fieldnotes (Bogdan and Biklen 2003). In order to ensure consistency and theoretical orientation (Silverman 2010:210), observations were recorded using the following systematic approach. Detailed notes were made at the time, i.e. the same day, about the when, where, what and who. Usually with some day’s distance, whenever a flash of insight struck, observations were condensed into analytic memos organising ideas in a more conceptually related manner (cf. section 3.4).

Case-specific documents present the third source of data collected (see Table 7). Conservancy staff provided me with copies of their constitutions and gave me access to files such as work plans, financial statements and job descriptions at the head offices. NGO employees shared a number of internal conservancy evaluation reports as well as donor project reports, often at draft stage. Searching the National Library and Archives in Windhoek produced a number of Namibian CBNRM research papers (mostly published by the Multi-Disciplinary Research and Consultancy Centre (MRCC) at the University of Namibia (UNAM)), which are not listed in other relevant academic databases.

Numerous photographs were taken during both field research trips. However, there has been no intention to conduct a systematic visual analysis—whenever I observed actual CBO–NGO interaction I rather chose to listen and watch closely. Also, I did not want to put participants (or myself for that matter) in the sometimes awkward, intrusive situation of “forced photographing”. Pictures are therefore only used to illustrate observed settings, routines and events to aid the reader’s imagination by enabling her to get an impression of the research process and observed events.
3.3.2.3 Doing Research—About Access, Gatekeepers and Research Flow

A CBO is an overall “closed setting” (Silverman 2010:203). Being a rather obvious outsider, gaining access to the remote rural areas and building relationships was paramount in terms of doing research. In both cases, contacts to CBO managers and joint-venture partners had already been established in February 2013 at the aforementioned two-day workshop in Windhoek. I deliberately chose the conservancy managers as my point of entry. Only they could facilitate the critical condition of staying in the village and being close to the conservancy office where “everything happens”, as opposed to staying in the lodges far away from the villages. Being able to build on these relationships is considered to be the fundamental precondition for the smooth second fieldwork period. Furthermore, the strategy of not rushing things and forcing my research agenda upon my hosts is believed to have been conducive to the relaxed and friendly on-site stays. They both invited me to stay longer than I would have had the courage to ask.

The manager of the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy invited me to stay in her house again (I spent two nights at her place in 2013) and Wuparo’s ex-manager, still directly involved and on the payroll of the conservancy, invited me to set up my tent next to his family home in Sangwali village. Both live a short walking distance from their conservancy offices. Keeping to the protocol, both hosts arranged for me to introduce myself and my project to the traditional leaders to get their consent. The role of my hosts, acting as gatekeepers in terms of safeguarding my stay and facilitating actual data collection, cannot be overestimated. The fact that they are highly-regarded individuals was felt to legitimise my presence in the village and the nature of my work which involved asking an awful lot of questions. After a couple of days on site, the general curiosity about my persona and travel mission seemed to fade. An actual turning point was felt when my research subjects started asking me questions, often centred around how wildlife is managed where I come from.

Figure 3: Briefing by the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy manager in 2013 and reunion in 2014

Source: Author’s photographs
The Namibian NGO scene was more easily accessible. The national CBNRM programme is well-researched and interview requests are generally well-accommodated. Interestingly, in 2013 a recurring *nota bene* in my field notes was my perception that Namibian NGO workers in particular are very protective of “their” CBNRM programme. Reinforcing the success of the programme, often combined with an alleged defensiveness, was recurrently perceived as arrogance. During my second visit, these negative sentiments somehow evaporated. The fact that I came back and actually spent some time in the field and “now knew what I’m talking about” was felt to benefit my own credibility. Asked if she wanted to add something to our interview, the director of the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO) comments:

> So I will try just to wish you all the best with your studies. I know you have been coming a long way and you are very passionate about what you are doing. When I saw you again, I said wow this lady! [laughs] She is not giving up, she is doing so much, so much in terms of coming back and wanting more and wanting to understand and wanting to re-consult. So I think that is really good. Not these ones that come once and then they forget. (Interview 14)

Having met and interviewed 16 people out of the total sample in 2013 already, the majority of them NGO staff, significantly aided the conversational flow of interviews. Silverman cautions that when interviewing “up”, elite members might object to “opening up” (2010:196). Nevertheless, the openness of especially senior NGO representatives is considered to be very high—their eagerness to voice opinions and criticism almost came as a surprise. The particular time of enquiry might have been influential as the fourth and supposedly last phase of “big donor money” phased out in September 2014 and there seemed to be a lot of honest reflection. Also, at that particular time, there was a very intense debate within and between different NGOs about the “right” joint-venture model and if community-ownership over assets and business operations was desirable or not.

### 3.4 Processing Research Data—Analysis, Interpretation and Presentation of Data

All 30 interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder, full transcripts were produced using the transcription software f4 (Audiotranskription 2014). Basic transcription rules (cf. Selting et al 2009 “Gesprächsanalytisches Transkriptionssystem” (GAT)) were applied in order to capture the contextual richness of the data, short pauses “(.)”, longer pauses in seconds “(3)”, emphasising single words using capital letters “well (.) i DON’T tell YOU what you NEED”, see Appendix 3 for a transcript excerpt.

There is no single procedure that can capture the diversity of qualitative data (Sayer 2010). Neither is there agreement on the “right” amount of data to be analysed out of the entire data output. In line with most qualitative researchers (Miles 1979, Seidman 2006), I made the pragmatic decision to focus coding on the parts where structural and relational aspects were
narrated and described in my fieldnotes. Following Saldaña (2009), actual coding was done in two phases, first and second cycle coding. Three coding methods were applied during the first cycle (see Appendix 3 for an example of a coded transcript). (1) Structural coding sought to organise data around particular research questions, as opposed to theme-based codes emphasising relations and modes of interaction to generate a first index of categories leading towards an analytical pathway (MacQueen et al 2008, Saldaña 2009). (2) In vivo coding extracts the exact, often action-oriented formulations from participants. Essentially an ethnographic method, in vivo coding was applied to capture participants’ very own ways of describing their views, actions and behaviours to enhance and deepen the understanding of their point of view (Chesler 1987, Saldaña 2009). In practical coding terms, an in vivo label was assigned to sections of data where research subjects used “unusual” terminologies and explanations, often expressed through metaphors and analogies (see examples “eating and feeding” below). Ultimately, this enabled me to capture interviewee-generated accounts from a particular group (here especially CBO members) rather than producing mostly researcher-inspired codes.

The conservancy, that they [NGOs] nurtured, is doing very well. (Interview 16)
NGOs have fed us so much that now, we cannot do things. (Interview 15)
Donors are feeding NGOs. (Interview 1)
Projects are failing because some say they want to eat, some say we want to invest. (Interview 4)
They [community] stand up and say: “Move out of the door, you have eaten enough.” (Interview 26)

(3) Especially the various issue subquestions were based on enquiring how respondents perceived or felt about certain aspects. “Appropriate for virtually all qualitative studies” (Saldaña 2009:90) value coding systematically exposes participants’ underlying attitudes, beliefs and perceptions. Practically applied, coding for values tackled importance ascribed to something and ways of thinking and feeling (belief/attitude) about something:

Examples for coded values:
IRDNC [NGO] are the mothers and fathers of this conservancy. (Interview 15)
Animals matter more in the conservancy than people. (Field notes)
Input and assistance from NGOs is invaluable. (Interview 3)

Examples for coded beliefs/attitudes:
Our initial feeling was that they [NGOs] just want to occupy our land. (Interview 18)
They [NGOs] have to come back, they cannot just withdraw. (Interview 4)
They [NGOs] expect that we [CBO] perform. (Interview 20)

This first coding cycle, where the three coding methods were applied to all 30 interviews, generated a complex codebook (Appendix 5 details which codes featured in the respective interviews). Table 9 demonstrates the procedure for second cycle coding where
individual codes were grouped into subcategories which then produced the overall emerging categories and ultimately key themes.

Table 9: Organising codes systematically*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Subcategory</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Quote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High CBO expectations</strong></td>
<td>Anticipating</td>
<td>Have to</td>
<td>I have to approach NGOs whenever… (Interview 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Must do/know</td>
<td>They have to make this schedule… (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>They have to come back… (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>You have to direct us… (17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tell us you must do this … (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>They must know… (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>This NGO must first know … (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demanding</td>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>Pressure has really been intense… (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Workload on our shoulders is quite heavy… (26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A lot of pressure from clients (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Expect</td>
<td>When they quit out we can expect another … (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Where are we going to get the support… (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>They don’t even appreciate the support… (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relying</td>
<td>Forever</td>
<td>They should be there forever…(16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Always</td>
<td>We always want their technical support…(15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Never</td>
<td>We never say we can just go for ourselves… (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>End of age</td>
<td>Part and parcel until the end of age…(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Outside support</td>
<td>Tendency to rely on outside support… (10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See appendix 5.1/5.2/5.3 for a comprehensive list of codes and examples of categories

Source: Author’s research

The entire coding process was done manually and data output was organised electronically in spreadsheets. As this was a single-researcher project with a manageable number of interviews, there was a deliberate decision against the use of Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). The search function of the software NVivo for instance is considered to advance data interrogation, however, if respondents express similar opinions in completely different ways, the programme’s ability to capture this diversity is very limited (Welsh 2002). Apart from the more general criticisms of quantifying qualitative approaches (Barry 1998) and leading qualitative researchers towards certain analytic and argumentative paths (Seidel 1991), the NVivo software cannot perform the core analytical exercise of “knitting together” individual themes into (sub-) categories and uncovering the underlying meta-patterns (Welsh 2002:6).

First cycle coding focuses on capturing the what and how of structures and processes. Second cycle pattern coding sought to reduce (sub-)categories further to trace the causes and consequences of the CBO–NGO exchange relationship. Miles and Huberman specify that pattern coding creates a small number of “meta-codes” (1994:69) grounded in major underlying thematic patterns. The procedure of consolidating the data mirrors the practice of retroduction—the key epistemological process recognised by critical realists (Easton 2010).
Using iterative abstraction, they seek to advance the analysis from a mere description to “isolating the causal mechanisms” (Yeung 1997:58) that both cause and structure the conditions for the CBO–NGO phenomenon (Bhaskar 1986). As such, second cycle retroduction is essentially the process of building theoretical constructs.

Analytic memo writing (Bogdan and Biklen 2003, Strauss and Corbin 1990) significantly influenced the transition from first to second cycle analysis and was an essential step in bridging the gap between “unpacking” the data and making sense of it. Initially, during data collection, memo writing was more intuitive and basically “a place to dump your brain” (Saldaña 2009:32). While field notes followed a systematic and descriptive order, analytic memos were often only a paragraph long and mostly based on one direct quote that triggered an idea. These early memos are largely impulsive and suggestive.

During transcription and coding, memo writing advanced into a more systematic, rigorous approach (actually worthy of being called “analytic”). Fewer but longer memos now became more conceptually related. Considerably influenced by Bethmann’s et al (2012) notion of agency, memos tackled how CBO members and NGO staff construct their spheres of influence and responsibility and how their powers, real or perceived, shape and influence their behaviour. Analytic memo writing was also found to be conducive to the formal write-up of the discussion chapter.

As stated in the introduction data presentation is organised as follows: chapter 4 shall contextualise actors and key issues within Namibian CBNRM to “hold” the very qualitative and often slippery ‘furnishings’ that bring the narrative [the case studies] alive” (Stephens 2009:119). Chapter 5 and 6 use thick description (Geertz 1973, Ryle 1949) to draw as comprehensive a picture as possible of the structural relations within both cases. Initially reserved to ethnographic approaches in participant observation research, thick description supersedes the “thin” description of “behaviour only” by contextualising observations into the social fabric of settings and thus “ascribing present and future intentionality to the behaviour” (Ponterotto 2006:539). Denzin (1989) stresses that thick description must be conceptual and that the researcher should use it to abstract general patterns of social interaction based on a chosen theoretical framework. He further differentiates types of thick description: “descriptive-interpretive” accounts were used at the beginning of the case study chapters to not only acquaint the reader with the case but also to situate the behaviour of conservancy members during crucial events. “Relational” thick description illustrates mainly intra-conservancy relations, for example between the CBO and their traditional leaders and ordinary members. “Interactional” accounts are used to explore and illustrate the two-way exchange between CBOs their respective support NGOs.
Thick description of results presents adequate “voice” of participants; that is, long quotes from the participants or excerpts of interviewer-interview dialogue. Again, a sense of verisimilitude is achieved as the reader can visualize the participant-interviewer interactions and gets a sense of the cognitive and emotive state of the interviewee (and interviewer). (Ponterotto 2006:547)

Stephens reminds us that “good descriptive writing is also critical and challenging—in other words, it is not neutral” (2009:127). Direct, sometimes longer, quotes are deliberately chosen, not only to support and illustrate observations, claims and arguments but also to illuminate experiences and communicate emotions (Holloway 1997, Sandelowski 1994). Case studies in particular “often contain a substantial element of narrative” (Flyvbjerg 2006:237). Naturally, the process of quoting is an “act of choosing”; here, the objective was to achieve a “proper balance between the obligations of scientific reporting and the taking of artistic license” (Sandelowski 1994:479).

Moving from the description of structural relationships to a more “abstract conceptualization” (Reed 2005:1637), chapter 7 presents a discussion of the “conceptual analogues” (Miles et al 2014:292) extracted from the data. The chapter shall present the causal-explanatory mechanisms that structure the CBO–NGO relationship based on the following format: observed patterns (categories) → evidence in data → generative and constraining mechanisms → conceptualisation.

### 3.5 Ethical Considerations in the Research Process

Gaining permission to research involved following certain procedures. The Government of the Republic of Namibia legally requires researchers to obtain a research visa. The rather lengthy process was initiated through the Namibian embassy in Berlin five months prior to the second field trip. Obtaining consent from traditional leaders at the two case study sites constituted a *de facto* requirement. Tindana et al argue that in rural settings, consultation with chiefs equals a “visa acquisition process” (2006:7). My hosts naturally arranged those meetings, the formal enquiry was very much appreciated and my simultaneous interview request accommodated by a representative of the /Gaio Daman Traditional Authority based in Anker (#Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy) and the Mayeyi Traditional Authority in Sangwali (Wuparo Conservancy). On a more general note, Namibian conservancies are well-researched and have been widely exposed to both national and international researchers, consultants and students. The two chosen case studies have been in the public domain for more than 15 years, especially due to the fact that they were amongst the first conservancies to be gazetted by the government in the late 1990s.

The fundamental role my hosts played in terms of accommodating me and facilitating access has been stressed earlier. Issues surrounding financial compensation of helpers are well-
acknowledged (Miles et al 2014, Silverman 2010, Shaw 2008) especially in the constellation of Westerners conducting research in developing countries (Scott et al 2006). There was no monetary exchange with my hosts—I did not offer, neither did they ask. However, in order to compensate them for their time, effort and input, I brought a large amount of groceries from Windhoek for my host at the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy and took over many household duties during my stay. For my Zambezi host and his cousin, senior game guard of Wuparo Conservancy, who spent entire days showing me around the conservancy and “delivering” me to interview appointments, I bought solar powered lights. Post-research, I mailed letters to several CBO representatives containing pictures I had taken of them and their families, game guards and other conservancy staff.

Data collection was driven by voluntary participation and “overt access” based on informing people about my research project and how their input would be used (Silverman 2010:203). There is valid criticism that obtaining informed consent for participant observations is problematic (Mulhall 2003). However, due to my obvious outsider status and the fact that I always introduced myself as a PhD student with a keen interest in understanding the “CBO–NGO marriage”, interaction as well as non-disclosure and non-engagement, was largely determined by participants. Only two people declined my interview request, both of them CBO committee members of Wuparo Conservancy. This also explains why case study samples are not entirely matching or, more strictly speaking, why people are missing in the sample. On a positive note, people’s decision to turn down an interview request can be seen as a confident, autonomous decision which is contrary to Ryen’s (2004:232) experience where “many poor Third World interviewees” feel pressured to accommodate interview requests from visitors.

The consideration whether my research could potentially harm respondents was being felt of little relevance, due to the nature of my enquiry. Also, I did not differentiate between NGO and CBO folk, I never thought of the latter being more vulnerable just because they were poor (at least from a Western point of view). On the contrary, this group struck me as confident and outspoken. The manner in which respondents frequently expressed very strong opinions came as a surprise. The rare occasions, three in total, where interviewees asked me not to use certain statements were of course respected. Much more common were statements like “and you can quote me on that” or “am not actually confiding much to you because I say this stuff openly”. Despite non-naming interviewees, the actual individuals listed in Table 7 could be identified with moderate effort. Since omitting their roles and affiliation would impede contextual meaning, my principle consideration for good conduct was whether or not I would be discrediting anyone or if anyone could lose face. With the completion of data analysis, audio files and transcripts were deleted from individual electronic devices and stored on a password-protected cloud service where they can be retrieved if required.
The last interview question, “would you like to ask me anything?” was often answered expressing the desire to receive feedback. Government representatives in particular stated their dissatisfaction with researchers who did not share results (by forwarding research reports for instance), but simply tapped into Namibian knowledge and “disappeared” with it. Similarly, NGO staff frequently commented that “genuinely we would like to see your research papers coming back to us” (Interview 14). Conservancy members exposed to visiting researchers generally held positive attitudes towards them as the following statement illustrates:

When we see people are coming to our area, for me, I like it, I enjoy it. Because the more this kind of questions are being asked, at the end of the day, that’s how we can grade ourselves as a community, as a conservancy […] So personally, I feel that it’s very important when we see researchers coming into our areas. (Interview 15/former conservancy manager)

Since data collection in early 2014, I have been in touch with a small number of CBO and NGO representatives. Once this PhD project is finished, I do intend to produce a “real-world context friendly” synopsis of relevant findings which, ideally, will be discussed personally during my next visit to Namibia.

3.6 Limitations of Research

Conducting qualitative research on social interaction in a different cultural setting logically raises questions on how one’s individual values and socially-inherited subjective truths influence data collection and analysis. Both formal interviews and informal conversations are always constructed upon and aligned to contextual meaning and individual reference systems (Shaw 2008, Silverman 2010). Referring to the indexicality of language, Garfinkel (1967) attributes an overall high degree of vagueness to oral data due to the challenge of having to understand one’s respondents’ understanding, interviews thus automatically imply an inherent double hermeneutic. Meaning is always lagging behind the spoken word and can only be produced through recontextualisation (Allen 2003, Garfinkel 1967, Mannheim 1980). Assuming that coding data essentially involves making “judgement calls” (Sipe and Ghiso 2004 in Saldaña 2009:7) and, consequently, that data interpretation cannot be entirely objective and value-free, carries important limitations and implications for epistemic considerations. Critical realists assume that the very attempt to explain the world is “bound to be fallible” (Scott 2005:2) albeit not in the sense of being wrong but rather in “being one step behind the evolving nature of the social world” (Scott 2005:3). Against this background, Easton (2010:127) suggests that “competing explanations” should be made to enable the “best current interpretation”.

Relying on myself as principle tool for data collection, naturally, my persona had an impact on the reciprocity of researcher–respondent interaction. Being a single white German
woman traveller made me an obvious outsider, especially in the rural areas. Contrary to my anticipation, people never articulated—at least overtly—associations between Namibia’s German colonial history and my own nationality. Nevertheless, black Namibians repeatedly drew a line between “our people” and “your people”, understood as collectively referring to white Westerners, and how the two groups see and do things differently. Considering that this research makes an inquiry into the mechanisms of exogenous development intervention and how it is perceived by development targets, the recurring pattern of interviewer–interviewee positionality (Mullings 1999) from respondents was actually felt to be conducive to clearly articulating, and thus aiding my understanding, of the different points of view.

How has my apparent outsider status impacted upon my actual data collection? Intentionally or not, my hosts significantly influenced my actual sample selection and thus respondents’ attitudes towards their conservancy. However, I do oppose the view that I merely got to see what I was supposed to see. I believe that staying on site considerably longer than researchers normally do and not being affiliated with or introduced by an actual donor or NGO enabled me to glimpse behind the powerful Namibian conservancy success story. Respondents expressing utter frustration and disillusion with CBNRM and or their specific conservancy, open arguments about corrupt or inept committee members wasting conservancy money, lions being illegally shot on communal conservancy territory and drunken game guards demanding rifles to walk home after dark were strong indicators for a non-staged research setting. Being an outsider even allowed me to ask certain questions. By explaining that an institution like the traditional authority does not exist “my side”, I could ask somewhat naïve but powerful questions on the spheres of influence of traditional leaders, whereas a Namibian would have been expected to know or otherwise be deemed ignorant.

English is not the first language either of the researcher or of the vast majority of respondents. It is, however, the common language for the different linguistic groups within Namibia and, most importantly, it is the shared official CBNRM language, as most training and training manuals, technical assistance, contracts and wildlife monitoring and recording are conducted in English. Critics may argue that the complex symbolic meaning in qualitative research cannot be communicated at the required level in another language. Yet talking the same language poses the threat of assuming that both parties are automatically “on the same page” (Kruse and Schmieder 2012). Summarising in my own words what was said as well as asking for examples were principal probing questions to check if I “got it right”. I would argue that not English as a foreign language per se may have caused lost or distorted meaning but rather the inherent ambiguity of language generally and specifically the intersection with the dynamics of positionality in a cross-cultural, mixed-race setting. Overall, I do acknowledge that this potentially impacts on the data validity, however, to a large extent this pertains to qualitative research methods in general as discussed below.
Validity in qualitative research, and specifically in case study research, is very much contested (Miles et al 2014, Thomas 2003, Yin 1994). While some reject it entirely (Wolcott 2001), case study advocates stress that intrinsically, due to their context-dependent knowledge, cases cannot represent samples or populations but rather enable generalisability to theoretical propositions (Bryman 1988, Easton 2010, Flyvbjerg 2006, Gobo 2008, Yin 2003). Flyvbjerg (2006) reasons that falsification rather than verification constitutes the actual strength of this method. In order to ensure high conceptual validity, two “purposively contrasting cases” (Miles et al 2014:296) were chosen. Then, within each case, the underlying causal-explanatory mechanisms structuring the phenomenon of development intervention were tackled following the critical realist approach. In order to resist premature theorising, causal explanation of cases ought to be constructed upon relevant existing theories organising these causal explanations (Easton 2010). Ultimately, it is argued that a strong emphasis on conceptual validity in case study research combined with comprehensive and transparent data analysis can indeed lead towards an analytical generalisation of findings.

3.7 Conclusion

In conclusion, this research contributes to the elimination of a gap of knowledge within the CBNRM literature by examining the specific problems associated with and implications of significant NGO-led facilitation for community-based conservation. A more refined understanding of the relationship between CBOs and NGOs is necessary in order to comprehend which mechanisms enable and or constrain the establishment of robust local institutions. Knowledge about the CBO-NGO exchange emerges out of the very process of their social interaction; it is “essentially a joint product of the encounter” and must therefore “be looked at relationally” (Long 2001:19). Kontinen notes that this actor-oriented sociology of development intervention in rural areas is based on the methodological commitment for looking at social processes, “for practical research this means close engagement with actors and ethnography-oriented research methods” (2004:83). An inductive approach employing ethnographic techniques appeared most appropriate for this research design as it allowed me to focus on cases as well as people:

Cases—the two conservancy case studies focus on specific interactive systems and routine processes linked to observable patterns of behaviour. At the same time, case studies accommodate the possibility for a deeper, embedded analysis of unique issues developing during research (Yin 2003). The differing degrees of NGO input to the respective joint-venture agreements, for instance, emerged as core aspects which are conducive to unpacking CBO-NGO interaction. Moustakas refers to this as “heuristic quest” (1990:38) for connectedness and relationship.
People—concentrating on the contextual experience of both CBO and NGO representatives is essential to understanding their attitudes, beliefs and demands. *Thick description* and verbatim quotes from interviews aim to root this work in the position of those who are living it (using values and in vivo coding). Ultimately, this is anticipated to facilitate an evaluation of CBO-NGO exchange within the overall CBNRM design (through structural coding).

Although there exist few blueprints for a research enquiry like this there are various established methods for collecting relevant data which have been reflected in this chapter. In accordance with the preferred research strategies for rural intervention (cf. section 2.5, inventory of theory and method in CBNRM research) this thesis is a qualitative enquiry built upon a case study design. Based on the critical realist pursuit to provide meaningful explanations, the strengths of this approach is that it is likely to provide new insights which are both theoretically informed and grounded in existing knowledge of 20 years of CBNRM intervention in Namibia. Contrary to the largely assumed CBO dependency on NGO support, the chosen methodology seeks to explicate the specific and interconnected domains of CBNRM project knowledge of both providers and consumers.
CHAPTER 4: THE NAMIBIAN CBNRM PROGRAMME

4.1 Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to contextualise the relationship between community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within the Namibian community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programme. Initially, a number of problematic issues of the young southern African “role model” democracy are highlighted: The massive disparities between rich and poor, white and black, and urban and rural rooted in the country’s colonial history still affect CBNRM in post-independence Namibia. By presenting the different regimes of colonial administrations in the north (Zambezi Region where Wuparo Conservancy is located) and south (Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy in Kunene Region) the two case study regions are introduced.

The remaining sections focus on the complex relationships of the various relevant CBNRM actors illustrated in Figure 4. Drawing on the “growing body of ‘new’ Namibian history” (Amoo and Harring 2009:90), section 4.3 explores the relationship between the traditional authority as “old” and CBOs as “new” institutions for natural resource management. In this context, the significance of the traditional leaders’ role as legitimate custodians of the land is emphasised as it serves to explain the structural dualism between private and communal land and the corresponding duality of laws—common and customary—which both determine land use practices under CBNRM today. Section 4.4 traces the evolution of the relationship between government and non-government actors. Making reference to the major donor-funded project phases, it is shown how the vast network of CBNRM support NGOs developed since the 1990s. The following section tackles tourism ventures on communal land which are heavily promoted by NGOs. Essentially presenting a form of economic dualism as it is an overall white-owned and -managed sector, tourism is emphasised as the principal source of conservancy income and economic rationale for CBNRM based on the commodification of wildlife. It also serves to illustrate conservancies’ strong dependency on NGOs which are the sole facilitators of high-yielding joint-venture partnerships between CBOs and private tourism investors. At the same time, it demonstrates how NGOs safeguard and protect so-called flagship conservancies that have high-earning lodges as they rely themselves on CBNRM success stories.
Figure 4: Relationships between CBNRM actors*

* PS = private sector; C = community; TA = traditional authority; GOV = government

Section 4.6 unpacks the workings of CBOs per se. Here, the dynamics between the community members as the conservancy constituency and the organisation as representative local institution are accentuated. In order to expose their structural properties, CBOs are broken down into the three different categories of (organisational) processes, for example, voting procedures and decision-making, overall purpose and people who are supposed to drive conservancy development. Ultimately, this chapter illuminates the structural embeddedness of CBOs and how external (such as donor-funded NGO support and private sector investment) and internal (community dynamics and traditional leaders) forces shape their CBNRM development paths. By highlighting the extent to which NGOs are involved in virtually all essential components of CBOs’ institution-building processes and business development, the chapter sets the scene for a focussed discussion of how extensive NGO support enables or in fact hampers the establishment of independent CBOs in the subsequent case study chapters.
4.2 Contextualising Namibia’s CBNRM Pathway

4.2.1 People, Politics and Economy in Today’s Namibia

Politically and economically, the young Republic of Namibia is considered a “success story” (Hunter and Keulder 2010, Melber 2015, Namibian Sun 2013, World Bank 2009). A politically stable democracy based on constitutional mechanisms for democratic institutions, access to basic education and primary health care and the steady decline of poor and extremely poor households are commonly cited as major achievements (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, McConnell 2000). Even in the context of global recession, Namibia’s prospects were considered healthy which is reflected in the annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates averaging 4.7% from 1990 to 2014 (African Development Bank 2014). However, most Namibians are excluded from the benefits of economic growth. The country’s income gini coefficient “is the worst in the world” (Kanyenze and Lapeyre 2012:ix). Namibia’s extremely low employment ratio of 48% (Namibia Statistics Agency 2015) (compared to an average of 75% in other sub-Saharan countries) combined with a steady increase of joblessness (from 20% in 2000 to 38% in 2008) demonstrates the deep structural problems of the national labour market (Kanyenze and Lapeyre 2012). Since independence in 1990, Namibia has experienced rapid urbanisation: From 28% in 1991 to 33% in 2001, and 46% in 2014 (CIA 2015, Indongo et al 2013). For the majority of the rural population, rain-fed subsistence farming and communal agriculture are the main sources of income (Woltersdorf et al 2014). The extremely low labour force participation of 42% in rural areas, where especially communal area residents are being locked into the informal economy, are considered one of the main development challenges (Kanyenze and Lapeyre 2012). Almost 30% of Namibians live below the poverty line, most of them in the rural northern regions; low skill base, high illiteracy and low university completion rates are commonly referred to in this context (World Bank 2009). Poverty is being exacerbated by extremely high HIV/AIDS and Tuberculosis infection rates, life expectancy dropped from 62 years in 1995 to 52 years in 2014 (CIA 2015, Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014).

Arid and semi-arid Namibia is the driest country south of the Sahara. Sparse and erratic rainfall results in regular, extended periods of drought—the country’s main environmental hazard. Only 1% of Namibian land\(^{23}\) is arable, 46% is permanent pastures (CIA 2015). Food shortages during droughts and increasing food prices (Levine 2012) make household food security a major challenge for the rural poor (Humavindu and Stage 2013). From an ecological perspective, land degradation through desertification presents the principal ecological challenge (DRFN 2003, Lohman et al 2014). The reliance of rural people on natural resources cannot be overestimated, at the same time, the traditional subsistence farming sector underlines the economic dualism characterising Namibia as it is in stark contrast to the market-led sectors

\(^{23}\) Namibia’s total land mass is 824,292 km\(^2\); it is the third largest country in southern Africa after Angola and South Africa, both approximately 1,200,000 km\(^2\).
Positive accounts about Namibian governance typically go hand in hand with emphasising the country’s “strong” constitution as “a shining example” (Van Wyk 1991 in Erasmus 2000:79) or “a model for the world” (Berat 1991:1). The constitution’s progressive stance on human rights guarantees, in particular, is said to have amplified Namibia’s international recognition (Ruppel 2008). The United Nations’ (UN) and other, primarily Western states’, involvement in drafting a blueprint of the constitutional principles is well-documented (Amoo and Harring 2009, Diescho 1994, Erasmus 2000, Killander 2013). This does not automatically imply that mostly non-Namibians were shaping the country’s future. Rather, it serves to illustrate Erasmus’ argument of “constitution as international ticket”, linking international development assistance and “good governance requirements in line with Western ideals” (2000:100).

Constitutionally a multiparty state, in reality, Namibia functions as a single political party system (Massó Guijarro 2013). None of the other national parties have been able to challenge the “overwhelming dominance” (Melber 2015:47) of the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) since 1994 when it won a landslide victory in the first democratic elections. SWAPO is inseparable with Namibia’s war of liberation. In the 1960s, SWAPO’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), launched an armed struggle as the “ultimate means” (Melber 2003b:310) to liberate Namibia. By the early 1970s, SWAPO had become “the only recognized representative of the Namibian people internationally” (Melber 2007:63). SWAPO was conceived in Cape Town in 1958 as the Ovamboland People’s Congress through a network of Namibian contract workers, Ovambo peoples living in the northern parts of the country (du Pisani 2000). Namibian parties are heavily fragmented along ethnic lines, the “backbone and power base of SWAPO” (Melber 2003b:209) is the Ovambo majority in Namibia accounting for 51% of the population (Asante and Asombang 1989, Massó Guijarro 2013).

The young independence government enjoyed somewhat of a honeymoon period (Erasmus 2000, Simon 1995). Despite being “praised as one of the most laudable democratic societies” (Melber 2015:45) in sub-Saharan Africa, criticisms centred around the notion of “liberation without democracy” and SWAPO’s powerful dominance resulting in political hegemony are getting louder (Massó Guijarro 2013, Melber 2007, Simon 2000). SWAPO’s selective glorification of warfare for liberation (Friedman 2005, Kössler 2007) combined with “pervasive silence” (McConnell 2000:51) over socio-political issues such as land distribution is heavily criticised. Melber (2015:56) diagnoses a “minimalist form of democracy” as SWAPO frequently ignores or bypasses formal and legal principles of the democratic state to further
consolidate its political dominance. Non-conformity with party ideals and discourse is stifled as unpatriotic and “associated with disloyalty, if not betrayal” (Melber 2003a:21)

4.2.2 Brief History of Foreign Rule and Dispossession

Werner (1993) distinguishes two pre-colonial agricultural production systems: Settled agriculture and animal husbandry in the northern regions and mainly pastoral existence of the Nama, Herero and Damara peoples in southern and central Namibia. Due to the unpredictability of the arid land, the latter in particular were characterised by high mobility and no fixed boundaries. In 1883, the German trader Adolf Lüderitz was the first to acquire land from local chiefs. Following the 1884 Congo Conference in Berlin, Namibia became the German colony Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Walther 2002). The establishment of the colonial state was effectively by conquest and military occupation by the German Schutztruppe24. By taking advantage of local conflicts, German colonialists executed the systematic appropriation of land by signing protection treaties with traditional leaders. The German Schutztruppe rapidly obtained land by introducing the European model of private land ownership based on rigid boundaries (Sullivan and Homewood 2004, Werner 1993).

The Red Line, demarcating northern Namibia from the rest of the country (cf. Map 1) offers valuable insights into the different colonial administrations in the north (Zambezi Region where Wuparo Conservancy is located) and south (#Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy in Kunene Region). The line first appeared in 1911 on a map drawn in Berlin (Miescher 2012). Originally proclaimed as a “Police Zone”, white settler country, progressively expanding from around temperate Windhoek, was separated from the wetter and hotter north (Amoo and Harring 2009). Apart from protecting the “civilised”, European settlers from the native African interior, the policed boundary also marked a veterinary line separating African and European cattle. As the Germans considered the north a “remote useless outpost” (Lenggenhager 2015:468), initially, peasants in the north had been largely unaffected by the German alienation (Werner 1993). Contrary to direct administrative control in favour of European settlement in the south, the northern regions were maintained under indirect rule through traditional leaders (Behr et al 2015, Kangumu and Likando 2015, Sullivan 1998). Therefore, traditional leadership structures “remained largely intact as they emerged from precolonial times” (Hinz 2010:150). The fact that the northern populations were never relocated also gave them a higher degree of autonomy compared to the rest of the country (Colpert et al 2013).

24 Literally “protection troops”, the term Schutztruppe stems from Germany’s then chancellor Otto von Bismarck who referred to German protectorates (Schutzgebiete) instead of colonies.
South of the Red Line, the Damara and Otjiherero-speaking communities, for example, were exposed to direct colonial rule and brutally forced out of their ancestral lands and inherited forms of governance considerably weakened (Hinz 2010). The colonial settlement pattern translated into the systematic dispossession of land and livestock to make space for commercial farms. The most well-documented—and most violent—struggle over stolen land is the Herero/Nama war of resistance from 1904-1907, during which the Germans killed 80% of Herero and 50% of Nama people (Amoo and Harring 2009, Bridgman 1981, Gewald 1999). Combined with other forces, particularly the devastating rinderpest pandemic in the 1890s wiping out 90% of cattle and leaving stockless pastoralists dependent on wage labour, the situation was further exacerbated for the southern communities. By 1902, the foreign rulers had acquired almost two thirds of the land south of the Red Line, in 1905 the German colonial administration announced the expropriation of all indigenous land (Werner 1993). By 1913, 90% of cattle and 70% of small stock within the police zone was white-owned (Goldblatt cited in Werner 1993:140).

The First World War marked the end of German rule. In July 1915 the Schutztruppe surrendered to the South African army and in terms of the post-war settlement, the League of Nations declared “South West Africa” a trust territory of South Africa in 1920 (Walther 2002). While Germany attached high symbolic and ideological value to conquering African territory, neighbouring South Africa used its mandate as a means to an end—to “accommodate the land-hungry white underclass at minimal expense” (Miescher 2012:773).

A key shift occurred in 1946 when the South African nationalists called for the incorporation of South West Africa as a South African province which was rejected by the UN (the successor of the League of Nations). After gaining power in South Africa in 1948, the National Party overrode the trusteeship mandate, treating South West Africa as a legitimate part of South Africa and thus ignoring the revoking of the UN mandate (Walther 2002). Based on their politics of racial discrimination and segregation, the nationalists expanded their apartheid laws to South West Africa. The policy “a farm to every settler” (Miescher 2012:781) and the infamous Odendaal Commission drove the settlement of poor, white South Africans onto dispossessed land while black Namibians were resettled in the 1960s onto more marginal land. Werner (1993) notes that 87% of the new Damara homeland fell within arid and semi-arid areas. Tasked to further entrench territorial segregation, the Commission advised to reduce and consolidate the 17 existing “native reserves” into ten “ethnic homelands” (cf. Map 4). Blacks and coloureds living in urban areas were moved to separate townships, based on the South African

25 During the South African administration, a white commissioner served as administrative link between Pretoria and each of the “homelands” that were established within the Police Zone. Here, usually three local headmen were appointed to aid South African law enforcement (Sullivan 1998).

26 The commission owes its name to Frans Hendrik Odendaal heading the “Commission of Enquiry into South West Africa Affairs”.
apartheid model (du Pisani 2000). Eventually, 93% of the non-white Namibians were forced into the ten homelands that represented 40% of the land area (Lee 2003:24).

Map 4: Demarcated "ethnic homelands" of the Odendaal Commission

Whereas reserves established under German and South African administrations were mainly to satisfy demands for indigenous migrant labour on white-owned farms (Botha 2005), the creation of the post-1948 homelands was also a mechanism for depriving indigenous Namibians as well as black South Africans of their cultural identity and citizenship (Walther 2002). Many of the older Damara and Nama peoples living in the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy in Kunene today were forcibly relocated to the former Damaraland homeland in the 1970s (DRFN 2003, Jones 2006). Implementation of the Odendaal recommendations marked the final and most severe phase of forced removals and relocation of Namibians south of the Red Line, leaving “a deep scar in the social fabric of Namibian society” (du Pisani 2000:67).

Growing international resistance let the UN withdraw South Africa’s mandate in 1978 (Erasmus 2000). Notwithstanding, the South African apartheid regime continued its subjugation, disguising it as development of unproductive landscape and—through massive militarisation north of the Red Line—aggressively defending it as protection against communist infiltration from neighbouring enemies (Lenggenhager 2015). Contrary to the
German administration which never exercised formal jurisdiction over the “useless” northern territories Kaoko, Ovambo, Kavango and Caprivi (Werner 1993), South Africa brought the entire north under their control and the Caprivi Strip transformed into becoming an area of high strategic significance (Colpaert et al 2013) (cf. section 6.2.2). During the increasing militarisation of SWAPO resistance, the Red Line became a hermetically closed, heavily militarised border to prevent infiltration from SWAPO and other anti-apartheid fighters into white men’s land (Miescher 2012).

In 1989 eventually, the end of the Cold War and apartheid rule, as well as diplomatic agreements, enabled the UN Transition Assistance Group to take up its mandate to support peaceful “transition through constitutionalism” (Erasmus 2000).

4.3 Customary Land Tenure Systems

Customary law is an area of extensive research. Hinz (2008:60) emphasises the “plurality of modernities” of the subject area in that it appears to be traditional despite often being created more recently, amended or otherwise integrated into present day rules and guidelines. For the sake of clarity, and in line with Namibian legislation that differentiates between “traditional” and “modern”, I continue to refer to “old” customary law and “new” contemporary law. Despite doing so, the allegedly traditional is, in actual fact, an evolving set of formalised norms where traditional leaders have modernised their roles and engage in “new” commercial activities.

4.3.1 Customary Law and Traditional Leadership Now and Then

Land rights and distribution in independent Namibia are strongly influenced by the “structural legacy of settler colonialism” (Melber 2003a:13). The former “ethnic homelands” were transformed into communal land (43% of total land). Private land, mostly white-owned, is almost identical in size (44%), 13% is state land (including protected areas such as the entire Namib Desert coastal strip). Legally owned by the state (cf. Sullivan and Homewood 2004), rural Namibians are the lawful occupants of communal areas, however, current land policy and land tenure legislation does not allow them to hold comprehensive titles to their land (Amoo 2014).

Ultimate ownership of communal land is vested in the state, the Communal Land Act of 2002 rests upon two essential rights: Customary land tenure under customary law and rights of leasehold which are of great significance regarding commercial undertakings such as tourism joint ventures on communal land (Amoo and Harring 2009). Article 66 of Namibia’s Constitution recognised common law and customary law as equal sources of law. The legal
dualism of having “white land” and “black land” based on different property rights, legally administered by different juridical powers constitutes a chief criticism in Namibia’s land ownership debate (Amoo 2014, Berat 1991, Tötemeyer 2000).

Contrary to the notion that customary laws are “non-specific and unwritten” (Berat 1991:29), Horn’s review of Hinz’s (2010) assessment of customary laws from northern Namibian traditional authorities finds that they vary from the very sophisticated document of the Mashi Traditional Authority, carefully weighing every traditional practice and customary law against the Namibian Constitution, to a mere list of prices and offences, as delivered by the Mafwe Traditional Authority. (Horn 2011:136)

Mamdani notes that customary law is not a “single set of native laws” (1996:33), however, the example of the Ovamboland and Kavango traditional authorities clearly demonstrates a process of harmonisation where four out of five adjacent traditional authorities operate based on a single set of ascertained laws. Although this undermines that customary law is exercised in a random, unsystematic manner Corbett and Jones note that the jurisdiction of traditional courts may be “subject to diverse interpretation” (2000:3).

Virtually all Namibians living on communal land are under the jurisdiction of a traditional authority. Their most important legal body is the tribal council, known as khuta which is presided over by a chief councillor and ultimately the chief. Villages are represented by individual headmen who exercise control over traditional village courts. Headmen report to and advise senior headmen, referred to as indunas, who represent several villages at the next administrative (district) level and preside over district courts. Hinz (2010) notes that, although the Traditional Authorities Act, 2000 (No. 25 of 2000) does not make reference to these titles anymore (the official terms are “traditional councillors” and “senior traditional councillor”), “headmen” and “senior headmen” continue to be the commonly used designations. Most traditional leaders inherit their roles (Murphy et al 2007) but still they are appointed by “members of a specific, ethnically-defined community by means of the accepted customs of the day, to preside over that community” (Keulder 2000:154).

Traditional leaders, chiefs and kings long predated the colonial era, however, their role changed significantly under colonial rule in that they were formally incorporated into state structures and thus “they were turned into an enabling arm of state power” (Mamdani 1996:123). Often deployed by foreign colonialists as a strategy to exercise control over vast rural areas (Chimhowu and Woodhouse 2006, Keulder 2000) traditional leadership was selectively constituted or newly established27 if none had existed already (Friedman 2005, Mamdani 1996). In order to maintain control over the dispersed peasantry at minimal cost, the

27 Mamdani (1996:17) refers to indirect rule as a mode of domination over the rural indigenous population as “decentralised despotism”. One of his main arguments relates to the incorporation of “subjects” as opposed to their exclusion, meaning that colonial administrations used indigenous elites through incorporation instead of marginalisation.
powers of traditional leaders were anchored and therefore legitimised in “localised notions of tradition” (Friedman 2005:24) which more accurately resemble the “invention of tradition” based on recent legislative actions as opposed to having been in place “since time immemorial” (Hinz 2008:60). Understanding traditional leaders as an extension of colonial administration clearly shows the mutually conducive relationship between the two, as Keulder explains: “Customary law became a mechanism for upholding the colonial order: perhaps even to the extent that the colonial order became the ‘customary’” (2000:150). Friedman’s (2005) ethnographic study of historically manufactured chieftainships in Kaokoland, Northern Kunene illustrates the symbiosis between central state and traditional authorities and how (re-) constructed notions of tradition and shared history are coupled with political intention in post-independence Namibia. Referring to Ferguson’s (1990) anti-politics machine, he argues that tradition in Kaokoland is deliberately de-politicised although in actual fact it reinforces political and economic interests of the state.

The previous section explained the different extent to which foreign powers aligned traditional leaders as “local level lawmakers” (Keulder 2000:150) north and south of the Red Line. By means of conferring customary rights and law enforcement to traditional leaders, colonial administrations secured support from traditional leaders by opening up new avenues of income generation (Mamdani 1996). Traditional leaders exercised rule over land allocation, natural resource use (for example grazing fees) and communal labour practices (Keulder 2000). Düsing (2002) notes that leaders who cooperated with the foreign rulers received significantly higher financial support than those who opposed to them—Caprivan traditional leaders earned the highest while Nama leaders in the south received the lowest wages.

With Namibian independence, they lost most of their revenue streams and their financial and institutional capacity is considerably weaker (Keulder 2000, Mamdani 1996). Nevertheless, under the Traditional Authorities Act of 1995, traditional leaders are still expected “to assist the Namibian police and other law enforcement agencies” (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2000:4). Section 17(1) of the Act makes provision for Payment of Allowances to traditional leaders, Section 18(3) stipulates that a Community Trust Fund shall be established where members contribute to community projects and administrative costs. Section 16 dictates the Relationship of traditional authorities with government organs:

A traditional authority shall in the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties and functions under customary law or as specified in this Act give support to the policies of the Government, regional councils and local authority councils and refrain from any act which undermines the authority of those institutions. (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2000:13)

Thus previously extensive powers of traditional leaders were considerably restricted to an advisory function where they are “compelled to support government” (Tötemeyer 2000:132). Regarding the actual powers of the traditional authority in Namibia today the literature supports contrasting views. With traditional leaders’ de jure rights and revenue
streams severely restricted, their leverage has been largely eroded and they are perceived as somewhat “backward” and for some “remain ‘stooges’ of colonial administration” (Keulder 2000:165). Contrary to that, others argue that the institution of the traditional authority has “survived colonialism” and that traditional leaders are “central political actors today” (Behr et al 2015:460) and remain “a stronghold against the claimed ‘apolitical’ character of conservancy management” (Pellis 2011:141). Furthermore, there are different degrees of how traditional rule continues to impact on the lives of rural area residents. In this context, Hinz finds that in the northern populations “traditional authorities have a broadly accepted and firm stand in the society” while Damara and Nama groups in the central and southern parts of the country “do not show the same degree of organisation” (2008:70).

Land allocation for and income generation from community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) provides a neat example for the multi-faceted nature of “new” land use practices where not only community-based organisations (CBOs) and traditional leaders compete for authority but also chiefs and state institutions as the next section demonstrates.

4.3.2 De Jure and De Facto Powers of Traditional Leaders in CBNRM

Community-based conservation in Namibia serves to exemplify the ambivalent role of traditional leadership as CBNRM legislation operates parallel to customary law in rural areas (Corbett and Jones 2000). Overall, communal land use and allocation represents a “model of regulated dualism” (Hinz 2008:63) where the state confirms traditional governance and application of customary law, at the same time, it retains ultimate decision-making power. As pointed out before, the state holds the title to communal land while registered conservancies gain the rights to use natural resources. In their role as custodians of the land, traditional leaders allocate land for residential use and grazing and thus perform the role of a local authority (Tötemeyer 2000). Although ownership is vested in the state, many traditional leaders still regard communal land “as lawfully owned by them”, Behr’s et al recent investigation into traditional authority and state institutions’ perceptions on “fiercely contested” land ownership found that “ownership depends on who you ask” (2015:463).

The Communal Land Reform Act of 2002, essentially a decentralisation attempt by the state, stipulates that decision-making authority over land use and allocation is vested in communal land boards while the traditional authority has consultative status only (Boudreaux and Nelson 2011). However, if a community wants to apply for conservancy status, it must first consult its traditional authority with regards to the demarcation of communal land, only after they have decided upon the application is it forwarded to communal land boards. Behr et al conclude that land boards “have created antagonism” (2015:465) between traditional authorities and the state
where the former perceives the new layer of regional authority as duplication—and threat—to their local structures.

Despite Namibia’s decentralisation objectives with regional councils as *de jure* local government authorities (Keulder 2000), CBNRM planning and policy formulation is driven by central government28 (Corbett and Jones 2000). CBNRM legislation provides no institutional links with regional councils other than their approval for conservancy borders by communal land boards. Largely excluding regional councils was done deliberately to prevent falling into the same trap as Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme where regional councils capture substantial CBNRM benefits (Murombedzi 1999). Except municipalities, there is no administrative unit below regional councils, thus “creating a governance gap in rural areas” (Corbett and Jones 2000:2). Keulder (2000) explains that limited (especially financial) capacities and powers of regional councils result in their inactivity in areas that fall under the jurisdiction of traditional leaders. This power vacuum is likely to foster power struggles between emerging conservancies, traditional authorities and district councils (Jones 1999c), especially with regards to the rather sensitive issue of demarcating conservancy boundaries (Jones 1999a). Jones and Murphree report that conservancy registration in Kunene and Zambezi was delayed due to regional councillors’ reluctance to endorse them since they felt they should have “greater say in the approval process” (2001:56). Countrywide the two regions emerged as “conservancy hotspots” which 36 registered CBOs in Kunene and 16 in Zambezi. Here, the struggle over competencies involved not only traditional authority and state actors but also the strong lobby of non-government organisations (NGOs) which came in heavily backed by donor-funding (discussed in the following section 4.3).

Namibian CBNRM legislation noticeably avoided the incorporation of traditional authorities (Campbell and Shackleton 2001), thus mirroring the overall scepticism by political minds and funding development agencies during the country’s constitution building process of traditional leaders which largely stemmed from their ambivalent position during colonisation (Hinz 2008). Sullivan’s study of the formation of a conservancy in north-west Namibia illustrates how the involvement of a designated support NGO played a role in “an emerging leadership challenge to the Senior Headman of Sesfontein” (2003:74). Corbett and Jones (2000:5) argue that the “*marginalisation* of traditional leaders has been motivated by the desire to modernise” land use generally and CBNRM specifically. Needless to say that their exclusion from conservancies’ natural resource revenue is “a fairly radical departure from the traditional power relations” (Corbett and Jones 2000:8). Nevertheless, acknowledging their traditional

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28 The central natural resource management agencies are the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET), the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development (MAWRD), the Ministry for Land Resettlement and Rehabilitation (MLRR) and the Ministry for Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR). Promoting further policy integration amongst them has been identified as a key future challenge for CBNRM (NACSO 2014).
leaders’ status, conservancies provide cash support to the already financially weak traditional authority.

Regardless of their conjectural post-independence powerlessness, *de facto* influence of traditional leaders, albeit varying degrees in the different regions, can be substantial (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Massyn 2007). Schiffer (2004a) observes that traditional leaders are not as strong in Kunene region compared to Zambezi, still within the Kunene region their spheres of influence differ, being much stronger in Kunene North than Kunene South. In the CBNRM context, differentiating between weak and strong traditional leaders is often directly related to appraisals of conservancy success (Boudreaux 2007, Halstead 2003, Jones and Murphree 2001, Silva and Mosimane 2014). Here, “strong” traditional authority equals uncontested, stable leadership where all conservancy members are affiliated with the same chieftainship which is highly advantageous to conservancy- and enterprise-building processes. “Weak” essentially translates into fragmented leadership due to historically contested *khutas* where individuals from different traditional chieftainships both claim the right to rule. In sum, while their *de jure* powers are largely eroded, in areas where traditional authorities are still the eminent social fabric of communal life, conservancy development will be impossible without the consent of the *khuta*. “Tribalism” was frequently referred to by different stakeholder groups (CBO, NGO and ministry representatives) as a serious obstacle to conservancy formation and ongoing development. Both NGO and government support agents stressed that they would not interfere in traditional leadership issues. During the interview with the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) deputy director for the North Eastern Regions, he referred to one of his current cases where a community with high tourism potential did not want to form a conservancy:

> These are political issues. Political tribal alliances that are there. And now they are mixing development with tribal issues which doesn’t collaborate, which doesn’t work.[…] We don’t really work with that. (Interview 23/MET deputy director)

> It becomes like— it’s tribalism and we are not supporting that. We step back and say listen, sort out your issues and call us when you are ready [laughs]. (Interview 27/field NGO)

### 4.4 Programme Inception and Ownership

#### 4.4.1 Evolution of the NGO–Government Relationship

CBNRM in Namibia essentially grew out of concerns by conservationists over the decline of wildlife (Jones 1999a) in the 1980s. Preserving wildlife on the basis that it becomes “an economically competitive form of land use” (Jones and Murphree 2001:43) is the underlying concept for all CBNRM policies. During foreign occupation, rural Namibians were increasingly alienated from their natural resources. Traditional ecological knowledge was suppressed by South African expert knowledge aiming to tame and control the hostile, arid Namibian lands (Botha 2005). Largely excluded from legal natural resource utilisation, many
impoverished rural Namibians turned poachers as a result of their precarious situation. Nevertheless, Jones (2001) estimates that most illegal hunting was in fact done by government officials and poor white farmers who were opposing game protection. Elephants and lions were considered fence breakers, several species threatening livestock (jackal, hyena, wild cats, leopards, wild dogs and lynx) were often shot (Botha 2005). Combined with severe drought in the early 1980s, game populations shrank dramatically. In former Damaraland, today’s Kunene Region, wildlife populations were reduced by up to 90% (Alpert 1996). Namibia’s high-profile CBNRM model is generally associated with the dramatic recovery of numerous species\(^\text{29}\), “it is especially in the former Damaraland, scene of pre-independence doomsday forecasts of wildlife extinction, that a remarkable transformation had been wrought” (Botha 2005:189). At the same time, growing wildlife populations on communal lands pose increasing pressure for residents. Human-wildlife conflict throughout Namibian conservancies, including fatalities, is increasing, in particular reoccurring damage and losses\(^\text{30}\) to farmers and livestock owners (Jones and Barnes 2006).

Deeply concerned over the carnage of rhino and elephant in the north-west by mainly the South African Defence Force in the early 1980s, Blythe Loutit and Ina Britz (who were also the founding mothers of the Save The Rhino Trust) established the Namibia Wildlife Trust (Owen-Smith 2010); its “pioneering work” (Jones 1999a:303) is universally cited as the inception of CBNRM in Namibia (Alpert 1996, Botha 2005, Boudreaux and Nelson 2011, Jones 1999a, 2001, Jones and Murphree 2001). In 1983, rural Damaraland people were appointed as community game guards—essentially to patrol and report poaching—by local headmen (and therefore with consent from the chief), who shared concerns over the disappearing wildlife. Appointed by the Namibia Wildlife Trust, local conservationist Garth Owen-Smith led the community game guard programme and eventually, teaming up with anthropologist Margaret Jacobson, the programme was extended to Zambezi where the two founded the NGO Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) (Jones 1999a). By 1992, IRDNC sponsored 30 game guards with international donor funding (Alpert 1996). In the early 1990s, IRDNC received funding from different international donors and

\(^{29}\) Conducted as a pilot project in 2000, the annual North West Game Count is now the largest road-based game count worldwide. Between 1995 and 2013, Namibia’s elephant population grew from 7,500 to 30,000, the country’s free roaming lion population—outside protected areas—is growing, so are black rhino populations occurring in 15 communal conservancies (NACSO 2014). Nevertheless, Namibia is not immune to poaching. In 2014, 24 poached rhinos were reported, by May 2015, 60 rhino carcasses were discovered, mainly within Etosha National Park but also on communal land in Kunene (New Era 2015). Especially in Zambezi, cross-border poaching across the Angolan, Botswana and Zambian borders presents a major challenge.

\(^{30}\) The Human Animal Conservancy Self-Insurance Scheme (HACSIS) ran from 2003 to 2010 in Kunene and Zambezi conservancies supported by IRDNC. Its successor, the Human Wildlife Self Reliance Scheme (HWSRS), is a national scheme. Despite insurance and compensation systems reimbursing up to 50% of lost livestock (Boudreaux and Nelson 2011, Nott et al 2004), several interviewees complain that refunds are often not even a third of the actual market price of the animal.
became a national programme. Today IRDNC supports more than half of all registered Namibian conservancies, all of them in Kunene and Zambezi where they have field offices (IRDNC 2015b).

Political support for community-based conservation at “the right time” (Newsham refers to “policy spaces” 2007:130) in newly independent Namibia was paramount for enabling legislation for the devolution of rights. Jones (2010) describes a window of opportunity for CBNRM in the first half of the 1990s which is reflected in the passing of all principal CBNRM policies:

- 1995 Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas Policy
- 1995 Policy on the Promotion of Community-Based Tourism
- 1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act 31

Boudreaux and Nelson point out the role of Niko Bessinger, first SWAPO Minister of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism (the predecessor of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism), who “personally pushed for the institutional and legal changes needed to extend use and benefits of wildlife to non-white Namibians” (2011:18). Additional enabling factors were that no other government agency competed for control or saw the economic potential of the then low-value wildlife on communal land; emerging international debates and pressure to include the rural poor in conservation objectives, the expanding Kunene community game guard project and the hailed communal areas management programme for indigenous resources (CAMPFIRE) initiative from neighbouring Zimbabwe (Jones 2010). Not surprisingly, Bessinger’s pro community conservation network faced strong opposition from the prevailing “fences and fines” ideology in the ministry (Jones and Murphree 2001). Government officials’ persisting distrust in rural Namibians’ ability to manage wildlife efficiently (Newsham 2007) was and is reflected in MET’s insistence on approving wildlife quotas which are not based on any legal provision (Corbett and Jones 2000).

The strong Namibian ownership of the CBNRM programme (compared to neighbouring country programmes) is well-acknowledged in the literature. Generally it is attributed to and rooted in the early 1990s new government’s “intellectual confidence to reject prescriptive donor approaches and to accept money largely on their own terms” (Child and Barnes 2010:290). A senior NGO/CBNRM specialist recalled how the Namibian government insisted on having a veto right in the programme and the rigorous manner in which it was negotiated:

- USAID always wants to keep it [sole veto right] just so that they can keep control and they said no, if you want, you can have a vote but you can’t have a veto […] so Namibia said fine and got up and started leaving and got closer to the door. They were quite

31 The amendment of the 1975 “Nature Conservation Ordinance” is considered the greatest CBNRM policy achievement as it extended (conditional) ownership rights over wildlife, previously only granted to private landowners, to communal area residents (cf. section 2.3.2).
willing to give it up. And then oh no no no, we back down says the USA. I think that was quite an extreme situation on both sides. (Interview 13/NGO)

Naturally, the relationship between NGOs and the MET has not been static. The IRDNC Zambezi director described their relationship in the 1990s as “very very painful but now we are like the same family” (Interview 26). The area warden, employed at the MET since 32 years, repeatedly referred to a “push and pull situation” in the early years, acknowledging that there was a “big power struggle” over competencies. Jones (2001) notes that IRDNC’s dominance was undermining the ministry and that NGOs were generally better equipped. Schiffer’s (2004b) research shows a ratio of one regional MET staff in Kunene versus 40 NGO staff in the region. At the inception of the programme, well-funded and well-represented NGOs were generally found setting agendas at both conservancy micro level and at policy level through high-powered individuals (Hoole 2010, Jones 2001). Based on his PhD fieldwork in 2003/2004 in Namibia, Newsham (2007) describes the interaction of government and NGO support actors in the CBNRM programme as “ongoing negotiations and renegotiations” (2007:140), frequently related to the allocation of programme funding.

With CBNRM becoming a mainstream approach to rural development in Namibia, government expertise, resources and project funds grew alongside it, and CBNRM is now seen as firmly embedded into government (Boudreaux and Nelson 2011). Contrary to that, more than two decades of donor support and the reclassification as upper-middle income country, donor-funded NGOs are now facing a situation where funders are diverting resources to other sectors and countries. As a result, NGOs have to scale down and retrench staff. Thus, the strong NGO lead is gradually tailing off while the MET’s dominance is increasing. All the government representatives interviewed repeatedly underlined that CBNRM is a “government programme” (Interview 7, 22, 23). Especially in comparison to NGOs, they stressed that MET has “the power to intervene”, for instance to de-gazette conservancies:

MET can pull the plug, we have the power to step in, only we can do that not NGOs […] but not like dictatorship [laughs]. (Interview 22/MET warden)

Whereas government and non-government actors are continuously renegotiating their spheres of influence on a macro level, their cooperation at micro conservancy level resembles a functioning partnership according to both sides:

When it comes down to one on one—conservancies—we really do support each other. IRDNC will fill in where the government fails sometimes but at the same time, when we need them, they are there. (Interview 30/field NGO)

We unite efforts. For example, for game counts or other monitoring or if there is a conflict, we team up. (Interview 7/MET warden)

We know that we need each other so we work very close. I think if there is one example of NGOs and government working together than it’s us. It’s us. (Interview 14/NACSO director)

Despite narrated and factual power of the ministry, “MET staff are frequently unable to meet their own requirements as a result of logistic limitations” (Nott et al 2004:202). As aforementioned, both case study regions are considered conservancy hotspots. Yet, the MET’s
conservancy support team is extremely understaffed with three people (field officer, ranger and area warden) in Kunene and two (ranger and area warden) in Zambezi responsible for all queries. Contrary to NGOs which only support selected target conservancies, the MET staff has to serve all Namibian conservancies.

4.4.2 Structure of the Namibian NGO Network and Project Phases

Contrary to most other southern African countries, there were already a small number of active non-governmental entities; Hunter and Keulder (2010) describe pre-independence civil society as a defining feature of the Namibian liberation movement. SWAPO’s pre-independence support for women solidarity programmes was mentioned by some interviewees, arguing that the structure and mandate of civil society was already known to the post-independence government.

In 2009, 460 NGOs operated nationally, a significant number considering the population of approximately two million Namibians. Almost half (47%) are involved with HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, natural resource management constitutes the second largest group (12%) (Hunter and Keulder 2010). The group of CBNRM support NGOs is considered to be “among the strongest in the NGO community and perhaps the best organised” (Hunter and Keulder 2010:91) largely due to its role in policy formulation and close alignment with relevant ministries and also owing to its ability to attract substantial, prolonged external financing. The 1992 Policy on the Establishment of Conservancies does not make provision for NGOs as CBNRM stakeholders per se (Schiffer 2004b). However, the 2013 national CBNRM policy emphasises NGOs as partners in Section 5 “Institutional Framework”:

Non-governmental organisations are recognised by this policy as key partners in supporting CBNRM processes, especially in helping to create or strengthen community based structures and building management capacities and linking communities to funding sources. The government will continue to collaborate with NGOs to deliver services to communities and where appropriate, and support the formation of local NGOs to outsource certain functions to them. (MET 2013:14-15)

Large-scale funding for CBNRM started in the early 1990s with the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) project based on a bilateral agreement between Namibia and the United States through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) was awarded a “cooperative agreement” (App et al 2008:1) meaning that they govern and “control” programme implementation by means of providing technical assistance to their Namibian counterparts, USAID refers to this as “Leader with Associate” mechanism (WWF 2009:4). LIFE’s foremost role was the awarding of sub-grants and technical support to national implementing agents (Jones 1999b, Gujadhur 2000) who then themselves disbursed funding and training to conservancies. The network of Namibian “associates” is organised through the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations
(NACSO) which is the official coordinating body for support NGOs and primary vehicle to addressing the strategic development of CBNRM (Murphy 2003) (see Appendix 5 for a comprehensive list of NACSO member organisations). Figure 5 illustrates the hierarchical organisation of the non-governmental support structure since the 1990s. As such, it clearly resembles a linear development process (cf. Fowler 2002) where funding and technical assistance—CBNRM expert knowledge—is channelled from northern donors to southern beneficiaries.

**Figure 5: Linear development process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor (USAID)</th>
<th>Northern NGO</th>
<th>Southern NGO</th>
<th>CBO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>→ International NGO (WWF)</td>
<td>→ National CBNRM Network (NACSO)</td>
<td>→ Implementing NGOs (IRDNC, NNF etc.)</td>
<td>→ CBOs (ǂKhoadi //Hôas/ Wuparo Conservancy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Fowler 2002:294

Although this structure may be interpreted creating a situation where the WWF as an international “super NGO” resembles somewhat of a big brother role, both literature and interviewees do not support this. WWF’s Namibian country director is commonly credited with opting for a strategic partnership approach as he engineered the LIFE project primarily as a support system to the emerging Namibian CBNRM network (Jones 2010). Various NACSO members characterised their inter-NGO relationships, including that with WWF, as rather positive as it allows “cross fertilisation of ideas”, “honest reflection” and a “joint-sense of purpose” (Interview 25/NGO director). Despite WWF’s significant powers in providing technical and financial expertise to its Namibian partner organisations, its non-imposing character was stressed:

The way WWF works is— they come along, the put the flag in the area and say right, now we are gonna implement a WWF programme. This is not the case in Namibia and that is why I believe we have one of the most successful programmes in the world here. Because it's not a WWF programme. It's not an international programme. It's a Namibian programme. Here we go, we gonna provide support to our field partners, to our local partners. (Interview 13/WWF CBNRM specialist, previously IRDNC field-staff)

Apart from Hoole’s (2010) work there are hardly any research accounts tackling the extensive Namibian CBNRM NGO network per se:

The national NGOs are headquartered in Windhoek and some have regional field stations or a regional mandate. NGO operations feature professional and technical staff cadres such as biologists, GIS technicians, social scientists and project managers, equipped with
all-wheel drive vehicles, modern offices and sophisticated tools, including the latest in computing and remote sensing. [...] It is also evident, from the large and diverse establishment of professional and technical cadres, vehicles, offices and equipment in Windhoek, that NGOs have appropriated a good deal of CBNRM donor funding for themselves. (Hoole 2010:84/94)

Interestingly, when conducting interviews with Windhoek-based senior NGO staff, two national NGO directors, as well as the WWF CBNRM specialist, admitted that they felt their respective NGOs “grew too big”, the latter two specifically referred to their large head offices in the capital32 (Interview 13, 25). Another Windhoek-based consultant criticised the “bloated field NGOs” (Interview 9) in particular. Contrary to senior, often expatriate staff in Windhoek, field staff is predominantly local, often from the communal areas. A phenomenon emerging in the last few years is that individual field NGO workers are getting elected as governing committee members in their conservancies, hence the line between NGO staff and conservancy members is becoming increasingly blurred. Windhoek-based, senior NGO employees seemed somewhat suspicious about these hybrids due to the high potential of conflicting interests. Most striking were the opposing views from MET staff about this, ranging from “this is a nightmare, it only creates problems” (Interview 7/MET warden Kunene) to “these conservancies have moved from being disasters to being successful role models” (Interview 22/MET warden Zambezi). Close association between national NGOs and emerging conservancies, here particularly in the context of privileging certain local groups over others (for example through access to donor-funded vehicles and employment positions created), “have exacerbated local conflict along ethnic lines” in the north-west (Sullivan 2003:74, also Pellis et al 2015). Likewise, Taylor’s (2012) PhD research on identity-building amongst the Khwe San people in the western part of Zambezi Region finds that, albeit unintentionally, alliances between NGOs and certain community members and traditional leaders intensified the struggles over authority, often in the context of ethnic difference.

As Hoole (2010) pointed out, certain regions are generally under the auspices of different national NGOs. During various interviews, the different stakeholder groups (CBO, NGO and government representatives) somewhat automatically referred to certain areas “belonging to” individual NGOs. Map 5 illustrates how Kunene Region is essentially divided into Kunene South where most conservancies are supported by the Namibia Nature Foundation (NNF) whereas Kunene North has always been “IRDNC conservancy territory”. Schiffer notes that in the 1990s both NGOs “were competing for territory” (2004a:29), similarly, Sullivan (2003) and Pellis et al (2015) refer to intensely political and competitive conditions surrounding conservancy formation and associated support provision by different national NGOs.

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32 IRDNC employs six financial auditors exclusively working on financial management to meet various accountability requirements from their donors. The co-director explains that it was recommended to double the financial management capacity “but we refuse to spend even more of our limited resources on bureaucracy”.
IRDNC’s director explained that due to their “historical presence” in the area they become known and therefore have always been routinely consulted by local “communities of interest” (for example traditional authorities and farmers) and outsiders such as researchers and international NGOs alike. Becoming regional gatekeepers is not a role they intended for IRDNC she clarified, at the same time, she described a “turf war” situation where “you start thinking this is our area” (Interview 25/NGO director). Given the high number of supporting NGOs, it is not surprising that donor funding promotes competition for funds (Hoole 2010). Murphy’s (2003) research reveals poor coordination and information sharing between the different support NGOs.

Map 5: IRDNC supported communal conservancies

Source: IRDNC 2015b:6

Table 10 summarises duration, budget and objectives of LIFE project phases by USAID and the subsequent Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) project funded by the American Government. Total CBNRM programme investments achieved are deemed “highly positive” at a 23% rate of return in 2013 (compared to 5% in 2005), based on an economic net value of N$669m (NACSO 2014:10).

LIFE is anticipated to account for approximately 70% of CBNRM activities (Gujadhur 2000). In addition, there are significant parallel contributions from other donors. For 2005, for instance: US$ 3 million by the European Commission, US$3.2 by the German Development Bank KfW, US$ 1.7 French Global Environmental Facility and US$ 1.1 by Finland’s Foreign Affairs Ministry (World Bank 2012).

Education, tourism and agriculture are development target sectors of the MCA compact between the Republic of Namibia and the US Government. “Poverty reduction through economic growth” being the ultimate goal, the compact aimed to increase Namibian workers’ skill base and enterprise productivity in rural areas (MCA Namibia 2015).
Table 10: Principal CBNRM funding periods

1993-1999—LIFE I “Foundation building period” (Project budget US$17m)
**Objectives:** Pilot initiative for the development and implementation of CBNRM; strengthening national CBNRM (non-governmental) support organisations; supportive role in policy development resulting in legislative reform; development of support services promoting tourism as principal source of conservancy revenue

1999-2004—LIFE II “Intensified support to achieve self-financing conservancies” (Project budget US$15m, equal amount leveraged by USAID from additional donors, plus cash/in-kind contributions from MET and WWF)
**Objectives:** Expansion of target regions, optimising operational and legal frameworks, systematic CBNRM training, introduction of Event Book System, increasing support for CBNRM coordination and planning

2004-2008—LIFE PLUS “Improving rural livelihoods through natural resource management” (Project budget US$11m, equal amount of cash/in-kind contributions from MET and WWF)
**Objectives:** Strengthen conservancies as rural, democratic institutions, enhancing financial viability, spreading Event Book System to all registered conservancies, changing communal area residents’ attitude towards wildlife

2008-2014—Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) Namibia Compact (Project budget US$67 million (total tourism allocation), US$18m specifically to support conservancies)
**Objectives:** Develop the capacity of communal conservancies to attract investments in ecotourism and capture a greater share of the revenue generated by tourism in Namibia

Post 2014—Sustainability Strategy
**Objective:** “Transcend from the high-cost development phase to a cost-effective maintenance approach in the provision of sustainable support” (NACSO 2012b:5)


With the commencement of the MCA-funded project phase in 2008, there was a noticeable shift in project-planners emphasis and corresponding project objectives. Whereas the previous funding cycles had strongly focused on wildlife management and institutional governance, MCA put a strong emphasis on conservancies’ tourism enterprise development. The following section demonstrates the significance of tourism income to CBOs and the NGOs’ crucial role in facilitating joint-venture partnerships between communal conservancies and private tourism operators.

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35 While there is no apparent exit strategy, the Sustainability Strategy (NACSO 2012b), a joint-effort by NACSO members, tackles the continuous provision of “critical” support services. In essence, it is a strategic assessment of diversified financing mechanisms for environmental services such as a conservancy trust fund, philanthropic support, voluntary carbon payments and biodiversity offsets (NACSO 2012b:6). Requiring conservancies to pay for NGO support services, thus moving away from providing free services to a consultant-based model, was fiercely debated during field research in 2014.
4.5 NGO Facilitation of Private-Sector Involvement

4.5.1 The Significance of Joint-Venture Tourism Partnerships

In 2014, cash income and in-kind benefits to conservancies totalled N$87,310,785 (~US$7.2 million). Table 11 shows that the top five sources of income combined generate almost 90% of conservancy income.

Table 11: Conservancy income 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of cash income or In-kind benefits</th>
<th>Value in N$</th>
<th>% of total cash income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint-venture tourism (includes all cash income and in-kind benefits to conservancies/members)</td>
<td>39,586,078</td>
<td>45.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation hunting (includes all cash income to conservancies/members)</td>
<td>24,106,436</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservation hunting meat</td>
<td>7,371,740</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community-based tourism and other small to medium enterprises</td>
<td>3,534,926</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous plant products</td>
<td>3,496,849</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of top five sources of income</strong></td>
<td><strong>78,096,029</strong></td>
<td><strong>89.3%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NACSO (2015b:63)

The above figures clearly demonstrate the significance of tourism where combined income from joint-venture tourism lodges (45%) and trophy hunting concessions (28%) accounts for almost three quarters of revenue. It needs to be emphasised that this tourism income is specifically from joint-venture partnerships. Contrary to that, a total of 167 community-based tourism enterprises owned and run by conservancies (for example campsites and crafts shops), account for only 4% (in 2014, 5% in 2013) of conservancy cash income (NACSO 2014, 2015b). While there has not been any significant change in the actual sources of income there is considerable regional variance in terms of their actual contribution. Figure 6 shows that joint-venture lodges—non-consumptive tourism—contribute over three quarters of income to conservancies in Kunene, consumptive trophy hunting (“Wildlife Utilisation”) generates more than half of the revenues of Zambezi conservancies due to their significantly higher wildlife populations and correspondingly higher wildlife quotas. Naidoo et al (2016) find that there is a considerable temporal difference in generating returns from hunting (an average three years) and tourism (approx. six years after formation).

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36 The remaining 10% are made up of own-use harvesting meat, miscellaneous (interest), crafts, thatching grass, shoot-and-sell-game harvesting, other hunting or game harvest, live game sales (NACSO 2015b:63)
Figure 6: Conservancy income by category

Kunene income by category 2015

Zambezi income by category 2015

Source: IRDNC 2015a

Direct income to conservancy residents from tourism is mostly through employment (708 full-time staff in lodges) (NACSO 2014) while hunting benefits mostly occur as cash income to the conservancy and meat distribution to members (Naidoo et al 2016). There are several examples where tourism and hunting are the principal or exclusive source of income for the majority of conservancies (Mulonga and Murphy 2003, Naidoo et al 2016). Less than half, predominantly older conservancies, more likely having established joint-venture partnerships, are able to cover the high operational costs from their own income. Thus only 46% are actually distributing cash or in-kind benefits to members (NACSO 2014). Humavindu and Stage’s (2015) evaluation of the first 59 conservancies set up in Namibia reflects the high discrepancy between “old” and “new” organisations: while they deem financial sustainability “problematic” for all, especially for the younger conservancies “there is no real link between conservation achievements and financial success” (2015:1). Interestingly, Naidoo et al (2016) simulated a ban
on trophy hunting and found that this would significantly reduce the number of conservancies able to cover their operating expenses “whereas eliminating income from tourism did not have as severe an effect” (2016:628).

By giving registered conservancies concessionary rights to tourism within their boundaries (Jones 1999b), subsequent tourism policies sought to promote the “active involvement of rural communities in tourism operations and to encourage the formal tourism industry to enter into partnerships with informal rural based tourism sector” (Corbett and Daniels 1996). In terms of social economic development, particularly high-yielding tourism and trophy hunting partnerships have been heavily promoted by NGOs (Ashley and Garland 1994, Ashley and Jones 2001, Boudreaux and Nelson 2010, Roe et al 2001, Snyman 2012). Especially in the early years, there are numerous, somewhat euphoric, examples of how tourism can stimulate rural economy growth (Child et al 2001), promote natural resource management (Halstead 2003) and equity and poverty alleviation in communal areas (Ashley and Garland 1994). Lapeyre’s (2011a) case study of ≠Khoadi //Hôas’ joint-venture partnership highlights training and capacity building by the private tourism operator as an important non-financial benefit where ongoing on-the-job-training (for example English language and computer skills) is “strongly associated with better livelihood opportunities” (2011a:232). However, with increasing maturity of the programme and corresponding assessments, critical voices are getting louder. Hoole concludes on his study of Torra Conservancy which has one of the highest-yielding tourism joint-ventures in the country that “most conservancy households remain highly impoverished, with no apparent benefits from the ecotourism enterprise partnership” (2010:87, also Lapeyre 2011b). Helen Suich (2010, 2013), probably the most rigorous Namibian CBNRM critic, laments the lack of stringent, long-term data collection to allow the systematic evaluation of household-level data and benefits.

Compared to other activities, tourism, in particular, raises high expectations (Lapeyre 2010) despite generally low profit margins. The considerable time lag between investment and return (Ashley 1998), that is an average four to five years for a lodge to break even, may hamper ongoing community support. Direct financial benefits on a household level through employment occur to an average of 16 community members permanently employed per joint-venture lodge and conservancy (three members per trophy hunting agreement) (NACSO 2014). Tourism carries high opportunity costs, especially when competing with other forms of land use such as farming (Measham and Lumbasi 2013).
From a private sector perspective, operators face a number of uncertainties when investing on communal lands such as insecure leaseholds (Massyn 2007) and associated costs due to business inefficiencies (Lapeyre 2011c). Although CBNRM promotes community participation in decision-making and actual management, limited exposure to and industry-specific knowledge of tourism planning and management (Halstead 2003, Lapeyre 2010, Murphy 2003, Murphy and Halstead 2003) contradict the goal of risk minimisation and increase cases of business failures (Ashley 1998). However, blaming inexperienced communities ignores the shortcomings of support agencies excessively promoting tourism to them. NGOs often do not have sufficient knowledge of the fickle dynamics of the tourism industry themselves (Lapeyre 2011b, Murphy 2003) and their agendas may conflict with tourism business realities (Forstner 2004). Similarly, local and district level authorities rarely possess any advanced tourism business knowledge necessary to facilitate joint-venture partnerships. The MET warden in Zambezi stated that “tourism knowledge is really a vacuum [in the ministry]” (Interview 22). At the time of research in February 2014, the MET was interviewing for the post of Regional Tourism Coordinator to facilitate the almost entirely NGO-driven tourism enterprise development.

National and international NGOs have been the sole providers of joint-venture tourism knowledge and acted as key facilitators for contractual agreements between conservancies and private operators. Specifically making reference to “community capacity” and “a shared understanding about the tourism sector”, Lapeyre asserts that “external support is essential” (2011c:309). The WWF employs designated tourism business advisors with strong private sector backgrounds who provide technical assistance to their Namibian associate NGOs. The IRDNC tourism coordinator in the Zambezi field office explained that “the mission is to have a smooth relationship in place and my role there is to put the oil, make sure it’s operating and running” (Interview 27). Furthermore, he stressed that the conservancy’s understanding of operating a lodge in rural areas is paramount otherwise they “would kill the business” by pressuring the operator with unrealistic financial demands.

In essence, there are three different types of joint-ventures. A “classic”, or traditional, joint-venture agreement is based on a lease agreement where the conservancy allows the private sector partner to build and run their own lodge while the conservancy receives a monthly lease fee. Here, the conservancy has little part to play in the actual enterprise, on the other hand, they are not exposed to the actual risks of owning a business (NACSO 2012c). The

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37 During numerous informal conversations with private tourism operators in 2013 and 2014 somewhat of a shared opinion emerged: the private sector side is the business side whereas the conservancy side is “community politics and messy”. Demands by the community can suffocate private investors in case they get “caught up” in different requests by the community and/or traditional leaders. When operators ignore the demands they are called into community meetings with the traditional authority. NGO staff mentioned that communities can “hold operators to ransom”. Especially Zambezi-based tourism operators had rather strong opinions about operating on communal land: “The community is where the problem comes in. In Caprivi it is impossible to work successfully on communal land.” (Field notes 2013/Katima Mulilo).
vast majority of the 39 joint-venture lodges in Namibia are based on classic lease agreements. Wuparo Conservancy entered into such an agreement in 2010/2011. In an equity share model, there is a higher degree of community ownership. The conservancy not only leases the land but also owns part of the assets. Hence, they not only rent out a part of their land but actually lease their share of fixed assets to a commercial partner resulting in higher returns, a very small number of joint-venture partnerships are structured like this. In a 100% community-owned model, the conservancy owns both assets and lodge operations, only marketing and management are outsourced to an experienced private sector partner, referred to as a hotel management agreement (HMA). Grootberg Lodge, 100% owned by the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy, presents the only joint-venture partnership structured in this way. Local labour employment and training guarantees are usually part of all joint-venture models.

Assisting the development of joint-venture partnerships is probably one of the most heavily facilitated processes based on extensive outside expertise and technical assistance. There is a heavy, ongoing debate, especially within the NGO community, as to which is the “right” model. At the heart of the debate over community ownership in joint-venture models lays the divide between a high sense of ownership and high earnings and carrying the associated ownership risks as opposed to receiving benefits only (NACSO 2012c). Should the business run into trouble, the conservancy would have to make a decision as to whether their money will support the enterprise or maintain social development of the conservancy. The following two case study chapters illustrate that the Namibian NGO scene is deeply divided over the “right” distribution of risk, ownership and returns.

In view of the Namibian tourism industry in general, the existing 39 joint-venture lodges on communal land are certainly not challenging the structural dualism of the predominantly white-owned and managed tourism industry. In fact, the WWF laments that “the contributions of the Communal Conservancy Tourism Sector have gone under-appreciated by the tourism industry” (WWF communication 2011, internal ≠Khoadi //Hôas documentation). Conversely, the extent to which communal conservancies are able to generate future income, and therefore almost the entire economic rational of Namibian CBNRM, heavily depends on securing high-yielding partnerships with tourism operators—and it is precisely in this area where conservancies, almost entirely, rely on NGO support.
4.5.2 (Uneven) NGO Support to Conservancies

There are three principal CBNRM support categories in which different NGO support services are divided, which are (1) natural resource management, (2) institutional development and governance and (3) business and tourism; these categories are also reflected in NACSO’s working groups. Support services to communities interested in forming a conservancy are trainings on committee formation, constitution development and boundary mapping as well as conflict management should boundary disputes arise (Child et al 2001). Once gazetted, NGOs offer financial assistance to cover operating costs and salaries for game guards and other employees until the conservancy is self-financing. They also assist in acquiring equipment such as uniforms and office utensils, fencing and even vehicles, and facilitate transport to meetings and cover meeting costs (Child et al 2001). Through their supporting NGO conservancies can apply for grants for joint-venture, small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) development, for craft centres and campsites. LIFE and MCA grants were also used for the translocation of game to communal area conservancies (MCA 2011c). Once registered, conservancies continue to receive ongoing trainings and technical support in the three core areas. Table 12 lists the full range of training modules of the MCA-funded Conservancy Development Support Services (CDSS) Project with a budget of U$9.1 million operating from 2010 to 2014.

38 While “training” is generically singular, it was commonly referred to as “trainings” by conservancy members who are continuously being trained by NGOs. Hence, the plural will be used as it is highly expressive and offers an important insight as to how local people perceive the constant expose to training workshops and ongoing requirement to be trained.
### Table 12: CDSS training modules and technical assistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Technical Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional Development and Governance (total of twelve training modules)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance—constitution development/revision</td>
<td>Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOM management</td>
<td>Financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management committee training</td>
<td>Management planning and implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder communication and relationship management</td>
<td>Staff management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender awareness training</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public speaking and presenting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy and legislation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution planning and benefit sharing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservancy framework/management plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Business and Tourism (total of six training modules)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic business</td>
<td>Basic business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism awareness (for staff)</td>
<td>Financial sustainability plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism awareness (for members)</td>
<td>Tourism joint-venture development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism joint-venture development</td>
<td>Legal technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism SME product development</td>
<td>Tourism SME product development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism guiding</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Resource Management (total of ten training modules)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event Book system</td>
<td>Event Book system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game count</td>
<td>Management planning and zoning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game value</td>
<td>Natural resource management rules and regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quota setting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game utilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human wildlife conflict management</td>
<td>Human wildlife conflict mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management planning and zoning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wildlife biology/behaviour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural resource management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Trainings are complemented by on-site technical assistance to ensure that “new knowledge and skills are transferred and adapted into enhanced committee and staff competencies” (MCA Namibia 2011a:6). Under project personnel the CDSS Inception Report lists a total of 14 “specialists” (“project hub and home office staff”), 23 “field-based consortium staff” and 16 “potential short-term consultants” (MCA Namibia 2011a). The CDSS project coordinator for the Zambezi Region explained that the development of “very specific training manuals”, as well as having an actual training centre, has taken NGO support provision to “a different level”:

For the first time, it just established a kind of *standard* which hasn’t been there before. […] Historically, these kinds of workshops and training had been done under trees at some campsite, you know. With the development of these manuals and the way that we structured it in Caprivi, it has become something that is seen as *valuable*— not just another opportunity to be away from home and be around people and get what you call training and have something to eat. (Interview 30)
Standardised trainings are delivered as part of project requirements but conservancies can also request trainings or technical assistance when a shortage of skills has been recognised. Training needs are also identified as part the annual planning exercise. As mentioned in the literature review, apart from Snyman’s (2012) study where conservancy members mostly identified “training” as their NGO’s main support service, there has been no systematic research on conservancy members’ perceptions of and satisfaction with NGO support. NGO staff explained that training contents are often designed based on need assessments. Referring to the CDSS project, several field- and Windhoek-based NGO employees heavily criticised the standardised training modules for not accommodating conservancy-specific needs:

We [MCA] have developed these things. It doesn’t matter if conservancies need it. I think that some of their trainings for me sometimes were very ridiculous. Go and train somewhere where people have already had trainings. Try do some other trainings? No! If your compact says you needed five trainings, it’s five trainings. (Interview 14/NGO director)

Volume and value of support to conservancies, in-kind or financial, differs substantially. Older, more established conservancies that are considered self-financing “graduated out” of receiving grants and financial assistance from NGOs to cover their operational costs. Contrary to that, young and emerging conservancies still need “100% support” compared to established conservancies “which need maybe 25%” (Interview14/NGO director).

In line with the scholarly tendency to repeatedly point towards the same CBNRM success stories, Namibia has created its own “conservancy flagship collection”. Here, high-yielding joint-venture partnerships, high wildlife quotas and good (financial) governance are the most common recipes for success. The MCA donor report refers to three high-income generating conservancies in Kunene as “the Big Three” (MCA 2012:28). Halstead’s comparative analysis of five conservancy enterprises in Zambezi finds that “some have been highly successful, while others are in various stages of decay” (2003:8). One of her findings is that external support by NGOs is a key determinant of business success. Similarly, Corbett and Jones (2000) observe that committee members of conservancies that received considerable NGO support have a better understanding of their role and the importance of accountability compared to conservancies receiving no external support. The fact that Namibian conservancies receive highly unequal NGO support—in-kind and financial—has been largely overlooked. Jones is an exemption pointing towards the “danger that ‘elite’ conservancies will be formed”

39 The duration of trainings differs considerably. While game guards indicated that they attended a number of one-week workshops on natural resource management per year, institutional governance and management trainings for other staff and committee members reportedly took place more often but lasted only a day. Assessing the actual contents and anticipated outcomes in terms of capacity building for different projects and the didactics employed in the training delivery by different support NGOs was beyond the scope of this research project. Although training modules have been standardised, several interviewees indicated that there is considerable variation in the delivery based on individual capacity of the trainer. One consultant commented that “often conservancy committees and staff are showing more capacities than some of the [field-based] NGOs”. (Interview 9)
receiving “five-star NGO and donor support” (1999b:iii-iv, also Sullivan 2002, 2006) while others are left alone. The CDSS project supported 31 conservancies, less than half of the conservancies registered in 2010 when the project commenced. Tourism potential was the principal selection criterion by the donors:

They [MCA/donor] focus on conservancies that have low-hanging fruits. That’s the word they used all the time. The ones already making strides, so they can grow the cake for them […] The selection was their own. We did not partake. I was so pissed off because they didn’t put the Erongo and some other southern conservancies. We were excluded because of vested interest. 31 conservancies based on their criteria. (Interview 14/NACSO director)

There is absolutely no equity in the way that we support conservancies. What IRDNC tries to do is that we’ve invited conservancies from the other areas at a minimal cost […] At the end of the day the conservancies with the most economic potential have been the ones that received the most support. (Interview 25/IRDNC director)

Neither NGOs nor MET had a say in the selection process. The MET area warden in Zambezi complained that MCA would “pump in grants close to 5 million [N$]” into conservancies which already have high-yielding tourism enterprises. Contrary to NGOs always only supporting identified target sites, the MET serves all Namibian conservancies. Asking the MET warden in Kunene why ≠Khoadi //Hôas is considered a success story, he got noticeably irritated:

No conservancy is better than another one. Except how they are marketed or whether they are favoured by certain NGOs which place them higher than the other ones. The only problem I have— the donor grants are not distributed fairly among the conservancies. […] ≠Khoadi //Hôas got millions and there are conservancies in Kunene South which didn’t even get a cent […] Ja! Ja! [shouts] They flew in the people here, they flew in the people to Torra [another “flagship” in Kunene] but other side? If you see BBC and National Geographic, you always see ≠Khoadi //Hôas and Torra and elephants and you believe that elephants are only in ≠Khoadi-=//Hôas and Torra [laughs]. But as a government officer, I don’t have a choice whether these conservancies have enough resources or not, I have to serve them. […] It’s like promoting the unfair game and refer the people that this one is the best one. Later on these guys which we leave now behind will become the problems and poaching and all this stuff will come in. […] If I was in the position, I would have told them [NGOs] leave these guys, they’re now good. Go to this area a, b, c, d and if you don’t, then you leave. (Interview 7/MET warden)

The next section assesses the underlying organisational and governing structures and actual CBO composition. The fact that NGOs are mandated to provide training to ensure a constant skill base within conservancies will be emphasised as it presents an important interface of CBO-NGO interaction.
4.6 The Relationship between Consumers and Providers of CBNRM Projects

4.6.1 People and Institutional Structures in Community-Based Organisations

A conservancy consists of different groups of people: members from the community are the constituency group. Elected individuals on the conservancy management committee (CMC) are tasked to govern the conservancy whereas paid employees run the organisation on a day-to-day basis. The 79 conservancies registered in 2013 have a 30% share of female CMC members, 12% of conservancies have a female chairperson and almost half (49%) of conservancy treasures or financial manager are females (NACSO 2014). CMC members do not receive a salary except for a “sitting allowance” of approximately N$200 per day when attending meetings, workshops etc. The three crucial institutional components of Namibian conservancies are an elected CMC, a legal constitution as the conservancy’s fundamental law spelling out the rights and responsibilities of members and the governing CMC (see Table 13) and the annual general meeting (AGM).

Table 13: Rights and responsibilities of conservancy leaders and members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conservancy members’ rights…</th>
<th>…and responsibilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right to vote at every AGM; Access to all relevant documentation (financial, policies etc.); dismissal and re-election based on poor performance of CMC members;</td>
<td>Knowing the constitution; Compliance with the constitution; Reporting misconduct to CMC and/or MET.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMC rights …</td>
<td>…and responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit distribution, opening/managing accounts, appointing, supervising and dismissing staff, decision-making on staff contracts</td>
<td>All decisions must conform with constitution and shareholders vote at AGM; Financial reporting and budgeting; Supervising accounting of area committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⇒ The CMC cannot amend agreed upon budgets, contracts, policies etc. without majority approval at AGM.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on the constitutions of ≠Khoadi //Hôas and Wuparo Conservancy

Jones and Murphree underline strong internal legitimacy where “ideally membership and jurisdiction are self-defined” (2001:44) as the precondition for the external legitimacy of conservancies as strong units of collective proprietorship. Corbett and Jones (2000) question the extent to which constitutions are actually developed and understood by communities. Asking a field-based NGO on the original process of constitution development he commented:

When the legislation came out and they started to gazette conservancies, I think, no I don't think—I know—there was a template that was made and sent out to all of the newly gazetted conservancies. And they were told ok, this is your template. You need to take it to your communities and figure out what do you want in your constitution. How do you wanna change the template? I don't know if there was a facilitator for that process or not. But so a lot of the conservancies just—they didn't do that. They just took the one that was given to them and they gave it in in and said well this is our constitution. So it stayed the same. (Interview 10/field NGO)
The AGM is the highest decision-making platform in the conservancy. The CBNRM policy specifies the holding of the AGM as a key “repeating obligation” (MET 2013:9) to ensure ongoing compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. Here, members have the mandate to approve—or disapprove—all essential plans such as the annual budget, capital development plans, purchases of assets and the benefit distribution plan. Furthermore, they authorise operational policies and general guidelines and procedures and need to give their consent to zonation plan, utilisation and allocation of wildlife quotas. For a “successful” AGM, the constitution usually details the quorum of members necessary to participate from different conservancy areas. Typically, different conservancy areas are represented by an elected area representative who automatically serves as CMC member. Below the AGM are area meetings where the different CMC representatives are tasked with feeding back information to members as well as bringing area concerns to the attention of the CMC. Informed membership is one of the underlying principles:

The AGM is really where it all happens at the conservancy level and if you have a good AGM […] the members walk away a hell of a lot more happy about everything and they are informed and they know where their money as members is going. (Interview 10/field NGO)

At a conservancy meeting in early 2014 in Zambezi, the CDSS project leader reported that only ten out of the 31 target conservancies held successful AGMs. The top three future challenges NACSO (2014:11) identifies—governance capacities, effective decision-making and “wise leadership”—are all directly linked to the abilities of CMC members. Especially poor accountability and financial (mis-) management were the key concerns from NGOs, government and CBO interviewees alike (see also MET 2013). Child et al caution that “floating committees” (2011:49), weakly linked to their constituency, can lead to a “re-centralisation” of power at conservancy level. If not further specified in the constitution, the actual composition of the CMC and qualifications necessary are often not prescribed and “much is left to community initiative and choice” (Corbett and Daniels 1996:8). An NGO field director complained about the weak or non-defined election procedures as per conservancy constitutions:

They just grab anybody on the road. You are a member of the conservancy. There you are—a treasurer. You haven't managed even 10,000 but now we are talking of thousands and thousands. So now you mismanage 20,000. At next year’s AGM they tell you out. Janet [anybody new] comes in. What is Janet going to do? She doubles the amount because there was no procedure. (Interview 26/director field NGO)

Constitutions generally make provision for the inclusion of at least one representative from the traditional authority, acting as advisor for the khuta, usually without the right to vote. Term times for serving as a CMC member average two to three years with different provisions for re-election as per conservancy constitution. Consistency and continuity of CMCs, especially in view of increasingly complex business ventures, presented another principal concern for NGOs. Members regularly use their right to dismiss CMC members mostly on the grounds of
financial mismanagement. In several instances, entire CMCs were fired at the AGM, leaving the new leaders with no experience and skill on how to govern the complex organisation. NGO field staff expressed their utter frustration with constantly having to retrain CMC members “from the scratch” since the ones who just got fired are “angry, walking out with all their skills and all their documents” (Interview 25/NGO director Zambezi Region) hence there is often no handover. The MET deputy director stated that the practice of firing entire CMCs is something he wants to “correct” in his region as it is far too costly in terms of lost skill and necessity to retrain (Interview 23).

Apart from voluntary CMC members, conservancies have paid employees. As per the constitution, the committee has the power to appoint and dismiss staff and therefore basically acts as their employer. Countrywide, a total of 656 permanent staff are on their payroll, 80% of them are game guards, averaging seven per conservancy (NACSO 2014). This work is traditionally dominated by males, explaining the overall low share (26%) of female staff members. Every conservancy essentially starts with wildlife monitoring through game guards in order to receive their first wildlife quota from the MET.

Conservancies are using the Event Book\textsuperscript{40} system, the main work and monitoring wildlife tool for game guards. Often from different conservancy areas, they patrol by foot, bike and donkey cart on fixed and casual routes. Considering that the game guards are the actual backbone to conservancies’ core objective of wildlife conservation, there is surprisingly little research about them. Somewhat symptomatic of the Namibian CBNRM success story, whenever game guards are quoted, it is to report conservation achievements.

The remaining staff group consists of different, mainly office-based positions such as bookkeeper, enterprise officer and liaison manager. The number of posts and their actual job description are determined by the conservancy and can differ considerably. A “fixed” position is that of the conservancy manager. It is a crucial position since s/he is the connecting link between staff and CMC as well as all other involved actors such as support organisations and joint venture partner(s). Whereas “adaptive management” is frequently stressed being the basis for “successful implementation” (Breen 2013, Jones and Murphree 2001, Child and Barnes 2010), again, there is virtually no mentioning of the significance of the manager’s role per se in the CBNRM literature. The manager’s job description at ≠Khoadi-∥Hôas states:

As the most senior employee of the Conservancy [the manager] provides efficient management of the affairs of the Conservancy including management of personnel, assets and business contracts of the Conservancy. To ensure that decisions of the AGM, Extra-Ordinary AGM and Management Committee are implemented (≠Khoadi-∥Hôas Conservancy, no date)

\textsuperscript{40} Initiated by scientists of supporting NGOs in late 2000, the Event Book constitutes the conservancy’s annual monitoring report, audited by the MET. Game guards collect, analyse and report on events such as poaching and problem animal incidents as well as systematic monitoring (Stuart-Hill et al 2005, 2006).
During formal and informal interviews, conservancy managers described themselves as the “gearbox” or “brain and heart” of their conservancy. Contrary to CMC members, the manager is a paid employee, working full-time for the conservancy. Since the turnover of CMC members is likely to be higher than that of managers, they are also an essential component to the critical condition of continuation and stability of conservancy operations. Private sector partners defined the manager position being “critical” as they are their key communication point of all business-related (contracts, finances etc.) enquiries. In view of the increasing complexity of especially the older, more established conservancies, the general qualification of grade 12 education is not likely to be sufficient to fulfil the high requirements managers need to live up to. A Zambezi field NGO stressed that mostly “managers don’t have enough qualifications to run the show” (Interview 29). In case individuals do have or acquire the necessary skills through extensive NGO trainings, a typical manager’s salary of approximately N$2,000 is far below what one could earn working for the government or private sector. A Kunene-based field NGO commented that “in general managers are underpaid and therefore not motivated” (Interview 10). As NGOs are heavily investing in training managers, a crucial future challenge will be to keep them from moving on to “greener pastures” once they have skills and qualifications. Various NGO workers expressed their frustration about skilled conservancy employees “being poached” by a private company able to pay more attractive salaries, often in urban areas. The director of NACSO explained:

The problem is, you build that capacity and, after a few months, people have gone out, to be employed in lodges […] Then they are calling us in again to retrain other people. (Interview 14/field NGO)

Figure 7 proposes to differentiate the structural features of CBOs discussed in this section by breaking them down into the three vital dimensions of people, procedures and purpose. Distinguishing people on the basis of their actual task (rotating committee members that govern versus permanent, paid employees that run conservancies) enables a more focussed discussion of the actual workings of the CBOs.

**Figure 7:** Unpacking community-based organisations

Source: Author’s own illustration
Procedures are considered the hardware of the conservancy. A lack of clarity and systematic analysis of constitution building, election procedures and qualifications and measures of transparent financial management could be discerned. Considering purpose and direction of conservancies, there is the valid question whether CMC members are political leaders or, in actual fact, business leaders in the sense of a board of directors. There seems to be high ambiguity in the question about purpose. The proportionately high turnover of CMC members and voting based on e.g. personal preferences, family ties and tribal representation may suggest that the CMC is understood as a vehicle for member participation and representation:

This is a community project whereby they elect a committee. The community, at the AGM, they will stand up and say that what you are doing good and that what are you doing bad. They stand up and say: Come on move out of the door because you have eaten enough! (Interview 26/NGO director)

Or are conservancies more like social enterprises in communal areas? Considering “the economical-managerial logic of conservancies” (Pellis 2011:141), the CMC would be the main body to ensure consistent business leadership and governance of the income generating community enterprises. The fact of the matter is that with conservancy maturation, the business side is becoming increasingly complex. In the context of people, this would imply that the manager and CMC members are capable of strategically managing multi-million dollar (social) enterprises.

4.6.2 (In-)Dependence and Interdependence

“Persistent and consistent ‘light touch’ facilitation” (Jones 1999b:iii) has been extensively promoted as the “right” approach from supporting NGOs (Child and Barnes 2010, Jones 1999a, Jones and Weaver 2009, Koch 2004). Jones and Mosimane explicate that “communities may be ‘nudged’ into taking action, facilitators are not taking decisions on behalf of communities” (2000b:11). In order to ensure “correct implementation of systems”, the CDSS project report advises deploying monthly “‘dripping tap’ technical assistance” (MCA Namibia 2011a:35). Schiffer arrives at the conclusion that “NGOs did not dictate what conservancies had to do, funding was seen as a strong incentive for deciding according to the priorities of the NGO” (2004b:159). Within NGOs there is an overall high awareness of the intervention–dependency dilemma:

We become quickly gate keepers. Gate keepers of ideas. Gate keepers of direction. Gate keepers of priorities. Gate keepers of information. And I think we have to be very careful of that. That our role is to just share knowledge and understanding […] If we want growth and involvement and maturity, then people must go learn themselves. We can only provide the best type of information possible to then back up their decision as much as possible. And if they always make a wrong decision you need to think about how you are advising. So it's a fine balance and again—it's facilitation. And again, I’ve used that before, it's the light touch or the heavy touch and I think one should always verge on the light touch. (Interview 13/NGO CBNRM specialist)
NGOs may intervene in “wrong” decisions. Child et al stress that the Naye Naye Conservancy’s poor performance was due to “non-essential expenditures” such as high employment, for example, paying too many game guards too high salaries. Deemed “more of a social welfare mechanism than an investment decision” by their support NGO, the LIFE project report recommends this financially unsustainable practice “to be reversed” (2001:65).

NGO employees categorically answered that they would not get involved in “conservancy politics”. Nevertheless, several statements suggested that support NGOs do interfere, albeit “in the interest of” the community. A former senior IRDNC employee referred to a situation where the conservancy decided to lease their community campsite to a “dubious” South African safari operator. To stop them from “making a mistake” NGO staff went “to see the chief” who then prevented the deal from happening (Interview 13). Corbett and Jones remark that conflict resolution between conservancy members, usually left to the khuta, may be “complicated by the fact that some NGOs, which might be able to play such roles, already have an existing working relation with one of the parties thus opening themselves up to a charge of bias” (2000:17).

At the same time, this shall not create the impression that conservancies are submissive and generally compliant or somehow externally managed by NGOs. Enquiring if conservancies are rather active or passive in coming forth with training requests, NACSO’s director comments:

Communities are not passive. They used to be, but are not anymore. I think they are the ones that drive us crazy [laughs]. I should use that. Crazy! I mean they just call and they want this service and they want that service. Even if you tell them: I’m short on resources, I don't have funding, I cannot do a, b, c and d. (Interview 14/NGO director)

She continued to explain that sometimes there is “pressure from clients”—conservancies—complaining about field NGOs “not performing”. A CBNRM consultant remarked that “often conservancy committees and staff are showing more capacities than some of the [field] NGOs” (Interview 9). The sometimes low skills of field advisors have been pointed out several times. IRDNC’s director recalled that an employee was dismissed due to repeated complaints from the conservancy. This supports the view that especially older, more mature conservancies are in fact experienced and savvy consumers of NGO support services.

As per institutional framework, CBNRM support NGOs are mandated to assist conservancies (MET 2013). The Zambezi MET warden, referring to ongoing, “heavy” NGO assistance with financial auditing, lamented that conservancies sometimes “don’t even appreciate the NGO support” but rather take it for granted (Interview 22). Furthermore, he described a situation where conservancy employees would refer him to IRDNC—their principal support NGO—when he requests certain documents during on-site visits which have to be accessible at the conservancy office. One year after the first conservancies were registered, Jones states that “external support needs to be such that communities are able to
wean themselves off it” (1999a:300). Halstead stressed the problematic nature of combining long-term commitment from supporting NGOs and “the reliance this might create” (2003:15).

4.7 Conclusion

The review of the Namibian CBNRM programme illustrates how wildlife conservation is the overarching theme. It is both starting point and motor for ongoing income generation to conservancies. As such, the Namibian case resembles typical pre- and post-independence approaches to wildlife where poaching and slaughter to (near) extinction has been followed by conservation tactics based on commercialisation through consumptive and non-consumptive tourism (Botha 2005). Since the 1980s, the Namibian CBNRM programme made a remarkable transformation from monitoring wildlife through community game guards to institutionalised resource user units (Jones 1999a). Over time, many conservancies further evolved into complex business entities. Despite being an overall well-researched national CBNRM programme, systematic analyses of the actual workings of CBOs per se have been largely superficial or absent altogether. “The conservancy”—much like “the community”—needs to be further differentiated to allow for a more meaningful assessment. In this context, the three principal dimensions of people, procedures and purpose were proposed.

The key outcomes of this chapter relate to the thesis’ research focus as follows: Despite CBNRM’s objective of social and economic development of previously disadvantaged black Namibians, the structural dualism that characterises the post-independence Namibian society is also reflected in community-based conservation on communal land. (1) Structurally and institutionally, traditional leaders are basically excluded from conservancy management and decision-making, apart from one representative on the CMC—who has no right to vote—there is no formal interface. However, despite their de jure powers considerably weakened after independence, their de facto powers over communal area affairs may still be extensive. Section 4.2 and 4.3 showed that differing degrees of traditional leaders’ authority are likely to correspond with the different regimes of indirect and direct colonial rule north and south of the Red Line. Especially in the northern territories traditional leadership is still considered to be rather powerful (Düsing 2002, Hinz 2008, Silva and Mosimane 2014). Of key relevance to CBNRM development is that the duality of customary law for communal land and statutory law for private land prevents communal area residents to hold formal titles over “their” land. Entrusted with the authority over land allocation, traditional leaders can seriously delay or even stall conservancy development. (2) Furthermore, insecure leaseholds present a hindrance to private sector investments on communal land (Amoo and Harring 2010) which is seen as one of the biggest obstacles for tourism investors (Massyn 2007). Tourism, overall white-owned and industry-driven, presents another form of dualism when declared a livelihood strategy for the
rural poor who mostly engaging in subsistence farming. Not only spatially but also in terms of experience and skill, communal area residents are far removed from the workings of the tourism industry. (3) As a consequence, conservancies have been relying heavily on NGOs to enable joint-venture partnerships. Contrary to other core CBNRM activities such as wildlife management, there has been no corresponding development of resources and expertise within the relevant ministries. As such, NGOs are the sole providers of technical support and facilitators of joint-venture tourism partnerships. (4) Highly uneven NGO support to conservancies is largely determined by their economic tourism potential based on the occurrence of wildlife. The older and so-called target conservancies especially enjoyed substantial financial and in-kind support. As a result, conservancies with high-yielding tourism lodges create regional tourism hotspots while other communal areas which have not received the same level of support are excluded from this source of income.

The assessment of the CBO-NGO relationship shows that its key interface is the ongoing provision of trainings and technical assistance. Here, the growth of the programme is “a major logistical and intellectual challenge” (Child et al 2001:49). After more than two decades of large-scale funding, the “big” donor money is phasing out, at the same time, the number of registered conservancies is steadily increasing. While it is generally accepted that continuous support creates long-term dependency (Barrow and Murphree 2001, Lapeyre 2010, Newmark und Hough 2000, Sebele 2010) the findings of this chapter suggest that CBOs matured into experienced and demanding consumers of CBNRM support services. As per CBNRM design, NGOs are mandated to assist conservancies who may perceive those services as free and taken for granted. The reliance of conservancies on their support NGO to retrain new CMC and staff members illustrates this dependency dilemma. At the same time, NGOs have a keen interest to safeguard conservancy “success stories” as they basically serve as a yardstick for the effectiveness of their support.
CHAPTER 5: #KHOADI //HÔAS CONSERVANCY CASE STUDY

5.1 Introduction

The ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy is considered one of the flagship conservancies in the Namibian community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) programme. It boosts the only 100% community-owned tourism lodge in the country and, instead of receiving support from one dedicated non-governmental organisation (NGO), it is the only conservancy which determines the process of sourcing different services from a number of NGOs by itself. The objective of this case study chapter is to deconstruct the success story by illustrating how disproportionately high financial and in-kind support was and is systematically driven by staff and committee members who emerge as sophisticated consumers of CBNRM projects as well as NGOs who heavily promote—and protect—“their” flagship.

In order to explore the dependent relationships and contingent conditions between the community-based organisation (CBO) and their supporting NGOs, the chapter is organised based on the following structure: To establish a sense of place, the case study begins with an introductory story of the daily routine at the conservancy office. The appreciation that ≠Khoadi //Hôas is a particularly well-organised conservancy is a salient characteristic of this case which will inform consequent descriptions and arguments throughout the chapter. The conservancy-specific introduction is followed by a short overview of typical features of Kunene Region and the Damara people, representing the largest group in the region.

The remaining sections all tackle CBO-NGO interaction and its causal relationships. By means of differentiating the distinct development phases of the conservancy since the late 1990s, it is shown that, regardless of being deemed “mature” and “financially self-sufficient” by their supporting NGOs, ≠Khoadi //Hôas continues to receive extensive trainings and technical assistance. Drawing on the aspect of being exceptionally well-managed, the chapter further unpacks the specific CBO structures and the different groups of people behind them. By means of portraying several crucial positions such as game guards, manager and committee members, the significance of NGO trainings to maintain CBNRM knowledge becomes evident.

The community-owned Grootberg Lodge features prominently in this case study chapter as it serves to illustrate several key issues: the strong controversies within the Namibian NGO scene as to which is the “right” joint-venture partnership model, their corresponding levels of CBOs’ expose to associated risk and, in the case of the Grootberg model, the substantial technical assistance from NGOs required to safeguard this unique ownership structure. Based on the insights into CBO structures and ongoing NGO support, the chapter is concluded by highlighting the different dimensions of dependent relationships and how they relate back to the research questions.
5.2 Introducing the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy

5.2.1 Environmental Shepherds

Every workday morning during my two-week long stay, my host Hilga, manager of the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy, and I left her house in the small settlement of Grootberg and walked to the conservancy office. On our way, we passed the tents of the eight game guards, each from one of the eight conservancy areas. During the week, they stayed in their temporary home in Grootberg village, weekends were spent with family. Their workday at the conservancy starts at 8:00am sharp with singing and prayers, followed by a group discussion of current matters and actions to be taken. Most issues I observed during my stay related to human-wildlife conflicts. Incidents of livestock losses and growing elephant populations raiding crops and destroying water pipes heavily increased. One #Khoadi //Hôas field worker explained that “human-wildlife conflict with elephants [is] increasing to a point where I can feel the frustration of the community in area meetings” (Interview 10). Both conservancy and NGO representatives pointed out that the growing human-wildlife conflict presented the biggest future challenge faced by the conservancy.

At #Khoadi //Hôas, game guards are called “environmental shepherds”. Asking them what they like about their job, they responded “being out in the field”, “conserving and protecting our wildlife” and “our elephants”. They explained that they chose this job because they were against poaching, describing themselves as the new generation wanting to pass on the legacy of wildlife conservation. As in most conservancies, environmental shepherds represent the biggest staff group. At #Khoadi //Hôas, there is remarkably little fluctuation; most environmental shepherds have been working here between six and nine years. The apparent pride they took in their work was striking! Hence my confusion when the two female shepherds shook their heads when I asked them if they wished for their children to follow in their footsteps. No—they wish for better jobs for their children. Physically hard and sometimes dangerous work for a below minimum wage salary being a game guard is no popular job. Jones (2006) also points towards their difficult position as they are community members on the one hand and anti-poaching watchdogs controlling their neighbours on the other. #Khoadi //Hôas’ field-NGO, serving various conservancies in the region, voiced great concern about game guards’ reluctance to get out in the field and how this jeopardises the fundamental CBNRM condition of wildlife monitoring:

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41 At #Khoadi //Hôas, they earn between N$700 and N$800. In 2014, the minimum wage for “agricultural employees” was raised to N$3.70 per hour plus an additional allowance of N$400 (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2014), thus a 50 hour week equals a monthly salary of N$1,140 (U$90). The median wage for other “unskilled work” is N$2,500 (U$195) (Namibian Economist 2015).
One of the biggest challenges that we are facing in southern Kunene, and I think conservancy programme countrywide, is that game guards don't go out and do their work as they are supposed to. They are supposed to go out on patrols, they are supposed to do, you know, anti-poaching kind of methods and really just get out into the field and do their work. In the other conservancies that I work with it’s been a real challenge to try to support them to do that. There is only so much you can do really, you can't force these guys out of their houses and go and do their work. (Interview 10/field NGO)

Asking an environmental shepherd why at #Khoadi //Hôas, they actually work so well, she answered: “We like our work very much and we help each other” (Interview 5a). “Supporting each other” was a recurring answer: “We help and learn from each other, we never fight” (Interview 5b). The field-NGO attributed their outstanding work ethic to the role of the conservancy manager:

Hilga has the respect of the game guards. They go and do their patrols, they fill in their Event Book properly which in turn is reflected in Event Book audits and quota setting. So the ministry guys, when they come, they have a look at this, they see wow #Khoadi //Hôas is actually doing the work! Their guys are out in the field, they are reporting poaching incidents, they are reporting human-wildlife conflict and that's one of the things that make it a really well-run conservancy. (Interview 10)

Fortunately, my visit coincided with the Event Book audit by the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) which determines the annual game quotas. On the day before the audit, my enquiry as to how the shepherds prepared for this important event prompted a relaxed “we don’t have to prepare for tomorrow, all books are ready”. Special preparation only took place by means of slaughtering an oryx the evening before, the meat being evenly distributed among all conservancy staff members. On the actual day, I could not discern any changes in the routine—just like every day, the conservancy office was spotless, everybody arrived early, wore their uniforms and carried their individual Event Book bag. About ten large folders labelled “Event Book”, “Human-Wildlife Conflict” and “Natural Resource Management” were brought from a room entirely made up of large shelves holding all the conservancy documentation.

Various people participated in the audit: ten conservancy staff (eight environmental shepherds, the environmental coordinator and the manager), five conservancy management committee (CMC) members, the MET area warden and the auditor from the ministry, one NGO representative from the Namibian Association for CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO) and one for the donor (Millennium Challenge Account—MCA). CMC members attending the audit is an unusual practice, at #Khoadi //Hôas however, novice CMC members are always encouraged to join this key event to understand its procedures. Initially lined up as spectators, they were asked to sit next to the shepherds as they started reporting figures from their books.

42 As mentioned in section 4.6.1, the national Event Book System constitutes conservancies’ core resource monitoring tool. Each game guard has its own individual Event Book where she collects information such as game counts and incidents of human wildlife conflict.
The manager opened the meeting with singing and prayers; she specifically thanked the CMC members for attending. This was followed by a short introduction round of everybody present. The MET auditor then gave a short summary of the recent performance of Event Book audits by stressing the poor performance of conservancies in Kunene South. He emphasised the area being all red (failed audits) and “people not showing up for audits”. #Khoadi //Hôas has a record of positive audits, the last “bad audit was in 2006, before Hilga, because the books were only half-completed” explained one shepherd. Over the next hours, all different Event Book categories (for example problem animals, predators, poaching, mortalities) were reported as each environmental shepherd specified her monthly figures from their Event Books. Apart from numerous technical terms used in English, the meeting was conducted in Afrikaans.

Towards the end of the audit, the previous matter-of-fact tone changed due to a disagreement over the accurate way of reporting data collected on “fixed routes”\(^{43}\). The MET auditor was critical that fixed routes were not reported in the right format, the manager objected that this category had always been reported this way—exactly the way her staff had been trained by NGOs. The rather fiery debate lasted over 30 minutes. The MET auditor kept bellowing at the shepherds, their eyes fixed to their books. The NGO and donor representatives, both quite junior, listened silently. Essentially, this argument was fought out between the MET auditor and the manager who made clear that she did not accept the denunciation for incorrect reporting—she stressed that they did exactly as they had been trained by NGOs and had been doing so for years.

During lunch, I chatted with the MET warden who explained that this issue arose because NGOs would advise communities without consulting MET first. This, he said, confused communities who then “don’t know what is right”. In contrast, two environmental

\(^{43}\) The Event Book distinguishes “fixed routes” and “casual routes”, however, both determine wildlife population estimates and identify trends of wildlife development and mapping.
shepherds lamented during the formal interview that although the NGO would always invite MET, their representatives rarely attended trainings and meetings. Asking them what type of support they received from MET, they responded:

We don’t receive any trainings from MET, only from NGOs […] It’s NGOs that come and ask us what sort of trainings do you need but MET guys, they don’t come to us. They can also come and teach us the Event Book! (Interview 5a)

We get all trainings and all knowledge from NGOs. I did not know when I meet a lion, how is the behaviour of a lion and what types of plants are good to eat and when it’s good to go and drink water. We did not even know these kinds of things. (Interview 5b)

Still at an early stage in my field research, it struck me how interviewees automatically equated “support” with “trainings”. In the following weeks, it would become clear that this was a common thread amongst conservancy representatives in both case studies. The second quote unveiled another denotation I would encounter often from now on: all “CBNRM knowledge” comes from NGOs.

Later that evening, my host was still very clearly upset about the alleged reporting error and, apparently even more so, about the conduct of the MET auditor “lacking respect”. She was enraged that he neither acknowledged the effort of the CMC members to attend (“they never show up but they show up here”) nor that he recognised that the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy “was always green” and had successful audits in the otherwise red Kunene South area. He scared and intimidated her staff, she continued, despite her telling him that “some of them are slow but he will not listen”. More generally referring to the ministry, she condemned MET for “always blaming others”. She echoed her staff’s sentiments by reinforcing that “it is always only NGOs who support us” while MET representatives “often skip meetings” to which they were invited by the NGOs. “They do not like the NGOs” she concluded.

On the day of my departure, we arrived at the conservancy office a few minutes after eight. As we approached the building, I could hear loud chanting. The environmental shepherds had already started carrying on with the daily routine—a last demonstration of the efficiency of the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy office.

Figure 9: Fifteen years of conservancy documentation

Source: Author’s photograph
5.2.2 A Short History of Place, People and Their Environment

#Khoadi //Hôas is one of the first four conservancies established in 1998. Located in the Sesfontein constituency in Kunene Region, the closest larger towns are Kamanjab and Khorixas, several settlements within the conservancy are connected to them by one major gravel road that circles the area. The conservancy has approximately 3,600 members. According to the constitution (#Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy 2008), people who are born or reside permanently (minimum 2.5 years) within the boundaries of the conservancy can register for membership. The gazetted area comprises 3,364 square kilometres (NACSO 2012a), the eastern border is mostly privately owned and fenced commercial farms. Apart from smaller direct borders with two tourism concession areas (Etendeka and Hobatere) and Etosha National Park, the southern and western borders are shared with other conservancies.

Map 6: Map of the #Khoadi//Hôas Conservancy

Source: NACSO 2012a
Map 6 illustrates the major different zoning areas which have been demarcated to reduce conflicts between different users. The lion’s share is multiple use and farmland including a no hunting area towards the north east where a comparably high number of settlements are located. The scenic Klip River area is both an exclusive tourism and core conservation area; in 2007 the MET reintroduced black rhinos, eland and black-faced impala which “have significantly boosted the value of the area for tourism” (NACSO 2012a:8). Adjacent are two more wildlife zones, one for trophy hunting and one multiple use area. Celebrated for its desert-dwelling elephant population in particular, #Khoadi //Hôas counts more than 80 mammal species, some of them endemic, such as the Hartmann’s mountain zebra. Common predators are the lion, leopard, cheetah, spotted and brown hyena (NACSO 2012a).

“#Khoadi //Hôas” means “elephants’ corner” in Damara-Nama Khoekhoegowab language (#Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy 2008). Believed to be inhabited by the Damara for centuries, today they constitute the largest group in the conservancy area, together with other ethnic groups including the Nama, Herero and Ovambo. Contemporary Damara and Nama groups have been related to being “descendants of an early Khoekhoen migration into Namibia” (Lau 1987:4 cited by Sullivan 1998) from northern Botswana. Historically, the Damara have been suppressed by more powerful groups as slaves and bounded labourers (Rohde 1993). Their oppression coupled with the political turmoil of German colonisation and diseases such as rinderpest had a disastrous effect on Damara land and livestock—and the manner in which they have been portrayed (Sullivan 1998). With reference to the so-called “Kalahari Debate” Rohde highlights the problematic Damara identity as accumulated negative indigenous and colonial discourse conceptualising them as: “a melting pot of an ancient underclass, a proto-type of the rural proletariat, an historically disempowered, dispossessed residual cultural category” (1997:7). Positive Damara imaginary is essentially built upon their adoption of Western modernity, for instance by embracing Christianisation, education and obedience to higher authorities. Nevertheless, “the ‘culture of poverty’ narrative persists as the main prop for a problematised contemporary Damara self-image” (Rhode 1997).

The conservancy territory of today was profoundly shaped by the two colonial administrations. Appropriated by German farmers in the late 1800s, most of the land was then owned under freehold tenure. In 1964, the South African Odendaal Commission created the

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44 Contrary to “conventional” wildlife sanctuaries in protected areas, communal area conservancies include domesticated animals—livestock farming constitutes one of the principal livelihood strategies for the rural population. Allowing people to continue both livestock farming and subsistence agriculture clearly distinguishes CBNRM from protected “wildlife only” areas. Also, this was a key feature to secure local peoples’ support for communal conservancies. While there is no limitation on the amount of privately owned livestock, there is a clear restriction on its movement. The establishment of a zoning plan is a legal requirement for a communal area to become a registered conservancy. Map 6 clearly indicates “Farming – Multiple use” and different “Wildlife” zones.
Damaraland Native Reserve\textsuperscript{45}, many of the older generation(s) who still reside there today were forcibly resettled in the new “Damara homeland” (DRFN 2003, Jones 2006). Remote, dry and inaccessible, the country’s northwest was neglected by the colonisers. However, Sullivan argues that, because of this, former Damaraland was “spared some of the larger excesses of control” (1999a:259) by the foreign rulers. Located south of the Red Line (cf. section 4.2.2), the Damara “homeland” was administered through “second-tier authorities” consisting of a South African commissioner and “present functioning rulers” (Odendaal Report 1964:93), that is traditional leaders. The then leader of the Damara Council, “veteran chief” Justus //Garoëb, who became paramount chief in 1982 and king of the Damara in 1994, exemplifies how government and traditional leadership politics are deeply intertwined. //Garoëb entered “official” politics when he became the leader of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1989. Focal points of the UDF’s party programme are land reallocation as well as health and education systems and agricultural development. //Garoëb stood for the presidency three times winning most votes from Damara speakers in the Khorixas and Sesfontein Constituencies (Tonchi et al 2012). The Traditional Authorities Act of 1995 does not allow simultaneous tenure of traditional and political office, leaders like //Garoëb were given one year to choose one post. Opting for the latter, Düsing notes that leaders who resigned from traditional office are likely to “still be accepted as legitimate traditional leaders by their communities” (2002:190).

Topographically, the semi-desert conservancy area is characterised by the flat, sandy highland plains of the Grootberg Plateau, mopane savannah and acacia grass (Vaughn and Katjiua 2002). Extreme aridity combined with an exceedingly spatial and temporal variation of rainfall (between 240 and 300 mm) is the key determinant for various interrelated environmental challenges such as prolonged periods of drought and resulting food shortages, desertification, deterioration of grazing pastures and intensification of human-wildlife conflict (Jones 2006, NACSO 2012a). Of course, this also has severe social-economic implications. Settlement throughout the region is ultimately determined by water availability (Sullivan 1998). Two seasonal rivers, the Hoanib and the Huab, pass through the area, however, water resources are mainly subsurface (DRFN 2003). Taye (2008) indicates that there are 641 households on conservancy territory dispersed in a scattered settlement pattern close to artificial water points in groups of approximately five families. The water points are shared among residents, livestock and the growing wildlife population. Again, human-wildlife conflict, especially elephant damaging water pipes, increases at an alarming rate (Vaughn and Katjiua 2002)

Namibia’s poorest constituency, Eupupa, is located in the far north of Kunene (Government Namibia 2015:7). Material, employment and education deprivation in the Sesfontein constituency is disproportionately high relative to the rest of country (UNEP 2012).

\textsuperscript{45} For this purpose, three existing reserves (Otjohorongo, Fransfontein and Sesfontein), state land and 223 commercial farms bought from white farmers were merged (Rhode 1997).
Aridity is the “fundamental constraint on productivity” (Sullivan 1999a:259). With 87% of the former homeland territory being semi-desert, poor soil makes crop farming extremely difficult, large-scale livestock farming is considered rather problematic too (du Pisani 2000). The majority of residents live on a subsistence existence based on farming livestock. Albeit extremely unevenly distributed, “wealth is mainly stored in goats around Grootberg” (DRFN 2003:12). Apart from its economic value, the social dimension of livestock is equally important. In this context, Sullivan (1998) emphasises distributional patterns of livestock through extended kinship relations as an important social fabric. Similarly, a study by the Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DRFN 2003) stresses the strong social networks of reciprocity between ≠Khoadi //Hôas’ subsistence farmers.

Although livestock farming is the backbone of the regional economy, today’s Damara population in north-west Namibia has diverse sources of income and subsistence. Sullivan (1998) specifies the main sources of cash income as formal employment, payments received by farm labourers, state pension as well as various informal income-generating activities. Drought relief (Sullivan 1999a) and remittances from family members working in larger towns (DRFN 2003, Taye 2008) are additional sources of subsistence. Taye describes employment opportunities for young people living in ≠Khoadi //Hôas being “slim to none” (2006:20), the majority of wage-earners are middle-aged and employed by the government or working as teachers. The fact that various CMC members are teachers (Taye 2006) emerged as a key theme and was almost ritually cited by different NGO workers (Interview 9, 10, 14, 25) as well as during an informal conversation with a MCA donor representative as ≠Khoadi //Hôas’ recipe for success.

**Figure 10:** Interview with the chairman in his schoolroom

Source: Author’s photograph
5.3.1 Conservancy Formation and Support Coordination

Structural data coding unveiled two recurring themes with regards to conservancy formation: the previous existence of another local CBO and the determination of a small group of individuals who were key drivers of the formation process. The Grootberg Farmers Union46 (GFU), formally founded in 1990 but operating in the area since the late 1970s (Taye 2006) to represent farmers’ interests and pool resources, already had a self-governing body, elected among the farmers “long before the conservancy was even conceived” (Interview 2/CMC member). Sullivan describes the mushrooming of local agricultural unions in the 1990s as “an emerging regional and local power” (1998:43) which basically filled the post-independence vacuum of a strong regional public sector representative (see also Rohde 1993). However, due to its lack of funding, the GFU could only offer in-kind benefits to its members. The 1992 Policy on the Establishment of Conservancies in Namibia and subsequent policies on wildlife utilisation were quickly recognised by the GFU as a means to generate more direct financial benefits to farmers as well as the wider community.

Previous publications already acknowledged the significant role of the GFU in establishing the conservancy (Boudreaux 2007, Jones 1999c, 2006, NACSO 2012a), where their relation is “described locally as that of parent and child” (Jones 2003 in Jones 2006:8). The current chairman described the farmers’ association as “the driving force behind everything” (Interview 2). The GFU, already well-known and “trusted by the people” (Interview 3) actively promoted the new conservancy concept. The first CMC appointed in 1998 was mostly made up of core GFU committee members:

The chairman who has been on the Grootberg Farmers’ Association at that time became the chairman of the conservancy. You know, their secretary also became the secretary here. He just took the same position [here] from the farmers’ association. (Interview 4/former manager)

Although most research accounts portray the strong overlapping of the two CBOs as entirely positive, Schiffer (2004b) challenges the fact that an already powerful league of more affluent farmers dominated the emerging conservancy. Most interviewees emphasised that the two organisations “split up again” after this first CMC term time. However, to this day they share an office building in Grootberg village and continue working together “on a variety of land use issues” (NACSO 2012a:8).

46 The organization was initially called Grootberg Farmers’ Association (GFA). While Grootberg Farmers’ Union is the official name now, it is still being referred to as “the farmers’ association” by most residents.
Figure 11: Signpost for #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy and GFU office (with the prominent Grootberg Mountain in the background)

Source: Author’s photograph

Apart from the role the GFU played, “the enthusiasm of the community” (DRFN 2003:16), more specifically the commitment from a small group of individuals stood out. Both former and current manager, as well as the longest serving environmental shepherd, repeatedly described themselves as “founding members” and “builders of this conservancy” back in 1996/1997. For almost two years, they “walked all over” to demarcate conservancy boundaries and to register boreholes and farms, work they recalled being “extremely hard”. The biggest challenge, however, was to promote the idea of living with wildlife to the people, the former manager explained:

So we go around and we registered the people. We talk to them, we tell them about the good news. Not very good for some people because if you are in the area where you have got wild animals, like the elephants, you have cheetahs, you have leopards, you have lions—and these animals are causing damages. Peoples’ life is also cheated, some people have been killed and are still killed and people lost livestock. And you come and you tell them: Listen we are going to have a conservancy and you are going to benefit from the conservancy, we’re going to make a lot of money. And lastly you said but you have to stay together in harmony with these animals […] They said, oh I’m sorry, the first part was good but the last one I didn't like. So can you take your head and leave my house […] Some are aggressive, they will just tell you no, no, no, no! I won’t listen! Now go away. Leave my house. Finished! But you come back and you come back and you come back. It takes us about two years because we start with nothing [laughs]. Nothing! (Interview 4)

In vivo coding (cf. section 3.4, essentially a form of verbatim coding to extract terms—and ultimately meaning—generated by the research subjects themselves) revealed a remarkable consistency of the idioms “mobilising the people” and “grabbing opportunities”, the latter was the main response to the enquiry what actually drove their commitment. When I asked the director of NACSO why she thinks #Khoadi //Hôas received disproportionately high shares of donor money and what made the conservancy become this “donors’ darling” she recalled their
determination in terms of wildlife management which was essentially their first coordinated CBNRM activity:

But they had no income and we were very surprised that they still continued—embracing conservancies—even though there was very little income and they have highest human-wildlife conflict issues. And they are still embracing it. (Interview 14)

The literature confirms that the actual formation and registration processes of the conservancy happened with very little NGO support (Jones 2006). The very fact that this is highlighted, points towards its uniqueness. However, this is not to say that the establishment of the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy happened without any outside support but rather that the lack of stable NGO support in these early days is unusual. Instead of “conventional” NGO assistance, the community received considerable direct assistance from two Fulbright American scholars (Tim Abbott and Vivian Laberge), funded by the MET through grants from the Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) Project (Jones 2006). In essence, the two Americans functioned as consultants, they introduced wildlife counting and monitoring systems, provided support for institutional development and governance and drafted essential documents such as the constitution and land use and management plans with the emerging conservancy.

Another distinct feature of the ≠Khoadi //Hôas case is the adoption of the Forum for Integrated Resource Management (FIRM) approach which was basically inherited from the GFU and significantly shaped the manner in which NGOs would support the conservancy. As a cooperation between government, NGOs and local CBOs, the donor-funded Namibia’s Programme to Combat Desertification (Napcod) had partnered with the GFU in 1996 to pilot a model for integrated livestock and wildlife resource management called FIRM (Taye 2008). Since the early 1990s, the GFU had received support services from four different donor-funded projects, operating simultaneously, they were perceived as lacking in coordination between the responsible agencies (Murphy (2003) criticises the poor harmonisation of support services between different agencies). One conservancy interviewee described a situation “where the right hand didn’t know what the left hand was doing” (Interview 4). Hence, the main objective of the FIRM approach was to better align support services and avoid duplication of different trainings and technical assistance offered by government and the various emerging NGOs in the area (DRFN 2003). Kruger et al (2008) outline how the FIRM approach soon expanded from the GFU to the newly established conservancy as it began to gather its own string of NGOs, the manager explained:

Previously, NGOs were just coming in and doing whatever they wanted. But later we decided that we have to form an approach whereby all organisations come around a table. At that time it was WWF, NNF, Sardep, GTZ. (Interview 1)

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47 These projects were Namibia’s Programme to Combat Desertification (Napcod), Sustainable Animal and Range Development Programme (Sardep), Communal Area Water Supply (Caws) and Living in a Finite Environment (LIFE) by the WWF (DRFN 2003).

Many interviewees stressed that FIRM helped them to make it clear to NGOs what they actually did and did not need. Using this approach, the following routine was established: the various supporting NGOs, conservancy staff and CMC members would come together and draft the annual work plan. Once established, training and technical assistance needs were identified, prioritised and allocated to the respective NGOs (Taye 2008). As such, FIRM was a key mechanism through which the conservancy requested and received NGO support. Initially deemed “an ideal testing ground for the FIRM approach” (DRFN 2003:16), #Khoadi //Hôás eventually became a “demonstration site for most newly established FIRMs” (Kruger et al 2008:294). The approach shaped the course of #Khoadi //Hôás’ CBNRM development path and vice versa, thus FIRM as a feature uniquely associated with this Kunene conservancy often surfaced during interviews:

#Khoadi //Hôás has always been a special case because it has never had a permanent supporting agency. They’ve always had FIRM where they bring in expertise as they see needed. So it’s not like Torra [another Kunene conservancy] or Wuparo that has a mother NGO living next to them. Like IRDNC permanently helping them. #Khoadi has never had that so it’s a very ad hoc, needs-based approach. (Interview 9/CBNRM consultant)

The “ultimate goal” to “successfully apply the FIRM approach in other areas, within and outside conservancies” (Schachtschneider et al (2002) cited in DRFN 2003:16) has only been realised partially—#Khoadi //Hôás is the only Namibian conservancy that has applied it effectively. One other example where a similar model has been used is the Uibasen Twyfelfontein Conservancy, also in Kunene. NACSO’s director explained why the initially efficient model was discontinued: “They had one business person [a conservancy staff member] that did everything, once that person moved, everything fell apart” (Interview 14).

### 5.3.2 Phases of Conservancy Maturation

**Phase I — From Heavy NGO Support to Financial Self-Sufficiency**

In the first years after registration, #Khoadi //Hôás concentrated its efforts on wildlife management. Several interviewees pointed out that NGOs provided small salaries to environmental shepherds to “keep them going” (Jones (2006) mentions this too, it is basically standard procedure for emerging conservancies). Conservancy representatives frequently stressed that then, there was nothing and they could not do anything without NGO support:

At the start, there was nothing. We went to Windhoek often, we request the NGOs to assist us. (Interview 1/manager)

We could do nothing without donor funding. Nothing! Nothing at all! So that time, we have been resting on their [NGOs] shoulders. (Interview 4/former manager)

During the first four years, the conservancy had no income despite a hunting agreement signed in 1998. Granting rights to one trophy hunting operator, it had been signed by the committee “too hastily” with “no outside advice or facilitation” (Roe et al 2001:23). Drawn up in favour of the operator (exclusive rights and no advance payment for quotas), the
conservancy lost out on potential income when their contractor did not undertake any hunting activities. To secure a better deal in the future, a workshop was organised under the LIFE programme in 1999. No income translated in no benefit distribution to members. Keeping the community “on board” during this time is usually achieved through considerable external financing. In the first few years, the conservancy “benefited from generous financial and material support” (Taye 2006:23), #Khoadi //Hôas in particular

has also benefited from additional institutional development trainings on issues of financial management, office administration, record keeping, hospitality and tour guiding, roles and responsibilities of CMC members, as well as fundraising techniques such as proposal writing […] Environmental shepherds have also been trained to do regular monitoring and recording of the status of wildlife, rangeland, livestock and any other relevant resource related conditions in the conservancy through the Event Book. (Taye 2006:24)

Although Taye’s research asserts that ordinary conservancy members experienced “limited to no capacity development intervention” (2008:90), interview data challenges this. In particular, knowing your rights as a member and mitigating human-wildlife conflict were pointed out a number of times as early lobbying activities by NGOs, one of the founding members recalled:

The thing was also to teach the people on the ground, the conservancy members. To learn about the constitution, about conservation, about finances, about, you know, communication. […] Human-wildlife conflict it will never ever go away as long as we exist but how are you dealing with it. You cannot solve it but there must be a way how you can make everyone happy. So that’s the type of trainings they [NGOs] provided. (Interview 4)

In line with Taye’s finding that conservancy staff receive “the majority of the training” (2008:89), it became apparent that certain individuals accumulated an exorbitant volume. Training certificates received by the #Khoadi //Hôas’ manager covered an entire wall in her office, her colleague laughed out loud saying “she might give you a bag full, you can make a booklet from all the certificates”. He estimated his own trainings account totalling “about hundred and thirty trainings, some of them I don’t even know” (Interview 4). Dividing an estimated 130 trainings by their 14-year involvement since inception (where both individuals held different staff, CMC and lodge employee positions) equals an average of eight trainings annually.

Despite continued efforts to assess the overall value of support services received, I did not manage to produce a trustworthy estimation for several reasons: Apart from the four major LIFE programme phases detailed in the previous chapter, there were various other projects funded by different donors and administered by the dense Namibian NGO network as well as consultant agencies. Also, the differentiation between financial and in-kind support, and pricing the latter, in particular, is problematic. Although a limited number of articles provide figures on individual projects funds49 to this specific conservancy, research reports usually quote total

49 N$294,000 grant from the Game Product Trust Fund (GPTF) cited by Sullivan (2002:170); N$300,000 from the first LIFE programme phase, N$108 480 from LIFE II (Jones 2006:9).
grant values distributed to target conservancies. Asking senior NGO staff, active in CBNRM for at least a decade, to make an educated guess resulted in friendly but firm replies that one could not possibly estimate this—every time I asked, I felt like I had stepped upon rather sensitive ground.

#Khoadi //Hôas’ chairman described the early period as one where one “could pick and choose NGOs”, at the same time, he underlined that the substantial financial support “phased out after the first five years and then the conservancy popped in with its own money to pay its staff and so on” (Interview 2). The conservancy has not received financial donor support since 2003; based on its annual game quota, trophy hunting then generated the majority of revenue. After five years, #Khoadi //Hôas was considered “mature” and “self-sufficient” (Taye 2008:96).

Phase II — Enterprise-building

Table 14 lists development milestones of the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy. In terms of tourism development, 2005 is considered a momentous year as both tourism enterprises, Grootberg Lodge and Hoada Campsite, opened. In the following, the Grootberg Lodge joint-venture agreement will be focused on as it illustrates the continuous intense involvement of NGOs in the evolution of the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy.

**Table 14: #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy development milestones**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Formation of the Grootberg Farmers Union (GFU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>GFU adopts the Forum for Integrated Resource Management (FIRM) approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Registration of the #Khoadi//Hôas Conservancy in June</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint-venture partnership with private hunter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Implementation of Event Book Monitoring System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Grootberg Lodge opens (as joint-venture partnership with EcoLodgistix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hoada Campsite opens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Black rhino reintroduced to communal land by Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>MET awards rights to Hobatere Tourism Concession to #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Revised hotel management agreement (HMA) with Journeys Namibia (formerly EcoLodgistix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Board of directors for Grootberg Lodge established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Tender put out to find a private-sector partner for new Hobatere Concession joint-venture</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on NACSO (2012a)

NACSO’s director explained that

What actually brought NGOs back—it’s the business side, their lodges. […] They called us and said we need some help here, we don’t have the skills, we don’t have the know-how. So this is where we came in. (Interview 14)

The contractual Grootberg agreement between the conservancy and the private sector partner EcoLodgistix was developed as part of the EU-funded Namibia Tourism Development
Programme (Shikongo et al 2012). The consultant who had been hired by Deloitte’s Emerging Markets Group to advise on the project recalled that the specific location in the westward Grootberg Pass mountain range came out as a priority site based on a physical study and other criteria such as market potential and “conservancy readiness” (Interview 9). A senior NGO staff put it more bluntly “they had to spend some big money quite quickly and so that’s why we got Grootberg [Lodge] there” (Interview 13). As per original agreement (five-year contract signed in 2005), the operating company EcoLodgistix would receive 15% of gross turnover as a management fee, another 15% of gross turnover went into the conservancy’s account. The remainder would be used for lodge maintenance and to invest in further infrastructure (Jones 2006, Lapeyre 2011a). Using one of the more polite comments, this original contract was called “very naïve” in that it was essentially a simplified agreement that profits would be shared 50:50 between the conservancy and the operator, however, there was no clarity who would pay for assets. By 2008 the relationship between the joint-venture partners was under severe stress: “It [the contract] was so badly developed, that’s what really caused the tensions and the blow-up.” (Interview 13) The Progress Report on Grootberg Lodge Agreement by the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) (internal conservancy documentation) referred to loopholes in the initial agreement; the biggest issue of concern to the conservancy was that Grootberg Lodge was not generating the income originally indicated. The CMC, not even understanding the way in which finances were reported (Interview 1), then requested NACSO and WWF “to take up matters with their lawyers”. WWF’s tourism business advisor became the key figure who mediated between the two groups. Contrary to most NGO staff, he has a private sector tourism background in his native U.S.A.

When Keith came along, he picked this case up and then introduced— He sorted this contract out, brought it across to a hotel management contract and that’s where it stands. (Interview 13)

In 2012, WWF explained the details and financial implications of the new contractual agreement of the Grootberg Lodge Pty Ltd to the conservancy. The hotel management agreement (HMA) is basically structured on the outsourcing of management, marketing and reservations functions to the operator who earns a set fee per month and a performance bonus if agreed targets are exceeded. The conservancy is 100% shareholder; it has full ownership of the lodge and carries both assets and operations. Furthermore, the conservancy acts as landlord, providing the operator with permission to occupy the area, in return they receive a monthly fee of N$ 30.000 plus a 1% increase annually which is in principal the equivalent of a rental fee for the land. Not all EcoLodgistix partners accepted this. As a result, two of the original partners

50 ≠Khoadi //Hōas received a grant of N$4.5 million for the lodge (MET 2010) and secured a loan. The private sector partner estimates total “accumulated” MCA funding for Grootberg Lodge to be around N$10 million.

51 Lapeyre (2011a) provides a detailed socio-economic analysis of the original Grootberg Lodge partnership where he identifies high operating costs/insufficient turnover and deteriorating communication between the joint-venture partners as main problems.
formed a new company, Journeys Namibia, and signed a new— the current— joint-venture contract in early 2013. The duration of this agreement is nine years and eleven months with the option to renew. I met the #Khoadi //Hôas’ chairman and manager together with their joint-venture partner for the first time in early 2013 in Windhoek at a workshop organised by NACSO/WWF. During this and various subsequent meetings, both sides consistently referred to their relationship as “very mutually respectful” (Interview 8/operator) and “very strong” (Interview 2/chairman). The manager emphasised that now, their partnership is based on trust and openness and that, thanks to the new HMA, they “know the revenues now and we know how to negotiate with the operators” (Interview 1).

Figure 12 (cf. section 5.4.1) illustrates how the joint management committee (JMC), the main channel of communication between operator and conservancy, is integrated into the #Khoadi //Hôas’ governance structure. NGOs frequently attend monthly JMC meetings in an advisory capacity to the conservancy. In 2013, a board of directors had been appointed consisting of three CMC members (chairman, vice chair and treasurer), two operator representatives and two newly appointed independent advisors, “a hard-powered lawyer” and a “Namibian tourism expert” (Interview 8). The operator stated:

Having proper board meetings and discussing things on a professional level has just escalated the operations to a completely new level. Having those other two independent professionals on board has hugely assisted the conservancy in terms of insight, in terms of what they need to be looking at. (Interview 8)

Again, it was WWF’s tourism advisor who brought the two industry professionals on board, the operator also described the NGO “being instrumental” in receiving a loan from the Namibian Development Bank for their next endeavour, the Hobatere tourism concession, adjoined to the conservancy in the north. NGOs “fulfil a huge function” in mobilising joint-venture agreements the operator explained, simultaneously she pointed towards the “massive lack” thereof from government. Journeys Namibia reports their quarterly financial results to the WWF “just that they are in the loop and they can track it and they almost act as quiet guardian in that sense” (Interview 8).

**Phase III—Consolidation**

After more than a decade after its inception, #Khoadi //Hôas affirmed its mature status by holding successful annual general meetings and MET audits. The 2013 *Natural Resource Management Performance Review Questionnaire* (internal WWF document) attests the conservancy best possible results in seven out of twelve categories (for example category “committed staff to protect natural resources”=excellent), the remaining are all well above average. #Khoadi //Hôas has three established income-generating tourism and hunting enterprises. At the time of research, the lodge employed 47 staff from the community, five people work at the community campsite; with about 65% pre-booked occupancy for the next year Grootberg Lodge “superseded all expectations” (Interview 8/operator).
NACSO’s director beamed with pride pointing out that #Khoadi //Hôas has “graduated now from aid money going into loans” (Interview 14), thus making it the first conservancy a bank has lent money to (MCA 2013b).

At this stage, they can fly on their own. (Interview 12/NGO)
They are on their own now […] They invite us to their AGM. (Interview 14/NGO)

Irrespective of the above assertions that the conservancy is fully independent, it continues to receive in-kind support in the form of annual planning sessions for budgets, trainings and work plans, mainly from the Namibia Nature Foundation (NNF) which constitutes their main supporting NGO with a field presence in Khorixas. WWF continues to advise on the HMA. This type of support falls under the umbrella of more focussed technical assistance. Interaction with the supporting NGOs is mostly channelled through the conservancy manager who communicates via email. A CMC member described the present frequency of CBO–NGO interaction as “quite a lot, many times” (Interview 3). Environmental shepherds said that they receive about five trainings, each lasting three to five days, per year. Every single interviewee rated training contents and delivery very highly.

Table 15 serves to exemplify one support service package the conservancy received from the Integrated Community-Based Ecosystem Management Project52 (ICEMA) project. Although it clearly demonstrates the strong focus on technical assistance for tourism enterprise-building, it also shows that ten years after its inception, the apparently well-organised and, at least, financially, self-sufficient conservancy continued to receive considerable “general” administrative and managerial support.

Table 15: Terms of reference for consulting services from the ICEMA project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technical Assistance (TA) to #Khoadi //Hôas conservancy:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Compilation of operational policy document that covers:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Staffing and human resource management;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Vehicle and asset management;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Code of conduct for both staff and committee members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Finalisation of benefit distribution policy;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Support with clarification of the status of the exclusive wildlife area;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Assist with development of funding proposal for the envisaged upgrading of Hoada campsite and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Support with Hobatere joint venture negotiations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Internal document 2008, #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy

At the time of research, the NNF field-NGO stated that he had delivered various training modules of the Conservancy Development Support Services (CDSS) project detailed in section 4.5.2. In particular referring to #Khoadi //Hôas, he criticised that this “block project” had been “slapped onto every single conservancy” where he had to deliver an exact amount of

prescribed days. He complained that there was no flexibility in terms of allocation and contents of trainings:

They want every conservancy to receive gender awareness training [laughs]. There is a woman manager at #Khoadi /Hôas, there’s women game guards, there’s women sitting on the committee and we are now told to deliver gender awareness training regardless. And that to me is, to put it frankly, bullshit. (Interview 10)

With regards to community benefits, essentially the rational why rural residents would support wildlife conservation, the manager specified income for 2013 from the three enterprises as follows: N$395,000 Grootberg Lodge, N$35,000 Hoada Campsite and N$100,000 trophy hunting, totalling N$530,000. For the financial year 2013, the WWF reported N$2.2m in “pure benefits” (job creation/salaries to lodge staff, payments to the conservancy/monthly lease fee) from Grootberg Lodge, making it the highest yielding join-venture in Namibia. Being the only community-owned lodge in the country, another N$2.6 million in net profits makes it the first conservancy to actually achieve earnings. Earnings are used to pay off the N$8 million loan (all figures shared by WWF staff during interviews). Once repaid, WWF staff predicted “significant earnings” (Interview 13) and eventually “unbelievable money coming in for social development programmes” (Interview 12).

Despite #Khoadi /Hôas’ textbook CBNRM evolution, benefits to the community continue being modest. Apart from repaying the loan, the conservancy has significant overhead costs. Benefits were distributed for the first time in 2002, the compulsory (as per CBNRM policy) benefit distribution plan was drawn up with the support of the Rossing Foundation, another CBNRM support organisation. As per approved benefit distribution plan for 2012/2013 (internal conservancy document), a total of N$61,500 was dispersed as follows:

- Human-wildlife conflict: 30,000
- Pensioner soup kitchens: 7,000
- Schools: 5,000
- Traditional Authority: 5,000
- GFU: 5,000
- Field fire: 5,000
- Conservancy area admin: 4,500

It is notable that the majority of declared community benefits are in fact a form of wildlife endurance subvention combined with damage control: members pumping water for elephants receive diesel at a 50% discount, “benefits” also entail rewards for water point construction for elephants and compensation to water point committees for elephant damage (Jones 2006, Taye 2008). The case of #Khoadi /Hôas shows that income generation and financial business viability cannot automatically be translated into individual household benefits.

53 These include salaries but also running costs of the office, vehicles and other equipment as well as per diems and other allowances. The burden of high running costs of conservancies resurfaced numerous times.
5.4 People and Institutionalised Structures of the Conservancy

5.4.1 The Conservancy Management Committee

The ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy is governed by the elected CMC consisting of 16 people, see Figure 12. The conservancy consists of eight areas, each represented by one elected representative. Another six candidates (chairperson, deputy-chairperson, treasurer, deputy-treasurer, secretary and deputy-secretary) are elected at the AGM, the remaining two CMC members are one representative from the traditional authority acting in an advisory capacity only (having no vote), and one member of the Women’s Desk. In addition, there are general meetings and area level meetings chaired by the respective area representatives; feeding information down to members and bringing their issues to the attention of the CMC is one of the key responsibilities of area representatives (≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy 2008). The secretary of the CMC explained that the complexity of information in certain conservancy policies makes it difficult “to comprehend what the meaning of the idea of the document is” (Interview 3). Thus, certain CBNRM terminology, in particular legal terms that do not translate into native Damara-Nama language, could only be “deciphered” with the help of external support organisations. Similarly, the manager said that she would request NGO support when CMC members did not understand the meaning and implications from their CBNRM policy documents.

Figure 12: ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy structure

The Woman’s Desk was established as part of the FIRM approach (Kruger et al 2008). It was deliberately not tackled in this research, as it does not constitute a central point of CBO-NGO interaction. Generally, the mere existence of the Women’s Desk underlines that, contrary to the still rather dominant patriarchal social organisation in Zambezi, women’s rights and representation are more advanced in Kunene (Colpaert et al 2013).

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CMC members draw no salary, for meetings and NGO trainings they receive a sitting allowance of about N$200 per day\(^{55}\). A committee term is five years, members are eligible for no more than two consecutive terms. Again, #Khoadi //Hôas is unique in that they have only ever had two chairmen, most conservancies have shorter terms averaging two to three years and thus correspondingly higher turnover of CMC members. The current chairman had already served two terms and been re-elected in 2012 after he had to pause one term: “The management of the conservancy will always have one of those old horses, I was out here and again back.” (Interview 2/chairperson) Although several NGO interviewees underlined “the tremendous value of consistency” (Interview 13) in conservancy leadership, previous research identifies two problematic issues relating to #Khoadi //Hôas manifestation of CMC powers: uneven representation of areas and distance between the CMC and their ordinary members.

Map 7 shows the eight conservancy areas, the two biggest settlements, Anker and Erweë, host the majority of the conservancy population and have a clinic and school. Since inception, the conservancy office has been located at Grootberg station in the Estorff area, sandwiched between Anker and Erweë. Taye’s (2008) research illustrates the problem of favouritism during CMC elections resulting in localised power centres. The above-mentioned 2012/2013 benefit distribution plan for instance stipulates that “only schools at Erweë and Anker will be eligible for benefits from the Conservancy”. Interviewing farmers, Taye found that six out of eight complained that CMC positions and related job opportunities mainly benefited the old farmers’ union network centred in Anker and Erweë:

> We only have 5-6 people going from Condor for AGM and those from Anker go in a bunch. So Anker people only elected their own, that’s why you have the chairman, the vice chairman, the treasurer, and vice treasurer from Anker. Our headman was elected on the last election just because those from Anker knew him from the farmers union’s days so they favored him. (Taye 2008:127 quoting a Condor famer)

\(^{55}\) Sitting allowances provoke great controversy: On the one hand, CMC members are expected to devote much of their time for a common good. Taye (2006:33) reasons that “executive positions” conflict with CMC members’ real life duties, many of them work as teachers for instance. The current amount of N$200 should be at least doubled according to the manager. On the other hand, sitting allowances eat up a considerable amount of the budget and thus reduce benefit distribution to members. On a more subtle note, during an informal conservation with Carol Murphy (CBNRM researcher since the 1990s) she questioned: “Why is it called ‘sitting allowance’? It should be called ‘decision-making allowance’”.

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As a consequence of the biased representation, the CMC makes decisions on behalf of the entire community without actual consultation (Jones 1999a, 2006), yet again this transpires into a lack of interest and involvement by the underrepresented (Schiffer 2004b, Vaughan and Katjiua 2002). Essentially, this dilemma reflects the acknowledged CBNRM challenge of inclusiveness of and participation in community organisations with a bigger membership base (cf. section 2.4). NGO support, albeit unintended, is likely to have accentuated this gap. CMC members and conservancy staff are seen as the “experts of the conservancy” in possession of “the institutional memory of the conservancy” (Taye 2008:90).

The skewed CMC representation was never questioned by NGO interviewees, rather #Khoadi //Hōas’ consistent governance was praised. My own observations during the MET audit confirmed the conservancy’s role model reputation. During informal chats at lunch, CMC members present explained that they had been elected recently and now they wanted to understand the important aspect of quota setting. Article 16 of the constitution *Transitional Process for the Conservancy Management Committee* (#Khoadi //Hōas Conservancy 2008:15) specifically makes provision for incoming and outgoing CMC members:

1. The outgoing Conservancy Management Committee shall, with no voting rights, be obligated to attend the first two meetings of the new Conservancy Management Committee in order to ensure swift handover and transfer of skills and knowledge;

2. The Conservancy staff, in conjunction with support agencies where appropriate, should provide an induction course and other training programmes for the incoming Conservancy Management Committee within at least six months of taking up their positions.
Asking the chairman of the conservancy, a teacher whom I interviewed in his classroom in Anker, if he would like to add anything to the interview, he stressed the significance of NGOs in terms of securing the CMC’s knowledge base:

In my personal view—we [CBO and NGOs] need each other. I don’t want to blow my own whistle too much but today you have got people with knowhow at our CMC and tomorrow you won’t have and then you will need NGOs for training, for capacity building once again. So we need each other. (Interview 2)

5.4.2 The Manager—“Hilga, the Glue of the Conservancy”

Comparing ≠Khoadi //Hôas to the rest of the conservancies that I work with, I would say that ≠Khoadi //Hôas is one of the, or is pretty much the best, the most well run conservancy out of all of them. This is largely due to Hilga [the manager] being very much on the ball, being very committed to what she does. Loving, really loving, her work and you know, Hilga having that kind of sense of—the respect of the people that work with her. Not the committee, because they don’t work with her, but the staff who are employed by the conservancy, the game guards. […] I think they are an example to the rest of the conservancies or she is an example to the rest of the conservancies. (Interview 10/field NGO)

Tackling the question of why ≠Khoadi //Hôas is commonly cited as one of the Namibian CBNRM success stories, Hilga’s persona was the underlying theme in virtually every reply. “She mobilised the community to a great extent to work together with the staff [environmental shepherds] when they are out in the field” (Interview 3/CMD member). “She listens to you, when you ask, she always answers. She helps you.” (Interview 5a/game guard) “She’s at least 65% of what happens there.” (Interview 8/operator) NACSO’s director resolved:

For me, I think she is just one of these icons that I have met. She has earned so much respect from the community. And they love her, they love her. (Interview 14/NGO director)

Contrary to the CMC, the manager is a paid employee working full-time for the conservancy. By contrast, there is potentially much more rotation and turnover of committee members, thus managers are considered an essential component to continuation and stability.

The manager is a full-time employee; the committee only comes once or twice a month. The manager who is there every day should advise the committee […] not drive the committee but initiate things for them to do. (Interview 29/field NGO)

Hilga explained that self-confidence and creativity were critical for her job:

Every Monday, I sit down and look and my work plan. I don’t wait for my committee to come and tell me what to do. I go and present my Excel sheets to them. If something needs attention of the chairperson, I need to call him and inform him. […] I have to go and do things on my own. I can do the books, they normally go directly from here to the auditors so there is no NGO to come and check. (Interview 1)

Born and raised on a local farm, Hilga is an acknowledged founding member of the conservancy. Her involvement dates back to pre-registration, when she had been extensively involved in lobbying for the conservancy idea, registering members and identifying the physical boundaries. In 1998, she was appointed vice-treasurer in the first CMC. She described that during a computer training “I was maybe a little bit faster than the others, so I grabbed this
opportunity” (Interview 1); she was appointed as liaison officer and then environmental coordinator supervising the environmental shepherds. “Getting a paid position got her out of the CMC” explained the chairman (Interview 2). When the conservancy manager position was advertised in 2007, Hilga applied. When new job appointments were discussed at the AGM, “the community said Hilga must become a manager because she is the one who started this conservancy—and the committee listened” (Interview 1).

At the time of research in 2014, Hilga shared a number of reasons why she wanted to move on now, the two critical factors being her marriage in 2012 (her husband was permanently based in Swakopmund, approximately 600 kilometres away), and her monthly salary of N$2,000 which she described as “very weak” and that it would be difficult “finding somebody doing all the work for that little” (Interview 1). The Kunene field-NGO also acknowledged that conservancy managers were underpaid and therefore not motivated (Interview 10).

Asking the various different conservancy stakeholders how they felt about Hilga leaving, their responses are best described as confused and perplexed, the shoulders of the environmental shepherds visibly sagged: “If a new manager comes it will be difficult but we must try.” (Interview 5b) The chairman prompted me to switch off the recording machine, then asked whether Hilga had shared her anticipated departure time frame with me. “We are going to have a serious talk about it this year”, he said, adding, “Hilga is the glue of this conservancy” (Interview 2). The joint-venture representative took a long time until she responded:

That's going to be a bit of a problem because she has been amazing. I mean she's just—she just kept the whole admin thing going there so I actually don't know. [Silence] Ja, I don't know, we—Possibly we could look at giving them an employee from the lodge. Someone that's good with administration because that is a hectic job and I mean she—her—Hilga, in terms of all conservancies out there, she is extraordinary, I tell you. Am sure you have also seen that in your travels [field research], I mean, flip that woman is a saint. She’s an honourable. She's got all her little ducks in a row. No, am not quite sure what's going to happen there and that is most probably a complexity waiting for— for the conservancy and well, possibly the business to a certain degree too. (Interview 8)

In the past, the conservancy had appointed two liaison officers, both of them left once they had gained skills through NGO trainings to work in better paid private sector jobs in urban areas. This exemplifies one of the principal dilemmas that NGOs are facing: once they have trained and heavily invested in individual community members, they often leave for greener pastures. NACSO’s director sighed: “We train them, we do everything! We create the Hilgas and the next minute—I’m going to Swakop, I have a job in this company.” (Interview 14)
5.4.3 #Khoadi //Hôas and their Traditional Authorities

Under the CBNRM policy framework conservancies receive conditional ownership over wildlife, however, traditional leaders are the legitimate custodians of the land (cf. section 4.3.2). The MET area warden confirmed that, during the early years of the #Khoadi-//Hôas Conservancy formation, the traditional authority perceived the new institution as a threat but “now with all the community education and information sharing and all these efforts from NGOs, now everybody understands his position” (Interview 7). At the beginning of the interview with one of the two female members of the /Gaio Daman Traditional Authority based in Anker, she explained: “It must be the traditional authority which has the mandate, the power. The conservancy is just the hand of the traditional authority as we are the custodians of the land.” (Interview 6) While initially, during formal and informal conversations with conservancy members, their relation with traditional leaders was, albeit unenthusiastically, described as “healthy”, land allocation eventually emerged as the most delicate issue disrupting their relationship.

Polite but persistent enquiries disclosed traditional leaders’ dissatisfaction with their share of conservancy benefits received (as per the 2012/2013 benefit distribution plan, the /Gaio Daman Trust Fund received N$5,000 directly paid into the traditional authority’s account). Conservancy representatives frequently stated that “the traditional authority wants higher quotas” (Interview 1), the younger generation of traditional leaders in particular was said to “want more and better things” (Interview 3); a typical example was a percentage of revenue from trophy hunting.

Article 13.1 of #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy constitution (2008:14) makes provision for traditional leader representation on the conservancy committee:

(d) One representative of the Traditional Authority which has jurisdiction over the land within the Conservancy and which shall have a written appointment letter;

(e) All members of the Conservancy Management Committee shall have voting rights, except for the representative of the Traditional Authority who shall be ex officio members.

Being the only CMC member without the right to vote, the traditional authority representative basically serves as mouthpiece between the two institutions, however, since the start of a new term at the 2012 AGM, there has been no representative. “I don’t know whether he doesn’t want or whether he is lazy—but he doesn’t attend CMC meetings.” (Interview 2/chairman) Bringing this up during the interview with a representative from the traditional authority, she explained that the new appointee is the chauffeur of the chief and therefore often not available. Still, she commended the “good way of communication” whereby “we exchange views in these meetings and that’s good relations that we maintain. The conservancy and the

36 Colpaert et al (2013) note that while many traditional authorities are “historically patriarchal” (2013:146) Kunene has a greater share of women serving as village headmen and in traditional authority structures.
traditional authority, they do not have any conflicts as far as I’m concerned” (Interview 6). Contrary to that, a CMC member explained that traditional leaders “do not stay to the full length of the meeting, they always have excuses. Then they go on and walk out. So there is always a tense atmosphere when we meet with the traditional authority.” (Interview 3) Comparing the two organisations, the chairman deliberated about the obscured workings of the traditional authority:

You need educated people even there in the traditional authority structure but the contrary happens. The conservancy is full of people of knowhow, people that are visionary, people that are proactive—and that’s why things look brighter on the conservancy side. The conservancy is having more meetings, is transparent, and it’s supported [by the community] where the TA is not that transparent. They don't give their reports timely, they don't have regular meetings. They are having a closed book.” (Interview 2)

Another CMC member’s comment made clear that, despite members not being happy, they had to respect the powers of traditional leaders.

What they want is what I do not know. Maybe they want the whole managerial ability of the conservancy? But we realise we must have the respect for them because they are on the part of the government. They act on behalf of the government. But the actions that we learn in speculations are that they hire out land for their own self-enrichment process and that poses danger and difficulties for the conservancy. (Interview 2)

Although the manager also repeatedly emphasised the “healthy relationship”, she was very concerned about the situation where traditional leaders allocate land to outsiders, regardless of conservancy zoning—and without consulting them. Another conservancy member vigorously condemned traditional leaders’ land allocation for income generation as it caused conflict between actual and relocated residents and it opened the door for illegal poaching. The fact that several members of the /Gaio Daman Traditional Authority resided in bigger towns like Otjiwarongo (ca. 250 kilometres away) and were, therefore, more removed from issues on the ground, further hampered communication. Keulder (2000:161) notes that traditional leaders’ jurisdiction is “confined to all his/her subjects irrespective of where they live”. Not surprisingly, communal area residents were not happy about this, as they saw no means to make themselves heard:

Now these big heads, the decision that they take, that goes directly from there to the government. We only get information from MET on how we should cooperate with the traditional authority.

Asking the traditional leader how she thought about NGO support, she stated that “their work here is very much needed, we really understand the importance of NGOs in mobilising and synthesising the community to become self-sufficient” (Interview 6). Actual interaction between NGOs and the traditional authority was confirmed to be slim to none. Likewise, the joint-venture partner stated: “I speak under correction but we have no dealings with them.” (Interview 8)

Conservancy members’ outspoken criticism of their traditional leaders left me somewhat puzzled. Contrary to Zambezi Region, where traditional leaders seemed to be highly respected by default and their actions rarely questioned—at least openly—#Khoadi //Hôas’
residents stressed that here, traditional leaders had to earn the respect of the people and “if you mess up you are not respected” (Interview 2).

**Figure 13:** The /Gaio Daman Traditional Authority in Anker

Source: Author’s photograph

### 5.5 Spheres of Interdependency

#### 5.5.1 Self-Esteem and Knowledgeability

“#Khoadi //Hôas is special—and they know it!” This was the quintessence of two short memos written onsite in an attempt to organise thoughts and observations made in relation to two conditions repeatedly encountered; that is self-esteem and CBNRM project knowledgeability. Conservancy representatives’ remarkable self-assurance recurrently surfaced when decision-making modalities between them and supporting NGOs were discussed:

- They can just come and sit in [during JMC meetings] and give some advice. If it’s *good* advice, we take it. (Interview 1/manager)
- Nothing has been imposed on us and we will not even allow something being imposed on us. (Interview 2/chairman)
- That thing of the NGOs deciding—it’s not in this area. We, we decide. Put it this way: We put the community in the driver’s seat and the NGOs are in the back. So we drive the car ourselves, all they do is—they put in some fuel you know [laughs out loud]. (Interview 4/former manager)

The CMC having all decision-making powers based on the mandate given to them from the community members was the consistent explanation as to how decisions are made. Also, it was emphasised that the CMC can “*turn* down the appraisals made by the NGOs” (Interview 3/CMC member). In this context, incidents where they “got frustrated” with their support
provider (or rather certain individuals within that NGO) and “called them to order” (Interview 2/chairman) were mentioned. One founding member explained how they would “go straight, knock on Chris Weaver’s [Namibian WWF programme director] door: Chris this is what’s happening, we are not happy with what this one is giving” (Interview 4). Furthermore, I regularly encountered confident and routinised elaborations as to what makes ≠Khoadi //Hôas a “success story”:

Based on the profile of the conservancy and based on our performance NGOs fell in love with this particular conservancy because the capacity, the willingness, the know-how, that people are having the diligence [...] We don’t know problems, we only know challenges, we easily accomplish something with those challenges. Our hard work, our commitment and our willingness to reach the top is what makes the difference comparing ≠Khoadi //Hôas to other conservancies. (Interview 2/chairman)

The other discernible condition relates to project knowledge and how this knowableability was used. Here, interviewees often employed constructs similar to if-then formulations: “Only conservancies that meet certain criteria are assisted. You cannot bring your side—you can forget about assistance” (Interview 2/chairman). One founding member commented: “Also they have criteria of what they have been looking for, so if you are going along, you start to understand these things.” (Interview 4). During my interview with the manager, I admitted that initially I found the dense NGO network somewhat confusing and thus asked how she navigated the conservancy through the jungle of different service providers:

I know what I can request at WWF, I know what I can request at NACSO […] If you need something you request and when you get something you have to report. And that’s why NGOs mostly like this conservancy, we are working closely with them whenever we need something, we contact them. (Interview 1)

“If NGOs run out of money and leave tomorrow—how would this affect ≠Khoadi //Hôas?” Again, responses to this enquiry echoed self-assurance based on the tenor:

We will not sink without NGO support. (Interview 2/chairman)
We will still survive without NGOs. (Interview 5a/game guard)

Here, two principal answer patterns became evident. Firstly, several staff members (especially environmental shepherds and the manager) reasoned that they were not dependent because they were able to train new staff themselves. Secondly, formulations like “being creative”, “coming up with new ideas” and “grabbing opportunities” (Interviews 1, 2, 4) were repeatedly employed to emphasise the proactive, conservancy-driven attitude. The following quote from the manager summarised these sentiments:

Once MCA phases out, the NGOs won’t be able to help conservancies. We are already in that position, I can give trainings, I train other conservancies already in finances and admin and so on […] There is no fear for me when the NGOs phase out, I cannot sit and wait for somebody. While I’m here, it will not be a problem. I know how to manage our staff, control our assets, working closely with my committee and with my members, I have no fear. (Interview 1)

Remarkably, the chairman stated that, in fact, “NGOs will struggle at the end of the day but somebody will support conservancies”, at the same time, he stressed the need that “we must get rid of dependency syndrome” (Interview 2). There were, however, also opinions that clearly
reflected dependency thinking:

We cannot do without them. If they pulled out, that would be catastrophic, definitely. [...] Khoadi //Hôas is in a position to struggle on for a while but, as I say, if the NGOs pull out there will be a lack, a deficit which will place an additional burden on the management of the conservancy because there are instances where the skill, technical knowhow lacks. That’s where they became so helpful the NGOs, to help us go to appraise the obstacles. (Interview 3/CMC member)

Asked whether or not conservancy representatives felt that they had a responsibility towards their supporting NGOs, most interviewees said they did not understand the question (Stake makes the apt observation that “just because you ask a question it does not mean it’s understood” (1995:27)). Exemplifying this enquiry by referring to the rights and responsibilities that both parties have in a partnership, a distinct response pattern emerged. “Thanking them” (Interview 3, 4, 5a, 5b) was the most frequent answer, notably in connection with acknowledging and promoting NGO support:

Whatever institution that has been helped, assisted by the NGOs must give that back to these people so that they can say proudly to the world: That is what we have done. (Interview 4)

5.5.2 The Grootberg Model

Conservancy interviewees specifically mentioned NGOs having to come back with regards to “loopholes” in the management of tourism enterprises. Correspondingly, the unique Grootberg Lodge model exemplified the distinct views of NGO representatives, which in essence, reflected their opinions on dependency.

Arriving in Windhoek during the first field trip in 2013, I quickly came to realise that Grootberg was “a very prickly issue” where “everyone kinda pricks up their ears” (Interview 10/field NGO). During an interview with the CDSS project team leader (a senior WWF employee), he challenged my conviction that community ownership was essentially the desired state of the CBNRM development agenda. He argued that community ownership actually reinforced dependency on continued NGO support:

The one thing we have seen is that the technical assistance and the cost to us, as a support organisation in that model, is much greater. Because basically every few years you get a new committee and they, in addition to being conservancy committee members, which is a difficult enough job in the first place, they are also directors of a major company. They need a huge amount of support in order to deal with that. There is a much greater need for technical backup in this kind of model than in the other kinds.

The dispute about the “right” model is by no means new; it has been contested ever since conservancies started entering into joint-venture partnerships (Ashley and Jones 2001). However, during data collection in 2014, the casus Grootberg enjoyed “lively debates” (Interview 25/NGO director) as it had been stirred up again during a number of recent intra and inter-NGO planning meetings. “We just had a big discussion about this and it wasn’t so pretty,” (Interview 12) commented the WWF’s tourism business advisor, the key advocate of Grootberg.
Lodge’s HMA. Enquiring about the model at this particular time unveiled strong emotions and opinions where interviewees, at times somewhat aggressively, strongly lobbied for or against the Grootberg model.

The WWF’s tourism specialist “basically drove a total reform of the [initial] business model” (Interview 9/consultant) when the original joint-venture agreement between ≠Khoadi //Hôas and the operator caused serious tensions as the lodge was not generating the projected income. The new contract then clearly distinguished between the conservancy, owning both assets and business operations, and the joint-venture partner, responsible for managing and marketing the lodge.

During the interview, the WWF’s tourism advisor powerfully promoted what he referred to as “benefits plus”. His principal critique of “classic” joint-venture partnerships, where the conservancy basically rents out land and receives a monthly lease fee from the operator who owns and manages the business, was that conservancies merely received benefits (employment/salaries and payments to conservancies/lease fees) while earnings were always “handed over” to the private sector partner. Contrary to that, the Grootberg model had positioned ≠Khoadi //Hôas to receive benefits plus earnings (N$2.6 million in 2013), thus making it the first and only lodge owned by black Namibians in the white-owned and – managed national tourism sector:

> The whole HMA is a clash of mind-sets. […] If success is that conservancies are getting benefits but somehow, they shouldn't be involved in business—they should just be, I hate to say it, but like passive employees, then that's success? […] I think the big hairy audacious question on the table for CBNRM is to make a decision whether they [support agencies] are going to support conservancy ownership of assets—and that will have a dramatic impact on how we structure benefits. (Interview 12)

An opponent of the model pointed out that “the nice political return” of the ownership rhetoric essentially masked the “huge additional cost” (Interview 9), meaning that the required technical assistance was not properly “cotted to” the conservancy, thus making it an overall unsustainable business model. Equally, NACSO training material describes support requirements being “very high compared to other models”, stressing that “significant ongoing support” is necessary (2012c:2). Facilitation and guidance of the new contractual agreement took approximately two years; comparable to a senior consultant, the WWF’s tourism advisor’s salary alone is a significant expense factor. Another NGO director concluded that Grootberg “came at a cost that is not replicable anywhere” (Interview 25).

Apart from costs, the fear of business risk carried by the conservancy which was then “locked-in as project owner” (NACSO 2012c:2) was repeatedly emphasised in a very strong way. Another WWF advisor stressed the very complicated financing structure, the issue of managing VAT claims and constantly having to pay attention to budgets. Contrary to “classic” joint-ventures, financial issues “don’t hit the operator, they still get their payments” (Interview 13). Major fear and concern also related to ≠Khoadi //Hôas’ involvement in operational
management (three CMC representatives are also members of the board), in particular, because the committee rotated and the business ultimately became vulnerable to fluctuations:

Your skill base for being on the board of a business is very different to being elected as a politician on the conservancy. So you don't have the consistency and you don't always have the right person for doing both. (Interview 13)

I think that there is a place for that ownership but I don’t think the place is in the boardroom, of operations and operational ownership. I think that is—I actually think it’s irresponsible, reckless and I think it’s gonna perpetuate dependency on external support. I don’t think it is a sustainable model at all. It’s hugely dependent on individual capacity and where you have changes of personnel in NGOs, because it’s been driven by WWF or one individual in it. […] As soon as you got a change of board at #Khoadi //Hôas and if you get one or two hostile individuals with crazy ideas in the head, if the company sells out, brings in new owners. I think the whole model could collapse. I strongly feel that it’s inappropriate, irresponsible, sort of reckless use of external resources. (Interview 9)

The advocate of the Grootberg model argued that these concerns were a “knee-jerk reaction”, the fear of risk “an externality introduced by the support organisations” (Interview 12). The operator also criticised NGOs’ tendency of being overly protective of “their” conservancies:

In terms of daily operations and guidance to the conservancy—#Khoadi //Hôas has crossed that bridge already. They’re very much into the understanding of the business already. […] Acknowledge that you [NGOs] can let go of the hand now. You walk next to them, you don’t need to hold their hand anymore. (Interview 8)

In an attempt to unpack the complex CBO-NGO exchange relationship, in the memo “#Khoadi //Hôas—Namibian CBNRM flagship” it was queried who gained what from this “success story” and who stood to lose what. While the answer seems more straightforward for the conservancy and its members, NGOs’ fear that Grootberg Lodge could sink before they could (again) be rallied to rescue the situation seemed to linger in various statements. The operator noted they got a lot of requests as “WWF advertises the model quite extensively, they always bring people to the lodge” (Interview 8). Similarly, the consultant commented that the model is “well-promoted” (Interview 9). The WWF’s tourism advisor stressed:

#Khoadi, they are at the epicentre of this great conservation success story […] If we can create an example [Grootberg model] it would become a shining light so that others will be motivated to replicate—nothing gets copied like success. (Interview 12)

Asking conservancy representatives if they felt that NGOs were dependent on #Khoadi //Hôas was eventually coded “the funny question” as every single interviewee would always burst out laughing! The manager shouted:

Yes! Yes, they send everyone who comes to Namibia first to our conservancy so they can hear good things—success! […] They don’t want the visitors to hear bad things about conservancies in Namibia, you see. They want the appraisals from the visitors for themselves, that’s why they send them here [laughs]. (Interview 1)
5.6 Conclusion

This last section summarises the main findings of the ≠Khoadi //Hôas case and aims to illustrate their relevance to the overall research questions. The key intrinsic feature of this particular CBO is its exceptionally high level of self-organisation. Initiative and drive for conservancy formation originated from within the community where the existing farmers’ union acted as the main catalyst. In this context, NACSO’s director stressed “the social setup” of, especially, Kunene conservancies where people are “more proactive in terms of doing and wanting something” (Interview 14). Stable, continuous governance—albeit at the expense of underrepresentation of certain conservancy areas—combined with high “conservancy capacity” made the ≠Khoadi //Hôas a favourite amongst the different NGOs. The fact that the majority of committee members are teachers (Interviews 9, 10, 13, 14, 25) and “having FIRM, they know what they are doing” (Interview 9, 12, 13, 14, 25) was almost ritually cited as ≠Khoadi //Hôas’ recipe for success.

It is safe to assume that Grootberg Lodge constitutes the most extensively supported (both financially and in-kind through technical assistance and contract (re-) negotiation) tourism venture on communal land in Namibia. The query if ≠Khoadi //Hôas was somewhat favoured by donors and implementing NGOs was commonly denied, apparently this was a rather delicate subject matter:

I wouldn’t want to make any conclusions about that because it’s quite sensitive ground.
(Interview 9/consultant)

Another key finding relates to the fact that despite the affirmation that the conservancy is mature, independent and financially self-sufficient, ≠Khoadi //Hôas continued to receive significant ongoing in-kind support. Here, trainings and more focussed technical assistance emerged as the principal mechanism for interaction. Regarding the objective to uncover the dependent relationships between the CBO and its supporting NGOs, several causal relations can be deduced. (1) ≠Khoadi //Hôas depends on NGO input to ensure “necessary CBNRM knowledge” of committee and staff members. The massive investment of NGOs to train certain individuals (here the manager in particular) translates into the potential threat of a knowledge vacuum when they leave. Similarly, having CMC members who are effectively on the board of directors of a major company—Grootberg Lodge—makes the CBO more vulnerable to change in leadership. In both instances, the CBO heavily relies on NGOs to retrain. (2) The HMA for Grootberg Lodge is the brainchild of the WWF, or in actual fact, of one individual in it. Especially in view of the complex financing structure, ≠Khoadi //Hôas depends on the technical assistance of the WWF for ongoing contractual advice. Hence, contrary to the relationship with their traditional authority, supporting NGOs are extensively involved in continuously safeguarding the CBO-private operator connection. (3) To request assistance such as training game guards or upgrading CBO (tourism) infrastructure, proposals and the accompanying procedure of requesting and reporting need to be administered through supporting NGOs.
(4) While the forgoing pertains to “real” contingent conditions, the question of whether or not #Khoadi //Hôas had an actual responsibility towards its support NGOs (cf. 5.5.1) enabled an insight into how continued support to the conservancy fostered a state of NGO support as CBO obligation. The manager explained that in order to serve the needs of the conservancy members, it would be her duty to request NGO support:

Responsibilities? Not really. I have a responsibility to what are my community members, it’s not my responsibility to the NGOs […] We are not responsible really but I need to approach NGOs whenever we need something like trainings. (Interview 1)

Although NGO dependency on #Khoadi //Hôas is less apparent from the outset, the analysis of the case—and especially the causa Grootberg—indicates that dependency is reciprocal. (1) Grootberg Lodge, the only black-owned tourism lodge in the country, has been heavily promoted by the WWF. Over the years, many groups from Asia and the Americas interested in CBNRM have visited the Namibian “best practice conservancy”. (2) The movers and shakers of #Khoadi //Hôas had effectually appropriated the rhetoric of development, commonly deployed by NGOs, for themselves. The supporting NGOs relied on the conservancy’s cooperation and stable governance to justify their extensive facilitation and to continue “growing the cake for them” (Interview 14/NACSO director). (3) Resources allocated to this conservancy and Grootberg Lodge in particular (financially and by means of expert personnel) was so high that virtually all Windhoek-based NGO leaders agreed that it could not be replicated. The WWF has effectively “rescued” the joint-venture partnership and renegotiated the entire contractual agreement and positioned #Khoadi //Hôas to not only receive benefits but also earnings. The protectiveness and continuous safeguarding of CBNRM flagships like #Khoadi //Hôas strongly indicates that the NGO community heavily depends on them.

Considering its unique characteristics (the FIRM approach and the Grootberg model, both exceptional within the Namibian programme), it seems peculiar that leading NGOs promoted the #Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy as a CBNRM role model as it is essentially non-representative of Namibian conservancies.
CHAPTER 6: WUPARO CONSERVANCY CASE STUDY

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the relationship between the Zambezi-based Wuparo Conservancy and their support agency Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC). Contrary to the previous case study, this conservancy resembles a typical case as it is representative of the majority of Namibian conservancies that have received ongoing support from one dedicated non-governmental organisation (NGO) since conservancy formation. The objective of this chapter is to unpack the contingent conditions that characterise the exchange relationship between Wuparo and their “mother NGO” IRDNC.

To understand the evolution of Wuparo, it is vital to apprehend its extremely close ties with IRDNC. Therefore, this chapter is introduced with observations from the bi-annual planning meeting, which constitutes a key community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) event for Wuparo and all other Zambezi-based conservancies under the auspices of IRDNC. Here, the routinized habit of Wuparo and other community-based organisations (CBOs) to rely on NGO support—a salient characteristic of the case—is established. In order to further contextualise this case study, the introductory section is completed by an overview of selected pre-and post-independence issues to describe how the “Caprivi identity” evolved “in a historically own territory” (Kangumu 2008:298).

The section on formation and evolution of the conservancy emphasises the different phases of substantial NGO support to illustrate how IRDNC assisted Wuparo in becoming one of the most distinguished enterprise-building conservancies in the Zambezi Region. The subsequent assessment of the conservancy-specific governance structures shows that successful commercialisation stands in stark contrast to the weak institutional set-up in general, and poor financial governance in particular. The examination of Wuparo’s relationship with its traditional leaders reveals their significant powers to interfere in conservancy development and leadership. This becomes particularly evident in view of the joint-venture partnership with the private investor who owns and manages a lodge on communal land. The deeper analysis of this “classic” joint-venture model also demonstrates the extent to which support organisations favour low-risk models to shield “their clients” from the associated risks of owning and operating tourism businesses.

Overall, the chapter illustrates how IRDNC played a crucial part in virtually all conservancy-building aspects and how this fostered a “culture of reliance”—which seriously undermines the objective to establish an independent CBO. Especially with regards to providing “essential” CBNRM knowledge through trainings, the case study highlights the intense pressure for field-based IRDNC staff who constantly need to retrain conservancy staff and committee members to safeguard continuous conservancy governance and management.
6.2 Introducing Wuparo Conservancy

6.2.1 The Bi-Annual Meeting—IRDNC and “Their” Conservancies

Parallel to the formation of the first conservancies in Zambezi Region in 1998, IRDNC has initiated regular meetings where all conservancies in the region, their traditional leaders and ministry representatives, take part. Initially on a quarterly basis, the now bi-annual meeting lasts three days and is essentially a planning and communication exercise where conservancies report back to IRDNC on what they have accomplished since the last meeting and present what they want to achieve until the next—and what support services they need to do so. “The idea was to start getting a platform where they [conservancies] are saying we need this, we need that, as opposed to [IRDNC] saying you are getting this, or you're getting that.” (Interview 13/NGO)

Due to fortunate timing and invitations from senior IRDNC staff, I attended the bi-annual meeting in February 2014 hosted by the Sikunga Conservancy. Together with about 60 attendees, I camped onsite for the full three days. Detailed fieldnotes and memos based on observations and numerous informal chats during these days reflect common key challenges for conservancies as well as their ongoing reliance on IRDNC.

Figure 14: Bi-annual meeting 2014—“Conservancies report back”

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Source: Author’s photographs

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57 Established in 2009, Sikunga Conservancy is located about 30 kilometres east of Katima Mulilo (see also Map 8). The hosting conservancy always rotates. IRDNC assists the host with the event logistics such as invitations and food preparations.
Different interviewees from NGOs and the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET) repeatedly criticised that conservancies’ growth, both in numbers and maturity, is not matched by them taking greater responsibility and advocacy roles within their regions. IRDNC’s co-director based in Windhoek acknowledged that the organisation struggles in view of conservancies taking actual ownership of the bi-annual meeting:

“It’s more still an IRDNC event instead of a conservancy event—but we want it to be a conservancy event. We are gradually trying to reduce the level of dependency.” (Interview 25)

Sikunga’s chairman opened the event with prayers, then handed over to the head of IRDNC’s field office based in Katima Mulilo. After welcoming and thanking the conservancies for their support and effort to attend, she called upon the audience: “IRDNC won’t be here forever, you must take care of yourselves!” This message would be reiterated often during the next days.

On this first day, a number of representatives from different ministries were present and introduced their projects, the bold questions and vehement tone of conservancy members enquiring about community benefits of government projects initially came as a surprise. A representative from the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Forestry was dismissed for not introducing himself before addressing the audience, other ministries were openly criticised, people complained specifically about the “poor distribution of information” and pointed out that often, ministry staff “did not know their own regulations”. Government representatives found equally strong words. When a conservancy member complained about incidents with wildlife and justified people “taking their own measures” (which basically meant killing “problem animals”) the MET deputy director for Zambezi Region shouted, “you are the problem animals, the actual animals will sort you out!”

On the second day, all 16 Zambezi conservancies presented their finances. Here, two members of staff reported the figures on a flip chart in front of the audience. Issues relating to finances, and financial management, in particular, emerged as the dominant subject matter lengthily discussed during the remainder of the event: (1) The key source of income to the majority of conservancies is hunting: Wuparo’s financial summary for 2013 showed that 91% of total income was generated through hunting. Two species, buffalo (50%) and elephant (22%), accounted for over 70% of the hunting take in 2014 (Kahler and Gore 2015). In general, the “richest” conservancies nationwide are found in Zambezi Region, owing to dense wildlife populations and correspondingly higher annual quotas. (2) Members complained that they are overburdened with the high overhead costs of running conservancies (cf. section 4.5.1); again Wuparo’s summary showed that operational expenditure amounts to over 50% of income. High expenditures reduce benefit distribution to members. Salambala Conservancy (registered in 1998 with a large constituency of 6,000 members) for instance reported an

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58 According to the MET warden, the lowest earning conservancies in Zambezi generate an annual income of approximately N$500,000.
income of N$1 million of which only N$50,000 were distributed to members. On the previous day it had become clear already that actual benefits lay at the heart of most debates. (3) In this context, human-wildlife conflict emerged as a recurring theme. Compensation for loss and damage puts a strain on conservancy budgets, still, at individual level, reimbursements “are never enough to pay for what has been lost” (conservancy member).

Financial (mis-) management also dominated discussions. Given the considerable income, the question “where did all the money go?” was frequently asked. Many representatives responded that they could not explain since they did not know—“the conservancy just sent me here”. Hence, many attendees loudly demanded that conservancies must send their treasurers in the future. Again, the candour of reporting was somewhat startling at times. A young woman representing Impalia Conservancy (registered in 2005) said that she could not report any figures because the CMC had misused the money. During 2013, three managers and been hired and fired, as was the entire conservancy management committee (CMC). A traditional leader asked if MET and IRDNC are aware of this. Yes, replied IRDNC’s institutional support manager “but the relationship turned sour two years ago”. Since then, the NGO had been avoided or simply ignored by the conservancy. This news left one NGO representative completely stunned: “I spoke to the chairman [of Impalila] yesterday, everything is fine, he said.” The NGO representative had just handed over a donor grant for a fisheries project from the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) to the apparently dysfunctional conservancy.

On day three, the last point on the agenda was to agree on the conservancy hosting the next bi-annual meeting and the financial contribution each conservancy would have to make. In this context, the provision of transport to and from the event came up. IRDNC’s Zambezi director had already expressed her frustration about conservancies’ heavy reliance on this “service”. “We are running short on vehicles and imagine—we are talking of 16 conservancies which need transport”. (Interview 26) In Windhoek, a CBNRM consultant had ironically referred to how field NGOs had “basically become taxi drivers” (Interview 9). The transport issue exemplified the CBO─NGO dependency dilemma: To ensure attendance, especially in the beginning of conservancy formation, IRDNC would always provide transport to meetings and trainings (see Figure 15). Now, regardless of their “maturity status”, conservancies continue to rely on it.
Stressing that conservancies are “multi-million dollar businesses”, the MET warden in Zambezi heavily criticised both conservancies for taking advantage of this service and NGOs for continuing to provide it:

It's true, they are so reliant on support from NGOs you know. They do have money but they say no, we don’t have money. If you tell them: Come to Windhoek for a workshop! They say nah, we don’t have transport, are you arranging transport? We will always arrange transport for them. But they have money in the community. [...] But they say: We can’t go to Windhoek! We don’t have food! You know, you have to provide for that.

(Interview 22)

For this bi-annual meeting, every conservancy, usually represented by two members, had contributed N$300. To ensure continuous bi-annual meetings, a senior IRDNC staff member announced that conservancies needed to contribute more. “Why do you rely on IRDNC? Why do you depend on us? Grow up! Build your own houses,” he shouted. Being one of the few conservancies that have a budget for transport (N$6,000 annually) as well as trainings and workshops (N$20,000), Wuparo’s enterprise officer proposed to contribute N$1000. Various others insisted this being much too high. When one member asked if this decision could be postponed, the IRDNC staff member explained:
IRDNC staff  MCA is going out. SARDEP\textsuperscript{59} is going out. They are funding the meeting. Then who is going to pay? If you pay for it yourself, it will be yours. You will have true ownership.

Conservancy member  It’s you again who is pressuring us!

IRDNC staff  What are you suggesting?

Conservancy member  N$150 for each, so 300 in total.

IRDNC regional director  [Shouting] You must be joking!

Sikunga’s manager  [Trying to relax the situation] IRDNC staff is not benefitting from us. We are benefitting from IRDNC. They are like mothers and fathers, at the end of the day, we must support them. This bi-annual, it’s not for IRDNC—it’s for us. Colleagues! Please!

Eventually, N$500 per conservancy was collectively agreed upon.

Due to a late and heavy rainy season in 2014, I relied on transport myself. Zambezi gravel roads are, in actual fact, sand roads, which regularly turn into deep, muddy tracks during rainy season that can only be conquered in a four-wheel drive. A senior IRDNC staff member kindly offered me a lift back to Katima Mulilo—together with three honourable indunas which is one example that serves to illustrate the strong ties between the NGO and traditional leaders.

**Figure 16:** Attendees of the bi-annual meeting

![Attendees of the bi-annual meeting](Source: Author’s photograph)

\textsuperscript{59}Sustainable Animal and Range Development Programme (1991-2004) implemented by the German Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ, now GIZ).
6.2.2 Caprivan Identity—A Short History of People and Place

Registered in December 1999, the Wuparo Conservancy is located in the Judea Lyaboloma constituency in the extreme north east of the country. The conservancy counts approximately 1,700 members and with 148 square kilometres, it is one of the smaller conservancies (NACSO 2008). The majority of the 310 households (Collomb et al 2010) are located in the “conservancy capital”, Sangwali village, which also hosts the conservancy office building. One major road connects Sangwali and the other two village hubs, Samalabi and Samudono, with the regional capital Katima Mulilo.

**Map 8: Conservancies in the eastern Zambezi Region**

Wuparo is located in the eastern Zambezi floodplain, which is divided into the Mudumu North and Mudumu South Complexes. The latter is home to three conservancies: Wuparo was established first and shares borders with Balyerwa Conservancy in the east and Dzoti Conservancy in the west. As a unique location feature, Wuparo is sandwiched between Mudumu National Park in the north, and Nkasa Rupara National Park (formerly Mamilili National Park) in the south which were both established as hunting reserves in 1945 (Kahler et al 2013). NGO representatives frequently cited bordering protected areas with established boundaries as an advantage to conservancy formation, which is often considerably delayed by lengthy border negotiations with adjacent communities (Jones 1999c). The two national parks are not fenced, large wildlife populations can roam freely into conservancy territory which is both blessing and blight: Wuparo enjoys high annual wildlife quotas (N$1.5 million combined hunting returns in 2014, with twelve buffalo and four elephants on trophy hunting quotas) (NACSO 2015), at the same time, conservancy residents need to endure growing human-
wildlife conflict resulting in livestock attacks and crop damage. Here, “the most troublesome problem animals” (NACSO 2015:1) are elephants, antelopes, hyenas and porcupines. In 2013, elephants alone accounted for 70 incidents. Many informal chats with conservancy residents reflected people’s frustration, two young teachers based in Sangwali stated:

Wildlife is a big problem. If you kill something to defend your property, they [Wuparo] report you, MET takes you to court. But if an animal kills a human, nothing happens. They don’t even shoot it.

The landscape is a mosaic of mopane woodland, Kalahari grassland and floodplains (Kahler et al 2013). The semiarid Zambezi Region belongs to the 8% of the country that receives over 500mm of rain per year, considered the necessary minimum for dryland cropping (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2004). Although Mudumu South complex receives an average 625mm precipitation annually, there have been severe droughts due to erratic rains and consequent government food relief programmes for drought-stricken communities.

The Zambezi Region is considered one of poorest in the country (Suich 2010). The national index measuring domains of deprivation, repeatedly lists Zambezi Region constituencies amongst the 20 poorest nationwide (Government of the Republic of Namibia 2015). Rural Zambezi residents have little access to jobs and cash, research on Wuparo by Collomb et al finds that employment is “extremely low”, only 27% are formally employed and most jobs are “related to the ‘nature’ industry” (2010:10), where people work in safari, lodge or hunting tourism, in the ministry or in the conservancy. Pensions, cash crops and natural resource utilisation (for example thatching grass and reeds for sale), constitute the largest contribution to household income. Although cattle are less important with regards to income generation, they are a vital source of food consumption and field maintenance (Jones and Dieckmann 2014).

Prior to German invasion of the country in the 1880s, the Zambezi Region was part of the British Bechuanaland Protectorate (later Botswana) (Massó Guijarro 2013). The peculiar shape of the 500 kilometre long strip of land sandwiched between Angola and Zambia in the north and Botswana in the south is a product of colonial treaties between Germany, Great Britain and Portugal (Kangumu 2008). Initially, the German colonisers postponed formal occupation as administrative costs were found to be too high; apart from lacking precious minerals, the area’s low population density also meant low potential in sourcing labour. Malaria and other endemic diseases further heightened Germany’s disinterest in the territories beyond the Red Line60 (Kangumu and Likando 2015). Largely uncontrolled by colonial powers, smuggling and poaching became rife in the area and eventually, in 1909, a small contingent of the German Schutztruppe was sent to Caprivi to end “lawlessness” and “native savagery” (Lenggenhager 2015:468). Under the command of Captain Streitwolf, the rights of

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60 Cf. section 4.2.2, the boundary demarcated the protected police zone in the south and served as veterinary line separating African from European cattle.
the ruling Lozi kings of western Zambia were significantly reduced while the local chiefs of the two largest ethnic groups, the Mafwe and Masubia, were officially recognised—according to Colpaert et al (2013:147) Streitwolf thus “started to create a Caprivian identity”. All non-Masubia people, including the Mayeyi who constitute 94% of today’s population in the Mudumo south complex (Kahler et al 2013) where Wuparo Conservancy is located, were grouped under the Mafwe. The Mafwe and Masubia chieftainships remained the two recognised traditional authorities during the entire colonial period (Kangumu and Likando 2015) and both Germans and South Africans exercised an indirect rule through the traditional leaders (cf. section 4.2.2). This, combined with the fact that Caprivians were not relocated but stayed in what was declared a native reserve in 1940, gave them a higher degree of autonomy compared to the rest of the country (Colpert et al 2013).

Massó Guijarro (2013) illustrates that culturally, Caprivians are much more closely connected to the Lozi people, Silozi is still the most common language in the region. She argues that it was the armed liberation struggle that formed the “historic bond” between the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) and the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) with both groups fighting “for the liberation of their respective lands” (2013:342).

With reference to its transition from useless land under German rule to a liberation battleground due to its strategic location, Lenggenhager describes the Zambezi Region as an “oddity” (2015:468). Sparsely populated western Caprivi (today Bwabwata National Park) was declared a game reserve in 1968 and later became a military zone for the South African Defence Force. Eventually, the entire area was heavily militarised in the 1970s (Kangumu and Likando 2015). South Africa’s Native Commissioner for the Northern Territories referred to Caprivi as “politically anomalous, economically unsound and administratively wellnigh [sic] impracticable” (quoted in Lenggenhager 2015:469). As a result, the region was “tossed around from one administration to the other” (Kangumu 2008:299) and remained the only one directly administered from Pretoria until Namibia’s liberation.

We will never be Namibians, even by force. We are Caprivians.
(Mishake Muyongo cited in Massó Guijarro 2013:340)

During the first decade of independence, the disconnectedness between the Zambezi Region and the central government in faraway Windhoek continued. Melber describes the region being “isolated and marginalised” (2007:326) in the country’s new political environment. The new SWAPO administration neglected the Zambezi Region in terms of social welfare and political development and people felt left out when the independence government failed to bring real benefits such as a notable reduction of unemployment to the region, which had materialised elsewhere. CANU leader Mishake Muyongo began to lobby for Caprivi’s independence despite his earlier agreement to one united Namibian state as a member of the 1989 Constitutional Assembly (Massó Guijarro 2013). The ongoing political dispute,
described by Melber (2003a) as the new government’s failure of effective nation building, climaxied in separatist rebel attacks on a military base near and government buildings in Katima Mulilo in August 1999. Despite the central government’s chauvinistic and oppressive response61 (Melber 2007), Colpaert et al note that since, it has taken actions to better integrate the region into the Namibian state, for example by opening up the “Trans Caprivi Corridor” (2013:148) through the construction of a bridge over the Zambezi river in 2004. Interestingly, during the elections shortly after the attacks, SWAPO won the majority for the first time and nowadays the “secessionist cause seems to be a minority one” (Massó Guijarro 2013:351). Nevertheless, underlying issues of a unique, non-Namibian identity linger on in the region. The official renaming of “Caprivi” into “Zambezi Region” in 2013, commonly attributed to the attempt to abolish regional identity and political association with Muyongo’s CANU party (Kangumu 2015), manifests yet another hallmark event in the Caprivi conflict deemed by Massó Guijarro “the most significant conflict and the biggest challenge for the fledgling democracy” (2013:338).

6.3 Formation and Evolution of the Wuparo Conservancy

6.3.1 Inception—Distrust in the New Conservation Concept

Our initial feeling, they come to us, they want to just occupy our land. Because that idea, you see, it was colonial history. Because they were telling us: All the resources are yours. So by ourselves we were thinking no, why are they telling us those things? It never happened before in our life so meaning that they want to take our land—that is our idea. (Interview 18/field coordinator)

CBNRM had a difficult start in Wuparo. In 1997, about two years before the conservancy was gazetted, IRDNC approached the community to “sell their ideas to the community” (Interview 19/founding member). “We had not just heard anything about that new ideal before. Those people brought this concept, these people were NGOs.” (Interview 20/game guard) Distrust and disbelief with regards to the use of their land and wildlife were the emerging themes in the analysis of conservancy members’ initial perception. Owing to its location between Mudumu and Nkasa Rupara National Park, the communal area was of prime interest to donors and NGOs. The South African Defence Force had poached heavily in the protected areas (Kahler et al 2013), likewise, rural residents relied on bush meat, as Wuparo’s environmental field coordinator explained:

Especially here in Wuparo Conservancy, to tell you the truth Caro, people were so negative, you know. Because Wuparo people are still like bushmen—they like meat too much you know [laughs]. And me also especially, I have been fed with meat, which means I was just like doubting. (Interview 18)

61 CANU leader Muyongo fled to Denmark where he stays in exile until today, other secession fighters were imprisoned for high treason against the state. Massó Guijarro (2013:338) finds that the “radical wing [is] barely visible today”.

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Having to stop poaching, or rather what was commonly perceived by local people as a somewhat legitimate local source of nutritious food, to obtain wildlife quotas and receive money at community level was simply mistrusted. Various different interviewees stated community members believed they could not continue their subsistence activities such as ploughing and herding livestock. The MET deputy director for the region explained that the suspicion was intensified by the local peoples’ experiences with protected areas:

At the beginning, it was difficult because they thought it was the same format how our parks had been gazetted. We removed the people, outside from the areas where they were living [and] put them somewhere without any compensation. (Interview 23)

Poor post-dependency performance of the new SWAPO administration combined with high local suspicion of government representatives resulted in a tense relationship with outsiders. IRDNC’s regional director recalled that the negative attitude from communities was heavily influenced by their perception that the NGO “was spying” for MET because the region was rife with illegal poaching. Regarded as “the eyes and ears of the ministry” IRDNC was avoided, “whenever you call a meeting they don’t show up”, or even threatened “if we see you here tomorrow, we are going to burn you here” (Interview 26). She continued to explain that by means of targeting women who expressed that they were feeling left behind (the area is widely acknowledged as being “historically patriarchal” (Colpaert et al 2013:146)), IRDNC “gradually worked their way into the community”. She believed that the turning point of the fragile relationship was reached when, through women’s utilisation of veld products, the community saw actual cash benefits coming from their natural resources.

The first female resource monitor explained that after she fully understood what a conservancy was, she “came to believe in it”. As in the previous case study, a small group of committed individuals then drove the crucial pre-registrations requirements such as agreeing on physical boundaries with neighbouring communities:

It was our dream. We want Wuparo Conservancy to be in the government gazette, we don’t want to lose; we wanted to be the heroes. That’s why we used to push forward until the time we come to win both borders, that’s how we worked. (Interview 19)

Also picking up on the analogy of winning, Wuparo’s senior game guard summed up how IRDNC successfully introduced the conservancy concept:

At the end, IRDNC, they sold their ideas to the community members. They told them about the potentials of conservation, then at last all the community members agreed. So immediately when they agreed, they made like a sort of referendum, they signed a book, a document. And then from there, they have sold their ideas to the community members. […] At the end, they won. (Interview 20)
6.3.2 Conservancy-Building Through NGO Support

“Wuparo is one of the thriving conservancies in the Caprivi region” (Angula and Shapi 2004:5). In fact, IRDNC’s tourism coordinator described Wuparo as “one of the best in terms of going forward and implementing things on their own” (Interview 27). The conservancy’s proactive approach was typically mentioned in the context of tourism enterprise developments. At the same time, during preliminary data collection in 2013, the same IRDNC field staff noted, “we invest in communities like hell”. The following are four different support categories that Wuparo received since inception with their relevance to enterprise-building highlighted:

1. IRDNC offered financial support to game guards “to support them during that period when we are still waiting for our quota [from MET]” (Interview 15/former manager). Interviewees indicated that the “difficult period” until benefits materialised and the realisation that “it’s true what IRDNC was selling” took about four years (Interview 18/field coordinator).

2. One principal in-kind support service is trainings, often referred to as “capacity-building”. Apart from awareness raising activities for the wider community (for example rights as conservancy members and benefits of wildlife conservation), conservancy staff and CMC members in particular received, and continue to receive, trainings in accordance with IRDNC’s core advisory subject areas, that is institutional support, project administration, natural resource management, accounting and business development:

   We run like in lions you know, community rangers get training on that lion. The finances, the treasurer, they [IRDNC] have to go give him training. Whatever chairmen, what is your role, what is your responsibility to be a chairman. Then the manager, what is your responsibility as a manager—what are you managing. All those things you know, all the support was provided by those NGOs. (Interview 18/field coordinator)

3. With maturation of the conservancy, Wuparo’s former manager (2007-2012) explained that the working relationship between them and IRDNC had changed. Previously, IRDNC initiated interaction and support, “now, through a lot of trainings and a lot of workshops, they [conservancy staff and CMC] now understand what they are doing. So now it’s us who go there and say we need this.” (Interview 15) IRDNC’s Zambezi director confirmed this stating “when we started it was us, IRDNC, we go there every month, we were there three, four times per month […] now they come to us” (Interview 26). Although the direction of initiative changed from being NGO- to conservancy-driven, the reflections of Wuparo’s field coordinator exemplified that intensity and value of support actually remained almost unchanged:

   We were depending on IRDNC but now, we are running this organisation for our own. They are still supporting us but not as far as previously. But again, you see, it is true! Again, because all these workshops they are busy facilitating to us, it’s also—it’s money. That’s why I say, previous and now, it’s still the same again [laughs]. (Interview 18/field coordinator)

(3) Technical assistance as in-kind support continues to be delivered in line with the Conservancy Development Support Services (CDSS) project’s three principal categories (cf. section 4.5.2): institutional development and governance, business and tourism, and natural
Regarding the first category, for instance, a donor report states that “IRDNC began the process of reviewing management plans […] IRDNC has spent the last quarter internally adapting these drafts” (MCA Namibia 2012b:24). Furthermore, Wuparo continues to receive assistance with financial auditing on a monthly basis (Interview 29/IRDNC financial advisor). (Technical assistance for tourism enterprises and joint-venture negotiations will be discussed in detail in the next two sections).

During interviews with conservancy staff another aspect of NGO involvement emerged: key conservancy staff (the book keeper, senior game guard and enterprise officer) all stated that they had been job-interviewed by IRDNC. In fact, two of them stressed that they had been selected by IRDNC and not by the conservancy. Conversely, IRDNC’s tourism coordinator explained that:

It’s the conservancy, it’s the panel. We only get to assist with questions. You set questions that morning with the panel and after the questions are set, you don’t allow them to get out because what happens is, they are favouring one of the candidates and say listen, these are the types of questions […] Then you have the assurance of saying it’s fair. (Interview 27)

(4) Direct financial support, mostly administered through IRDNC and the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF), constitutes the last category of support services. Table 16 details Wuparo’s major development milestones, most of which realised with significant donor-funded grants. To “strengthen the conservancy’s leveraging position in the joint-venture” (MCA Namibia 2011b) Wuparo received N$1 million from the CDSS grant fund of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) programme. The other two tourism enterprises, Sheshe Craft Centre which opened in Sangwali village in 2013 (N$292,017 grant from MCA Namibia 2013b) and the community-owned campsite operating since 2010, were both donor-funded, as was construction of the conservancy office in Sangwali. Along with all other conservancies in the Mudumu South and Mudumu North Complexes, Wuparo received a number of grants for “wildlife translocations—purchase, capture and transport” (MCA Namibia 2013a:55), in 2011 the conservancy received 30 giraffe and five giraffe bulls (MCA Namibia 2011c). In 2014, construction of a third bridge was completed to enable easier access to Nkasa Rupara National Park, the campsite and the lodge. Successful proposals are the key to secure grants, as part of technical assistance, IRDNC also advised the conservancy on proposal writing.

Through the help of IRDNC we now even know how to write the proposal to ask for money outside. (Interview 19/game guard)

We help them put together the proposal. So obviously in the proposal we write in very strongly saying that we support this [application]. (Interview 30/CDSS coordinator)

The repeated enquiry to what extent NGOs would be involved in the actual drafting of proposals may have touched a raw nerve—“it’s them” was the brisk response of an IRDNC staff member who strongly opposed the implication that the NGO secured grants for Wuparo.
Table 16: Wuparo Conservancy development milestones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Wuparo Conservancy is registered in January 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Wildlife quota from MET, joint-venture agreement with private hunter</td>
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<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Implementation of the Event Book Monitoring System</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Construction of the donor-funded community-owned campsite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Negotiations for lodge with the private investor start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Wuparo receives N$1 million MCA grant for the lodge</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nkasa Lupala Tented Lodge opens in July</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wildlife donation/giraffe reintroduced, MCA-funded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Sheshe Craft Centre opens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>New metal bridge to facilitate access between Sangwali village and Nkasa Rupara National Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of an environmental education centre in close proximity to campsite and lodge</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data collected from Wuparo Conservancy in February 2014, MCA Namibia (2011c, 2012, 2013a)

Essentially for the same reasons given in the previous case study (cf. section 5.3.2), no trustworthy estimate of the accumulated value of support services could be made. While the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO) is a reliable source of conservancy-specific information for returns from natural resources, it does not indicate the amount of external financing (Sullivan 2002).

During an informal conversation at the bi-annual meeting, a MCA donor representative stated that “Wuparo and ≠Khoadi //Hôas have received too much money”. Nevertheless, the idea that donors favoured Wuparo was always opposed by conservancy and IRDNC representatives alike. In essence, three aspects that justified intense financial and in-kind support were repeatedly stressed: Firstly, that no instance of poaching had been reported on communal land in over five years (“estimated poached high value species loss = N$0” (NACSO 2015a:1)); secondly, Wuparo returned half of its income its members; and thirdly, that the conservancy was proactive in terms of implementing set targets, especially in view of enterprise developments.

When I asked one of the founding mothers and member of Wuparo’s first CMC if she would like to add anything to the interview, she responded: “Everything you see in this [conservancy] office or in this community—it is because of IRDNC. Without IRDNC we could not see this.” (Interview 19) Similarly, the field coordinator, also a member of the first CMC, stated: “What is inside and outside [of Wuparo conservancy] is because of those NGOs.” (Interview 18)
6.3.3 Wuparo’s Joint-Venture Partnership

The Nkasa Lupala Tented Lodge Close Corporation is a joint-venture agreement between the Wuparo Conservancy and a private investor who owns and manages the business. The lodge is located on the very southern border of the conservancy, just outside the Nkasa Rupara National Park. In 2011, the joint-venture contract was signed for ten years giving the operator the first option for renewal for another ten years. At the time of research in 2014, 22 full-time staff were employed, during high season the previous year another five casual workers were recruited. Total investment for the lodge, including the N$1 million MCA grant to Wuparo Conservancy, is estimated to be N$4.7 million. For the first ten years, total conservancy benefits (employment/salaries and staff training/scholarships) are projected at N$8.6 million with annual wage benefits of at least N$250,000 (MCA Namibia 2011b). The joint-venture contract is based on a monthly fixed fee, which is essentially rent and access to land, as well as a percentage-based agreement on net turnover based on occupancy levels. The contract specifies that both increase annually (Interview 24/operator). There is general consensus among NGO staff that the combination of a minimum monthly fee plus a percentage of net turnover is “the fairest model out there”. Regarding the actual percentage of net turnover, there is considerable variation between Namibian joint-ventures tourism partnerships ranging from as little as 5% to up to 13%. The Nkasa Lupala agreement is, albeit unofficially, said to stand at a conservancy-friendly maximum of the spectrum.

Although the N$1 million MCA grant strengthened Wuparo’s position during contract negotiations, the Nkasa Lupala agreement is essentially a “classic” joint-venture where the conservancy rents out their land and has an overall passive role and little say in the actual business—capital and operating returns accrue to the private investor (Ashley and Jones 2001, NACSO 2012c). IRDNC’s tourism coordinator stated that the organisation does not encourage conservancies to become shareholders in “their” joint-venture lodges, as it is “too risky” (Interview 27). Remarkably, a NACSO training module handout states that a partnership based on private sector investment “distributes risks/roles to appropriate parties” (NACSO 2012c:1). Again, this reflects many supporting NGOs’ preference for low-risk arrangements despite lower returns to the conservancy.

In 2013, the private operator described the role of IRDNC and the WWF in the negotiation process as “absolutely crucial”. Asked whether or not he received any type of ministerial support he responded, “never, they don’t have the skills” (Interview 24). In 2014, three years after the joint-venture negotiation process, the operator indicated that he continued to interact with IRDNC/WWF on a more or less monthly basis. Wuparo’s former manager, heavily involved in the negotiations in 2010/2011, stressed:
Whatever we do, we would always want their [IRDNC’s] technical support as an NGO when it comes to tourism. [...] How to do management—those things we cannot do as a community. Even on joint-venture agreements, we still need NGOs to assist, help us to get into agreement with our joint-venture partners. (Interview 15)

IRDNC’s regional Zambezi office had a designated tourism enterprise support team which was created to tap into opportunities for maximising returns from natural resources other than trophy hunting to lessen dependency on consumptive tourism and donor-funding (Interview 26/IRDNC Zambezi director). IRDNC’s tourism coordinator explained that it was his job to bring both sides, conservancy and operator, together and help them to appreciate each other’s needs. To achieve this at conservancy level, a small group of individuals received extensive input to comprehend the logistics of operating a tourism business in a secluded area and to understand operating costs and profit margins and the issue of seasonality.

Otherwise, from the beginning, they will say no, no, no! It’s our land so this person has to pay us 50% of what he generates [...] The committee identified will go through series of trainings up to a stage when we felt they are ready to negotiate. (Interview 27/tourism coordinator)

Eight months lay between the first meeting and final contract signature. Apart from one hiccup involving the traditional authorities (discussed in section 6.4.3), negotiations and the resulting partnership were described by all interviewees as smooth and quick. “We are both lucky,” noted the former manager “we are fortunate that we can get more than what we are supposed to get with a flat fee only” (Interview 15).

*Being offered* [by the investor] to say if we have this lodge, we are going to pay you this much. It’s an *extra* on what they [Wuparo] were expecting to get from this lodge. And also for me, Simone [owner/manager], that family group, they are *fantastic* you know. They *listen* […] they have heard the reasons *why* the conservancy is calling them. (Interview 27/tourism coordinator)

Regarding the future of the business, the operator repeatedly made reference to two critical issues—wildlife and rotating committees. “Wildlife is a problem here because poaching is a problem in Caprivi.” (Interview 24) While this related mostly to organised international cartels and cross-border poaching, his conservancy-specific issue concerned the lion population. A quarterly CDSS report found that the operator–conservancy “partnership works well but the relationships become strained when lions (a major tourism attraction for the lodge guests) get killed as problem animals” (MCA Namibia 2013b:30). As an initial surprise, the operator said that not having lions on the wildlife/hunting quota the previous year caused immense losses:

We would have *less damage* than twelve lions killed by the community or the community rangers or the scientific service or the ministry shooting lions here. At the end, they killed 13 lions here, to be honest, in one year and they got *zero* out of it. […] I’m totally against hunting but at least a male [on quota], which they would have killed in any case, could have brought some *profit* for the community—and now we had twelve lions alive. (Interview 24)

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62 “A recent aerial survey of the Caprivi has shown the impact of elephant poaching in this area, and the loss of large tuskers is likely to have a lasting and damaging effect on the hunting industry, which will in turn reduce income to a number of target conservancies.” (MCA Namibia 2013a:63)
Rotating committees are an inherent characteristic of how conservancy governance is structured. However, the challenge of changing leadership at Wuparo was intensified by short CMC term-times of one year only (although members could be re-elected five times and thus serve five consecutive years). In this context, the operator indicated that Wuparo representatives on the joint management committee (JMC), serving essentially as a communication and planning platform for the joint-venture partners, regularly changed and hence, there was little consistency. He expressed strong concern about “getting the wrong people” in leadership roles because then “everything goes, no matter how good your agreement or your relation was” (Interview 24). For precisely this reason, joint-venture partnerships are considered risky for the operator—what is commonly referred to as “community politics” is basically beyond contractual control. The following response by a conservancy staff member to my questions as to whether he believed that Wuparo Conservancy was “ready” to take over full responsibility for the lodge in the future exemplifies this dilemma:

Our lodge is ours already! [The lodge is yours, I asked in surprise] Ja! The lodge is ours according to the books that we signed. [...] There is some misunderstanding with the lodge operators. It’s easy for us to remove the lodge operators, then we put another one. Or we run our lodge. That’s the rules that we put in our contract. Immediately when there is some missing understanding whereby they don’t follow our rules, automatically we can dismiss! We kick him out and then bring another investor in or we can run it ourselves.
6.4 Institutionalised Structures and People of the Conservancy

6.4.1 The Dashboard System

In 2010, through the amendment of their constitution, the Wuparo Conservancy implemented substantial changes regarding conservancy governance, area representation and benefit distribution. For more than a decade, Wuparo had been divided into the three areas hosting the largest settlements (Sangwali, Samalabi, and Samudono). Each area, locally referred to as zones, consisted of three representatives and six out of the nine individuals were elected into the CMC. In 2007 and 2009, extensive governance surveys, conducted as a joint-project between the University of Florida and IRDNC, found that Wuparo members were dissatisfied with few job opportunities, uneven benefit distribution and limited opportunities to participate in decision-making (Muyengwa and Kangueehi 2013). A key recommendation of the “dashboard survey” was further decentralisation by means of creating more zones headed by mini-committees where funds (conservancy income) would be directly allocated to zones based on membership size.

Wuparo’s former manager explained that the dashboard system “helped us to come to this understanding or idea of sharing income with our community” (Interview 15). Another conservancy staff member described how the decentralisation of decision-making powers helped to break up the dichotomy of “the community” and “the office” (Interview 20), the latter being synonymous with conservancy staff and CMC members. One of the first CMC members noted that, while previously income had been controlled by office bearers only, the dashboard “makes transparency” where “everyone knows everything” as every zone would get their own share (Interview 18).

As recommended in the dashboard survey, the three original conservancy areas were further divided into seven zones (Kamunu, Kazwili, Masasa, Nsheshe, Samalabi, Samudono 1 and Samudono 2); Nsheshe, the zone in which the conservancy capital of Sangwali is located, was further divided into Nsheshe North and Nsheshe South in 2012. In each of the eight zones a mini-committee, consisting of chairperson, secretary and treasurer, was elected to govern their zone. Zone chairmen then automatically became CMC members and among themselves elected Wuparo’s main chairperson. One relict of the three “old” zones remained in the form of three headmen acting as conservancy councillors and advisors.

The amended constitution stipulates that 50% of conservancy income shall be directly dispersed to the zones; the 50:50 principle makes Wuparo one of the highest benefit distributing conservancies countrywide. Wuparo interviewees took great pride in their dashboard system and repeatedly pointed out that it is unique in the Zambezi Region and Namibia.

That’s why, you see! Wuparo, it went even overseas! Now everyone is talking about Wuparo. Even when you are going to America, they are talking about Wuparo because of this system of the dashboard. So everyone is happy now, it's not like in other conservancies. (Interview 20)
Muyengwa and Kangueehi conclude that the dashboard “experiment succeeded” (2013:213) for a number of reasons. Two arguments, in particular, stand out: “The MET laissez-faire approach allowed the researchers and local NGOs to experiment with local institutions”. Here, the fact that the dashboard “created fifty-six committee positions” where each member received monthly allowances “thereby expanding the number of people receiving direct cash payments” (2013:211) seems an odd improvement considering the widely acknowledged problem where conservancies are burdened with high overhead costs. The figures below (Table 17) show that combined allowances and per diems amount to the second highest block of expenses (9% of total expenditure) after salaries.

Table 17: Income and expenditures for Wuparo Conservancy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income 2013</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hunting</td>
<td>1,281,100</td>
<td>(= 91% of total income)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lodge</td>
<td>66,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting Camp Rental</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Interest</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total income</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,407,100</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total expenditure</td>
<td>1,398,840</td>
<td>(= 46% of total income)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benefit distribution</td>
<td>649,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Expenses**

Salaries                        | 400,560  
Management allowances           | 61,800   
Field allowances                | 50,160   
Per diem                        | 12,000   

…

Source: Figures presented at bi-annual meeting/shared at Wuparo Conservancy office in Sangwali

During the analysis of interview data and field notes, the dashboard system repeatedly featured as a specific challenge to Wuparo’s (financial) governance. In this context, the correlation of the high fluctuation of CMC members who also governed their individual zones and poor financial management by zone committees clearly emerged as a key issue. IRDNC staff agreed that, at the outset, the decentralisation approach was “a good idea” (Interview 26), however, after four years, the initially promising developments at zone level had somewhat stalled or collapsed altogether as IRDNC’s institutional support manager explained:

When it started it was really working very well because they gave the money to the various areas and they started implementing projects like shops, buying cattle, hammer mills and so on. But it didn’t last because there was no skill to run those projects. […] So although we want the decentralisation of resources, their capacity on the grassroots is very limited and very scarce. As IRDNC, we are very stretched, we are unable to train those small, small, small committees at the grassroots. So we really only concentrate on the big management committee. (Interview 28)

As aforementioned, Wuparo’s constitution stipulated one-year terms for CMC members with the possibility to get re-elected five times. Both Wuparo and IRDNC
interviewees acknowledged this as problematic and counterproductive to consistent governance. The latter in particular lamented that there were no procedures that govern nomination and voting (Angula and Shapi 2004) of CMC members. Apart from condemning the regularised practice of firing entire CMCs (“the time is coming when you will be paying for these services because we are the ones who are training the staff you are firing every year” (Interview 28)), the notion of the CMC as a vehicle for actual community participation, instead of consistent leadership was highlighted by IRDNC’s Zambezi field director:

The problem we have—it’s a community project […] They stand up and say come on, move out of the door because you have eaten enough. And this is a community project, the next person moves in. (Interview 26)

Asking the former manager what he regarded as the biggest future challenge for Wuparo Conservancy—unrelated to the dashboard system which we had not yet discussed—his answer strikingly linked governance to voting practices and their implications for conservancy finances. He took a very long time to respond:

I think the key one is the management itself. You know, it's community-based, so when they [members] elect they understand that they just elect people to represent them. They don't look at the skill, the knowledge that the person has to represent them. So that automatically becomes a challenge because once they elect people who do not know—they don't even read or understand how to manage finance. So we find that we have issues where money is misused somehow in some zones because of lack of understanding and skill how to manage those funds. [...] Like in 2010, when dashboard started, all the zone committees, they came up with nice projects and they started very well. Some even started generating income. But because of—the chairperson, sometimes it’s one year [terms] according to our constitution. So once you change, that chairperson, he had the knowledge and the vision for the project. So automatically you will find that the next chairperson, he'll not be able to take the responsibility to the success of the project, so it fails. So that's also one of the challenges. (Interview 15)

Wuparo has grown into complex business entities, owning two community-enterprises (campsite and craft shop) and being joint-venture partner in another two (lodge and hunting). The community’s voting behaviour implies that they elect leaders based on personal favouritism (Angula and Shapi 2004) instead of necessary skills. In this context, financial management was repeatedly cited as a critical skill that is lacking. Wuparo has a history of financial mismanagement; a recent annual conservancy audit report attests Wuparo “poor” performance regarding their “sustainable financial plan” (NACSO 2014:3). At the AGM in December 2013, members did not approve the budget as they “had concerns with the financial report”, furthermore, “Wuparo has an unacceptably high level of expenditure not supported by receipts” (MCA Namibia 2013b:20). Another donor report found that both manager and treasurer were violating conservancy policies and accounting responsibilities and that “there seems to be very little involvement from the management committee in financial matters” (MCA Namibia 2012b:23). Muyengwa et al (2014:187) diagnose a “lack of regard for the constitution” as CMC members increased their sitting allowances without their constituency’s approval. During various interviews, financial mismanagement was confirmed where interviewees frequently mentioned that zone committees, albeit unintentionally, “waste money”
or “poorly manage finances” (Interview 15, 22, 28, 29). Less often, it was suggested that money deliberately disappeared, for example taken out of the conservancy account as unauthorised loans (Interview 26). A case study by Pellis et al finds that a recurring complaint by conservancy members “concerned the mysterious disappearance of earnings” where “money was eaten” by powerful individuals with access to conservancy accounts or “lost due to inefficiency” (2015:9).

The former manager repeatedly distinguished between poorly and strongly performing zones, the latter notably reflected the “old” power centres Nsheshe (where Sangwali is located) and Samudono. While most Wuparo interviewees still favoured the dashboard system, one founding member was utterly frustrated and repeatedly referred to the “devil system” that brought corruption and discrimination. In terms of the latter, she argued that the dashboard had introduced aggressive competition between zones. Using the example where one zone invested in a maize grinder and then did not allow other zone members to use it, she stated:

It’s like giving limitations to resources—within the same conservancy! Now everybody is just looking at the zone where he is coming from, they don’t care about the other zones.

(Interview 19)

While the dashboard sought to correct issues relating to representation, participation and benefit distribution, it seems to have intensified them. In 2013, Muyengwa and Kangueehi assessed that “zones utilized funds in ways that reflected local community needs, confirming the hypothesis that governance works best at smaller scales” (2013:213). One year later, however making no reference to the dashboard which led to the amendment of the constitution, Muyengwa et al (2014:187) found that “experience with the new constitution has not been positive” as there is clear evidence that CMC and staff members “selectively enforce regulations to serve their interests”. Ironically, this again reflects what one of the founding members described as distance between “the office” and “the community” (Interview 18).

6.4.2 The Conservancy Manager—“The Loss of Cebens”

At the time of research, the conservancy manager who had been a key leadership figure during the core period of enterprise building (2007 to 2012) had formally left this position. However, he continued to be on the conservancy payroll, as he still advised the new manager and was supervising the establishment of the environmental education centre targeting both tourists and residents, especially pupils.

Being from Sangwali where he continued to live with his wife and children, Cebens was initially elected as area chairman and thus became a member of the CMC in 2007. He explained that, at that time, “IRDNC saw the need of having a conservancy manager” which, until then, had not been a position in Wuparo’s staff portfolio as per their constitution. “Based
on the skill and knowledge that they [CMC and conservancy members] saw in me, they appointed me as the manager.” (Interview 15) Cebens was consistently described as mover and shaker in terms of initiating and implementing the major achievements regarding tourism enterprise-building, meeting natural resource management targets and infrastructure building, in particular securing funding for bridges to enable easy, year-round access to the campsite and the lodge. “He has proven himself that he can manage that conservancy and take it to the next level,” said IRDNC’s tourism coordinator (Interview 27). IRDNC’s financial advisor pointed out that Cebens had the capacity to “market Wuparo within and beyond Namibia” and “was able to negotiate better deals, was able to represent the conservancy in any way” (Interview 29). IRDNC heavily invested in Cebens through capacity building trainings and a donor-funded scholarship in South Africa from 2011 to 2012. While IRDNC expected him to continue serving as conservancy manager, Cebens decided to quit his position in favour of gaining more education. During my one-week stay, he made several trips to enrol for further studies in Katima Mulilo. A new manager from the Wuparo community was appointed in 2012. Despite being acknowledged as “a very good guy” by conservancy interviewees and IRDNC staff alike, the latter, especially, voiced their frustration about having had to retain a new manager:

Surely I feel the loss of Cebens affected the conservancy. Mostly, after he had done his studies, I expected Cebens to take it up with the conservancy in terms of managing. […] Ja, the loss of Cebens for me was a blow to the conservancy. Am not saying that the person who came in is not that effective but the capacity, with all the trainings that Cebens did, this new person that needs to undergo a lot of training and so on. It's going to keep Wuparo stagnant for a bit of time until when that person is also trained. (Interview 29)

Three manager-specific aspects emerged from the interviews. Firstly, IRDNC staff pointed out that when qualified managers leave, it “brings everything down”, referring to ongoing joint-venture negotiations, thus income generation and consequently benefit distribution to members. The tourism coordinator even questioned if Wuparo would be able “to move, to go ahead without Cebens” (Interview 27). Secondly, and essentially an implication from the previous aspect, the data uncovered that conservancy progress was essentially dependent on an able manager, not the committee:

The manager is an appointed officer. So at the end of the day, he has all the powers to run the office whereas the management committee, they are elected and he just gives report to the management committee. So at the end of the day, he makes all the decisions, the day-to-day decisions. […] The reality is that [sighs] that's how it is. But it's good if you have a got a powerful manager who understands, has skills. Things will get moving. (Interview 15/former manager)

If we don't have good managers to run the show first, doing the planning and doing the implementation and so on, nothing will work. Money needs to come from somewhere where somebody is able to propose and negotiate and so on. (Interview 29/NGO financial advisor)

The third issue transpired from fieldnotes and memos. Here, the common thread was that the conservancy office and staff seemed rather disorganised—and staff management was actually one of the responsibilities of the conservancy manager. During the entire week,
nobody showed up at the conservancy office on time. My designated chaperone, Wuparo’s senior game guard, and I were the first ones to arrive each morning. After an hour or so, some more staff members would arrive. I never saw a game guard carrying an Event Book or wearing a uniform. Compared to #Khoadi //Hôas, Wuparo only seemed to have a fraction of their conservancy documents on file despite being in operation as long as #Khoadi //Hôas. When I asked if I could see Wuparo’s constitution, there was none available and it could not be located for the remainder of the week. Instead, I was given a copy of the IRDNC summary “What every Wuparo Conservancy Member Should Know About Their Constitution”. On the third day, a young man who had just been elected as chairman for the Kamunu zone some days earlier came to the office. Whenever he would come here, nobody was there, he complained. He came to resign from the CMC position, as the job required too much time while he needed to study, he explained.

Wuparo Conservancy had a total of 24 staff members (key positions include the twelve game guards, campsite staff and several office positions such as bookkeeper, enterprise officer and security). A MCA donor report states that “it is becoming apparent that Wuparo are not effectively manging their staff. The conservancy does not have job descriptions and contracts.” (MCA Namibia 2012:25) During the interview with a CDSS project coordinator, he expressed the concern that “support to managers is sorely lacking” (Interview 10). In this context, he criticised the CDSS project for being somewhat obsessed with training “ever-changing” CMC members whereas managers received little backing for the undertaking of having to manage a community-based organisation and being tasked with overseeing complex business enterprises.

6.4.3 The Powers of Traditional Leaders

Under colonial rule, the Mayeyi people who make up the vast majority of Wuparo residents had been grouped under the Mafwe traditional authority. In 1992, the new SWAPO government recognised the Mayeyi as an autonomous, independent traditional authority. Lilemba and Matemba note that this “caused great consternations among the Mafwe” as the new chieftainship had effectively aligned “their political allegiance to the SWAPO-led government” (2015:289). The “new” Mayeyi khuta, the tribal council, under Chief Shufu is located in Sangwali. Kangumu (2008) finds that instability and uncertainty due to tribal division in the Zambezi Region poses a significant barrier to investment. The fact that Wuparo’s neighbouring conservancies, Balyerwa and Dzoti, belong to the same traditional authority was repeatedly cited as conducive to the establishment and organisation of the conservancy. Being part of the same chieftainship aided the process of defining boundaries
between the different conservancies and, equally important, the fact that all Wuparo residents are affiliated with the same leader, avoids the problematic situation where members report back to two different traditional authorities which are both claiming decision-making influence and a share of the conservancy’s income.

IRDNC has close ties with traditional leaders. The Kunene game guard project (cf. section 4.4.1), commonly regarded as the birth of CBNRM in Namibia in the early 1980s, was essentially based on the collaboration of local headmen. IRDNC’s co-director explained that the establishment of their Zambezi presence was based on “a request from traditional leaders to start working there” (Interview 25). During interviews with NGO staff and three senior headmen63 at the Sangwali khuta, both sides mentioned several times that they would just call each other when “issues arise” to address them. The indunas acknowledged the importance of NGO support to Wuparo, however, when I mentioned IRDNC played a key role they objected, pointing out that they carried the key responsibility for Wuparo (Interview 21). Both Wuparo members and IRDNC staff commonly referred to the paramount role of traditional leaders in terms of needing to secure their consent for any conservancy developments to happen:

Without them, nothing could happen. (Interview 19/founding member)

When we start up a conservancy, without the adoption of the traditional authority that conservancy is not going to go anywhere. So we have to lobby the traditional authority in whatever you are doing that you get their support. (Interview 26/IRDNC Zambezi director)

The history of strong traditional leadership was clearly reflected in the local level administration of CBNRM where support by the Mayeyi chieftainship was “an essential entry point to CBNRM in the area” (Muyengwa et al 2014:187). Figure 18 tellingly demonstrates the hierarchical structure of Wuparo Conservancy where Chief Shufu is the acknowledged head of the community organisation. Angula and Shapi (2004) note that Wuparo adopted the traditional Mayeyi voting system whereby the vote for CMC candidates is done by raising hands. Her research indicates that 38% (n=176) of members are not satisfied at all with the election procedure. More recent research by Muyengwa et al (2014) argues that elected CMCs are often powerless compared to the strengths of traditional leaders who exercise control over conservancy projects, staff appointments and dismissals.

63 Cf. section 4.3.1, a senior headman (locally referred to as induna) is a member of the traditional council; they represent individual villages located within the territory that falls under the jurisdiction of a traditional authority.
Wuparo representatives neither directly nor indirectly (at least as far as I, as an outsider, could discern) ever criticised their traditional leaders. Conversely, issues relating to finances emerged as the key theme for Wuparo and their traditional authority in interviews with IRDNC staff and the joint-venture partner. In general, the “smooth” joint-venture negotiations for the Nkasa Lupala Lodge were largely attributed to the fact that “there was nothing on the ground” (Interview 27/tourism coordinator). It is common knowledge that lodges that were established on communal land before a conservancy was registered were usually legitimised by a handshake between the chief and the private investor who would then make direct payments to the traditional authority. With CBNRM legislation, traditional leaders have now lost their claim to this source of income. Initially, the traditional authority strongly opposed having a lodge, and the conflict took about five months to be resolved. “It was a big fight to convince them,” (Interview 15) noted the former manager adding that, though joining forces with IRDNC, the traditional leaders’ fear of “giving the site away” was eventually overcome when consensus on their share of income from the lodge (the actual amount was not shared with me) was reached.

There are basically two ways of paying the traditional authority their share of a tourism joint-venture: either payments come directly from the operator or they are exclusively made to the conservancy which then transfers the agreed share to the traditional authority. Although the

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64 What was initially called village action group (VAG) is now referred to as zone. “EECenter” stands for environmental education centre, the abbreviation “CRM” is not known.
latter prefer receiving direct payments “because there is the fear that the conservancy might decide not to give them [their share] this month”, IRDNC strongly advises against direct payments to “shield” the joint-venture and the operator from dealing with the traditional leaders—“let the conservancy sort out the traditional authority and not the operator” (Interview 27/tourism coordinator).

Remarkably, both IRDNC and the operator chose precisely the same words (“it can put everything in jeopardy”) when describing the powers of the traditional authority to interfere in a joint-venture relationship. The lodge operator explained:

The role of the traditional authority is not well-defined. I think the interrelation of conservancy and traditional authority, there is a problem there. Especially when it comes down to payments and who gets what from what. [...] The conservancy, they need to involve them but then when it comes down now to sharing, in our case it’s not— it should be well-structured but apparently there is something somewhere where it’s not working and then the traditional authority calls us in and asks us but the conservancy should be that channel of information. (Interview 24)

Muyengwa et al find that, by means of installing chiefs as patrons, conservancies “need to buy the support of the traditional leaders” (2014:187). They argue that, in 2010, Chief Shufu received US$5,000 from Balyerwa, Dzoti and Wuparo, all are under his jurisdiction, while the average dividend to conservancy members was N$12 per household. Both IRDNC and MET representatives repeatedly stated that they would, under no circumstances, get involved in either intra-community or traditional leadership issues (cf. section 4.3.2).

6.5 IRDNC—The Mothers and Fathers of Wuparo Conservancy

Question: What does IRDNC mean to Wuparo Conservancy?

They are the mothers and fathers of the conservancy. Without them, we would not become what we have become today. I think NGOs have done a very big role in, actually even in the development of this conservancy. Because to go through all the process of the conservancy you need technical assistance and that can only come from NGOs who know exactly what is required until all the process is done. So I would say from the word go, the NGOs, they are the ones who are taking all the responsibility until the conservancy is registered. Even once the conservancy is gazetted, we still get support from NGOs. (Interview 15/former manager)

The quote, somewhat representative of the shared Wuparo experience, exemplifies two themes that resurfaced throughout the interview process: that IRDNC staff members “are just giving us the right information” (Interview 19) and that Wuparo was conceived through IRDNC—and has been nurtured by them since. With regards to the latter, different Namibian NGO representatives constantly reinforced the point that conservancies are their clients and that they essentially act as service providers. However, (mainly non-IRDNC) NGO representatives also often referred to IRDNC as “mother NGO”. When this apparent mismatch was brought up in interviews, most IRDNC staff clearly rejected this role:
I don’t know why they see us like that […] Try and walk on your own. You fall, we come in to help you to walk again. We have moved from spoon-feeding to helping them start fishing their own fish and cook it. (Interview 27/IRDNC staff)

Conservancies should be standing on their own feet by now. Am seeing most of the conservancies not really standing on their two feet—they are still like one foot down, one foot up. But with most of the conservancies who are 15, 20 years old, those ones I think IRDNC should withdraw a little bit and then let them go on their own. (Interview 26/IRDNC Zambezi director)

IRDNC wanting “their” conservancies to take responsibility, both for their own organisations and within the region (take ownership of the bi-annual meeting for instance), to become “fully independent” was the key message. At the time of research, IRDNC had been involved in Wuparo’s conservancy-building process for 17 years. Attitudes of the five different IRDNC field staff reflected a state of ambiguity: despite continued underpinning that Wuparo should and could “manage things on their own” (Interview 29/IRDNC financial advisor), it was repeatedly acknowledged that “they can’t do it without any support” (Interview 26/IRDNC Zambezi director). By means of systematically assessing the interview data against dependency themes, two principal dimensions emerged—real and imagined dependency. The former pertains to technical-procedural aspects, which, simply by way of how CBNRM has been structured, cannot be completed without NGO support. Wuparo’s enterprise officer explained that their AGM in late 2013 had to be postponed “because IRDNC could not release our work plan for this year. […] We could not get the documents because there was nobody at the [IRDNC] office” (Interview 17). Applying for grant funding is another process that cannot be completed without IRDNC’s involvement. The conservancy’s proposal needs to be endorsed by the NGO to be considered by the donor. Also, from Wuparo representatives’ point of view, finances materialised once again as the key area where they are still depending on IRDNC:

The only section where I see dependency maybe is when it comes to financial audits. I think there, yes, we still depend on them because we haven’t yet reached the level of saying we can hire an independent accountant to check our books. On that section, we still rely on IRDNC […] to make sure the audited report is given at the AGM every year. (Interview 15/former manager)

Despite employing a bookkeeper (interviewed and joint-selected by the NGO), IRDNC’s financial advisor continued to inspect Wuparo’s books on a monthly basis. While the above examples underlined technical dependency where the NGO controls essential conservancy procedures, it is noteworthy that IRDNC is, in actual fact, powerless when it comes to sanctioning “bad” behaviour such as deliberate financial mismanagement of CMC members:

As a supporting agency, we don’t have much power to say you have done this wrong, let me punish you. (Interview 29/financial advisor)

We have got limits. Even if we pick mistakes, serious mistakes, what do you do? Nothing! What we do, after compiling a report, we take it to the MET. (Interview 26/IRDNC Zambezi director)
The deliberations of IRDNC’s Zambezi director clearly reflected the dilemma of working with as opposed to controlling conservancies. On the one hand, she explained that she sees herself “as part and parcel” of policies and agreed procedures that need to be adhered to. On the other hand, she stressed that she does not want IRDNC staff “to be seen as policy dogs”, imposing restrictions on conservancies. IRDNC’s institutional support manager echoed this reflecting on the time when the dashboard system was introduced and conservancy income, previously kept in one central account, was dispersed to the different zones:

We were supposed to tell them that, at the end of the year, we want the areas to report at the AGM: What have they done with the money? But at the back of our minds we also thought this is their money—they can do whatever they want with the money. (Interview 28)

Tackling imagined dependency is far more complex. Here, the “training relationship” helps to unpack the multifaceted interdependency between Wuparo Conservancy and their support NGO. IRDNC’s CDSS project coordinator stressed that delivering trainings “is the core job that we do” (Interview 30); it is also the main interface between the two organisations. Without exception, conservancy representatives were overwhelmingly positive about trainings. Interestingly, completely independent from each other, interviewees described trainings as an excuse that “opens” one’s mind, which was understood as a necessary prerequisite to progress:

It [trainings] is definitely very useful. You know, it is opening the mind, the knowledge, to see the green light or the vision, […] What I have now in knowledge is fine but we still need to complete going up. Up, up, further! We need some workshops, more and more! Can we manage ourselves? No. I can say no, we still really need some workshops, more and more to run this organisation. (Interview 18/CBO staff)

Yes, I like it [trainings]. The more you get the trainings the more your mind becomes wide. I feel so good because the light that they are giving us, you see the skills that they are teaching us. Ja, it’s useful to us because these things, you didn’t know before. (Interview 19/game guard)

They [trainings] will open up our mind […] if you don’t do trainings you will not progress. I will never say I have enough. (Interview 17/enterprise officer)

One short memo attempted to make sense of the observation that everyone who received trainings constantly reinforced that they needed more. It also became apparent that “the trained” did not differentiate between actual training inputs, for example, in terms of nature or contents of trainings. Somewhat mystified by what exactly captivates the trained and secures their enduring quest to receive further trainings, the memo concluded by diagnosing what is best described as “training addiction”. This anew sheds light into a number of related aspects that emerged during data collection.

Interviewees and written fieldnotes frequently made reference to overworked and exhausted field staff who seemed under immense pressure to deliver all training modules within project timelines. In 2012, IRDNC had to retrench twelve members of staff (Interview 26) due to donors scaling down their funding. At the same time, the number of registered conservancies grew from three in 1999 to 16 in 2014, most of whom receive trainings on a monthly basis. IRDNC’s Zambezi director sighed “the little staff we have, they are overloaded”
Her staff frequently complained about heavy workloads in terms of training activities and reporting on deliverables and outcomes which would often require working extra time (Interview 27, 29). Senior Windhoek-based NGO representatives noted that the increasing complexity of output-oriented reporting was becoming a huge burden for (and difficult to combine with) the actual work of field NGOs. At the time of research, the CDSS project—and all 24 training modules—had to be completed within three months until project closure. One project coordinator acknowledged that he somehow had to “try to squeeze all of these trainings into the next couple of months […] that’s kind of the delivery challenge” (Interview 10).

While IRDNC anticipates a mature conservancy like Wuparo to become more independent, a recurring aspect by conservancy representatives was that, conversely, they expected continuation of support at the level previously experienced. In this context, they often constructed formulations using modal auxiliary verbs (“they have to check the budget”, “they have to advise us”) to emphasise the NGO’s obligation towards them:

- If we require another training we go to IRDNC—please we want this training to happen to us. Then they have to make this schedule to provide this training. (Interview 18/CBO staff)
- Years ago IRDNC managed to give us a grant close to 400,000 […] So, in the future, we still expect the same assistance from NGOs. (Interview 17/enterprise officer)

In this context, NACSO’s director acknowledged that there is an apparent misunderstanding of what NGOs are supposed to deliver as it has “always been taken for granted that NGOs would come and build capacity through trainings” (Interview 14). Similarly, IRDNC’s Zambezi director complained that conservancies “still feel IRDNC should be part and parcel” (Interview 26) of activities they could definitely do on their own by now. The MET warden pointed towards the misconduct whereby conservancies rely on IRDNC to administer and manage key conservancy documents such as work and financial plans:

- You find in some conservancies, when you go there, they are like ah but IRDNC should have that information. Why should IRDNC have this information, which is supposed to be in your office? This is your own administration—why are you letting IRDNC do your administrations for you? (Interview 22)

One interview question probed what would happen if IRDNC pulled out tomorrow. While some Wuparo interviewees said that they would “somehow manage” (Interview 20) and that, apart from financial management, they “would be fine” (Interview 15), others automatically posed the counter question: “Then where are we going to get this support?” (Interview 19) or stressed the necessity for substitute support:

- When they [IRDNC] quit out, we can expect another organisation will come. Then we are set. Then all our problems or our claims will have to go directly to that organisation that will take over. […] We never say that we can just go for ourselves. (Interview 18/CBO staff)

Pointing this out to the former manager, he strongly objected: “There is nothing we cannot do on our own!” Yet, he confirmed that many Wuparo representatives shared this attitude, making reference to especially CMC members who relied on IRDNC’s assistance. At last, he articulated why Wuparo continued to depend on their “mother NGO”:
NGOs have fed us so much that now, we cannot do things. Even if we can do it, we feel we need support from them. We are like babies, we are used to it. So I think some things we can do but we have been used that they are the ones who can do it for us. So there is that dependency on them. (Interview 15)

The question if IRDNC also depends on Wuparo—again—highly amused conservancy representatives. Several times, Wuparo members posed the counter question: “Once they are not going to work hand in hand with the conservancies—what are they going to do?” (Interview 15, 16, 19)

The former manager explained:
IRDNC are honoured when they hear that their baby, the conservancy that they nurtured, is doing very well. That pride also goes to them, it creates a good image for them as supporters. (Interview 15)

Given the fact the raison d’être of IRDNC’s Zambezi field office is to provide trainings and technical assistance to “their” conservancies, the regional director established that her organisation needs conservancies to secure their own livelihood:
Without the conservancy, we are not going to get the funding. […] We have to lobby the conservancy to get this funding from the donors. (Interview 26)

6.6 Conclusion—Dependency as Two-Way Traffic
This case study illustrated the development path of the Wuparo Conservancy based on the CBNRM development blueprint facilitated by IRDNC. Contrary to the previous case, the initiative for conservancy formation and progress was driven by an external support organisation. Wuparo’s status as “CBNRM success story” is largely owed to its proactive approach to enterprise development. Although the conservancy boosted three tourism enterprises (the community-owned campsite and craft centre as well as the joint-venture lodge), trophy hunting generated about 90% of income. The assessment of Wuparo’s governance structures uncovered a history of weak and or inconsistent leadership, which was reflected in poor financial management. Hence this suggests that, while wildlife-based income generation did work, the mechanisms for effective and fair distribution did not.

The principal objective of this chapter was to explore the contingent conditions of the CBO-NGO exchange relationship. Overall, a remarkable transformation became evident: from an initial state of profound distrust from Wuparo members towards IRDNC staff to one which was characterised as intimate and trusting as parent and child. The key exchange interface since inception constituted trainings. Providing continuous CBNRM input to conservancy staff and committee members is the core business of IRDNC’s regional Zambezi office. As per CBNRM programme design, trainings are anticipated to create independent conservancies. However, the data analysis demonstrated how both NGOs and CBOs were locked into an ongoing provision and consumption of trainings. Field-based IRDNC staff faced a situation where they had to
constantly retain especially CMC members due to their extremely high turnover resulting from one-year committee terms. The combination of an increasing number of Zambezi conservancies and the scaling down of donor-funding presented one of the main challenges for the NGO. IRDNC staff expressed their utter frustration with communities that treated CMCs as a participatory vehicle while apparently neglecting important aspects such as voting procedures, relevant experiences and proper handovers between outgoing and incoming committee members. The conservancy members, on the other hand, exhibited an attitude towards trainings that resembled a form of addiction. The received wisdom was that CBNRM knowledge could only come from NGOs and that trainings are the precondition for personal advancement within the CBO.

Wuparo’s strong reliance on IRDNC was a salient characteristic of this case study. In order to be able to further analyse causal relations in the following discussion chapter, two spheres of dependency were differentiated. Real technical-procedural dependency essentially related to structural CBNRM design where the conservancy is required to consult or go through their support NGO. Contrary to that, imagined dependency was much more multifaceted and likely to be influenced by both the unconscious sentiment that IRDNC was needed “indefinitely” to proceed further and the deliberate strategy of laying low to ensure maximum future support. Taking into consideration the persisting powers of traditional leaders in the northern territories (cf. sections 4.3.1 and 6.2.2), still significantly affecting the lives of communal area residents, NACSO’s director explained the apparent passiveness of communities as follows:

In Zambezi, because of the traditions, sometimes they wait and let IRDNC tell them what to do […] They believe in their traditional set ups and sometimes they will wait for them to be told. (Interview 14)

Similar to the previous case, IRDNC’s reliance on Wuparo is less obvious. However, the case study provided several insights where the reciprocity of dependency manifested itself. Here, the common pattern was the high ambivalence frequently articulated by IRDNC staff. (1) Although every single IRDNC representative stated that they want the conservancy “to walk on their own”, after 16 years of (financial) governance and management trainings, the NGO continued to provide bookkeeping services on a monthly basis to ensure business viability. (2) With regards to the newly established dashboard system IRDNC staff stated that they initially wanted Wuparo to report on what the money would be used for, thus basically replicating the reporting exercise of the bi-annual planning meeting (cf. section 6.2.1). (3) IRDNC was profoundly involved in the selection process of several vital staff positions to ensure fair procedures. All three examples signify the somewhat awkward position where IRDNC needs to choose between “letting go”, that is allowing the conservancy make “wrong” decisions, or continue to protect Wuparo from what, more often than not, seemed to be the existing conservancy elites or elected leaders misusing their positions. Combined with the increasingly
stringent outcome-oriented reporting criteria set by donors, the IRDNC appeared to opt for safeguarding Wuparo by means of continued service provision, as their own effectiveness is determined by—and thus depending on—conservancy success.
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

7.1 Introduction

The discussion chapter combines insights from the two case studies with the original research questions and the existing body of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) literature and related subject areas presented in the literature review chapter. The objective of this chapter is to transcend from the descriptive-interpretive data presentation in the two previous case study chapters to a conceptual, more abstract level of analysis—and ultimately towards analytical generalisation of the findings.

Theorising from the research data is organised into four parts: section 7.2 considers the structuring properties of the Namibian CBNRM programme to extract the specific processes that enable and or constrain interaction between community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Here, the “structuring structures” (Giddens 1979:64) which dictate CBNRM rule making and resource allocation are condensed to show where NGOs are restricted by donors as their principal funding sources and, conversely, where the national NGO network managed to create spaces of autonomy in which they act as gatekeepers of the national programme. Based on the research objective to unpack the defining organisational structures of CBOs, section 7.3 reflects on the observed “essential workings” of the two conservancies studied. Here, the discussion emphasises the outcome that, despite their many inherent differences (for example in terms of governance structure and NGO support provision), structurally the two cases exhibit strong parallels where basic CBNRM assumptions are systematically undermined or challenged by forces that contradict the very principles of community-based (wildlife) conservation.

Moving away from the structural properties, the remaining two sections adopt an actor-centred perspective to expose the causes and consequences of reciprocal dependency between CBOs as consumers and NGOs as providers of rural development projects. Section 7.3 tackles trainings as the key interface of the CBO-NGO relationship serving as an actual vehicle for the transfer of CBNRM knowledge. The finding that CBO members possess high project knowledgeability and experience lays the foundation for conceptualising CBO members as knowledgeable agents in section 7.5. Moving away from a case-specific to a more abstract level, it is shown how CBOs strategically use their accumulated project knowledgeability to secure maximum, ongoing NGO support. Ultimately, the reciprocity of dependency is conceptualised as a clientelistic relationship where both providers and consumers need each other to protect their interests within the development project.
7.2 The Structuring Structures of Namibian CBNRM Support

**Figure 19:** Dependency in Namibian CBNRM as two-way traffic

![Diagram of dependency in Namibian CBNRM as two-way traffic]

Figure 19 illustrates the different relational dimensions within the CBNRM programme. As such, it draws on the linear development process proposed by Fowler (2002, cf. section 4.4.2) but extends the one-way perspective by acknowledging that relationships between actors are inherently reciprocal.

The first three levels show the continuous cycle of receiving and reporting on project funds between the donor, the World Wide Fund For Nature (WWF) as a big international NGO
and its southern counterparts, the various national, often field-based, implementing NGOs such as Integrated Rural Development and Nature Conservation (IRDNC) and the Namibia Nature Foundation (NNF). As such, the Namibian CBNRM programme resembles the preferred structure for rural development intervention (cf. section 2.6.1) where a large environmental “super NGO” (Gordenker and Weiss 1996:217), almost entirely funded by northern governments, acts as chief distributing body for grants, key technical advisor and channels project funds to the receiving country in the south (Hoole 2010, Lyons 2013).

IRDNC reports to WWF, WWF reports to MCA—so they are the ones sort of holding a stick over us. (Interview 30/CDSS project coordinator)

The above comment shows the hierarchical structure of the Conservancy Development Support Services (CDSS) project funded by the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which shall be used to exemplify the two-way traffic between the donor and its implementing agencies. Both international and national NGOs heavily depend on donor funding. In exchange for financial resources, the donor dictates the rules in terms of how the money has to be accounted for and which training needs are prioritised. In the context of the CDSS project, the prescriptive project structure strongly emerged as a source of dissatisfaction, not only from NGO representatives throughout the different ranks but also from members of the Ministry of Environment and Tourism (MET):

The Americans have their ideals […] You want our money—we won’t allow you not to do those things. (Interview 10/CDSS project coordinator)

There is nothing we can do about it, it’s the MCA, they have their own agenda […] you have to impress them [donors] that you are doing what they want you to do. (Interview 22/MET warden)

Stringent predetermined financial management and, in particular, the specific reporting standards led to the paradoxical situation where field-based staff themselves would require technical support from their head office in order to meet the donor’s reporting requirements. However, this is not to suggest that NGOs are entirely powerless. Having secured donor-funding for 20 years, especially Windhoek-based, senior NGO staff appeared to be highly knowledgeable in terms of “creative ways” of managing donor requirements:

You move with what’s the next sexy thing for the donor. Well, that was HIV so we developed an HIV programme that had a very strong CBNRM focus. […] GIZ put out a call, they want to develop fire management. Really? It’s important but I don’t think it’s the burning issue for that area [Zambezi Region]. So let’s use this as an opportunity to create an entry point for communities to start working with each other between Angola and Namibia. (Interview 25/IRDNC director)

The director of the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO) reinforced that experience and the subsequent transformative learning process of support NGOs

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65 After the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, NGOs’ reporting obligations are much more strongly focussed on deliverables, predetermined targets and measuring outcomes.

66 German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ, previously GTZ).
enabled them to “use” donors’ development agendas to their own advantage to pursue a development path they deem appropriate.

Similarly, while the various national CBNRM support NGOs rely on the WWF for access to large-scale donor funding and technical support, WWF is equally dependent on their regional presence which is particularly powerful in Kunene and Zambezi. As implementing agents, their bargaining tool is their understanding of the social fabric of, and personal connections with, the rural communities. The WWF’s CBNRM specialist explained that local NGOs such as IRDNC are “more closely in tune with what is going on on the ground—instinctively, not intelligently” (Interview 13).

Contemplating the relationship between the donor and their target beneficiary the CBO, and ultimately “the community”, the data suggest that there is somewhat of a vacuum due to no, or very little, actual contact between the two. Despite the fact that ≠Khoadi //Hôas and Wuparo received disproportionately high donor support, there seemed to be very low awareness among CBO members of the role of donors; apart from Schiffer’s (2004a) research on local governance structures at ≠Khoadi //Hôas this aspect has not been recognised (or deemed necessary) within the CBNRM literature. Discussing the role of donors and NGOs’ downwards accountability towards their “clients”, IRDNC’s director asked how she could possibly explain to conservancies that there were 15 to 20 different donor grants, funding various different CBNRM support packages.

Reflected in the donor reporting requirements, increasingly rigid demands on aid effectiveness are gradually intensifying the pressure on NGOs to deliver successful outcomes (Sullivan 2003) and thus to justify the necessity for future funding. Critics attribute weak collaboration and information sharing (Murphy 2003), rivalry between NGOs competing for funds (Edwards and Hulme 1992, Michener 1998) and glossing over failures as honest reflection might result in the withdrawal of funding (Kovach 2006) to this circumstance.

Field-NGOs, in particular, seemed frustrated with the “donor dictate”, at the same time, they were notably more reluctant than their Windhoek-based superiors to openly criticise their funding sources. The CDSS project coordinator opted for self-criticism instead:

> In most cases you are dealing with people [donors, here MCA] that are just sitting in an office in Windhoek. Their experience of a field visit is staying in a fancy lodge and driving around in a nice car and, you know, having a feel good experience. And this is where I get frustrated with the NGOs—we organise a schedule for them so they see the best of the best. (Interview 30)

Apart from the above reciprocal relationships, structural coding also exposed a strong recurring pattern of inclusion and exclusion which was most evident at higher levels within state administration, the donor’s programme design and access to the national NGO network.

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67 Fowler (1985) notes that NGOs are typically accountable “upwards” to their funding sources and not “downwards” to their beneficiaries (cf. section 2.6.1).
Generally, conservancy status is only available to communities who actively protect wildlife; the preservation maxim was omnipresent in virtually all interviews with MET personnel. Strictly speaking, Namibian CBNRM should be termed community-based *wildlife* conservation. The strong preservationist wildlife focus is reflected in all key CBNRM policies passed in the 1990s. This supports the criticism by Twyman (1998) on the restrictive nature of CBNRM country programmes and Reid and Turner’s (2004) observation that the South African “success story” of the Makuleke community, who reclaimed land that fell within the boundaries of the Kruger National Park, was bound to the condition that the land would be used for conservation purposes.

During two decades of externally funded wildlife conservation, donors established a tight regime in terms of fund allocation and in-kind support where conservancies with considerable wildlife populations—translating into high tourism potential—were heavily favoured. The MCA-donor report on the CDSS project termed a group of conservancies (the Torra, Anabeb and Sesfontein Conservancies) in Kunene the “Big Three” based on their high-yielding tourism joint-ventures (MCA Namibia 2012:28). In the context of the CDSS project, neither MET nor NGO staff could influence which conservancies would be declared “target conservancies” and how grants would be allocated. Both heavily criticised this:

There is absolutely no equity in the way that we support conservancies. (Interview 25/NGO director)

It’s like promoting the unfair game. (Interview 7/MET warden)

Economic potential (“low-hanging fruits”) constituted the key attribute for inclusion and therefore a form of systematic, donor-driven favouring. Although this situation is rather obvious, it has not been appropriately scrutinised in the literature (as noted in section 4.5.3, Sullivan (2002) and Jones (1999b:iii) are an exemption). Rather, accounts of the overall achievements heavily feature in academic research.

The notion of inclusiveness/exclusiveness also became apparent at NGO level. Here, the prominence of NACSO, where membership somewhat legitimised an NGO’s status as a Namibian CBNRM support organisation, repeatedly surfaced in the interview data. If an NGO wanted to “come in” to support conservancies they were expected to follow a basic procedure such as consulting the ministry and “going through” NACSO:

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1995 Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas Policy
1996 Nature Conservation Amendment Act
You would ask to be invited to join NACSO and complete an application, present yourself, consult [NACSO] partners. We have a very much collaborative approach, we don't like companies coming in and just doing their own thing. […] I know some agencies, Peace Parks Foundation for one, AWF [African Wildlife Foundation] for another—there are probably many others that have tried to come in and possibly haven't followed the correct protocol procedures and probably got a cold shoulder. (Interview 9/ CBNRM consultant)

There is a lot of negativity sometimes around working with skills from outside our [NACSO member] NGOs. (Interview 12)

NACSO’s director as well as several member NGOs mentioned the problem of “black sheep”, that is ineffective or, even worse, dubious NGOs, and hence the importance of one “regulatory” body through which bad practice/conduct could be addressed. As such, NACSO constituted not only a forum to participate but also acted as gatekeeper and could thus exclude or dismiss NGOs.

Lastly, the inclusion–exclusion dichotomy was also reflected at local conservancy level where only communities that had the consent of their traditional leaders could in fact proceed with an application. Although the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002 significantly reduced the powers of traditional leaders (cf. section 4.3.2) who previously held the sole authority over land allocation, the newly established communal land boards would only consider applications for conservancy formation after the traditional authority had approved and demarcated communal land (Behr et al 2015). In the event of “tribal issues”, for instance in a situation where members of the same conservancy were affiliated with two competing traditional authorities (cf. section 6.4.3), the community stood almost no chance to form a CBO.

The underlying common thread of these patterns of inclusion and exclusion is that precisely those institutions that were targeted as beneficiaries—the conservancies themselves—had very little or in fact no means to exercise influence. Overall, this underlined the interventionist nature of CBNRM in Namibia where conservancies’ development pathways were largely shaped by exogenous forces.

In view of the research question “What are the structures and processes of CBNRM support provision by NGOs” the foregoing suggests that there are at least two distinct dimensions pertaining to NGO service provision. On the one hand, there are the explicit “generalizable procedures” (Giddens 1979, 1984) structuring the relationship between funding donors and their implementing agents. In the Namibian case, it is essentially one large international NGO which channels funds to the various smaller national NGOs who directly administer grants and in-kind support to conservancies. Here, the rules (targets and outcomes of development interventions and corresponding results-based reporting) are dictated and resources (grants and in-kind support) are controlled by the funding donors to whom implementing NGOs report. Overall, Namibian CBNRM support is structured based on an upwards accountability (Fowler 1985). Still, on the other hand, taking into consideration the more covert, subtle spheres of influence of the extensive network of support NGOs, the data support the argument that, despite being enmeshed in structural coercion, NGOs retain a certain
degree of autonomy. At national level, NGOs generated their own “intermediary space” for brokering CBNRM support. By forming membership institutions like NACSO, thus creating their own barriers and rules of conduct, support NGOs effectively structure this domain and create a form of self-rule. Furthermore, the Namibian NGO scene exhibits what Edwards (2002) refers to as “NGO learning”. Several senior Namibian NGO employees emphasised that not only conservancies but they as support organisations “grew up too” (Interview 14/NACSO director). “Being creative” (Interview 25/IRDNC director) and manipulating donor objectives so that they become more closely aligned to what they think is needed, or even neglecting donor money altogether (Interview 13/senior WWF advisor) illustrates a pattern of strategic conduct based on a transformative “joint process of learning” (Long 2001:183).

7.3 CBNRM Assumptions and Contradictions

The underlying principle for selecting the two case studies (cf. section 3.3.2.1 theoretical sampling) was based on their integral differences in terms of NGO support provision and the profoundly different ownership structures of their respective joint-venture tourism enterprises. Despite these differences, structural coding exposed strong parallels regarding the respective conservancy-specific challenges. Paradoxically, all of them are in actual fact undermining fundamental CBNRM conditions. The following demonstrates how wildlife, traditional leadership, conservancy management committees (CMC) governance, the manager and tourism business development are all caught up in an inherently contradictory fashion where one essential CBNRM condition is always undermined by another.

7.3.1 Contradiction I: Wildlife

Benefits from wildlife or internalising the cost of living with wildlife?

This research deliberately did not tackle benefits/benefit distribution and wildlife perceptions/human wildlife conflict. They have been extensively addressed in the CBNRM literature (cf. section 2.3.1) and, more importantly, they were not considered an essential variable to determine CBO-NGO interaction. Yet, respondents from all different stakeholder groups repeatedly referred to both aspects, often in relation to each other, as the main reason for conservancy members’ dissatisfaction and the greatest future challenge to CBOs and the Namibian CBNRM programme in general. Incidents with the growing elephant population at ≠Khoadi //Hôas are “increasing to a point where I can feel the frustration of the community in area meetings” (Interview 10/field NGO). Apart from “problem lions”, it is elephants, buffalos and hippos that are the main cause for crop damage in Wuparo. The data unveiled a notable contrast in conservancy members’ opinions. While all CBO representatives agreed that wildlife
conservation is essential, during the majority of informal conversations with ordinary conservancy residents (twelve accounts captured in fieldnotes) they expressed discontent and even resentment after two decades of CBNRM-induced wildlife preservation. Their statements all echoed that animal welfare is prioritised over people’s safety and well-being. Kahler and Gore’s study of local perceptions of risk and human-wildlife conflict in Wuparo and the neighbouring Dzoti Conservancy indicates high perception of risk, “specifically fear for personal and familial safety and increased labor burdens” (2015:56). Child and Barnes (2010: 285) note that “CBNRM is seen as a process of developing economic intuitions that internalize the cost and benefits of land use” (also Jones and Barnes 2006). Legislation is underpinning this by specifying that managing human-wildlife conflict and reimbursing communal area residents for loss and damage is the responsibility of conservancies (National Policy on Human-Wildlife Conflict Management, MET 2009). More critically, CBNRM functions as a mechanism to transfer associated costs of wildlife conservation and maintenance to local conservancy level (Sullivan 2002). That ≠Khoadi //Hôas stipulates fuel discounts to members pumping water for elephants and subsidies for water point construction as benefits can also be interpreted as placation or somewhat of a token benefit. Furthermore, compensations for wildlife-induced damage or loss considerably reduce the volume of “real” member benefits.

Direct wildlife revenue constitutes a major source of conservancy income. Kahler and Gore (2015) calculate that annual revenue from legal hunting mostly outweighs the cost of crop damage, however, 75% (n=56) of Wuparo members did not perceive its distribution to be fair and equal. Considering the larger size of ≠Khoadi //Hôas of approximately 3,600 beneficiaries, senior conservancy representatives admitted that per capita benefits “are a problem” (Interview 3/CMC secretary). Hence, the two case studies support a number of core critiques formulated in section 2.3.1: costs and benefits of biodiversity conservation are often not evenly distributed, with the cost of living with wildlife, in particular, likely to outweigh the benefits (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Jones and Mosimane 2000, Nott et al 2004, Suich 2013). Ultimately, the data reflects the critique that the equation of wildlife with benefits is an oversimplification (Boggs 2004, Child 2004a) as benefits, their distribution and socio-economic and ecological aspects are “uncritically melted together” (Scalon and Kull 2009:76).

CBNRM’s core objective is wildlife protection, yet the associated costs of living with wildlife pose the greatest threat to community-based wildlife conservation. This contradiction was also reflected in the way in which donor support was often determined by wildlife occurrence. NACSO’s director suggested that the ultimate attribute for donor support was wildlife (as opposed to well-governed CBOs). Thus a conservancy would receive money even if it is known that its institutional setup is seriously flawed:

If this conservancy was in another place or if this wildlife was in another place—I would be so happy! […] Donors hate them [ill-governed conservancies] but we need to keep money rolling there to keep our wildlife going, you know? (Interview 14)
7.3.2 Contradiction II: Traditional Leaders

Traditional leaders can de facto hold conservancies to ransom

Namibian conservancies were deliberately structured as community institutions where traditional leaders would be granted a “patrons only” status (Campbell and Shackleton 2001) in an attempt to “modernise” (Corbett and Jones 2000:5) and to avoid “chief-based conservation” (Murphree 2001:194), a situation where traditional leaders appropriate the revenue from natural resource management for themselves. Similarly, CBNRM policies do not make any provision for official links with regional councils to prevent them from hijacking benefits (cf. section 4.3.2).

Apart from the representation of one traditional leader on the ≠Khoadi //Hôas CMC who has no voting right (“who shall be ex officio members” (≠Khoadi //Hôas 2008:14)) and three indunas on the Wuparo CMC, acting as advisors to the chief, there is no formally recognised institutional link between the CBOs and the traditional authority. While the direct enquiry about the relationship between the respective conservancies and their traditional leaders prompted interviewees to reinforce their good relationships, in both cases, issues relating to income generation strongly emerged as potentially serious threats to the CBO. The key concern of the ≠Khoadi //Hôas representatives was that the /Gaio Daman Traditional Authority resettled outsiders on conservancy territory without consulting them and ignoring existing conservancy zonation plans. Behr et al note that land allocation to those who are able to pay “tobaco”, considered by traditional leaders more a gift than a bribe (2015:463), is essentially a consequence of the arbitrary land allocation reform under the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002. While the reform de jure limited the powers of traditional authorities and strengthened the position of the state, is has “provoked (inefficient) struggles over competencies” (Behr et al 2015:465). Interestingly, the ≠Khoadi //Hôas representatives clearly associated traditional leaders with being “on the part of the government” (Interview 4) and “the custodians for the government” (Interview 3). At Wuparo, the traditional authority initially obstructed the joint-venture negotiations between the conservancy and the private investor. Only through intensive mediation by IRDNC, clarifying how benefits would incur to them, did they finally approve of having a lodge on communal land. In 2014, three years after the lodge opened, the operator expressed strong concern about the situation where Wuparo Conservancy apparently withheld the traditional authorities’ share of his monthly payments.

Albeit in a different way, traditional leaders of ≠Khoadi //Hôas and Wuparo interfered with and exercised pressure on the conservancy, specifically with regards to income generation. In both cases, they were reportedly “not happy” with their share of revenue derived from natural resource management which, pre-conservancy legislation, was “traditionally” captured by them. Their theoretical “patrons only” status is contradicted by CBNRM practice. The research data thus mirrors the problematic circumstance where the objective of devolution (cf. section 2.4)
fosters the competition for benefits between “old” and “new” institutions (Campbell and Shackleton 2001, Koch 2004).

The research data revealed rather nuanced attitudes from conservancy representatives towards their traditional leaders. In Kunene, there seemed overall to be less intense obedience. A number of times, interviewees pointed out that traditional leaders needed to earn the respect of the community. Corbett and Jones (2000:15) attribute weaker influence by traditional authorities to the more dispersed settlement patterns rooted in colonial land distribution. The fact that many leaders are based in distant urban areas seemed to further distance them from their constituency. Especially CMC interviewees stressed that, contrary to the traditional authority, their CMC is “full of educated people”, taking decisions in a transparent manner (Interview 2/chairman). Keulder cites poor communication and often illiterate leaders who are increasingly seen as “backward” and “custodians of tribalism” (2000:165) as factors that further erode traditional leaders’ status in post-independence Namibia.

The “social fabric” in Zambezi appeared to be different as the geographic as well as mental proximity of traditional leaders seemed omnipresent. The history of strong traditional leadership in Zambezi is well-acknowledged (Behr et al 2015, Kangumu 2008, Silva and Mosimane 2014). In the case of Wuparo, Muyengwa et al (2014:179) assess that “this power is often exerted in subtle ways” where traditional leaders frequently interrupt conservancy processes from which they were deliberately excluded. Contrary to ≠Khoadi //Hôas, Wuparo representatives uniformly stated that the conservancy “could not go anywhere” if traditional leadership would not approve. The respective support NGOs act accordingly. In Kunene, interaction between NGOs and traditional leaders is limited to informing and (less often) inviting them. In Zambezi, IRDNC has very close connections with traditional leaders, still they need “to lobby the traditional authority in whatever you are doing that you get their support.” (Interview 26/IRDNC field director)

7.3.3 Contradiction III: Managers

Managers are expected to run conservancies but are ill-equipped to do so

The role of the conservancy manager manifesting itself as a key challenge in both case studies is, at least partially, attributed to the coincidental timing where, at the time of research, the manager of the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy planned to resign and the Wuparo manager had left this position the previous year. The consistency with which all different actor groups expressed the significance of managers as drivers of conservancy progress was remarkable— even more so in light of the fact that the CBNRM literature has virtually overlooked this critical position. Existing literature has, almost by default, emphasised the role of committees as principal mechanism for community participation and governance. Yet, research tackling commercial CBNRM enterprises, and tourism business venture in particular, frequently
identifies “bad” or lack of management skills as one of the principal reasons for business failure (Mbaiwa 2003, 2005, Nyahunzvi 2010, Sebele 2010). The case studies showed that apart from being critical to enterprise development and management, managers are the principal link between the CMC as the governing body and permanent conservancy employees. Staff supervision and management constitute an important duty of the manager. At #Khoadi //Hôas, the manager powerfully emerged as an outstanding leader, largely contributing to the common perception that it is the most well-run conservancy in Kunene (Interview 10/field-based NGO) and one of the national CBNRM icons. Conversely, donor reports on Wuparo highlighted poor staff management and IRDNC field staff explained that the loss of the manager “is going to keep Wuparo stagnant for a while” (Interview 27, 29).

The last MCA donor report of 2013, published a few months before the CDSS project would phase out, found that “the fact that very few conservancies have capable managers is a major concern and is one of the main impediments to sustainable growth of the conservancy movement” (MCA Namibia 2013b:59). The CDSS Project Coordinator for Kunene heavily criticised the projects for being somewhat obsessed with training CMC members while “support to managers is sorely lacking” (Interview 10). Personal requirements and skills to run community institutions, which in the case of #Khoadi //Hôas and Wuparo, evolved into complex, multi-million dollar enterprises, are high (cf. section 4.6.1). NGOs are trying to fill the gap between real job needs and the required grade 12 education deemed completely insufficient by providing managers with extensive trainings. Once individuals have been “topped up” with experience and skills they leave the low-pay high-demand position as they now qualify for better paid positions. Moving on in their lives and careers and wanting to secure better paid jobs were the reasons given by #Khoadi //Hôas’ actual and Wuparo’s pervious manager as to why they would leave/have left.

7.3.4 Contradiction IV: Conservancy Committees

Rotating CMCs are counterproductive to consistent business leadership

Although the assessment of equitable and inclusive CMC representation was not a research objective per se, the review of case-specific reports and case study data support the (often related) problematic issues of misrepresentation and misappropriation. The local teacher elite at #Khoadi //Hôas continues to dominate CMC composition. The current chairman, a teacher from Anker, one of the two “conservancy power-centres”, was re-elected in 2012 after he was forced (as per constitution) to leave the committee as he had already served two consecutive five-year terms from 1998 to 2008. Due to the one-year terms at Wuparo and subsequently high turnover (and much less published research), I cannot make a qualified comment on CMC representation. Nevertheless, Wuparo representatives frequently referred to the “old” power-centres of Sangwali and Samalabi (cf. section 6.4.1). The manager noted that
under the dashboard system, dividing Wuparo into eight zones which all receive their own annual budget, some areas would always perform strongly while others are weak and “struggling behind”. One founding member complained that people from Sangawali and Samalabi “were always favoured” during elections for CMC portfolio positions and in being chosen as employees in the different tourism enterprises.

Apart from the allegedly uneven representation, a number of factors indicate that both conservancies operate in an environment characterised by poor/non-consultation between ordinary members and the conservancy office. Several authors found that the small, constant power league at #Khoadi //Hôas dominates decision-making (Jones 1999a, 2006, Schiffer 2004b, Taye 2008 and Vaughan and Katjiua 2002). Also, a small group of people have accumulated an astonishing amount of NGO trainings reinforcing their status as conservancy experts. At Wuparo, the adoption of the dashboard system has created eight mini-committees working alongside the general CMC; both NGO and conservancy representatives expressed concerns over a situation where different zones now seemed to compete or rather constrict access of other zone members to their individual zone projects and resources. It transpired that these new bureaucratic structures are absorbing considerable amounts of Wuparo’s income for sitting allowances and that the various beneficiaries simply ignored the constitution and increased per diems without their members’ approval (Muyengwa et al 2014). Hence, Muyengwa and Kangueehi’s (2013) rationale that smaller, more “manageable”, units of representation are better (Jones 1999b, Jones and Murphree 2001, Murphree 1993) overlooked the issue that, regardless of size, the tendency for misappropriation by leaders remains the same. Overall, the underlying issues of distance between leaders and members, resulting misrepresentation and poor or non-consultation mirrors experience from previous research (cf. section 2.3.1) on skewed decision-making and distribution of income from CBNRM (Béné et al 2009, Kamoto et al 2013, Rihoy et al 2010, Sebele 2010, Sithole 2004).

The key contradiction that emerged from the case studies relates to the actual workings of the CMC. Albeit at different intervals, the CMC rotates. The research data revealed two fundamentally different attitudes towards the function of the CMC. At #Khoadi //Hôas, the two defining attributes emerged as consistency and knowledgeability. Having skills was seen as the precondition to serve the conservancy. Contrary to that, the Wuparo case provided strong indication that the CMC was understood as a vehicle for community participation in the organisation. Although their constitution makes provision for five consecutive terms, “the committee changes, like almost every year” (Interview 15/former manager). Having “eaten enough” was an analogy used several times by CBO and NGO representatives alike to explain why CMC members were not re-elected; it also suggests individual gain, through receiving sitting allowances. Furthermore, IRDNC staff and the former manager clearly condemned that there are “no procedures” and no criteria for eligibility based on qualifications such as literacy.
and experience (4.6.1). Missing continuity and procedures were considered main causes for Wuparo’s record of poor financial management. While #Khoadi //Hôas is recognised for being well-governed and organised, senior Windhoek-based NGO staff were strongly concerned about the fact that CMC members are effectively members of the board of directors of the community-owned Grootberg Lodge. The fact that CMC members rotate, they argued, makes strategic business leadership more vulnerable to fluctuations.

The CBNRM literature acknowledges the transition from first generation conservancies, mainly engaged in wildlife monitoring, to second generation conservancies, associated with more refined legal rights and accountable representation (Child 2004a). However, there seems to be no critical reflection on the condition that “old” conservancies have reached a level of business complexity where organisational structures need to be adapted accordingly. Considering #Khoadi //Hôas and Wuparo’s strong focus on tourism as core income-generating activity, “enterprise-based conservation” seems the more appropriate term than “community-based conservation”. Accordingly, the actual function of the CMC needs to be (re-)evaluated: is it a mechanism for community participation and thus mainly political representation or should it function as a body to ensure consistent, strategic leadership and governance of the conservancy’s social enterprises? Currently, CMC members primarily function as political leaders who represent their peoples. This potentially undermines the viability of conservancies which have become increasingly aligned to social enterprises—while their leadership was not.

7.3.5 Contradiction V: Tourism

CBOs heavily depend on external facilitation for tourism development

In 2013, 74% of #Khoadi //Hôas’ income was generated by the community-owned Grootberg Lodge. Due to their exorbitantly high revenue from trophy hunting, the share of Wuparo’s joint-venture lodge was only 5% of total income. These figures underline the significance of joint-venture lodges on the one hand and, in the case of high volume wildlife, conservancies’ overreliance on consumptive tourism on the other. Especially in view of Botswana’s hunting ban in early 2014, when virtually all CBOs lost their main revenue stream contributing between 70 and 90% of income69, Namibian NGOs strongly promoted non-consumptive tourism (Ashley and Jones 2001, Boudreaux and Nelson 2010, Snyman 2012, cf. section 4.5.1) as an alternative to trophy hunting. At the last day of the bi-annual meeting, IRDNC’s institutional manager addressed the attendees:

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69 Informal conservation with Frank Limbo, manager of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT), at the bi-annual meeting in 2014. CECT was the first CBO in Botswana and has been widely cited in the (Botswana) CBNRM literature.
Zambia has a hunting ban. Now Botswana has. You must be prepared! If you see the fire is coming from that side, you must also check and turn around—it might also come from your side. You must be prepared to change from hunting to safari tourism. (Interview 28)

The MCA-funded CDSS project (the fourth major CBNRM support phase, cf. section 4.4.2) which started in 2008 marked a clear shift in anticipated programme outcomes and corresponding provision of support services. While the three preceding programme phases had focussed on natural resource management and institutional governance, MCA put a strong emphasis on tourism enterprise development in communal conservancies. Table 18 shows that technical assistance for *Business and Tourism* outweighs the other two principal CBNRM support categories. Since then, NGOs functioned as principal “tourism knowledge brokers” to CBOs, which had little or no exposure to industry-specific planning and management skills (Halstead 2003, Lapeyre 2010, Murphy 2003). The specific objective of the CDSS project was to build tourism capacity within conservancies to better position them to attract private investments in non-consumptive tourism enterprises (MCA Namibia 2015).

Various stakeholders confirmed that the MET had virtually no tourism capacity in their own ranks. Section 4.4.1 illustrated how the NGO-MET relationship and scope of influence gradually transformed. While well-funded and staffed NGOs were, albeit unofficially, the principal CBNRM drivers for the first decade of the national programme, government expertise, project funds and resources of the MET considerably increased—except in the tourism field. Aware of the fact that there is a vacuum of tourism knowledge in the ministry, in early 2014, posts for *Regional Tourism Coordinators* in the respective regions were advertised.

Khoadi //Hôas’ and Wuparo’s joint-venture partners strongly emphasised the significance of the WWF and IRDNC in facilitating their business partnerships. Conservancy representatives repeatedly reinforced that they need NGO support for tourism enterprise-building. Whereas Wuparo’s “classic” low-involvement, low-risk agreement resembles the preferred joint-venture model by the majority of NGOs, the strong disagreement over the Grootberg Lodge model is intrinsically related to operational management and ownership of the conservancy.

The contradictory nature of tourism as the key source of income operates at different spheres. On the one hand, in order to become more independent from hunting revenue, conservancies rely heavily on NGO support for entering into and maintaining joint-venture partnerships. One the other hand, despite heavily promoting tourism, NGOs want to shield conservancies from the associated risks of fully engaging in tourism and therefore stipulate low-reward, “passive” ownership models. This largely confirms what others have identified as project-planners’ reluctance to hand over full project responsibility (cf. section 2.6.2) in order to protect communities from the associated risks (Boardman 2006, Hussein 1995, Michener 1998, Twyman 2000).
What can be drawn from these contradictions? Strikingly, the primary contentious issues always pertain to the underlying themes of marketization of natural resources and the income-driven rationale of CBNRM:

- Commodification of wildlife and internalising the cost of living with wildlife
- Competing for sources of income with traditional leaders
- Managers as drivers for conservancy and enterprise building
- The CMC as governing body for financial management and benefit distribution
- Tourism joint-ventures as key source of income/alternative to relying on hunting

As such, the emergent contradictions powerfully mirror the neoliberal logic of CBNRM (cf. section 2.2.1) based on the orthodox of focussing on markets to ensure biodiversity conservation (Brockington et al 2008, Harvey 2005, Holden 2013) and the necessity for private sector investment and involvement (Büscher and Whande 2007, Ferraro and Kiss 2002, Kiss 2004). At the same time, it ignores inherent power structures at local level. Considering the sheer volume of trainings and technical assistance which are integral to the CBNRM support design, this also connects to the wider criticism of NGO intervention mostly tackling “technical issues” while ignoring underlying structural inequalities (Banks and Hulme 2012, Cleaver 1999, Ferguson 1990, Navarro-Flores 2011, White 1996).

In view of the initial research question “What are the defining organisational structures of CBOs and where are the principal points of interaction with NGOs?” the identification of these contradictions helps to reflect on how NGO support facilitates conservancy-building. In four out of five aspects (except traditional leadership) NGO training is deemed highly relevant and reflects the three key CBNRM categories of Namibian support NGOs: (1) natural resource management, (2) institutional development and governance and (3) business and tourism. In section 4.6.1 it was argued that CBOs need to be further differentiated into procedures, people and purpose to allow a meaningful analysis. With regards to procedures, the analysis showed that the way in which CBOs are structured (based on rotating committees serving as a catalyst for community participation) is not conducive to the strategic governance of the increasingly complex business side of conservancies. The crucial importance of people powerfully emerged from the two case studies where the capacity of a number of individuals is critical to ensure continuous functioning of the organisation. This again is reflected in the degree to which trainings and technical assistance is designed where CMC and staff members are principal CBNRM training targets (Table 18 lists the 13 individual technical assistance modules as per CDSS project design). NGO support thus constitutes itself—quite literally—on a technical level where certain conservancy representatives are bestowed with CBNRM knowledge in order to advance conservancy development.
Table 18: Technical assistance

**Natural Resource Management**
- Event Book system
- Management planning and zoning
- Natural resource management rules and regulations
- Human wildlife conflict mitigation

**Institutional Development and Governance**
- Governance
- Financial management
- Management planning and implementation
- Staff management

**Business and Tourism**
- Basic business
- Financial sustainability plans
- Tourism joint-venture development
- Legal technical assistance
- Tourism SME product development

Source: MCA Namibia 2011a

7.4 The Interplay of CBNRM Knowledge and CBO Knowledgeability

7.4.1 NGO-Induced Knowledge

To go through the process of becoming a conservancy you need technical assistance. And that can only come from NGOs who know exactly what is required. (Interview 15/previous CBO manager)

The above quote represents a prevailing shared belief enunciated by virtually all conservancy representatives: in order to become, maintain and advance as a conservancy “the help from the NGOs is inevitable” (Interview 3/CMC member). Values coding exposed the elementary assumption—not challenged a single time—that knowledge about “right” information, decisions and actions comes from NGOs. In connection to this, CMC and staff members repeatedly and consistently articulated two obligations. Firstly, it is their duty to approach NGOs “whenever we need something” (Interview 1/manager) and secondly, that NGOs have to provide support (cf. Appendix 5.2 “CBO expectations”). At the same time, conservancy representatives, in particular at #Khoadi //Hôus, struck me as self-confident and very much aware that the overreliance on NGOs was not conducive to the long-term viability of their conservancy and especially the community enterprises. This somewhat perplexing situation was approached by employing Gaventa’s notion of space, tackling relational aspects precisely where interaction actually happens; “spaces’ are seen as opportunities, moments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions and relationships that affect their lives and interests” (2006:26). Whereas the political window of opportunity and subsequent “CBNRM policy spaces” were discussed in section 4.3, the specific arena for CBO-NGO interaction is located at the training interface. This space has been created by virtue of the heavy technical assistance necessary for establishing “new” CBNRM
institutions and, as such, it is essentially a space for participation by conservancy members and constitutes the main exchange modality between NGOs and CBOs.

In the previous section and in the case studies it was shown that, in accordance with their respective positions, every single CMC and staff member continuously receives trainings and more focused technical assistance. Having knowledge or lacking knowledge (knowing/understanding, skills, education and capacity were the common alternative notations used) was cited with remarkable consistency for either conservancy success or failure. Most Wuparo interviewees mentioned being able to see as a result of trainings as they “open the mind”; remarkably, Taye’s research on #Khoadi //Hôas generated the exact same response, he cites one of his respondents explaining “the training I have received has given me a chance to open up my eyes to new things” (2006:31). Precisely the association of having knowledge as a precondition to participate in the conservancy was always equated with NGO training input and technical assistance:

We got all the trainings and all the knowledge from NGOs. (Interview 5b/game guard)

I don’t want to blow my own whistle too much but today you have got people with knowhow at our CMC and tomorrow you won’t have—and then you will need NGOs for training and capacity building. (Interview 2/CBO chairman)

In practice, the continuous training delivery/input puts considerable stress on both the providers and consumers of CBNRM knowledge. The sheer volume of trainings presents a delivery challenge faced by field-NGOs in particular who are under great pressure to execute trainings based on predetermined project schedules. Section 6.4 made reference to the overburdened and apparently exhausted field-NGOs.

We are behind [CDSS project] delivery schedule, trying to squeeze everything in. It’s expensive for conservancies which pay sitting allowances [to CMC members]. I need to keep people in Windhoek happy and I need to keep these people happy. (Interview 10/CDSS project coordinator)

At the same time, project-planners automatically assume availability of their beneficiaries. CMC members, for instance, who are not permanent employees and often have “real” jobs, cannot be expected to volunteer their time for monthly trainings. Also, their compensation with per diems, basically an incentive to ensure attendance, further increases the already high overhead costs of conservancies. This problematic issue has been pointed out in section 2.4 where Twyman’s observation that allowances “have in themselves become a livelihood option” (1998:765) was cited. The anticipation that training delivery and attendance automatically translate into the desired knowledge outcomes is somewhat short-sighted.

One key issue is the development of what may be called ‘training fatigue’. Our original plans, as submitted in the Inception Report, were to deliver the bulk of the formal training in the first two years of the programme, and following this with related technical assistance. It has become clear that conservancy committees and staff are not able to absorb this level of support. (MCA Namibia 2011c:39)

Markedly, the donor report states that the recipients are unable to digest support while the actual programme design is not scrutinised accordingly. In this context, Islam’s critique (cf.
where “development projects get unquestioned acceptance, and if the project fails, blame goes to the local people as if they are not ready for the development” (2009:31) becomes painfully obvious.

It was stressed several times that, within the Namibian CBNRM framework, NGOs are mandated to build CBO capacity. Due to rotating CMCs and staff members that tend to leave after having received extensive trainings, NGOs constantly have to retrain their successors. Somewhat ironically, the core activity of various Namibian implementing NGOs is to execute trainings, consequently they are under permanent pressure to ensure a sufficient skill base. Especially when entire CMCs are fired or when new members are elected after only a year or two, having to retrain strongly emerged as a major source of frustration from virtually all field-based NGO staff interviewed.

They [conservancy members] have to re-elect and then us, we have to retrain […]. You move with all your skills and all your documents—and we have to start from the scratch. (Interview 26/field NGO)

As per constitution (cf. section 4.6.1) conservancy members make use of their right to dismiss CMC members. While the continuity in governance at #Khoadi //Hôas is (once again) exceptional, the Wuparo experience has shown that annual rotation is not unusual (albeit it is not clear if this is predominantly due to dissatisfaction or rather the members’ attitude towards a “community project” as discussed in section 6.4.1 “The dashboard system”). Overall, there is much greater turnover in CMCs than there is in NGOs. Figure 20 illustrates how the reliance on training becomes a liability and how NGOs, who are maintaining this need, are tasked to continuously serve training requirements—a vicious circle considering the growing number of conservancies and CMC/staff fluctuation and the fact that NGOs have to scale down due to less donor-funding.
NGO training as fundamental premise to participate in CBNRM

NGOs are heavily investing in individual capacity, every CMC/staff member receives ongoing training

Once qualified, staff members tend to leave for more attractive positions; CMCs rotate, entire committees are being fired at AGMs

Conservancies cannot function without trained people/NGO-induced CBNRM knowledge, conservancy operations suffer when trained people leave

Source: Author’s own illustration

7.4.2 CBNRM Knowledgeability by CBOs

While the ramifications of the previous section may infer that conservancies are, albeit unintentionally, somehow being made dependent on continuous NGO support through trainings and technical assistance, insufficient attention has been paid to the CBO members’ space for actively shaping their exchange relationship with their support NGOs (which is somewhat symptomatic for assessments of development projects where the rural poor are often seen as mere receivers or the “to-be-developed” (Hobart 1993, also Finnström 1997, Hall and Tucker 2004, cf. section 2.6.2).

Naturally, 15 years of CBNRM experience by conservancies and their subsequent collective project memory influences the manner in which support is consumed and how ongoing and future project provision is negotiated. Values coding (cf. section 3.4, this type of coding sought to expose underlying attitudes, beliefs and perceptions) uncovered a strong culture of expecting support, including considerable financial contributions, on an ongoing, ideally indefinite basis despite a CBO being considered mature and financially self-sufficient:

They cannot just withdraw and disappear, they have to still come back […] because things get old, if this table gets old I have to replace it—so I get this money from the NGO. (Interview 4/≠Khoadi //Hôas staff)

Years ago IRDNC managed to give us a grant close to 400.000 [N$]. So in the future we still expect the same assistance from NGOs. (Interview 17/Wuparo staff)
Here, CBO members’ consistent reasoning that NGOs simply have to support conservancies is striking (cf. Appendix 5.1–5.3/section 6.4 and the use of modal auxiliary verbs). Equally remarkable is the certitude with which CBO members assume future support—even if the format of NGO assistance would cease.

NGOs will struggle at end of the day but somebody will support the conservancies. (Interview 2/CMC member)

When they [NGOs] quit out we can expect another organisation will come […] Then we are set. Then all our problems or our claims will have to go directly to that organisation that will take over […] We never say that we can just go for ourselves. (Interview 18/CBO staff)

Continuous, somewhat unconditional support to conservancies fostered a state where conservancies, as one would expect, continue to rely on getting resources and the “right” information:

We can think on our own but, after thinking on our own, we call them [IRDNC] to help us to give us advice. (Interview 16/CBO staff)

In this context, NACSO’s director stressed that:
Sometimes I think there is a bit of a misunderstanding in terms of what it is the NGO is supposed to deliver […] It’s always been taken that NGOs will come and they will build our capacity. Conservancies would just sit there and wait—ok when are these people [NGOs] going to come so that we can have meetings? (Interview 14)

The Wuparo case demonstrated how the Zambezi conservancies tend to rely on their mother NGO in terms of transport provision and even administration (cf. section 6.5, the MET warden and IRDNC staff heavily criticised conservancies for de facto outsourcing administrative obligations to their field NGO). ≠Khoadi //Hôas requested legal advice and effectively handed conflict resolution over to the WWF when their joint-venture agreement started to cause tensions.

Data analysis of both case studies suggests that conservancy representatives possess high project knowledgeability. Often attributed to project-planners by default, the ≠Khoadi //Hôas representatives themselves powerfully deployed the discourse of 100% community-ownership and the conservancy-driven forum for integrated resource management (FIRM) approach. This strongly and repeatedly surfaced during formal interviews, observations/fieldnotes and especially at the conservancy workshop held in Windhoek in 2013 facilitated by WWF/NACSO (it was in fact then, after listening to the chairman and the manager “celebrating” their unique status, that I was myself captivated by this particular “success story”). The ≠Khoadi //Hôas’ chairman, in particular, took advantage of the rhetoric of black economic empowerment; in vivo coding of his interview transcript exposed strong and consistent “politicised” language. Moreover, various conservancy members demonstrated profound awareness of the workings of NGOs and project requirements and how this affects funding cycles. Especially reciprocal relations where adhering to the rules allows the conservancy to progress in return were clearly articulated by key staff/committee members:
Only conservancies that met certain criteria are assisted, you cannot bring your side—you can forget about assistance (Interview 2/chairman).

If you need something you request and when you get something you have to report. (Interview 1/manager)

They [NGOs] have got the timetable in which they have to complete—*deliver! Spend the money!* Finish it and get the reports from you so that they can report to that person again and *request* again. So that’s why we come together with NGOs. First, for me it was very strange, you know, the NGO story. (Interview 4/former manager)

At first, Wuparo seemed much more reliant on NGO support provision than #Khoadi //Hôas, which reinforced the FIRM approach and the Grootberg model as affirmation of their independence. In a nutshell, Wuparo’s initially diagnosed state of dependency constituted itself on the attitude that somebody—in this case IRDNC—is going to do it *for us*. The circumstance that Wuparo, as one of the highest earning CBOs in Zambezi where conservancies obtain the highest wildlife quotas countrywide, relies on IRDNC for monthly bookkeeping services while they could source this amenity from an independent auditor helps to elucidate the phenomenon.

In section 6.5 it was deliberated that, apart from “real” technical and procedural dependency (where IRDNC needs to authorise financial plans and documents for instance), there exists a much more complex dimension of *imagined* dependency. The former manager explained that after more than 15 years of extensive support “NGOs have fed us *so much*” that CMC and staff members now “*feel we cannot* do things […] because we have been *used*, that they are the ones who can do it for us” (Interview 15). Also taking into consideration other observations, e.g. that IRDNC is being expected to provide transport to/from and food during meetings and workshops, this suggests that there is a deliberate, self-imposed form of dependency which is essentially a strategy to secure future support despite being mature and financially self-sufficient. This indicates that Wuparo actively—and purposefully—chooses to rely on IRDNC.

In this context, a field-NGO explained that it is not uncommon for conservancies to request NGO support merely out of convenience:

> The chairperson is calling you—please write me a letter for I want to invite MET to come and do whatever. In terms of that simple logistical support it’s up to you whether you say yes sure, I’ll do that for you or no! *Hell no*, that’s your manager’s job, why don’t you get the letter from your own office? It’s a pretty fine line if you allow conservancies to take advantage of you and your services. (Interview 10/field NGO)

In view of the disproportionately high financial and in-kind support that #Khoadi //Hôas and Wuparo have received and the recognition that both conservancies display high project knowledgeability and, consciously or not, deploy their own tactics to secure continuous support undermines the proposition that donors administer support in a unidimensional fashion where support simply “happens to” conservancies. Discussing this, and whether or not there is a more general underlying pattern in the way resources are disseminated, a CBNRM consultant elaborated:

> I would question whether it is the donors doing the chasing or whether it’s people on the ground using success that they have achieved to rally more support, it seems like a chicken and egg situation. (Interview 9)
7.5 Conceptualising Dependency As Two-Way Traffic

A meaningful analysis of actor relationships cannot be divorced from the system in which they take place—social relations do not exist independently of the structure that governs them (Harvey 2002). Section 7.2/Figure 19 recapitulated the formalised CBNRM structures and “control regimes” (Reed 2005:1639) of the development process based on formal rules and procedures. Against the background of authority and decision-making, and thus ultimately power, these structures largely present the observable processes of decision-making and what Gaventa describes as the “‘who, how and what’ of policymaking” (2006:29). Here, donors dictate the rules and control the flow of resources and it was shown that CBOs are largely excluded from negotiating their own interests. Building on the work of Lukes (1974), Gaventa refers to this as the first—visible—form of power. Contrary to that, hidden power is concerned with (political) agenda-setting where “some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out” (Schattschneider 1960:71). In the Namibian CBNRM programme this “mobilisation of bias” (Lukes 1974:20) pertains to wildlife conservation. In this second form of power the imperative of “living with wildlife” (WWF slogan) is essentially the underlying objective of “the rules of the game” (Gaventa 2006:29). In order to unpack the “generative mechanisms or structures” (Reed 2005:1623) that enable and constrain ongoing conservancy and NGO interaction, one needs to move from the macro view of development intervention to a micro level perspective. It is argued that here the third, invisible form of power that “shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation” (Gaventa 2006:29) is crucial as it determines CBNRM meaning and what is considered acceptable CBNRM practice. Figure 21 illustrates how, in accordance the critical realist assumption (Bhaskar 1986 drawing on Giddens’ (1979, 1984) structuration theory), human behaviour is both the product and reproduction of social structure.

**Figure 21: CBO-NGO interaction and CBNRM project structure**

![Diagram](image)

Source: Based on Giddens (1979)

Long (1992) notes that the separation of intervening party and beneficiary is not conducive to the deconstruction of planned intervention. Drawing on Giddens’ notion of agency as action and “continuous flow of conduct” (1979:55), he insists that rural development is an “ongoing, socially constructed and negotiated process” (1992:35). In the following,
Trainings as the key “regularised act” (Giddens 1979:56) between CBOs and NGOs are conceptualised as principal CBNRM support modality.

Easton notes that the “most fundamental aim of critical realism” (2010:122) is to provide causal explanations to the observable patterns of events. Being largely invisible and not directly accessible, the underlying enabling and constraining mechanisms need to be theoretically constructed through conceptual abstraction (Blaikie 2000). As detailed in section 3.4, the causal-explanatory approach is structured in the format detailed in the below table:

**Table 19: Trainings as reciprocal dependency between CBOs and NGOs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed pattern</th>
<th>Evidence in data</th>
<th>Enabling/constraining mechanisms</th>
<th>Conceptualisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO dependent on training</td>
<td>Inexhaustible training need; Being able to “see”; Training addiction</td>
<td>Training imperative as participation modality</td>
<td>Inducing needs; Participatory orthodox</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO locked into training provision</td>
<td>Delivery pressure; Standardised training modules</td>
<td>Training as organising rule for CBNRM practice</td>
<td>Monopolisation of project knowledge; Compliance; Hegemony through norms and normalisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own graph

Rahnema uses the analogy of the rural poor being “patients” (2010:134) and NGO training their “treatment” to illustrate the tendency within rural development projects “to create induced and additive needs, many of which strongly condition the minds of their ‘target populations’” (Rahnema 2010:129). In the same vein, Mosse (2001) finds that “projects” and NGOs actively shape need perceptions by local people, Henkel and Stirrat (2001) note that training workshops bear a resemblance to religious meetings as they aim to control peoples’ thinking. Overall, this reflects the criticism on the participatory orthodox in development intervention (cf. sections 2.3.1 and 2.6.2) and the conditioning of the minds of the project targets by “influencing how individuals think” (Gaventa 2006:29). Drawing on Gramsci (1971), Lukes third dimension of power is deeply rooted in the notion of “ideological hegemony” (2005:8) and how it is (mis-) used as a strategy to secure local peoples’ support by means of managing and containing dissent (Cleaver 1999, Hildyard et al 2001, Rahnema 2010, Taylor 2001). The fact that NGOs financially support conservancies (for example by covering the salaries of game guards, cf. sections 5.3.2 and 6.3.2) during the first years when the conservancy does not yet generate income actually translates into buying support from, and compliance by, the community for the fundamental objective of wildlife conservation. On a more general note, it is remarkable how the benefits-centred CBNRM literature somewhat systematically omits the aspect that benefits only start to materialise after a number of years.
The counterpart to induced needs pertains to the domain of knowledge intervention defining what is “normal, acceptable and safe” (Gaventa 2006:29). “Essential knowledge” for participating in CBNRM is organised in different standardised training modules which are exclusively designed by the NACSO members functioning as “toolboxes” and “getting the techniques right” (Cleaver 1999:608). In this context, Mosse (2001) asserts that development agents effectively “own” the process of knowledge acquisition. Thus, the norm for what is relevant and how CBNRM has to be practiced is determined by NGOs and is therefore heavily based on scientific expert knowledge as opposed to traditional environmental knowledge (TEK, cf. section 2.4) which, ironically, is largely missing in an approach to natural resource management that grounds itself in local peoples’ way of living with wildlife. Krott et al (2014) refer to a state where development agents are generally credited with providing “the right advice” (codes in Appendix 5.1 for “decision-making” unveil strong normative statements like “good”, “right” and “wrong” decisions). While IRDNC’s tourism coordinator insisted that “we don’t interfere [in decision-making], we open up options” (Interview 27), joint-venture tourism partnerships on communal land clearly reflect the NGOs’ strong preference for the low-risk, “classic” joint-venture model (Twyman found that government officials in Botswana promote “only certain avenues” for community development through CBNRM (2000:328)). Section 4.5.1 and both case studies showed that NGOs are de facto the sole providers of operator-conservancy contractual agreements. This echoes critical viewpoints on professional closure and monopolisation of project knowledge by NGOs as one of the leading groups in designing natural resource management projects (cf. section 2.6.1 Büscher and Whande 2007, Hulme and Murphree 2001) where their prominent role is stabilised by dominant information (Ribot 2001) and by virtue of their expert status (Franklin 2013).

Initially, the following research question was posed: “What are the implications of providing significant CBNRM support services to CBOs and in what way are NGO support services conducive to, and where do they hamper, the establishment of independent CBOs?” Trainings strongly emerged as the principal medium through which CBNRM rules and objectives are imparted on conservancy members since the 1990s. As such, they constitute the essential “generalizable procedures applied in the enactment of social practices” (Giddens 1979:61) between CBOs and NGOs. The following implications can be drawn from this:

♦ NGO trainings enable CBO development.
♦ Constant need for trainings constrain CBO independence.
♦ NGOs are pressured to deliver essential CBNRM knowledge to keep CBOs functioning.
NGO-induced, essential CBNRM knowledge constitutes conservancy members’ ticket to play a part in the CBO, therefore, almost by default, people continue to depend on NGO trainings to be able to participate in CBNRM. Paradoxically, trainings are thus enabling, as well as impeding, independent local institutions.

CBOs are both beneficiaries and targets of development intervention. It was established that NGOs need CBOs to implement the conservation agendas set by international donors (Ribot 2002a). In accordance with Giddens (1979) it is presumed that both consumers and providers of CBNRM projects possess knowledgeable about the overall structures of domination (the Namibian CBNRM programme design) and, particularly relevant in this context, “mutual knowledge” (Giddens 1984:375) where the behaviour of individual actions is connected to others’—hence knowledge and behaviour are not incidental. Section 7.4.2 established that CBO members retain high levels of project experience and knowledgeable. Table 20 illustrates the causal-explanatory approach used to trace mutual dependency based on the assumption that “skilful individual agents interpret and implement institutional agendas” Harvey (2002:71).

### Table 20: Dependency as two-way traffic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed pattern</th>
<th>Evidence in data</th>
<th>Enabling/constraining mechanisms</th>
<th>Conceptualisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CBO dependency on NGOs</td>
<td>“Real” procedural dependency; Joint-venture facilitation; “Imagined” or self-imposed dependency</td>
<td>Outside facilitation; Permanent mother NGOs</td>
<td>Project knowledgeable; Actor-centred perspective; Dialectic of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO dependency on CBOs</td>
<td>Creation of conservancy flagships; disproportionally high, uneven support</td>
<td>Reliance on CBOs to implement conservation agenda; Pressure to prove success</td>
<td>Planner-centred view; Networks of patronage; Interest and intention</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s own graph

In the context of Gaventa’s (2006) three forms of power, “real” procedural dependency (cf. section 6.5) is basically a form of visible power working in accordance with formal structures and rules. Conversely, “imagined” and self-imposed dependency is situated in the third, invisible form of power. Here, rural communities have appropriated project knowledge for themselves as they “learn to bend or reinvent the project” (Mosse 2001:385). Actor-oriented, largely ethnographic, approaches have tackled this “unusual type of knowledge” which is essentially a result of the bargaining process “between agency staff and villagers but ultimately is a collaborative product” (Mosse 2001:389). Michener’s case study of a non-formal education project in Burkina Faso initiated by Save the Children/USA offers a rare account where the receiving community is portrayed as a sophisticated consumer, actively seeking to “specifically establish a clientelistic relationship” (Michener 1998:2114) and thereby
exploiting passiveness and dependency. As described in section 2.6.2, especially in the community-based tourism literature, apathy and overreliance on external support has often been translated into communities being incapable as they lack local leadership and entrepreneurial spirit or display passiveness in general (Blackman et al 2004, Wilson et al 2001). Ascribing a more strategic underpinning to communities “apparent ignorance” (Chambers 1983:107) has been largely neglected in the CBNRM literature.

Markedly, Namibian CBNRM support NGOs consistently described themselves as “service providers” and the conservancies as their clients. At the same time, they criticised the attitude of CBOs whereby support NGOs are perceived as “being there to give them that service” (Interview 14/NACSO director). Data analysis revealed (much stronger in the case of Wuparo Conservancy though) what is best described as the CBO members’ obsession to involve their support NGO as “they must know” (Interview 20/CBO staff). Quotes like “I must need the help of IRDNC” (Interview 19/founding member) suggest that conservancy members actually feel obliged to involve their NGO. Michener’s research suggests that “co-option or manipulation from the bottom up is one way of participation, of meeting ones needs” (1998:2114) and as such development targets are actually pushing NGOs into paternalistic roles. The different extent to which the two studied conservancies use their client status to secure support is striking. While Wuparo, consciously or unconsciously, relies on its mother NGO for receiving steady support with minimal effort, ≠Khoadi //Hôas acquires support from whom they deem most appropriate—the outcome is the same: maximum assistance. Against this background, the strategic conduct by conservancies, that is “the ways in which agents apply knowledge regarding the manipulations of the resources to which they have access” (Giddens 1984:288), constitutes a powerful strategic bargaining tool.

Any view of power rests on some normative specific conceptions of interests. (Lukes 2005:38)

All explanations will involve at least implicit reference both to the purposive, reasoning behaviour of agents and to its intersection with constraining and enabling features. (Giddens 1984:179)

The issue of interests is central to both Lukes’ and Giddens’ conceptualisations of power and specifically how they affect enabling and impeding mechanisms. Based on the foregoing, CBOs principal objective is prolonged service provision. Effectively being an intermediary organisation, the NGO position is inherently ambivalent (Long 2004, section 2.6.1 made reference to the representation dilemma of NGOs) as they need to serve both donor requirements and client demands (arguably there is also a healthy amount of self-interest which would apply to almost any situation). By default, NGOs work in the interest of people and, especially in Namibian CBNRM, in favour of wildlife. Regarding the promotion of rural peoples’ interest, the theme of NGO ambivalence strongly emerged from the data: On the one hand, NGOs constantly underlined the crucial need for robust, independent CBOs, on the other
hand, the notion of having to shield local institutions from exposure to risk came in very strong (cf. section 5.5.2, the Grootberg models exemplifies the risky community ownership vs. safe private operator ownership divide). In the case of Wuparo, the dashboard system (cf. section 6.4.1, decentralisation of decision-making by means of giving zones budget and project responsibility) was heavily safeguarded by the NGO that collaborated with the group of scholars:

However, it is important to note that the researchers, together with NGOs and especially Namibia’s Legal Assistance Centre, played an important role in creating these changes and in protecting them for at least three years. This again illustrates the importance of key outsiders in creating and protecting space of local democratic processes, and in protecting the rights of ordinary people and marginalized groups to benefit from the revenue pie. (Muyenga et al 2014:191)

Giddens makes specific reference to the “non-intentional consequences of actions” (1979:71) where agents exercise power without intending to do so. Newmark and Hough’s review of wildlife conservation in Africa attests development agents an “unintentional promotion of dependency” (2000:589) by the manner in which integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) are structured.

NGO dependency on flagship conservancies like #Khoadi //Hôas and Wuparo translates into their protection. By drawing on Michener’s (1998) critique of a planner-centred approach to development, Twyman (1998, 2000) suspects that the orthodox of community participation in CBNRM projects is primarily a means for ensuring project success—and not people empowerment per se. If a conservancy collapses then “the project” would have failed too.

7.6 Conclusion

The discussion chapter approached the analysis and conceptualisation of CBO-NGO interaction from two different perspectives. The first two sections (7.2 and 7.3) tackled the structural CBNRM programme design emphasising its visible, discernible features of decision-making powers and authority. Drawing on Giddens’ structuration theory (1979, 1984) the systematic examination of the structural properties of Namibian CBNRM exposed an exogenous development process where the authority over rules and resource allocation was based on a hierarchical, top-down structure. Although donors controlled the modalities of development intervention, it was shown that NGOs created their own “intermediary space” which was mostly governed by the NACSO members’ own particular rules of conduct. In this context, it was revealed that not only Western donors but also the national NGO network operated in a markedly exclusionist fashion. With regards to the first research question, which tackled structures and processes of CBNRM support provision by NGOs, a key result of this discussion chapter was that NGOs could not influence which conservancies received support,
however, being the designated CBNRM experts and principal providers of support services, they had effectively monopolised the design of CBNRM knowledge, that is the contents of the various training modules and technical assistance.

The exposure of strong, consistent contradictions, all of them closely aligned to income-generation, (financial) governance and management capabilities of individual CBO members, revealed an overall fragile state of conservancies as “new” local institutions. In view of organisational CBO structures and NGO interaction (research question 2), in four out of five aspects it was found that trainings were deemed “absolutely necessary” for continuous CBO development in general and enterprise-building in particular. By recognising training provision as a key exchange modality and thus “generalizable procedure” (Giddens 1979:61) between CBOs and NGOs, it served to explain the causal underlying mechanisms that enable and constrain the establishment of independent CBOs (research question 3). To enable a focussed discussion on CBO-NGO interaction within the overall project structure, the last two sections (7.4 and 7.5) adopted an actor-centred view concentrating on the invisible forms of power which shaped psychological and ideological behavioural conduct (Gaventa 2006) at micro exchange level. Whereas at macro level CBOs were generally excluded from exercising influence over their CBNRM development path, it was found that at local conservancy level, CBOs had in fact considerable powers to shape and negotiate development assistance from their support NGOs—which is essentially what Giddens refers to as the “dialectic of control” (1979:72). Here, the reciprocity of influence and dependency in the provider-consumer relationship was used to illustrate how the seemingly weaker, subordinate partner in the development project had considerable leverage to penetrate the conditions of CBNRM service provision that were otherwise exclusively designed and delivered by NGOs.

By conceptualising CBOs as “knowledgeable agents” (Giddens 1979, 1984) who aligned their behaviour (the flow of conduct) to their accumulated stocks of CBNRM project knowledge they, deliberately or not, used and reproduced their client status to secure future service provision. At the same time, NGOs were locked into the continuous provision of trainings to keep CBOs functioning. The causal explanation for NGOs’ continued support to mature and supposedly self-sufficient CBOs was that they themselves relied on “successful” conservancies and therefore continued to shield them from external (for example tourism business risks) and internal (inconsistent leadership and or skilled people leaving for “greener pastures”) associated risks. Likely to be an unintentional consequence of their support provision, a key implication of extensive external facilitation was that it fostered a culture of reliance.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

The objective of this thesis was to explore the relationship between community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the Namibian community-based natural resource management programme (CBNRM). More specifically, this study sought to know the manner in which NGO support services are structured and in what way they are conducive to, or obscure, the establishment of independent CBOs. The departure point of this research was based on the supposition that passive communities (here especially with regards to community-based tourism development, cf. section 2.6.2) which are somehow “being developed” are a myth.

Although there is a distinguishable and extensive body of CBNRM literature, the actual workings of CBOs as precondition and key institution for community participation and devolution of natural resource user rights have received perplexingly little scholarly attention. Similarly, their dependency on NGO support has been somewhat taken for granted while overall ignoring the reciprocal nature of social interaction. In the introduction it was argued that development intervention actually happens at local level where NGO facilitation and CBO consumption of CBNRM projects intersect. As integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) embody the preferred method for donor-financed national CBNRM country programmes in southern Africa, the importance of understanding the CBO-NGO exchange dynamics and the implications of heavy external facilitation was the main driver of this research project.

This concluding chapter provides a synthesis of what was learnt and what remains to be learnt based on the following structure:

1. After a brief summary of the outcomes of the individual chapters, the main empirical findings of the thesis are condensed to systematically address and connect the different research questions and how this relates back to the bigger, underlying themes such as neoliberal conservation and the dualism within Namibian society.

2. Building on the previous, the theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed and it will be shown to what extent the results contribute to existing conceptual understanding and how they may influence CBNRM practice.

3. Due to the exploratory nature of this project, in certain areas of the enquiry I encountered more questions than answers. Drawing on this, recommendations for future research are formulated.

4. In recognition that methodological choices carry their inherent advantages and disadvantages, the limitations of this study consider the consequences of the chosen research design.
8.1 Empirical Findings

The literature review chapter demonstrated that there is a massive gap between the irresistible rhetoric of CBNRM as a win-win-win solution and empirical research, mostly on a case-by-case basis, showing that actual project outcomes rarely live up to initial promises and expectations. After being hyped as a means to achieve both conservation and rural development, CBNRM is probably best described as being in a state of an identity crisis. The Namibian case in particular shows that the “dramatic recovery of wildlife” (Botha 2005) has not been matched by the anticipated benefits, especially on household level (Suich 2010, 2013). Nevertheless, compared to all other national CBNRM programmes in southern Africa, rural Namibians have received the thickest “bundle of rights” (Boudreaux and Nelson 2011:19) over their natural resources. It was shown that based on a neoliberal conservation paradigm, government deregulation led to the reorganisation of power and authority over natural resources which were essentially reregulated and priced into marketable assets (Dressler and Büscher 2008, Hulme and Murphee 2001a, Igoe and Brockington 2007, Sullivan 2006, 2009, Zimmerer 2000). The systematic review of CBOs as new local institutions generated the following insights: (1) CBOs largely resemble a black box. Empirical studies on voting procedures or a differentiation between governing committees and permanent staff members are overall absent. (2) CBOs are, almost by default, competing with the traditional authority as the “old” institution for communal area management. New structures are likely to be hijacked by old, existing ones. (3) The institutionalisation of CBOs is often left to NGOs acting as primary brokers for rural development projects in rural Africa. (4) While the CBNRM publications offer rather superficial accounts of assumed CBO dependency, the wider literature on development sociology has tackled the spheres of influence of development receivers regarding their ability to co-create and exploit accumulated project knowledge.

Chapter 4 sought to contextualise the structural properties of the Namibian CBNRM programme and to set the scene for the case study chapters. A number of aspects were selectively emphasised due to their constant resurfacing: (1) the general literature on the subject of traditional leadership is somewhat inconclusive on the extent of their powers in independent Namibia. However, while their de jure rights have been severely weakened by new legislation, the empirical findings suggest that communal land management—land allocation in particular—presents one of their last strongholds. (2) Despite the government’s allegedly strong ownership of the programme, structurally the rules and resources of Namibian CBNRM resemble a typical top-down development design: donor → large international NGO → southern counterparts as implementing NGOs → CBOs. The closer examination of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) programme, the last in a sequence of four major American-funded support phases over a 20-year period, showed that the donor monopolised decision-making as to which conservancies are supported. Here, non-consultation of the
Ministry of Tourism and Environment (MET) and the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO) was confirmed. (3) The linkage between wildlife and tourism is the Holy Grail of Namibian CBNRM and strongly propagandised by NGOs. This precisely reflects the neoliberal conservation orthodox of grounding community-based conservation in a market-based approach.

Against the background of the strong dualism (communal vs. private land/cf. section 4.3.1, levels of urban vs. rural deprivation/cf. section 1.3, black vs. white economic power/cf. section 4.2.1) persisting in post-independence Namibian society (Amoo 2014, Berat 1991, Tötemeyer 2000), the analysis suggests that overall, conservancy formation and CBNRM income-generation thus far have had little leverage to challenge these disparities. On a more critical note, highly unequal donor support to CBOs may in fact intensify uneven development at communal conservancy level. Promoting tourism as the ultimate development path reinforces the duality of private sector-driven tourism vs. subsistence farming on communal land. Having or lacking wildlife—translating into high or no tourism potential—determines the allocation of financial and in-kind support. Less than half of the conservancies (39 out of 82) have joint-venture tourism partnerships which are “strongly technically and financially assisted by donors and NGOs” (Lapeyre 2011b:187). Generally considered “rich conservancies”, the real costs of “successful” community-based tourism remain obscured. Conservancies deemed unfit for investment remain poor. Apart from Grootberg Lodge, owned by the members of the ≠Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy, all tourism lodges on communal land are owned and managed by white Namibians or foreign-owned operating companies.

Moving from the holistic, programme-centred perspective to the case-specific analysis of two purposively chosen “rich” conservancies, chapters 5 and 6 assessed the real life examples of CBO-NGO exchange. Here, the ≠Khoadi //Hôas case sought to represent a conservancy-driven CBNRM development path while Wuparo Conservancy resembles a typical case (Creswell 1998) based on NGO-driven development. The empirical findings of the case study chapters can be differentiated in terms of the (largely internal) workings of the CBO and external NGO support. Regarding the former, the key difference between the two cases pertains to their respective governance structures. The ≠Khoadi //Hôas case illustrates that the price of its exceptionally consistent, stable leadership is essentially the monopolisation of power by a small local elite. Conversely, the high turnover of conservancy management committee (CMC) members at Wuparo shows how the CBO is in fact functioning as a vehicle for community participation at the expense of continuity in governance—both seem to be a catch 22. To my genuine surprise the principal challenges both conservancies are facing were strikingly similar. Albeit in different manners, the respective traditional authorities posed serious threats to conservancy routines largely on the grounds of traditional leaders’ dissatisfaction over financial matters. Internalising the cost of living with wildlife, and the
communities’ commitment to continuously endure damages and losses from human-wildlife conflict, strongly transpired as the biggest dilemmas of, and future threats to, the Namibian CBNRM programme. The remaining challenges, the need for strong managers, robust CMCs and viable tourism enterprises, all clearly indicate the significance of ongoing NGO input to keep conservancies functioning.

A key finding relating to external NGO support is the high volume of trainings throughout the different phases of conservancy maturation. Both cases illustrate how individual CBO representatives have received substantial NGO input and how this has created CBNRM project knowledgeability. In accordance with their profoundly different development pathways, the two conservancies exhibited different attitudes towards their support NGOs. #Khoadi //Hôas somewhat mirrored being “a NGO on its own” sourcing legal advice and other services as needed, while Wuparo actively used the analogy of having a mother(-NGO) that has to continue to provide for them. Despite their different project outlooks, again, both cases exhibited strong parallels in that they represent demanding consumers of CBNRM projects, show high levels of awareness of their status as conservancy flagships and, overall, strategically use this to secure maximum support in the future.

Chapter 7 sought to strike a balance between pointing out the case-specific results and a more abstract, conceptually related analysis of findings; using Stephens’ words, it is the search for meaning “within the triangular relationship between theory, data generated, and context or setting” (2009:98). Based on the structural analysis of the CBNRM programme design, the empirical findings to the first research question “What are the structures and processes of CBNRM support provision by NGOs?” are synthesised as follows:

♦ CBNRM support NGOs have an intermediary function: as per CBNRM policy they are mandated to assist conservancies with building institutional and management capacity and linking them to funding.

♦ NGOs heavily depend on continued external funding and are accountable “upwards” to their funding sources. Overall, they have only limited influence over project rules and targets and, in the case of the CDSS project, no influence over actual resource allocation.

♦ The Windhoek-based senior NGO league constituting the NACSO network acts as gatekeeper to the support network. Furthermore, this group of NGOs effectively owns the process of CBNRM support provision as they design the norms and procedures of all training modules and are often the sole providers of more focussed technical assistance.

In accordance with research question II “What are the defining organisational structures of CBOs and where are the principal points of interaction with NGOs?” the analysis of the two case studies generated the following results:
Organisational structures based on CMC composition (and related term times and voting procedures) and staff portfolios can differ substantially. Yet, the core features of “new” CBNRM institutions—governance and (business) management, natural resource management (the Event Book system) and tourism enterprise-building—are all facilitated through NGO trainings.

According to the way in which Namibian CBNRM is structured, trainings are the *absolutely necessary* precondition for CBO development. As such, they constitute the principal CBO-NGO interface. NGOs train every single CMC and staff member. People in significant positions, for example managers, accumulate substantial amounts of trainings. CBOs then greatly depend on their individual capacity.

Both CBOs and their supporting NGOs are locked into trainings: they are a precondition for individuals to participate in the CBO and NGOs constantly need to retrain (because CMCs rotate/staff members leave) to ensure essential CBNRM knowledge for CBOs to function.

The present governance structure, based on rotating committees, is not conducive to the manner in which CBOs are evolving—complex (social) enterprises need consistent business leadership. However, conservancy members are likely to perceive the CMC as a participatory vehicle and CMC members are therefore fired after only one term. Hence, there is a mismatch between community members’ perception and the function that NGOs have anticipated for the CMC.

Whereas the first two questions mostly pertained to the structural relationship between CBOs and NGOs, the third research question “*What are the implications of providing significant CBNRM support services to CBOs and in what way are NGO support services conducive to, and where do they hamper, the establishment of independent CBOs?*” aimed to uncover the meaning that actors attached to their relationship to explain their behaviour. In line with critical realists’ causal-explanatory focus on context- and concept-dependent interaction (Harvey 2002), this last question assessed the enabling and constraining actions between CBOs and NGOs within the “reality” of the CBNRM programme structure (Reed 2005). The key consequence of more than 15 years of NGO support to CBOs is their strong mutual dependency:

CBO dependency on NGO support operates on a number of different levels.

1. *Real* dependency relates to the technical-procedural elements of the overall programme design. (2) *Imagined* dependency originates from needs induced (here trainings) by project-planners. (3) *Strategic* or purposefully self-imposed dependency results from the accumulated project experience of development consumers using their project knowledgeability to secure future support.
NGOs depend on “successful” CBOs because they are tasked to meet pre-determined project deliverables based on measurable outcomes. NGOs rely on facilitating “CBNRM success stories” to justify their own effectiveness—or their raison d’être—in rural development projects. Especially in an environment where NGOs compete for funding to support “their” designated conservancies (Wuparo as an IRDNC conservancy) or where a pilot project has received substantial support (the Grootberg model), they tend to shield this project from the associated risks.

Ultimately, substantial NGO support has facilitated the development of financially self-sufficient CBOs. At the same time, it is likely to have fostered a strong culture of reliance based on the perception and expectation that there will be support indefinitely.

8.2 Implications of Research

So what? One might be inclined to ask at this stage. How are these findings contributing to existing knowledge in the subject area and what are the consequences for CBNRM policy and practice? Based on Silverman’s (2010) recommendation to write for specific audiences, this section addresses theoretical contributions to the respective research communities, policy implications for CBNRM policy designers and practical implications for CBOs and NGOs.

In accordance with the differentiation of the structuring structures (the rules and resources) of CBNRM and the strategic conduct in CBO-NGO interaction, the findings contribute to three distinct subject areas. Firstly, the uncovered structural patterns are consistent with critical assessments of the political economy of development intervention, especially with regards to the excessive powers of international financial institutions funding biodiversity conservation (Büscher and Whande 2007, Islam 2009, Sullivan 2013). The findings make a particularly strong case of how NGOs constitute a “scientific fraternity” (Franklin 2013:76) that designs the rules of “right” resource management practice. In the early 1990s, Edwards and Hulme noted that “decades of NGO lobbying have not dented the structure of the world economy and ideology of ruling institutions (1992: 22). This is still valid for the contemporary Namibian NGO scene; dependent on donor money for their very own survival they are unlikely to bite the hand that feeds them. As Lehmann (2005:5) puts it “the key problem of NGOs is that they are susceptible to the very same system that they aim to reform”. Secondly, the findings make a contribution to the understanding of the workings and challenges of new institutions. As ultimate ownership of land and resources is vested in the state, the reference to “common property institutions” (MET 1995) and “collective proprietorship” (Jones and Murphree 2001, 2004) is in actual fact misleading. The systematic distinction between people, processes and
purpose of CBOs facilitates insights into the general knowledge vacuum on conservancies as local institutions. Here, certain findings differ from those of others: the consequences of the implementation of the “dashboard system” at Wuparo contest the “smaller social units work best” maxim (Child 2004a, Muyengwa and Kangueehi 2013) and both cases contradict the assumption that elected community leadership translates into democratic community representation. Third and lastly, the findings add to the conceptual understanding of how long-term exposure to external support aids project learning and knowledgeability by development targets. As such, it challenges the prevailing dichotomy of developer and to-be-developed within the CBNRM literature where “the rural poor” are collectively problematized and, almost by default, stripped of their agency (Gaventa 2003). The results underline the importance to incorporate theoretical insights from actor-specific perspectives of development sociology into assessments of CBNRM project failures and successes, as they are more likely to address the subtle workings of the reciprocity of consumer-provider relationships.

The consequences of neoliberal conservation and development intervention have been excellently discussed by, for example, Castree (2008a), Harvey (1996) and Igoe and Brockington (2007). Therefore, the formulation of policy implications concentrates on the Namibian CBNRM policy framework by focussing on how CBOs are positioned to exercise their natural resource rights.

Virtually all CBNRM activities take place on communal land; as such the Communal Land Reform Act of 2002 is the legal cornerstone of community-based conservation. The empirical findings of this thesis indicate that two issues in particular obscure the anticipated objective of conservancy-led planning and decision-making. Despite their formal marginalisation (Behr et al 2015), traditional leaders continue to act as gatekeepers in land allocation for the settlement of residents (and non-residents!), grazing rights, applications for leaseholds and demarcation of land—all of these will only be considered by Communal Land Boards if authorised by the khuta. Yet, the allocation of customary land rights has no legal effect until ratified by the respective land boards. In the mid-1990s, Corbett and Daniels note that “land allocation under customary law has always generated frequent land disputes with consequent disruption to community cohesion and harmony” (1996:19). The government’s lack of clarity on the role of traditional leaders continues to “provoke (inefficient) struggles over competencies” (Behr et al 2015:465) which are effectively beyond any control by CBOs. The other repercussion of the Act relates to the fact that CBNRM activities are supposed to happen in the absence of secure land tenure rights of communal conservancy residents (Boudreaux and Nelson 2011, Jones 2003). Despite only being a by-product of the research enquiry, the insights from private operators investing on communal lands strongly indicate that both the prevailing
influence of customary law and the absence of robust tenure present private investors with high levels of uncertainty and potential risk. Paradoxically, the key objective of the 1995 Policy on Wildlife Management, Utilisation and Tourism in Communal Areas is benefit maximisation from tourism to local communities. Yet their insecure land rights “by and large clash with the needs of the tourism industry, particularly capital intensive enterprises such as safari lodges” (Massyn 2007:382). Although this is simply guesswork and cannot be supported by any evidence, the lack of formal empowerment of CBOs may in fact (re-)cultivate the “old way” of doing tourism business on communal land which was basically legitimized by a handshake between the chief and the operator where the community was/is effectively bypassed.

The finding that procedures and composition of the CMC as the representative leadership body are largely non-specified implies that the 1992 Policy on the Establishment of Conservancies in Namibia is ill-equipped to address how and by whom the devolution of rights should be operationalised. Generally, the measures on who is eligible for conservancy membership are more clearly defined than who is fit for conservancy leadership. Apart from the stipulation that one traditional leader must be represented on the CMC, constitutions make little provision for democratic and accountable management of resources at their disposal (Corbett and Daniels 1996). Based on the realisation that conservancies are evolving into complex business ventures, their organisational structures and governance need to be developed accordingly. In line with the recognition that the Namibian CBNRM policy framework legally empowers communal area residents to a greater extent than any other southern African country programme, the synthesis of this section is that there is significant political will but that the implementation of the necessary actions is characterised by high ambiguity.

The findings carry practical implications for both CBOs and NGOs. It was shown that the latter are under immense pressures to satisfy the requirements from their funding sources (reporting and delivery within pre-planned project periods) as well as conservancy—or clients—demands. These stresses are likely to increase. Donors are scaling down funding while the number of CBOs is increasing. By promoting the Namibian CBNRM programme as “The Greatest Wildlife Recovery Story Ever Told” (WWF 2016), NGOs effectively put themselves on the spot. Despite being considered mature and financially self-sufficient, conservancies continue to claim CBNRM support services and NGOs continue to satisfy these demands—the collapse of flagship conservancies in particular may seriously damage their image and the corresponding flows of funds. Their heavy, ongoing dependency on external donor funding is probably the greatest challenge faced by CBNRM support NGOs:

Sometimes NGOs have to take donor money for survival—but that becomes dangerous because then you become a machine that’s just feeding the beast. (Interview 25/IRDNC director)

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70 “Power to grant right of leasehold” as per Communal Land Reform Act, Chapter IV 30(4): “The Communal Land Board may grant a right of leasehold only if the Traditional Authority of the traditional community in whose communal area the land is situated consents to the grant of the right.”
NACSO’s *Sustainability Strategy* states that, in order to maintain the programme, it needs to “transcend from the high-cost development phase to a cost-effective maintenance approach” (NACSO 2012b:5):

Permanent support services will be required by the conservancies, but these need to be cost effective and sustainable. (NACSO 2012b:5)

Cost-effectiveness may imply that conservancies will have to reinvest portions of their income to buy “essential services”. While “paying for services” is the preferred model within the Windhoek-based senior NGO league, it remains unclear how this would affect conservancies who would then become *real* clients. Also, this would mean that NGOs are potentially competing with each other and potentially other private service providers responding to this need.

Practical implications for CBOs are likely to depend on the extent to which CBNRM development support continues to be externally driven. Funding comes with conditions attached. The insights into NGO-facilitated joint-venture tourism partnerships infer that only those avenues of development are open to conservancies that are in fact supported by NGOs. Ironically, tourism as the core income-generating activity is indeed one domain where CBOs are maximally dependent on NGO input. While conservancies are effectively in charge of wildlife management, tourism management powers are essentially withheld from CBOs based on their lack of competence (and therefore perpetuating the stereotype that tourism is a “white industry!”). Michener (1998) describes development agents’ fear that their clients are “not ready” as an endemic pattern in rural development projects. Oddly, while heavily propagating tourism, it is an activity that fundamentally contradicts the goal of risk minimisation (Ashley 1998). The potentially negative implications for CBOs are twofold: dependency on external support “indefinitely” (Kiss 2004) and, where wildlife-based tourism is systematically favoured over other livelihood options due to its perceived higher benefits (Forstener 2004), dependency on a single source of income that is largely beyond local peoples’ control.

Ultimately, the outcomes of substantial NGO support built into the national CBNRM policy (“especially in helping to create or strengthen community based structures and building management capacities and linking communities to funding sources” (MET 2013:14-15)) are counterproductive to the establishment of independent local institutions. If NGOs are mandated to support CBOs then what is their actual incentive to become self-sufficient and voluntarily graduate out of free-service provision?
8.3 Recommendations for Future Research

The directions for future research are mainly informed by two realisations. The first one has been a constant, thought-provoking companion throughout this research journey: what are the implications of grounding community-based conservation within an enterprise-based approach? Closely connected to this, the second aspect relates to the future provision of CBNRM support to CBOs. After Namibia’s reclassification from lower- to upper-middle income country in 2011, the “big” donor money is now being diverted to other, less-developed countries. Chris Weaver, head of WWF Namibia, firmly grounds the survival tactic of the national CBNRM programme within the neoliberal conservation maxim that nature—in this case wildlife—has to become self-financing:

A goal of the Sustainability Strategy is to increase the number of financially self-sufficient conservancies who are effectively managing their wildlife. This will only be possible by further increasing the income to conservancies through improved consumptive and non-consumptive use of wildlife, natural plant products, and small and medium enterprises.” (NACSO 2012b:6, emphasis added)

One of the most consistent findings of this thesis is that increasing human-wildlife conflict poses the greatest threat rural communities’ support for community-based conservation. Based on the NGO-driven supposition that the key to effective wildlife management is tourism development, I would like to propose three areas for future research:

(1) In line with Suich’s (2010) postulation that Namibian CBNRM lacks rigorous data collection and analysis that considers both benefits and costs associated with different activities, a quantitative assessment of how much it actually costs communal conservancies to cater for wildlife is recommended. What is the share of conservancy income that is used to compensate losses and damages from human-wildlife conflict? To what extent do reimbursements cover the real loss incurred? Where have maintenance costs been declared as benefits, for example, by spending conservancy income on the construction of water points for animals? Addressing this gap in knowledge would enable a more comprehensive understanding that takes into account that the devolution of rights also translates into the outsourcing of the management responsibility by the government to cater for wildlife.

(2) The “pressure for marketization” debate has thus far largely ignored a crucial stakeholder—the private sector. Apart from the general critique that tourism as the core CBNRM activity has not been sufficiently scrutinised (Kiss 2004, Lapeyre 2010), a systematic investigation into operators’ real and perceived risks associated with doing business on communal land is mostly missing in the respective body of literature. Massyn provides one of the most comprehensive operator-centred contributions finding that conservancies are “often unstable and weak organisations” (2007:387) thus escalating operators’ transaction costs due to lengthy negotiations and maintenance of contractual agreements. Other research accounts that acknowledge these challenges (Ashley 2000, Ashley and Jones 2001) are often outdated as most joint-venture partnerships only commenced after 2005. Apart from tracking success
stories (Snyman 2012), more honest reflections on ten years of private tourism investors’ experiences are needed. Furthermore, the findings surrounding the significance of managers for tourism business development call for a more refined analysis of how the connection between the two intrinsically different joint-venture partners can be structured and maintained most effectively.

(3) Based on the identified knowledge vacuum of CBOs further studies need to address conservancies as institutional hybrids. Qualitative assessments of conservancy members’ self-conception regarding the welfare vs. business paradigm would tackle the CBNRM identity crisis from within—how are development targets anticipating their own development path? Whether conservancies serve the purpose of being vehicles for participation in rural development where good governance mainly serves political democratising objectives or if they are in fact social enterprises geared towards benefitting their shareholders is an important question that has been neglected in many “what can CBNRM do for the folk” debates. The realisation that many conservancies have reached a level of maturity and enterprise complexity where organisational and governance structures are likely to determine long-term sustainability of rural development projects calls for an analysis that addresses the three proposed defining categories of (organisational) process, purpose and the people who are supposed to drive conservancy development.

8.4 Limitations of Research

This thesis has offered an exploratory perspective on the relationship between CBOs and NGOs as the key interface of development intervention in the most credited community-based conservation programme on the African continent. It was argued that knowledge about CBO-NGO exchange emerges out of the very process of their social interaction. A case study methodology was chosen as it allowed for the examination of the structural embeddedness of cases within the overall CBNRM programme as well as an actor-oriented analysis with an emphasis on interaction. As a direct consequence of the methodological choices, a number of resulting limitations need to be considered.

Time and space. The research reflects a snapshot of the phenomenon under investigation; collected data and observations are grounded in particular spatial contexts at a certain point of the ever-evolving relationship. For practical and formal (such as word lengths) purposes, contextual pre- and post-independence background information on the regions was selective rather than comprehensive. The timing of research, especially that of “actual” data collection during the second fieldwork period in early 2014, is likely to have influenced the extent to which a number of issues materialised as key themes. The MCA-funded fourth major CBNRM support cycle was to phase out in September 2014, its principal CBO training device,
the Conservancy Development Support Services (CDSS) project, was to terminate in July. Although the CDSS project has been described as a particularly prescriptive project, it has been used as a general reference point as it was generally recognised as having set a new standard for the provision of NGO training modules that will be used in the future.

**Myself.** The primary method of qualitative interviewing implied that I had to rely on myself as principal instrument for data collection. The different skin colour and language of rural Namibians and me almost inevitably acted as a reminder of the imposed disparities in colonial *Deutsch-Südwestafrika*. Research participants strongly relied on reference-making to their and my positionality. Being an outsider from “that side” is likely to have influenced perceived roles and therefore possibly the answers given. While this may have obscured particular insights and revelations it also enabled me to make inquiries into the sensible grounds of certain domains, that of traditional leaders, for instance, a territory that a Namibian researcher might have been expected to know and respect and therefore not query openly. Similarly, the interpretation of data is also affected by individual value assumption: Lukes reminds us that the very process of conceptualising power and dependency is “ineradicably value-dependent” (2005:30). Hence, this is to acknowledge that—inevitably—my own normative judgements and sets of truths influenced the empirical application of the reciprocal workings of CBO-NGO interaction.

**The messiness of social processes.** Harvey (2002) points out that the nature of interaction is, necessarily, non-linear and thus complicating the prediction of patterns—in reality, social practices are much messier than the conceptualisations we formulate to make sense of them. By accommodating both the structuring CBNRM properties and the strategic conduct between providers and consumers of development, the research design sought to avoid overemphasising agency over structure and vice versa. However, compared to the analysis of structures which was felt to be more straight forward and undeviating, the crux—and potential shortcomings—of analysing action lies in the underlying assumption that behaviour is *intentional*. In this context, Giddens’ remarks that, “the unconscious, of course, can only be explored in relation to the conscious” (1979:57). Differentiating between conscious and unconscious elements of motivation within the narratives of individuals presented an unconquerable difficulty in the analysis of project knowledgeability.

**Generalising from cases.** The methodology chapter reflected on the difficulties associated with the validity of context-dependent knowledge. In line with the argumentation that case studies ought to derive legitimacy from analytical generalisation, which is based on *conceptual* validity (Easton 2010, Flyvbjerg 2006, Gobo 2008, Yin 2003), the data analysis was driven by methodically relating emerging themes and patterns to relevant existing conceptualisations. Considering that the two case studies were purposively chosen based on their stark contrasts regarding NGO support, joint-venture partnership design and governance
structure, the extent to which their principal challenges and survival tactics resemble each other initially came as a massive surprise. The findings suggest that the manner in which CBOs apply their project knowledgeability to manipulate the continuous flow of resources are not random acts but rather represent their capability of reaching a certain outcome (Giddens 1979). By acknowledging that the causal-explanatory mechanisms underlying heavy NGO facilitation of two different CBO development paths followed the same logic, the argument that a case study design is conducive to achieving analytical generalisation is reinforced.

**Final thoughts**

Natural resource management NGOs account for the second largest group of NGOs operating in post-independence Namibia (Hunter and Keulder 2010). They have successfully channelled and dispersed substantial amounts of donor funding to local conservancy level for more than two decades, in certain rural areas belonging to the main providers of employment in the nature industry. As such, they practically resemble a sector in their own right. Both CBOs and NGOs have experienced a huge mutual gain from their relationship and consequently stand to incur a massive loss if one partner vanishes. The main empirical findings of this thesis relate to trainings as the principal mode of interaction between CBOs and NGOs, where the latter impart CBNRM knowledge on the former. Ironically, while the NGO-driven training machinery is anticipated to create self-sufficient local institutions, the results imply that CBOs’ experience of extensive external support creates high development knowledgeability, which is likely to promote—consciously or not—prolonged self-insufficiency.

The Namibian NGO network presents a fascinating cosmos evolving around true dedication and grand egos wanting to leave their legacy—and ultimately, people who work in the development industry which, like any other, functions based on rules that are designed by capital. Although the findings of this thesis suggest that the effectiveness of NGO support in creating robust, independent CBOs is questionable, this is not say that their work is meaningless altogether. By training thousands of unskilled black Namibians since the late 1990s, NGOs are to some extent subsidising the poor provision of free public education in the rural areas. Through the NGO approach (or in fact obsession!) to “build capacity”, many previously disadvantaged Namibians have now graduated from non- to high-employability within private and public sector jobs. Therefore, in a wider sense, CBNRM support NGOs have made a considerable contribution to securing the livelihoods of communal area residents in Namibia.
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WWF – World Wide Fund For Nature


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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Registered Namibian Communal Conservancies

The two case study conservancies are:

No. 3 Khoadi //Hôas Conservancy in Kunene and
No. 5 Wuparo Conservancy in Zambezi Region
**Appendix 2:** Contents of the 20 most cited CBNRM studies (based on Google Scholar analytics, April 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors/ Affiliated university location/ Journal</th>
<th>Research location/ Research objective</th>
<th>Relevant theories</th>
<th>Methodology and samples (Where provided, actual numbers are given)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Kellert et al (2000) USA/ Society and Natural Resources</td>
<td>Kenya, Nepal, USA Assessing implementation of social and environmental indicators</td>
<td>Equity, empowerment, biodiversity protection, traditional ecological knowledge</td>
<td>Five case studies based on semi-structured interviews (total of 1078) and participant observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cox et al (2010) USA/ Ecology and Society</td>
<td>Worldwide/not specified Review of design principles for CBNRM</td>
<td>Ostrom’s common pool resource principles</td>
<td>Coding of the contents of 91 studies containing 77 cases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Twyman (2000) UK Geographical Journal</td>
<td>Botswana Assessment of different stakeholder perceptions regarding participation</td>
<td>Participatory conservation</td>
<td>Case study based on mixed method approach using semi-structured interviews, group discussions, informal conservations and observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. McCall and Minang (2005) Netherlands Geographical Journal</td>
<td>Cameroon Evaluation of participatory GIS and mapping exercise</td>
<td>Participatory spatial planning, indigenous knowledge</td>
<td>Case study of one village using participatory rapid rural appraisals, e.g. focus group discussions and semi-structures interviews</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Authors (Year)</td>
<td>Location/Country</td>
<td>Category</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Gruber (2010)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Environmental Management</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>Lauber et al (2008)</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Environmental Management</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>Clarke and Jupiter (2010)</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Environmental Conservation</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Schafer and Bell (2002)</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Environmental Conservation</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>Matta and Alavalapati (2006)</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>USA/Forest Policy &amp; Economics</td>
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<td>15.</td>
<td>Fujita and Phanvilay (2008)</td>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Society and Natural Resources</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>16. Mbaiwa (2004)</strong></td>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>Analysing success and sustainability of CBNRM in Okavango Delta</td>
<td>Sustainable development/triple-bottom line, benefit sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana South African Geographical Journal</td>
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<td><strong>17. Kaschula et al (2005)</strong></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Exploring local indigenous knowledge pertaining to harvesting technique</td>
<td>Scientific vs. indigenous knowledge in natural resource management</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa Human Ecology</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>18. Fabricius and Collins (2007)</strong></td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Assessment of key characteristics of CBNRM governance systems dealing with uncertainty</td>
<td>Good governance, organisational structures</td>
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<td>South Africa Water Policy</td>
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<td>Zambia and Norway Oryx</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>20. Virtanen (2005)</strong></td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Analysing the conditions on which CBNRM has been accepted by local community as new approach to natural resource management</td>
<td>Devolution of rights, CBNRM policy</td>
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<td>Finnland Sustainable Development</td>
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Source: Author’s own research
Appendix 3: Example of a coded interview transcript

Interview with an official of the KH conservancy; we already met the previous year at WWF/NACSO workshop in Windhoek, very friendly, welcoming atmosphere. I interview a student in his classroom, he is a teacher and he used to be a student at that same school. He is very much used to talking about the KHC. He strikes me as knowing the rules of the development game (NGO agendas, accountability) so very well.

5-minute chat before I start recording. I explain what I'm interested in (the marriage, dependency between KHC and NGOs) and how I'll be using this data. Ask permission to record.

C: Please give me a short history of your involvement in KH conservancy and how you became the chairperson.

A: It goes back during the formation of the conservancy, I was actually instrumental in the formation of the conservancy as well.

C: Is that sort of mid late 1990s?

A: Ahh, it was the late 1990s, 1998 to be exact, so it has been formed under the auspices of the then Groothoog farmers' association. It was the driving force behind everything to get the KHC registered GAZETTED so I have been a member of the first management committee, then I was the secretary after my first term of office, which was 5 years. I became the chairperson of the conservancy since the constitution of the conservancy allows the members to serve for two successive terms only; then fell out for a while for 5 years and I have been re-elected recently now in 2012 as the chairperson again.

C: So you were there from day one?

A: I have been the very first secretary, there has been somebody else, and then I became ( )? the management committee of this conservancy has been chaired by two people only so far, then I was the first chairperson, I became the chairperson, he became the chairperson, then again, and I'm the chairperson (laughs). So we are just substituting each other.

C: So will he be the next chairperson?

A: I don't think so considering his age.

C: What's the significance of the Groothoog farmers' association in terms of getting KHC registered?

A: We are having integrated resource management here, the farmers' association is fed because the conservancy can generate more benefits so that's why the farmers' association then decided to be part of the development management programme that has recently been declared by the parliament so that we can generate more benefits to our people, not only that but in a diversified way manage our livestock as well as WILDLIFE.

C: And whose initiative was to establish the farmers' association?

A: The farmers' association was established by the farmers themselves.
the senior citizens then and the farmers' association is coming a long way
before the conservancy was even conceived in the government's mind
#00:03:52-9#
#00:03:53-9#

C: ok what would you say are the key milestones since you got gazetted

A: ahm (3) WE were the FIRST to OWN a community-owned lodge 100%, THAT
was a secret (,) we are among the first who have got an integrated
resource management (,) that's why you will see ALL the other conservancies
will talk about game guards but when you come to your conservancy which is
KHC we talk about environmental shepherds which is a COMPREHENSIVE
term in terms of looking after the wildlife (,) and also the (2) livestock of the
people (,) not only that if you talk about milestones (,) MUCH has been
achieved (,) we went to send students from the lodge to study in south africa (,)
we were among the first to give money to schools (,) fencing around the school
direct and indirect employment of 80 individuals multiply by 5 (,) since the
african culture is the one of SHARING (,) each individual brings bread for 5
people on the table so we can talk about 300 people directly benefitting in terms
of MONEY from the conservancy and each related programme #00:05:36-2#

C: now tell me (,) as i said i'm interested in your marriage with the ngos (,) how
did that evolve since you were on board so early on (,) who was the sort of (,) or
HOW was that relationship initiated (,) did you go to windhoek and say HELLO
is there somebody here to help us register and establish and learn OR did the
ngos actually come to you and said OH have we this wonderful programme
here #00:06:01-8#

A: initially we wrote proposal and sent them to ngos like (2) who is it (2) wwf
and but initially it was sante and gta and those programmes (,) since everybody
was so EAGER to help we formed form where we brought together ALL the
ngos and then TABLE our problems and our desires and how we wanted to be
assisted by the ngos that's how early things STARTED (,) now based on the
profile of the conservancy and BASED on our performance ngos fell in love with
this particular conservancy because the capacity (,) the willingness the know-
how that people are having (,) the diligence the HARD work that the people are
having (,) to reach something one day that is what made the ngos really fall in
love with our conservancy because people are working hard here (,) and since
we don't know problems we know only challenges and we easily accomplish
something with those challenges through those challenges (,) our hard work our
commitment (2) and our willingness to reach the top that is what makes the
difference comparing kh to other conservancies #00:07:38-9#

C: when you say ngos were so eager to help in early days (,) that you sort of
had to come up with this firm approach because (,) to my understanding it was
actually not well coordinated this ngo support #00:07:50-8#

A: it was not coordinated in the beginning that's why we brought in the firm
approach so that we TALK around the same table and once a proposal has
been TABLED the ngo who feels like ok i will take this i will take this (,) that's
how it started to work but ah (,) most of the ngos PHASED out (,) they were
initially assisting financially even to pay the salaries of the workers (,)
INITIALLY (...) but that phase out after the first 5 years and then the conservancy
popped in with its own money to pay its staff and so on but the most assistance
which is given nowadays is technical assistance (...) capacity building and so on
#00:08:42-7#

C: when ngos facilitate something like institution building (...) will actually the
conservancy say hello ngo (...) hello NNF (...) we need training (...) is it like a NEED
that YOU identified (...) can you [ngo] PROVIDE this to us (...) OR is actually the
ngo coming and saying hello kh we are doing this capacity building are you
interested (...) you NEED this #00:09:04-5#

A: the whole approach is bottom up (...) we identify our NEEDS and based on
that we request assistance and we are assisted accordingly (...) it's not to say
that ngo's are FORCING down the road no no no (...) we identify our own
needs whether it is training needs or otherwise and we inform them accordingly
through proposals and they see then how they can help us #00:09:39-7#

C: alright i see (...) when i talk about the marriage i'm quite interested in what you
cut into and what you get OUT of a marriage (...) the sort of rights and
responsibilities (...) would you say that ah that the ngos actually have a
responsibility towards your conservancy #00:09:55-8#

A: aha (3) based on what type of a ngo it is they HAVE a responsibility towards
the communities of namibia not only kh but it's also (...) in the conservancy we
have got our obligations and accountabilities (...) therefore only conservancies
that meet certain CRITERIA are assisted (...) if you WANT but you cannot bring
your added then you can forget about assistance (...) you must first start to crawl (...) to
start to walk and the people (ngos) will get you on the hand and pull you
forward #00:10:45-9#

C: so it's your responsibility to be transparent and accountable #00:10:46-6#
A: ABSOLUTELY absolutely #00:10:48-6#

C: and what are your rights towards the ngos #00:10:52-1#
A: a i don't know how i understand your question (...) or whether i understand it
correctly but our RIGHTS (2) will you please a little bit explain what you mean
with rights now #00:10:59-9#

C: well basically i wonder if (2) what would be an example (...) i mean i find
especially here at kh you are all very confident (...) and by all means you CAN be
confident (he laughs) because you have this very good (2) calling it a product
sounds wrong but you know what i mean (...) i wonder if you for example would
say to an ngo uh uh (...) we are not happy with THIS or NO we don't want your
advice in this or maybe you SHOULD step back a little you know (...) like where
you would actually say THIS is what we want or this is what we DON'T want
#00:11:44-8#

A: ja our rights towards the ngos (...) first and foremost (...) we have to be
HONEST towards the ngos (...) we must be willing to work TOGETHER but also
(2) our rights start where the rights of the ngos stop (...) so they must know our
comfort zone thou that's all i can say #00:12:13-9#

RIGHTS

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## Appendix 4: Namibian CBNRM support organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Foundation/objective</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Centre for Research Information Action in Africa – Southern African Development and Consulting (CRIAA SADC) | Founded 1996, operating nationally  
Technical advice, feasibility assessments and market linkages to organisations and communities on development of the veld product industry.                                                                 |
| Desert Research Foundation of Namibia (DRFN)                           | Founded 1990, operating nationally; support to community organisations on desertification and livelihood issues.  
DRFN’s main thematic areas are energy, land and water.                                                                                                                   |
Technical support to registered/emerging conservancies, activities include training in natural resources management, community capacity building, institutional development, facilitation of income generating projects. |
| Legal Assistance Centre (LAC)                                         | “Fighting for Human Rights since 1988”, operating nationally;  
Legal advice to conservancies on constitutions, contracts, legal conflicts and conflict resolution and advocacy on CBNRM issues.                                                                                                             |
| Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organisations (NACSO)           | Created in 1998, NACSO is both key vehicle and mouthpiece for CBNRM support organisations, comprising nine NGOs as well as the University of Namibia. Divided in three working groups—institutional development, business enterprise and livelihoods, and natural resources—NACSO plans and coordinates support services to conservancies. |
| Namibia Development Trust (NDT)                                       | Founded in 1987, operating in the regions in the north (Okashana), the south (Keetmanshoop), Hardap and Otjizondjupa; rural organisational capacity building of community-based organisations to becoming more self-reliant in planning and managing their own development and resources. |
| Namibia Nature Foundation (NNF)                                       | Founded in 1987, operating nationally  
Provides assistance in grant administration, fundraising, financial management and monitoring and evaluation                                                                                                                               |
| Nyae Nyae Development Foundation (NNDF)                               | Founded in 1981, operating the Otjizondjupa region;  
Field based NGO providing technical support to San communities, support to the Nyae Nyae Conservancy.                                                                                                                                   |
| Rössing Foundation                                                    | Founded 1978, operating in Erongo and north central;  
Provides support through training and materials to community craft development and marketing. Support for CBNRM activities in north central Namibia.                                                                 |
| Save the Rhino Trust (SRT)                                            | Founded in 1982, operating in Kunene;  
Black rhino conservation through field patrolling and monitoring, community outreach, research and evaluation, capacity building, communication and fund raising.                                                                                           |
| World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) Namibia                             | The Namibian country programme commences in 1993 with the USAID funded LIFE project;  
Provides technical support to CBNRM implementers in the field focussing on enterprise and business development and institutional development.                                                                                         |

Source: Based on NACSO 2009
## Appendix 5: Codebook

### Structural Coding

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<th>Interview</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CBO challenges = contradictions</strong></td>
<td>Wildlife</td>
<td>Human wildlife conflict increasing</td>
<td>All but 6, 8, 9, 27</td>
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<td>Frustration in community increasing</td>
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<td>Compensation</td>
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<td><strong>Traditional Authority (TA) (→CBO-TA relationship)</strong></td>
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<td>Custodians of the land = powerful</td>
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<td>Formally excluded from CBO = powerless</td>
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<td>Respecting vs. avoiding</td>
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<td>Heavy NGO investment/training (→in vivo/training)</td>
<td>1, 2, 3, 10, 14, 15, 25, 29</td>
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<td>Drive business development</td>
<td>1, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 17, 20, 24</td>
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<td>Inform/advise/lead CMC</td>
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<td>Manage staff</td>
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<td>Mismatch: qualifications</td>
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<td>Rotation/turnover/firing entire CMCs</td>
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<td>15, 26, 27 (W only)</td>
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<td>Wasting money</td>
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<td>Then: NGO dominant (more resources)</td>
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<td>MET: lack of tourism knowledge</td>
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<td>TA wanting more $$ from CBO</td>
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<td>Kunene = CBO emancipated</td>
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<td>Traditional leaders – NGO</td>
<td>Kunene: no/little interaction</td>
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<td>Zambezi: IRDNC close ties with TA</td>
<td>Zambezi: IRDNC close ties with TA</td>
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<td>NGO: not getting involved in “politics”</td>
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<td>NGO: facilitate JV-partnerships</td>
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<td>50% of income = benefit distribution</td>
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**IN VIVO CODING**

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<td>CBOs wanting outside support forever / always / until end of age</td>
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*Quotes not listed here but kept in a separate document due to lengths (27 pages in total)*
Appendix 5.1: Theme—Decision-Making

NGOs facilitate “appropriate” decision-making...
♦ “How do you make sure that they [CBO] make good decisions?” (Interview 12/NGO tourism advisor)
♦ “In some instances it’s more than some sort of guidance [from NGOs]. It’s strongly encouraged actions.” (Interview 8/JV partner)
♦ “I feel very worried about, you know, what are they doing, are they going in the right direction? So the worries really come from us.” (Interview 14/NGO director)
♦ “If they always make the wrong decision you need to think about how you are advising […] if there comes the situation where there would be irrevocable damage done then one ups the heaviness of the touch but I think as a principle we should not be gatekeepers. We should not be influencing unduly.” (Interview 13/senior NGO)
♦ “They have to advise us. So you are supposed to do this and this you’ll see that it will be ok.” (Interview 20/CBO staff)
♦ “I have been interviewed by NGO people from IRDNC [question: so the NGO actually selected you?] Yes. Not the conservancy.” (Interview 17/CBO staff)
♦ “They are advisors, they are too our auditors. They give some guidelines, do this and this and this is in the future and the conservancy should progress more […] They are giving us the right information.” (Interview 20/CBO staff)

…however NGOs cannot force community to make certain decisions.
♦ “We request assistance, we get assisted. NGOs are not forcing us.” (Interview 3/CBO CMC)
♦ “Nothing has been imposed on us and we will not even allow something to be imposed on us.” (Interview 2/CBO CMC)
♦ “We are in the driver seat and the NGO is in the back. So we drive the car ourselves, all they do is they put in some fuel.” (Interview 4/CBO staff)
♦ “Don’t prescribe to them. If they don’t want they don’t want. Leave them and just walk away […] They will come to you when they are ready.” (Interview 14/NGO director)
♦ “I don’t tell you what you need to do, you have to tell me what you want to do. Because immediately when I tell you, that thing won’t be yours.” (Interview 23/MET)
♦ “They were actively interested […] You know we can’t force people to build a lodge.” (Interview 30/field NGO)
♦ “A project that the community feels is not really beneficial—they rejected it […] We don’t want to push the community in what they don’t want. Because even if you push the community to do something that you want and they don’t want—they will not do it.” (Interview 28/field NGO)

There is a fine line between advising and influencing...
♦ “They are giving only directions to us. Don’t do this. Do this.” (Interview 18/CBO staff)
♦ “They give us advice but still we have to make our own decisions, we have to make our own decisions (Interview 20/CBO staff)
♦ “NGOs only give us directions in terms of JV agreements but mostly the decision is made by the conservancy.” (Interview 17/CBO staff)
♦ “They [≠Khoadi //Hôas] know what they want. Unless Andrew [field NGO] tells them what to do.” (Interview 14/NGO director)
♦ “They [NGOs] are not involved although they can be part of the decision-making process.” (Interview 3/CBO CMC)
♦ “It’s our baby to decide. They can just come and sit in and give some advice. […] If we make mistakes, tell us you must do this.” (Interview 1/CBO staff)

…and there is generally awareness that NGOs do influence the course of decision-making.
♦ “We become quickly gate keeper of ideas, direction, priorities, information.” (Interview 13/NGO CBNRM specialist)
♦ “Sometime NGOs do influence because of the conditions of the grant, you are guided by grant conditions.” (Interview 7/MET warden)
♦ “First we wanted the conservancy areas to report at the AGM what have they done with the money. But at the back of our minds we also thought this is their money. They can do whatever they want with it. So we didn’t want to push that far.” (Interview 28/field NGO)
♦ “Rural, often uneducated, people often don’t understand implications of decisions. As facilitator you need to say this isn’t gonna work because of for example logistical implications so I would suggest that you do this. But at the same time try to give the people ownership.” (Interview 10/field NGO)
♦ “Certain NGO staff are more removed from the community. I think they are more heavy-handed, not on purpose but because they don’t have been exposed. They come in and they think they own this place.” (Interview 13/NGO CBNRM specialist)
Appendix 5.2: Theme—CBO Expectations

CBOs have high expectations
♦ “I have to approach NGOs whenever we need something.” (Interview 1/CBO manager)
♦ “Whatever we do, we would always want their technical support as an NGO.” (Interview 15/CBO staff)
♦ “If we require another training we go to IRDNC—please we want this training to happen to us. Then they have to make this schedule to provide this training.” (Interview 18/CBO staff)
♦ “We still need them, they should be there forever. Their support—we need it.” (Interview 16/CBO staff)
♦ “Years ago IRDNC managed to give us a grant close to 400.000 […] So in the future we still expect the same assistance from NGOs.” (Interview 17/CBO staff)
♦ “They have to come back and see, they cannot just withdraw […] Because things get old. I have to replace them so I get this money from the NGO.” (Interview 4/CBO staff)
♦ “This connection cannot be cut away under any circumstances, so the NGOs and conservancies should be part and parcel. I don’t know how long—maybe till the end of the age.” (Interview 3/CBO CMC member)

If NGOs withdraw there will always be support to CBOs
♦ “NGOs will struggle at end of the day but somebody will support the conservancies.” (Interview 2/CBO CMC member)
♦ “Once they [NGOs] leave—where are we going to get the support?” (Interview 19/CBO member)
♦ “When they [NGOs] quit out we can expect another organisation will come […] Then we are set. Then all our problems or our claims will have to go directly to that organisation that will take over […] We never say that we can just go for ourselves.” (Interview 18/CBO staff)

Demanding CBOs
♦ “The pressure on NGOs as support providers has really been intense.” (Interview 12/Windhoek-based NGO)
♦ “A lot of field-based NGOs lack in terms of business skills and as a result there is a lot of pressure from the clients [CBOs].” (Interview 14/NGO director)
♦ “Communities, when they hear IRDNC can’t do that [support], then they become so furious with them. Ah! They are not supporting us.” (Interview 22/MET warden)
♦ “[On contributing financially to support services provided] Conservancies are earning millions but they still feel ah! It’s too much!” (Interview 26/field NGO)
♦ “IRDNC has been assisting with financial auditing. Conservancies sometimes don’t even appreciate the auditing that is done. They can also hire an independent auditor, […] they should start taking it seriously because these are multi-million dollar businesses.” (Interview 22/MET warden)

Relying on NGOs
♦ “There is a tendency for conservancies to rely on outside support.” (Interview 10/field NGO)
♦ “Conservancies relying on NGOs—it’s a terrible syndrome. It will be a challenge immediately when the money dried out of these NGOs.” (Interview 23/MET deputy director)
♦ “Sometimes I think there is a bit of a misunderstanding in terms of what it is the NGO is supposed to deliver […] It’s always been taken that NGOs will come and they will build our capacity […] Conservancies would just sit there and wait—ok when are these people [NGOs] going to come so that we can have meetings?” (Interview 14/NGO director)
♦ “We would sit to say ok—what you want to do in the next six months? And you develop the plan for them. Conservancies will put these plans in their files and forget about it. Only when you come in and say but listen! I thought you were supposed to do this in March what happened? Ah no, we felt maybe when you have time, you can come to us.” (Interview 27/field NGO)
♦ “It’s true! They are so reliant on support from NGOs. You know they do have money but they say nah, we don’t have money. We don’t have transport. We [MET/NGOs] will always arrange transport for them.” (Interview 22/MET warden)
Appendix 5.3: Theme—Interdependency

CBO must involve NGO
♦ “Come and advice if we make mistakes. Tell us you must do this.” (Interview 1/CBO manager)
♦ “The help from the NGOs is inevitable.” (Interview 3/CBO CMC)
♦ “I must need the help of IRDNC.” (Interview 19/CBO member)
♦ “You cannot put them aside, they [NGOs] must know.” (Interview 20/CBO staff)
♦ “We can think on our own but after thinking on our own we call them to help us to give us advice.” (Interview 16/CBO staff)
♦ “We need someone to come closer so whatever we do you have to direct us please do that do this.” (Interview 18/CBO staff)
♦ “If you go to certain areas then there is a NGO, the conservancy says we must first consult this NGO. They say no, this NGO must first know and stuff like this. It means that communities are not independent.” (Interview 7/MET warden)

CBO dependency on NGO support
♦ “They get support from IRDNC, the conservancies, they cannot do it alone. They can on writing but they must submit the request to IRDNC.” (Interview 19/CBO member)
♦ “We cannot do without them […] If there is a pull out then they [CBOs] will collapse.” (Interview 3/CBO CMC)
♦ “The community they can ask—please can you do this for us? This we cannot do it alone unless we involve IRDNC.” (Interview 19/CBO member)
♦ “The only section where I see dependency is when it comes to financial auditing […] We still rely on IRDNC to check our books.” (Interview 15/CBO staff)
♦ “Yes for now we feel Wuparo is still dependent on our services. Although we feel, when the trainings and the support is taken seriously, they could manage things on their own without our support. But at this stage maybe they still need us to help a bit more.” (Interview 29/field NGO)
♦ “It is difficult to expect conservancies to just all of the sudden be able to stand on their own feet after being donor supported for so long.” (Interview 10/field NGO)
♦ “That’s also dependency syndrome: administration issues, book keeping. They [CBOs] don’t do that very good because they know there is IRDNC.” (Interview 22/MET warden)
♦ “They are still supporting us but not as far as previously. But again all these workshops they are busy facilitating to us, it’s also—it’s money. That’s why I say, previously and now, it’s still the same again.” (Interview 18/CBO staff)

NGO dependency on CBOs
♦ “NGO need the conservancies to get money.” (Interview 2/CBO CMC)
♦ “Once they [NGOs] we are not going to work hand in hand with the conservancies—what are they going to do?” (Interview 19/CBO member)
♦ “Without the conservancy, we are not going to get the funding […] We have to lobby the conservancy to get this funding from the donors.” (Interview 26/field NGO)
♦ “NGOs are very much dependent! They sit back and relax and send people there [successful CBOs]. They are very dependent on us.” (Interview 4/CBO staff)
♦ “Ja! For sure [are NGOs dependent] because they are honoured when they hear that their baby, the conservancy that they nurtured, is doing very well. That pride also goes to them, it creates a good image for them as supporters.” (Interview 15/CBO staff)

NGO actions to counteract dependency
♦ “We strongly feel that they need to play the advocacy role in the regions, representing their conservancies at the regional level […] Many conservancies are still having a dependency because there was an NGO there before […] One of our biggest challenges—how do we get rid of dependency?” (Interview 14/NGO director)
♦ “Conservancies who are 15, 20 years—those ones I think IRDNC should withdraw a little bit and then let them go on their own and see how far they go.” (Interview 27/field NGO)
♦ “We want to see the conservancies themselves getting the responsibility to run the conservancies themselves. We don’t want people to be seeing us as policy dogs, to say here they are, they come, they want to chop our money, they are going to give some restrictions, they have got this tough rule. We want to see them fully independent.” (Interview 26/field NGO)