Immediation/Toward the Selfless Other?
Tony Richards, Senior Lecturer, Lincoln School of Media

One should hear the calling of two hyperbolic selves within this questioning concerning what I would propose to call here the desire for panop-tech-clair-voyance:

**Selfless** interpreted as an infinite reactivity (machinery)

**Selfless** interpreted as an infinite responsibility (agency)

Reaction or response is what, according to Derrida, always classically partitions the human (agency) off from the entirety of the non-human an-agential (i.e. whether animal or machine). Within this opositional coupling, of the reaction or response, the presumed cleanliness of a humanistic responsibility forms the self-sealing benchmark or organising pivot par excellence. Reaction then would form the height of irresponsibility.

Outside of this partitioned history of such a safe ahistorical truth comes the imminent arrival, as we will soon see futurologically demonstrated, of certain ‘invasive’ prostheses that will promise or threaten the return of the human to the status of that animal or machinic an-agency just mentioned. This threat or this promise comes along however within a train that forms a component part of but a whole history of prior invasive woundings to the anthropo-centralised ego. Such wounds to the agency-of-the-human have come, according to a recent historical re-cap by Haraway, within the numeric shape of four comparatively modern wounds to this once presumed safe base of the absolute human-whole: the Copernican, the Darwinian, the Freudian and finally the Cyborgian. Somewhat fittingly however for such post-humanistic prostheses, attachments or (machinic) extensions, there seems to be within this final fourth wounding a notable lack of proprietorial nomenclature, or of an anchoring proper name. This residence of the [C]yborgian wound lacks capitalisation. Can we perhaps question this lack and in return supply (or buy into) the potent common currency of a founding biographical signature to act as metonymic signage?

In answer to this quest, we would offer here for our, as we will see panop-tech-clair-voyant, purposes the figure of a galvanian wound, named after the Italian 18th Century physician and physicist Luigi Galvani. As discover of the bioelectric properties of these “animal” and “human” nerve and nervous systems, a whole subsequent arché or paleo-prosthetic pan-electrical truth system was unlocked within the very heart of the human envelope and thus was born the possibility and potential to interface and “interfere” (for how can one now be seen to invade or “interfere” with what was previously always already charged with such a currency-of-the-electrical?) with “the human” via apparatuses that could lead, we might worry, toward the nameless monstrous bridge-being of a Frankenstein-esque composited-recognition. More than such de-monstrosities however, the galvanic wound opens or offers the inside up to the outside and allows for a veritable folding-out into the arbitrating open; an invagination or an electrical archiving of what might in fact lie (and we obviously measure this word carefully) beneath. The skin of the being-that-we-are is now no longer something that folds or better holds the inside, but which
now conveys, through the trans-portal vi ontological history of this wound, a connection or an availability. The galvanic skin responds and thus (now only) reacts? Response or reaction?

Does then this fourth ‘bio-electrical wound’ or dehiscent ontological opening of the selfspace onto the otherspace offer any directional cues to a location (for this bridged human-animal) of either a space of response or of reaction? And further does this galvanian wound, while forcing upon us the recognition of this ontologised history of an always already existing electrical interior, also involve an attendant concern or hope (depending on one’s point of view) of an additional turning toward a further techno-scientific or pragmatological plunging into either Uber-responsibility or Unter-reactivity? In other words does this recognition of the primacy of the bio-electrical interior offer either a promising or threatening furtherance of responsibility or reactivity respectively? Response or reaction?

1. Selfless Responses or Selfless Reactions?

So, to rewind and remind ourselves of the doubling of the latter part of our opening titles, we are working here within the dual undecidable orbit of two futurally directed ends or solicitations of the semantic resources (or recourses) of this singular syntagmatic questioning concerning “immediation”. Some concrete images of these somewhat split ends: The first end is of the eschatological end, or of a quite worrying interpretation; where we worry that we ourselves and all of these others, will lose our “selves” and become just so many reactive machines, zoo animals or beehive dwellers vii (the death of the infinity of the Levinasian autrui? viii). The second end is the more promising teleological promise of a self and an other driven or encouraged into selflessness ix by the affordances granted by the opening-up structures of the network; by being hooked-up to the sociality-of-the-social and thus to be brought or encouraged out of the protective, somewhat selfish shell. Selfless then or self-less, this self is thought at this moment (as still existing before the encroachment of these futurally positioned ‘ends’) to be a singular separable “self”. A human whole-hearted or ill-hearted self: but a hearted Cartesian self nonetheless.

Something then is imminently coming along (we place our ear upon the tracks and some well-attuned ears can hear the approach) to steal this Cartesian ‘self’ away xi. The purpose of this paper, it must be made clear, is to cast or to sew some doubt around a supposedly pre-existent, pre-im-mediatised ‘selfness’ that would pre-exist such an imminent approach of immanence and some doubts also around the subsequent modelling of a choice either of some hyperbolic surplus of responsibility in the face of this newly arrived inside-of-the-outside or a hyperbolic xii deficit-restrictiveness of reactivity (again in the face of an new arrival of the inside-of-the-outside) that a certain form of projected tele-techno-pathic engagement would seem to presuppose as delivering. The purpose of this paper then is not one fuelled by models of fear or of hope, but of a model of the human based upon the problematic of the reactivity of the human before xiii such machinery. Before we reach these questions concerning pre-panoptechclairvoyant reactivity we will concentrate here on a few exemplars who would wish to expand our humanistic horizons by plugging us into an expansive post-human space.
1.2 Posthuman Interfaces and Inter-Face-inality

Who or what parties could we call upon, as currently representing the promise of this currently encroaching post-humous self-lessness (of which at the moment we are self-ed but soon to loose)? In searching we would, of course, have no shortage of futurological exemplars to stand-in-for many more of those who would, as a totality, see us as soon being able to raise and place ourselves squarely outside of this all-too-finite temporo-spatial condition; a new post or trans condition exterior to the confines of a self-hitherto-trappedness. These exemplars then are commonly labelled and self-labelled as the post-humanists and the trans-humanists. We will very briefly look toward three posthuman resources or exponents from the transhumanist field before settling upon our main cyborgian example.

Representing a potent dose hyperbolic responsibility there is John Perry Barlow. Projecting and protecting the a-domain of cyberspace Barlow and his somewhat kooky border-busting text “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace” forms a strong polemical opposition to those who would like to re-impose (national, etc.) restrictions on Internet communicativity; Barlow would here like to clearly re-echo some valuable founding-foundational sentiments that have been lost within the modern age of ‘restrictions’. For as electronically-freed techno-enabled Thoreauan tele-hunters, he believes that we should be able to hunt and comport ourselves out the within the cyberspatial open and boundless without any terrestrially ‘positioned’ laws picking us up on any conventionally territorial Locardian exchange-values; localised-legal “values” that might tightly establish our footprints or movements. *Cyberspace* is a frontier and a properly lawless, open-source pathbreaking that transcend and should transcend these pre-cyberspatial terrestrial localist restrictions. In connection to such supposed de-territorialised disembodied space/s, we have investigated elsewhere a somewhat illustrative aporetic example of a so-called tele-presence that problematises or unfurls some of the strange logic of this wish for a transcending of territorial regimes through the possibility of the actual hunting of animals placed within distant counties and killed via an internet connection. Questions of undecidability -but not the indeterminacy- of the status of the deathplace and inter-spatiality were concentrated upon there. Similarly Barlow’s Cyberspace would wish not to touch down on any territory or its regimes or practices, even though it cannot help but touch down upon the very territories it nevertheless wishes to escape and evade being captured within. Needless to say, Barlow’s is an argument with and assault upon territor-reality that powerfully deconstructs its own premises and grounds.

Then there is Ray Kurzweill the technological futurist and sometime inventor of some very concrete and very helpful ontical technological prostheses. To go along with this solid track-record of certain useful groundfloor concrete-ontico-practices, he has written two books full of predictions of future Moore’s law fuelled apparatuses; mostly centring upon predictions of the future-fact of being able to download our psyches into permanently-existing “mechanisms” and thus dispose ourselves of our aforementioned Platonico-Cartesian shells (as just so much innocent and now unnecessary baggage). In a sort of technological version of Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ argument (itself presented upon the fall of another form of divisive curtain)
there is the powerful image of an ultimate synthesis or singularity that is near and that will end the longheld and somewhat problematically ‘finite’ (as his findings are finding*) sticking-point of this body and its tendency toward decrepitude and of final closure. He is taking his food-supplements until soon, and luckily within his own lifetime, he and we can finally live forever: Peter[pan]occhio?

Relatedly, and closing in upon our main post-humous quarry, or case study, there is George Dvorsky. Dvorsky, while ultimately sharing Kurzweil’s transhumanist predilection for and prediction of ultimate immortality, sees a more short-term achievable goal of an imminently-to-hand (that is, soon to be integrated into a networked everyday ‘ready-to-hand’) invention of what he neologistically calls techlepathy*. He points out how recently Chuck Jorgensen**, a scientist based at NASA, has invented a technology to implant reading-writing (input-output) prosthetic technologies upstream from previously damaged or non-functioning vocal apparatuses of some disabled subjects, by hacking or tapping-into nerve signals situated within the throat that control speech. These nerve signals, Jorgensen found, operated in normal subjects whether or not they actually enacted the process of moving their lips. Thus he hacked into a region situated upstream from the lips, in a region situated notionally closer*** to the location of the human organism’s intending-to-say; at some point spatially “earlier” than this localised ontical sticking or “saying-point” that is broken in these particular subjects. As so often is the case, these injured subjects function as test cases, or pragmatically driven thought-experiments, for something much more radical and socially-encompassing (an upping-of-the-ante). For while the power of speech is then given-back or bestowed upon those once relatively closed or struck-dumb, this lucky or local repair job can form the basis of some more transformational or trans-humanist success or proof-work. As a result then of these borrowings-of or burrowings-into these previously purely**** naturo-bio-physiological signals, he points to the presence of a close-by somewhat unintended-transportation or resource to help furnish the onward teleological journey (and as we will see, one set within an entelechial***** family-circle) to the long-sought location that is telepathy.

It strikes him, in hearing about this space agency invention, that by the process of moving the prosthetic connection up a little******, up this anthropo-biological entity’s communicative-process chain, that we might totally cut out and expand these vococentric (I will not of course say phono-centric*******) apparatuses out and be able to communicate our very intending or meaning-to-say, without going to the (deferred*******) trouble of actually having to say it. Speech and what it does will still be there, but will now (or at least ‘soon’) be so much clearer and cleaner. Such a will-to-cleanness and the washing out of what might muddy communication haunts as well our main exemplar******, who we will now move along to.

2. Kevin Warwick and the Feeling of the Feeling of the Inside of the Significant Other

Professor Kevin Warwick works within the apparently very practical****** environment of the University of Reading Cybernetics lab. Something of a media darling a few years ago (especially on a number of titillating “future-shock”-“future-
sex” shows), Warwick has invented a series of subcutaneous or embedded prostheses to enable communication between, for example, 1) one’s own proper-body and the buildings which one owns (or perhaps work at\textsuperscript{xxxii}) and which are thus one’s extended property; and 2) the ability to control technologies that operate across internet connectivity (with attendant benefits to medicine and of help in augmenting or creating various other tele-extensible ‘expertises’ unable “themselves” to travel) and finally, at least for our main purposes here, 3) an embedded batterless chip that enables both himself (he loves being his own guinea-pig\textsuperscript{xxxiii}) and his wife to share the (co-)presence or evidence of their internal “love chemicals” as evidence of their intimate pleasure within one another’s presence, without as a consequence having to worry about any previous uncertainties of any, perhaps, questionable vouchsafes-of-voice or of any fog-of-the-face (that this technology seeks to bridge and obviate). Warwick is intent on upgrading himself and his wife Irena to avoid such difficulties.

For Warwick has invented himself as “the world’s very first cyborg” and believes in the future of highly integrated technologies that will expand our sensual milieus or our interpersonal umwelt and that these will help to form the very future of our post-humans. Older forms of communication via speech and facial gesture will soon be on the wane. In his autobiography (or his auto-cyborg-ography?) Warwick states that our children’s children will “look back with wonder at how their ancestors could have been so primitive as to communicate by means of silly little noises called speech” (my emphasis). In a television interview\textsuperscript{xxxiv} that reported on a related implanting of chips into both his wife and his own nervous systems (and pre-faced with a section title reading “linking the brain with technology in order to upgrade the human species”), Warwick states:

“That was for me the most exciting thing scientifically thing that I’ve been involved with. She had electrodes pushed into her nervous system, and with my implant-electrodes in my nervous system, electrically [intonation in original] we linked our nervous systems together. So what happened, when she moved her hand ‘chuke-chuke-chuke’, my brain received three pulses “chuke-chuke-chuke”. So we communicated telegraphically, nervous system to nervous system, for the first time in the world. Quite clearly now communicating brain-to-brain is the next step”

Such replacements of external speech and of external sight by the replacement or upgrade of a more direct technological ‘thought transfer’ (what we are proposing to call here panop-tech-claire-voyance) will finally transport us to the long awaited promised land or location of the behind-the-face-of-the-face-of-the-other and allow as such for a direct and immediate form of communication that will finally be able to edit or to splice out any uncertainty or undecidability from our intimate relationships. For Warwick then, no longer will there be any speech act or any other act of the body to be worried over, concerned by or questioned (nor presumably, by extension, will the promissory of the once necessary, though still perhaps perturbing, performative of the “I do” of the wedding ceremony any longer need to signature-stamp the opening of a marriage?) but will allow us to really share our real spirit and feeling with our significantly immediatised other (a shared space or an overlapped hearth of ipseity). For the faces and the voices that will once have projected our significant others ‘out’ to us will no longer form a possible undecidable barrier-entrance to what presumably lies beneath, but will provide a final cure for such uncertainty of these two sites of mediation of, for example, the pre-immediatised voice and the face: intimate as they
are, these two communication devices also intimate a certain uncertainty principle or the possibility of a loss of meaning. Hence the need for a device to inter-face with and open up the previously hidden potential of the galvanian fourth wounding.

For these latter “natural gifts” (of the face and of the voice) that one certainly presently greets (through our aisthesis that enable a quite immediately-felt interpretation) with great pleasure and which one certainly loves-of-the-other and which give one so much food-for-desire-and-thought (gifts that allow the human subject to be-with-the-other, or of the Heideggerian significant otherly oriented mit-da-sein) always immanently include an element, or at least the possibility of a risk of a deviation from the path-of-the-proper. Through the presence now of such prosthetic grafts, the family-plot of the couple can now truly thicken and blend into a unified one. Who can argue that these secondary prostheses, though coming late upon the scene, are not then so much more primary than what they come along later to so secondarily augment? For surely the desires embedded within our seeking of the very behind-of speech and of the other-side-of the face; such “behinds” for-the-sake-of which we seek out our intercourse in the first place (the seeking for the catching of its sight/site). Intercourse always already assumed then a distance of mediation that is, quite paradoxically, not the intercourse itself. Envois (Derrida) then are sent out through such intercourse, but the demanded closure of the destination is not touched enough (in its joint-core) so a second-order envois or envoy is always already presupposed by the failure of the primary internally-fissured envois to properly deliver its message and have it finally arrive.

Something, in excess, then cannot quite find itself being touched within such activities of intercourse, even as-one is speaking, looking or touching upon the matter of the other. What is sought-out within the operations of the sense organs is the envois (message) that apparently might lay, or perhaps “lie”, behind the intercoursal-touching and is then much more intimately at stake within the circulations of the game than the surface of the loved one that one makes contact with. Mediation (or intercourse) itself then, in this somewhat pre-Levinasian totalising model, is nothing but the embodied desire to erase itself as (de-)distancing (as a “materiality” that comes between).

The desire then is to bridge and once bridged, the mediatory device (for this is now what we are calling these various ontical intercourses, in “sympathy” with this totalising model) disappears to become immediate; the ultimate teleology of speech or sexual intercourse here would reduce writing, as excess, from itself (as undecidability, improbability; difference) and of course as differance.

Thus, as with Dvorsky and his speech-thought based techlepathy, Warwick would now techlepathically connect and interface with his own wife’s very organismic, as well as orgasmic, interiority and to be (rather than previously, perhaps, not enough to be) his wife’s own intimate ipseic pleasure; a pleasure that he himself has gifted or given to her and most certainly and symmetrically vice-versa (more than simply a mise-en-abyme mirroring?). The previously dominant interpersonal, inter-spatial or inter-facial economy as excess-beyond-total-exchange vanishes within a lossless and vastly reduced economy and a sort of joint interpersonal Umwelt arises in its previously divided wake. Obviously we are
questioning
cerning this “techlepathy” or of what I would prefer to label here (to distance us from Dvorsky’s unproblematically inclusive term but also to bring out a Derridean overtone of “the envoi”) a panop-tech-clair-voyance.

3. Certain Philosophical Questions Concerning the Problem of Thought-Transference: Hegel & Tele-Familiarity

A so-called pre-panoptechnological clair-voyance involves the reduction of the fog or the spatial interruption that is the distance of the aesthetic apparatus of sight from its interest on a grand scale. This clear-vision (as the word translates) or augmented second-sight at a distance, as well as forming the dream-life of many a historically concrete couple, has also been the concern of some prominent thinkers. Just as for Freud (as Derrida points out in his “Telepathy”, where Freud played-with and leaned-toward telepathy as possibly existing inter-personal cashable currency of soul-exchange), so Hegel wrote some words on this subject for his own audience (also delivered in the situated lecture format) in talking a little about his own particular example and “use” of clair-voyance.

He was not however, as his English translator Wallace is at pains to point out, exactly sold on clair-voyance, but this lack of being-sold-on-it was not so much the result of a doubt as to its veracity (i.e. as something that actually can happen), but on its proper place within a communicative system that places a pure (human) spirit pyramidically at the top and thus somewhat above its base level of intercourse. “Clairvoyance” is primitive but it nevertheless does exist. So base though it may be, it still nevertheless has a function to provide, if only as a powerfully figural illustration, within the circle of spiritual family values. Such an activity (of the figure of) clairvoyance can certainly travel well, if only to be tamed through figuration and transformed into the actuality of spirit. It is in this former figural aspect of its presence, at the very least, that it has a rather uplifted and upright existence.

It exists as something that, within the grand Hegelian tradition, is to be lifted-up (the famously powerfully teleological Aufhebung) into the human spiritual realm: a realm that, most importantly, centres around the inviolable solidity of a filial-familial unity. In the particular passage of the lecture where Hegel talks of clairvoyance and the family unit together, we find echoes that closely approximate those of the aforementioned Freudian excursions into the family+telepathy coupling. But there will soon be a problem that will inherently and intricately haunt these functioning figurations, these telepathic family ties. We will have to wait a little to see these problems bubble on their surface.

Both of these excursions (Freud and Hegel’s) bind-to or feed-from the solidity of a blood-based family unit. For blood circulates through the channels of these distantly placed paleo or arché-prostheses and bring out within these channels of discourse only what is most proper, and thus already together, all together. The figure of blood contains difficulties however, as we just alluded. Hegel himself states as much (and backed-up as we will see by certain conceptual clarifications of his English translator) in his ‘Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit’. He states within the universal first-person that:
“The family tie constitutes my actuality. There can be people who, when in the external situation some change occurs, know about this in their own inwardness, their genius. So we have now to consider what exists in the form of presentiments. A man of forceful, sound self-feeling is bound to the usual condition of knowing. But there are several examples in which, removed at a distance, a subject suffered a loss, nevertheless experienced an immediate sensation of that loss, believing that he had heard the noise or some such thing”

(Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit, p130)

“Clairvoyants also know about distant objects. The individual is actual, and to his actuality belongs everything that concerns him. Since clairvoyants know their actuality, and their actuality is this concentration of feeling, they know all of this in an immediate way…”

(208 W. reads: so they know of this without the mediation through which one otherwise knows of such objects existing outside oneself. They know in an immediate way).

“This is particularly true of blood friends…”

(209 W. Adds: the same blood. Family is an ethical, but also a natural unity. Actuality of the one is substantially included in the substantial actuality of the other).

“The sphere of actuality also extends to persons that interest one, belong to one’s environment, but extends further to such objects as belong to one’s circle and of which one can therefore know in one’s emotional life […] Here belongs the phenomenon of ‘second sight’ of the Scottish […] Also the prophet Muller of Heidelberg can be mentioned […]. The occasion of his capability is noteworthy. At the death of his father he threw himself on top of his father, and with the most inner fervour prayed to God. The father was awakened, and this highest effort, this postling of the soul outside of itself, had fixed this predominantly emotional life in him.” (Hegel, ibid. p136)

The figure of the composited “blood-friend”. Thus distance and mediation are short-circuited in such clair-voyance by an immediation where blood flows within one large body composed of two geometrically distinct coordinates; a clair-voyant sang-clair that flows over and penetrates the barriers of skin. It is only through this blood that such communication can (ethically) flow. And yet simultaneously the blood must also simultaneously be composed of the social (hence the “blood friend”) which W. reads as composing of the “ethical and natural family”: one’s spouse that one has a bond of spirit with binds itself here by the placing of an immense, though hidden, weight upon the word “ethical” while placing a more open weight upon the (seemingly less contestable) word family. Thus there is a naturalistic blood-bond that ties an ethics of the one to the other, without any “real” blood being present. All the burden is placed upon this somewhat structurally uneasy bridge-term then of the
“blood friend”. But what cannot be questioned, even apart from this questionable real-distance, is that blood is blood. What of this blood that flows through what is not in fact in itself composed of blood?

**Back to the Future: Panop-tech-clair-voyance**

We come back to something, a spectral metaphor composed of blood, that is fuelling our present exemplar (Warwick) and his embedded chip enabled tech-clairvoyance. In such a tech-clairvoyance we would not be dealing with a secondary ‘invasive’ prosthesis (that would invade the prior-primacy of the a priori natural body-proper) but of a prosthesis that completes the call-of-blood. This call-of-blood will complete a lack that apparently, as with Dvorsky, always needed to be completed. The love-envoi sent out from the “blood-friend” (a rather inherently-aporetic appellation as we have just seen) receives something already close-by and already interior. It just completes it more, or signs what was there already.

From a position where it was previously unable (through sensory-deprivation) to see inside we come to see the actually experienced position of the blood friend that so concerns Warwick and his pre-invention. A pre-invention in a long-long-long line commun-ication inventions. Again it is a long story whose recounting would seem to be coming to a present-day close: Warwick sees himself as carrying out the work and the challenges that would place him in filiation with the tele-technological communication apparatus of Alexander Graham Bell (he would indeed like to be remembered as an inventor of similar life-changing, geo-space-bridging prestige).

This is not however akin to tying two yoghurt cartons together with a piece of string in order to colloquy more immediately with our blood-friend loved ones, but more an super-intimate soliloquy of the (behind-the)face-to-face(behind). This would be something altogether more than a de-distancing electric speech, but of a sort of panoptechclairvoyant electric immediacy. This bypassing of the previous externality of the face takes each of us/them inside them-us in a sort of intra-circuitous technico-blood-grouping. But of the distance brought shorter, to disappearing..? Is there nothing more to say? Questions that we opened with of selfless otherness? Surely to connect so snugly to the other, we must already be at home most cannily within ourselves? And if we are soon to be together with each other, there must have been a privacy that can later be made to join within a new properly compounded blood-privacy?

If the history of mediation or communication has always also been a history of the desire for the bridging and the bringing closer of previously distant distances (according to McLuhan, Ong, Levinson’s ‘Digital McLuhan’, the systems/cyberneticists, etc.) and of vanquishing missing or errant excesses that might otherwise fall to the tomb (and whose seeds might not be deposited within the knowledge-bank) we have two questions perhaps to problematise it. One is the Levinasian ethical question concerning totality, another is the more “permanent” or ineradicable (and less ethically inclined) Derridean/Bataillian problem of a general economy and differance.

For economy of time we will move onto the second question concerning panop-tech-clair-en-voyance, the disappearance of difference. For unlike Levinas’s
respect for the alterity of the autrui (and of the face as something that stops and starts our having-of-the-other), the possible bypassing of the facial does not for all that implode these alter-spatialities. For the self here is not, prior to this possibility of a solid-bridging, in control and possession of its ownness, to then be able to take-control or totalise (and not leave to excess or infinity) that which comes before this spatial coming before (the other).

Is the self a self before it comes to wish to hold itself out to the other? Is the self a monad looking for something outside, itself? Does the self need to build a prosthetic bridge toward the other, or is the prosthetic of the bridge-outside already inside? For Derrida we are perhaps always already telepathic and thus always already invaginationally wounded:

_The truth, what I always have difficulty getting used to: that nontelepathy is possible. Always difficult to imagine that one can think something to oneself, deep down inside, without being surprised by the other, without the other being immediately informed, as easily as if he or she had a giant screen inside._ (Derrida, Telepathy)

And yet, we still seek to supplement this arché-telepathy, but perhaps the better to hide or bury ourselves away from this prior techclairvoyant substratum that we have always already so thoroughly been composed of? Remember the galvanic wound of the arche-electrical. Prostheses of prosfetishes do not hide away a lack but offer the threat or the promise of an extension to hide the existent alreadyness of a prior extension beneath the apparent prior lack of this invasiveness. Just as for Leroi-Gourhan the hand is not in any way invaded by the prosthetic tool but already available for it and calling-out for it in its very shape and ability to grasp or clasp onto what is outside, so the body (as galvanic already, but more as vibrating with invagination) is a quite uncanny abode: not of itself but of what is thought to be prosthetically outside.

In a twist on Haraway’s desire to have responsibility given to (to Christianise?) the animal -after Derrida’s question of animal possibilities of response-we might ask: and say the human reacted and has only ever reacted? What if the responsibility of the individual was only ever the panop-tech-clair-voitant machinic reaction of the other, of an alterity, inside? A reaction machinery unable ever to stand or have stood on its own two feet in any responsible way?

“[T]hen comes the last stage, the one that is still before us, but that I see seeing us coming and that softwarily, will have anticipated us right from the start. In this way a life is totally transformed, converted, paralysed by telepathy would await us, given over to its networks and its schemes across the whole surface of its body, in all its angles, tangled up in the web of histories and times without the least resistance on our part” (p243)

Such threats, offered within the voice of the somewhat camp quotation above, offer a return to a poverty of world, but where for all that were the riches? What would be a resistance where, in truth (?) a solidity ground has always already been lacking?

For here we spot a contradiction or a strange aporetic cut within Haraway’s somewhat celebratory cyborgian fourth wound and one that Luigi Galvani already
helped to have us recognise as dehiscent or open. Galvani’s electrical-technical interior does not seek to open a chasm, an abyss, or a wound between the animal and the human but to wound the safe biblical distance of a safe anthropocentric division (a division of which both Heidegger and Uexküll also partake of). In rightly seeking to question this rather neat divide however, why give responsibility unto to the animal and thus share out something of the human “individual’s” presumed possibility of answer from the bottom of an owned-responsibility? And so, without wishing to re-establish the dividing line between the human and the animal, we might ask the question: “and say the human reacted?”

**Preliminary Bibliography**

- Bataille, G. *The Accursed Share: General Economy*
- Becker, R.O. *The Body Electric: Electromagnatism and the Foundation of Life*
- Berkeley, G. *An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision*
- Buchanan, B. *Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexküll*
- Cassirer, E. *An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture*
- Derrida, J. *Eating Well: Calculation of the Subject*
- Derrida, J. *Glas*
- Derrida, J. *Of the Aforementioned Human Genome Project*
- Derrida, J. *On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy*
- Derrida, J. *Speech and Phenomena*
- Derrida, J. *Telepathy*
- Derrida & Stiegler *Echographies of Television*
- Devereux, G. (ed) *Psycho-analysis and the Occult*
- Engels, F. *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*
- Freud, S. *Dreams and Occultism*
- Fukuyama, F. *Our Posthuman Future*
- Geary, J. *The Body Electric: An Anatomy of the New Bionic Senses*
- Genet, J. *The Thief’s Journal*
- Harraway, D. *When Species Meet*
- Hayles, N.K. *How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Infomatics*
Hegel, GWF. Lectures on the Philosophy of Spirit
Heidegger, M. The Age of the World Picture
Heidegger, M. Basic Problems in Phenomenology: World Finitude, Solitude
Heidegger, M. The Question Concerning Technology
Hubbell, R.W. 4000 Years of Television
Kurzweill, R. The Singularity is Near
Levinas, E. Time and the Other
Levinas, E. Totality and Infinity
Levinson, D. Digital McLuhan: A Guide to the Information Millennium
McNeill, W. Life Beyond the Organism: Animal Being in Heidegger’s Freiburg Lectures, 1929-30
Merleau-Ponty, M. Nature: course notes from the College de France
Merleau-Ponty, M. The Structure of Behaviour
Mills, J. The Unconscious Abyss: Hegel’s Anticipation of Psychoanalysis
Nagel, T. What’s it like to be a bat?
Nietzsche, F. The Future of Our Educational Institutions
Royle, N. After Derrida
Royle, N. Telepathy and Literature: Essays on the Reading Mind
Schnapp, J. Crowds
Sinclair, U. Mental Radio
Steeves, H.P. Animal Others: On Ethics, Ontology and Animal Life
Timoner, O. We Live in Public
Uexküll, J Von A Walk Through the Worlds of Animals and Men
Wallace, W. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind
Warwick K. I, Cyborg
Warwick K. Upgrading Humans Via Implants
As we will see towards the end of this study, Haraway is quite far away from occupying a univocal position vis-à-vis the status of the animal and her use of Derrida, as a friend at her pan-biologic mess table, is equally far from being safely or univocally demonstrated. The cyborgian wound and the somewhat para-spatial position of the animal that she believes that Derrida helps to open up, by asking the question of the status of an individual agential response on the part of an-animal (here a cat, an empirical cat, in front of him in his bathroom one fine day): the question that Derrida asks in asking “and say the animal responded?” does not however stop dead in just one direction (of a reaction-becoming-response) but can be seen also to move the question equally in the opposite direction. We can ask (and later we will) whether response is such a safe-extensible category? Derrida rarely stretches one category to cover ‘the other’, so we hope to close our conversation with a question concerning the reaction and its undecidable stretch over the domain of the safe response. We might worry, further, about the status of a relatively simple ‘pan’ stretching of the category responsibility as a curative to a dualist conception that places or parcels the animal as reactive-human-opposite and which then ties up all of the ends (the ends that we have here opened with) or whether the conceptual category of this response/reaction opposition would be sufficiently problematised by stretching either end of this duality to cover or obviate the other. While we will certainly, at the close of this argument, be problematising Haraway’s stretching and inclusive opening-up of the category of responsibility (an opening up that would include the animal as a companion or ‘fraternal ’friend’) by provisionally coming in the opposite direction with a human given covering of reaction, we hope to unsettle or shake this conceptual framework in a much more undecidable direction without obvious end.

This fourth wound then is not a singular but a double-wound, for in being both bio-electrical and common to human and animal, two once safe borders become invaginated in a form that problematises two supposed temporalities.

Now this birth, this recognition, was the birth of a recognition in all senses. This final wound to the enveloping pride, like these previously recognised wounds, is not some explosive prosthetic invention that comes invasively along from some errant technological exterior coordinate, but is a discovery of something always already interior. This wound then is not an invention that offers a practical distance from previously more observational discoveries (Copernican, Darwinian Freudian) of a prior-existing nature, but is itself an injurious recognition of something always already prosthetic. As far back as ‘back’, the electrical interior that Galvani helped us to recognise was already doing its firing and its sparking, even as those ignorant yet noble cave men were trying to spark up and ignite their first primal fires and then later pre-scientifically mythologising the arrival of these gifts. Later still our somewhat naïve ancestors may worry about a certain illicit trade or of the stealing of something improper to our prior nature;
something dangerously additional but nevertheless safely distanced by the placement of a coordinate that is external. We now recognize that one can be supplemented by too much of what we already have; a supplementation of something dangerously internal. The very harm that this electricity can do is not because it invades something that was altogether empty of it, but instead comes about through the overloading of a circuitry that can only take so much extra current, currency or charge. “Whenever” the dividing line occurred that struck man down, or built man up from a previously reactive “animality” (and like the sparked-fire, later mythologised as either supplied or stolen away), this electrical interior, this charge that finally always drains away from us, finds all life living under its temporary protection (hence the wound to our animal separation anxiety). But this is a double-edged recognition that offers something futurial just as it takes away something we thought to be altogether posterior: new images of capture and storage electrical circuitry are offered in substitution or replacement for a prior blood-replacement mythology (for we are thinking obviously of vampires as escapees of the imprisoning of the double-edged settings of the sun) with an electrical systems-theory that simply interfaces with just a suchlike supplemental expansion of its already-own.

Again, to recognise this monstrous-monster, after this wounding that we now uncannily cognize and have since then come to “know” via the enlightened investigations of Luigi Galvani, it is not then the mere supplemental “lately”-invasion of some errant extra-monstrosity, but of a monstrous-city already internal to our previous “nature”. Obeying here then the integral rulings of Kristevian abjection, the symbolic vomiting out of this integral integrated imag(inary) is nothing but the somewhat difficult (to say the least) recognition of an image already really inside as real-ity. A strange logic of the pictor-real is residing in in-alienable residence here. Something ensconced safely inside does not come to imagine the horrors of something purely outside, but is thoroughly (and already) invested with its invaginating electrical-code. There is nothing really worryingly foreign to code-break-into, and here the horror itself resides. The firewall is nothing but a very (nothing but) porous myelin sheathing that itself conducts the charge.

We would see here a double-facing de-monstrosity that monstrates and demonstrates somewhat simultaneously: Frankenstein’s unnamed monster’s monstrous presence is allowed or brought-about by the artifice of being able to composite or piece together, through a supposedly secondary late-coming electrical charge, what was already charged in its prior intimate-interiority (of what each of the pieces were already composed). This late arriving “secondary” electricity however interrupts a proper circuitry of circulation that was put into motion via a proper birth from a proper-womb. The secondary-womb that adds a secondary-charge, and which runs across or monstrously sutures (what should be) the gaps of dead pieces, adds a false-life or a second life that can never outrun or live up to the live truth of the primary. This secondarity should clearly be placed into the flames. A primary primacy however finds itself haunted or seconded through a Derridean logic-of-the-supplement which cannot help but see (though the flame would hope to bury this unease) the illicit writing work of this electricity as already present and charging the very intimate-interiority of what is now not most proper. This fire all to easily burns their very own fingers.

According to Jakobson there are three forms of translation from one notional position into another. While two of these are notionally linguistic (intra-linguistic, for example in rewording for better understanding while inter-linguistic occurs between two language systems notionally foreign to one another), a third sense
of ‘translation’ has to do with the translation between one semiotic system and another. One such semiotic system is the language of the galvanic skin response. Once discovered or recognised as a form of communication, instruments can be invented for the reading of such ‘utterances’: another system (for example a speech-based linguistic one) is necessary to read these trances or movements. Just as Freud reads hysteria as but a series of symptoms of something beside itself, in itself, we have the presentation of a new interiority not previously available to be read (reading forms the nexus-instrument of such possibilities of systemic exchange) or fathomed. A prior secrecy is uncovered where previously it was secreted away, entombed or encrypted. While hardly uncovering a secret in-secrecy, the engine runs to burrow deeper toward that notional core and translates it into a public language or discourse. Science and the tradition of unconcealment was always Freud’s avowed goal (and, interestingly, why the figure of telepathy forms such a spectral figure in his ‘Dreams and Occultism’ lecture: does it exist, in which case we have a discovery of science, or does it not, in which case psychoanalysis will discover other reasons for the symptom-of-telepathy). This ambivalence concerning telepathy in relation to psychoanalysis’ status as a science, but of a science open to the other is interestingly explored (especially in terms of Derrida’s playful uncovering of these psychoanalytic remainders) by Royle in an essay titled ‘The Remains of Psychoanalysis: Telepathy’. Here he points to the unassimilable figuration that telepathy assails, or wounds, the Freudian wound with. Translation and trans-Portation within the panop-tech-clair-voYant desire-systems that we will shortly be looking at take the figure of telepathy as a prosthetic goal that is not in need of a prior natural-telepathy. Here we would have a prosthetic supplementation of a sort of sixth sense whose empirical existence or empiric extension is, of course, highly uncertain. Here we would perhaps then be techno-scientifically supplementing or prosthetising a myth or indeed a ghostly naked lack (a prostetiSh?). Within this latter science there is not the worry of status of discovery that so haunted Freud but the invention of a prosthetic system that would induce the presence of what previously was perhaps merely the domain of certain occultish desire. Such an occult would be the engine of this regional output of an ontic technoscience.

This is the strange celebratory-deploring apocalyptic image that Josh Harris, the 90’s Internet entrepreneur, likened the future of humanity to. As objects of the zoo (or of the zoographic gaze) he believes that we will super-lose our privacy and that we will, in the future, very much “live in public”. As proof of this prediction he created two famous New York public/private happenings that rolled Big Brother into some predictive, pre-dative facebook experiments. In his first social experiment “We Live in Public” he created a closed-in beehive styled pod (or coffin?) hotel where all members would be able to look at each other and interact with each other 24/7 for an extended period of time (until it was shutdown by the police around a month in). Every pod was networked together via cable-cctv and from time-to-time members were taken out and interrogated by Stasi-imitating overseers who would work to reduce further inhabitants’ sense of self. In an interview to introduce his conceptual-concept-artifice he stated “Everything is free here, except the videotape. That we own” to underline the dis-ownership of personal space that each inhabitant would be giving up or exchanging for this regulated freedom of consumption and movement. The selfless image of the worker-bee again raises its powerful metaphoric (lack of) visage, just as it so powerfully does also, as Derrida points out, as a pivotal image within Heidegger’s zoo-graphic chamber in ‘Basic Problems in Phenomenology’. Equally in Uexküll’s influential essay ‘A Walk Through The Worlds of Animals and Men’ (not least for Heidegger, who wrote at some considerable appreciative length in this ‘Problems’ book about the then current
umwelt researches of Uexküll) talks about the poverty of animals in comparison to man’s richness of world and particularly of the trapped tick that reacts mechanically to the butyric acid secreted by a passing cow. This trapped poverty is the umwelt that we must understand that surrounds the animal as of a soap bubble (Uexküll provides some impressively communicative examples that hides, while not trapping, an impressive conceptual complexity). In truth, he points out, we occupy umwelts too, but our umwelt is a very open and shapeable bubble. Such restrictive imagery of the bee and the beehive that encompasses and would threaten the rich human relation to ‘the open’ is also memorably (and in predictive eschatological intones) captured by E.M. Forster in his short story ‘The Machine Stops’ where people no longer travel or embark on journeys into the open, but stay in their pods and see, but not touch, everything (including their intimate geo-distant relatives) from a distance. Nobody, apart of course from the few, see within this machine, which will eventually stop, anything really to worry agitate or campaign about (for of course actual travel makes you dirty in all senses) as nobody here realizes their entrapped poverty of being (and how mechinic-beelike they have become). Unsurprisingly some see this as an early C20 short story based on a future vision of some captivating zoographic web 2.0 Internet-machinery. The pieces however were already in place and captured by quite a number of stories and inventions (though, of course, like the ancient Greek steam engine they had yet to find their epistemic local prowess) such as the Victorian Internet or the age of tele-technologies such as the telegraph, telephone and pneumatic tubes (later visualised so cleverly in Gilliam’s ‘Brazil’). Further into the dark land of the human-insect there is the image of the crowd where the individual-responsibility of the face disappears. Here we find the ‘The Day of the Locust’, where a swarm of insectuous quasi-telepathic mood-enraptured de-individuals mechanically play-out a reaction programmed in by some event that overruns them. A pre-crowdal responsibility thus hemorrhages out from holdings the body-proper and thus gets itself lost within the faceless dimensions of the labyrinthine cityscape. An interesting anthology titled ‘Crowds’ (edited by Jeffrey Schnapp) explores many such images of the crowd (and its cityscape).

For we will ask later whether the desire for penetration that operates through the desirable imagined machines that we will see as exemplifying the panop-tech-clair-voyant “alter-spatial-gaze” do not wish to cut out the undecidability of the face itself and all it stands for. What we would here call inter-faciality (echoing both Levinas and the traditional idea of the technè of prosthetic interfacing) would not wish to cut out or deface the undecidable site of the face itself. For ‘The Face’ is what presents the interior to the exterior and which not only offers a means of clear access or denial through certain non-verbal cues (forming a notionally simultaneous visible-invisible curtain), but also the haunting possibility of secret and secretion (entombing a truth denied to a particular outside that would desire access) that might fail to betray a notional intentionality. The face is both friend and enemy to the notional interlocutor and so as an ‘inter’ or between site, there is always the risk as well as the reward. As site of preference, or of clear reference, the clear and present reward of the truth (in all of its desired pre-facial nakedness) and of the possibility of the secret of a secretion is what interlocution is after (but would also wish to come before, in all senses). The bypassing of the possibly blocked road of the face, through interfacing with the bio-electrical galvanic apparatus, would assure and, as we said, cut out the necessity of the troubling facial intercourse. This possibility of a matrix of the extra-facial, as we will see later, is what umbilically feeds and keeps going our main panop-tech-clair-voyant exemplar Prof. Kevin Warwick’s quest. The face would thus be lifted out of the picture and panop-tech-clair-voyant apparatuses
brought down as of an ultra-clear-penetrative-visor; clearing out the thickety problematic-of-the-undecidable that any inter-facial intercourse (and other supposedly intercourses lacking immediacy by extension) would maintain. On this view (for we are certainly not forwarding this simultaneous pessimistic-optimistic position as our own, but for more complex reasons, that we hope will later become more clear or even clair) responsibility would, in such a bypassing of the undecidability of the face, be replaced by a beautifully and purely reactive machinic cybernetic loop. Nothing would, any longer, fall toward the tomb-of-uncertainty through such an impenetrably thick fogging of the face. Reaction not responsibility.

ix So many social networking ideals exhibit images of empowered ‘smart mobs’ (for here we are not dealing with ‘the crowd’) who come together to see their interests through before dispersing to other interests. On this view, as tea party activists they network together, not with the aim of losing their identity in some mass, crowd or hive, but of temporarily or temperately coming together so that the imposition of a framework does not win. Within this particular and progressive portrait of selflessness, the situated self joins likeminded selves to help out a cause that is heartfelt. As evidence of this temporariness of their self’s security, they would point out the sheer overlap of group identities within their facebook pages. They are not, on this view, zoologically confined to a bubble, but self-less in a very self-full way. Networking makes contacts and stretches the self’s bubble: the riches of the unwelt increase and here again we find some powerful post-human imagery at play, or on the prowl?

x Animal reaction is a self-less poverty-of-world in opposition to the human’s world-forming vision. While coming from a lecture course of , this is also almost a straight quotation of Jacob Von Uexküll’s. Further evidence of Uexküll’s influence upon a 1920s German strain of phenomenologically inclined (or more properly here Neo-Kantian in this case) philosophy at the time comes in the shape of Ernst Cassirer who headed the University of Hamburg where Uexküll set up his Institute for Umweltforschung and who probably also introduced Heidegger to his work (Heidegger attended a lecture of Cassirer’s at Davos where Uexküll’s current umwelt researches formed part of the subject matter). Cassirer writing in his ‘Essay on Man’ stated, “There is an unmistakable difference between the organic reactions and human responses” (p.29, my emphasis). Again we have reaction and response and an abyssal space coming between them. Cassirer adds an extra symbolic layer for the human, which comes or intervenes between the Merknetze (receptor net) and the Werknetze (effector net) that the animal also possesses. Man is not just set apart as the animal rationale, but according to Cassirer also animal symbolicum. The animal is denied the symbol. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (“Nature’) in appreciably addressing Uexküll’s non-mechanistic approach to the animal, however likens certain categories of animal to what he calls ‘animal machines’ or non-institutional (as in lacking in the locality of a certain portion of plasticity or ‘choice’) ‘reflex republics’ where organs rule the organism instead of vice versa. While allowing for more variegation he erects a machinic comparison that sets the human at a summit of an a-machinic positionality. Merleau-Ponty does however simultaneously open up a space of temporal-based reactivity within more ‘complex’ bio-entities in his interpretation of Uexküll: “The Merkzeit, for Uexküll, is not a fact of consciousness, but a component of the physical structure, which is manifest in the behaviour of the animal” (Nature, p.173).

xi Obviously we are (that is my-self here and now) somewhat cynically placed before this title of self-less-ness. Self-other.
This latter apocalyptic hyperbole is, of course deplored (and adored by those who manage to simultaneously or implosively celebrate-deplore) in the works of Baudrillard and Virilio. Loss, implosion, gone and biblically profound these writings intone in the tone of street occupying sandwich board walkers who we in ignorance walk by and make room for. There is a nascent eroticism within these intonations that captivate in a similar way to McLuhan in the 60s/70s where media “theory” takes an emotive turn and becomes sexy within the very spaces that it trains its own optics on. The irony is not lost upon either party and a strange beelike dance of the hunter and the hunted ensues where each does not quite know which role the other is playing, as their roles (as both also notice) have imploded.

This before then should be heard in two senses, just as in Derrida’s ‘Before the Law’. We would perhaps wish to see ourselves as responsible ‘before’ these technologies and before these technologies came along (either to add or take away; deposit or de-position), but also as responsible before reaction and before what is mechanical and prosthetic. The before then is not temporal or spatial (as one appears before some-time or some-space, e.g. ‘The Law’, in all our responsibility) but an inmixing of both and neither. Once we are before; once we were before; once we’re here before; once we’re there before: responsible or reactive; self-ful or self-less? The purpose of this paper then is not to mediate between these positions in favour of a new law, but of problematising any responsibility before such prostheses. The prosthesis, in being an already-electrical, might not be so promised or threatened and might not be so whole.

We will ask, as can be imagined, what in fact a cyborg is and how one can use the somewhat questionable barrier the skin as the figural border of use of technology from technology becoming a newly integrated organ. Technological resources have been used ‘since the beginning’ as means of communication or expansion of the present horizon (the French archaeologist Andre Leroi-Gourhan pointed out some time ago the primal-originary nature of the hominid’s integral relation to technology –via the hand’s very shape- that questions any idea of an early innocence prior to a technological encroachment). Subcutaneous invasions and upgrades to the human skeleton partake in fact of a romantic image of a whole-being whose whole comes later to be invaded. Leroi-Gourhan points out that this invasion is hardly late coming but was always already underway.

John Perry Barlow is a retired cattle rancher who takes much of the imagery of the wild west or the individualistic east coast Thoreueanism and transposes it across to the free space of cyberspace....
means that originally separated us off from the immediacy of a unified social body. In a book titled 'Digital McLuhan' Levinson sees a vindication of McLuhan's global village that sadly McLuhan himself (as 'Digital Moses' to this idea) did himself not get to experience or reside upon. The Internet brings us together upon an expansive land that at longlast is no longer divided or celled-up.

xxx My uneasy inverted commas, but not in a moral sense. Again the distinction (as in Heidegger's between organic organ and secondary equipment) is presupposed within the act that would see a future replacement of the entirety of the organs by new permanent technological (and thus not liable to decrepitude) organs. Is the distinction that Heidegger is eager to make between organs and equipment, not also presupposed in Kurzweill's innocent idea of down-loadings and replacements? It is true, to be sure, that Heidegger and Kurzweill come from two radically differing traditions (with the latter operating, in what Heidegger would see as Cartesian inspired technologically enframed world-picture), but both see something of the pre-prosthetic (paradoxical, to investigate further?) in the saveability, presence or substantiality of something inside (and it could easily be argued that Kurzweill clings onto this in a much stronger fashion than does Heidegger who has a rather more ambivalent relationship between technicity and a soul-substance opposite). Kurzweill celebrates the machine and the picture but cannot let go of the idea of the self that such a machinery should store or animatedly archive.

xxxi Although Fukuyama wrote about the end of history, he has questions about extending life into some near infinite. See 'Out Posthuman Future'

xxxii 'The Singularity is Near' and 'The Age of Spiritual Machines' are both very quantitatively-inclined books. Moore's Law (of exponential computer speed increases) assure us of a time that is close on the horizon. Similarly Kevin Warwick tells the BBC website of the soon to occur takeover of the world by computer intelligence (which, as children watching for the monstrous, we should be watchful over) and how very close this is. Sarcastic as this note is toward such a conception, neither of these futurologists seem to need to consult any "authorities" within the departments of philosophy of mind. Kurzweill is aware of one such cynical philosopher (the militant Heideggerian scholar Dreyfus and his books about "What Computers Cannot Do" and "What Computers (Still) Cannot Do" which point out how the most seemingly basic of human comportments, based upon tacit, quite 'fuzzy' knowledge, cannot be downloaded into a Minskian robots, etc.) he calls a sort of spoil-sport. No counter-argument is needed, only a pointing out of speed increases and the continued embeddedness of the computer within our lives. This 'within' however should be conceptualized in very careful and variegated ways.

xxxii Dvorksy obviously coins this term in the early 21st century to show the technological culmination or supplementation of something altogether more occultist. The term that Dvorsky uses (techlepathy) plays on a term which itself was coined within an age of technological transformation. Addressing his colleagues of the London 'Society for Psychical Research' (an institution which he cofounded) Frederic Myers stated "we venture to introduce the words Telesthesia and Telepathy to cover all the cases of impression received at a distance without the normal operation of the recognised sense organs". Myers introduced this term (just as Dvorsky does later, in a more neologistic-parasitical fashion) to replace 'thought-transference' to precisely add the transfer of something 'aesthetic' or the receiving of impressions at a distance, while also partaking of the explosion of various tele-media (as Royle points out) that were promising tele-communication at the time. While the transfer of thought-at-a-distance offers the opportunity of
something akin to the sharing of a purity of meaning, telepathy takes us closer to ‘the’ site occupied by whatever impresses the notional sender in the first place. This impression is, as we will see below in Dvorsky’s own usage, something that would take us more proximate to the meaning-to-say that would first fire-off the meaning and the thoughts (which are secondary to the primacy of the impression). Here again then we find sympathy or empathy instead of a mere understanding of the other (albeit at some distance) and thus something much more hyperbolic than the transfer of a mere thought.

xxiii This is dressed-up within the rhetorical garb of the futurist visionairy who, as is so often the case, is someone who picks up on the invention of something that, innovative in itself, will have further revolutionary unforeseen “uses”. While this ontic innovation becomes tomorrow’s (Silicon Valley) fish and (silicon) chip wrapping, Dvorsky sees a revolutionary ontological way of unwrapping the self and opening this self to technological openness in all senses...

xxiv It is this proximal spatial closer that so captivates Dvorsky’s attention within this local ontical invention. It resonates with something he has been thinking for a long time. For here he sees the intending-to-say as a site and a place that can by siphoned-off and directed to technologies that, as we will see, allow for two parties to be brought closer (and this closer is not simply some quantitative increase in proximity but a veritable qualitative transformation) to the spirit that desires union. Here we are obviously thinking of Derrida’s early study of Husserl in ‘Speech and Phenomena’ (some translate the title as ‘Voice and Phenomena’) where Derrida discusses Husserl’s attempts to divide a supposedly internal ‘expressive’ sign from an external and public ‘indicative’ sign. The expressive sign however cannot clear itself of its indicative other and Husserl’s exploration of the intimacy of the self find itself surrounded on all sides by what is outside. It is this hidden-hauntedness, as with mis-appropriations from many other deconstructive readings, which Derrida will use more openly himself as differance. Here Dvorsky presupposes the presence of the intimate (just as we will see that our main case study Warwick does also) that we would be able to share with our significant other outside of our poorly expressive indicative signage. Once we can siphon the site of the meaning-to-say, our loved one will come to see exactly what we mean. Derrida (or rather Husserl in his twists) points out however that there is no pure thought (signified outside of signifiers) to purely “thought-transfer”.

xxv Again we would refer to this desire to isolate some purity of signal that, just as with the complexities of moving robots along xyz coordinates involving “obstacles”, would allow access to some expressive ‘desire-point’ as a journey that is not only problematic at the notional point of arrival (communication with the interiority of the commicatee) but at the very point of departure itself (the commicator being able to be within their own proximity).

xxvi As well as with Aristotle, entelechy was used as a term in the biological sciences and was introduced in the by the German 19th/20th century biologist Hans Driesch. Having similar qualms to Uexkull a few years later with his umwelt researches, Dreisch did not agree with the mechanistic externalist Darwinian views of the organism that were currently coming to dominate the biological sciences. He pointed to the entelechial motion of the organism towards its goal, etc. He also, interestingly, happened to believe in a telepathy. We will try to draw together some of these strings later in our argument.

xxvii It is quite funny when he reaches the point where he visualizes the location of the new upstream interface, that although there is a location for the existing prosthesis developed by NASA that the newer more deeper-burrowing apparatus
is not really explained very well. He simply says, this simple next-step will involve
the delivery of “a fancy neural data conversion device”. Such a simple device
really is for others to worry about, for there will be really nothing to it.

Because obviously this wish to erase the voco from the apparatus will not
displace (in any Derridean general writing) the phono-centric but will, on the
contrary, solidify its rule, its supposed archy. For the meaning-to-say is all the
more deemed to be a location or coordinate, whose provenance and domain will
be proven and expanded, on this view, on a higher, grander scale.

For in cutting out this deferred externalization that is the vocal apparatus, and
placing an electric-prosthetic closer (if not at the very location) of the meaning-
to-say, we find something analogous in its desire to Husserl’s expressive as
opposed to indicative sign that we discussed a few footnotes ago.

For as we will see, speech at present provides too much colloquy, and
ultimately telepathy should furnish a sort of join-soliloquy.

I say ‘practical’ for, as with Kurzweill, the creation of such practical ground-
floor prostheses is embedded within a larger more globalizing project that far
outstrips the reach of these prostheses and lands us within territories that are. In
his autobiography (or should we say auto-cyborg-ography) ‘I, Cyborg’ Warwick
talks of a time where our children’s children will “look back with wonder at how
their ancestors could have been so primitive as to communicate by means of
silly little noises called speech”. When one examines what Warwick
understands by speech, we find however something quite linguistically primitive
and that he is working within a model of communication which does not seem to
feel the need to visit any theoretical debates on communication. Indeed while
the bibliography within this book has some interesting entries (Dreyfus, Haraway,
Hayles, Fukuyama, Penrose), none of these are referred to within the main body.
In a similar fashion Kurzweill (who Warwick received a supportive email from
when some critics were wondering about his sales-patter when playing with his
embedded prostheses), sees philosophers of mind, language, technics, etc. as
just so many spoil-sports. Minsky had a similar approach at MIT in the 70’s but
then was forced to reevaluate his use of Cartesian coordinates as quantitative
data within the buildings of robotics. Philosophers of embodiment had been
saying for some time that getting around was not merely a case of following
some xyz mapping agenda but is based more around tacit knowledge and
complex background processes. Although fuzzy-logics have begun to broach this
post-quantitative approach, still notions of clean ‘information’ tend to override
any possibly opposing ‘logic’. Indeed Warwick is very excited by error-diminution
and seems somewhat to be caught in the wonderments of the infinitely plastic
50s in his model of sci-fi futurity. The future is simply about ‘less errors’.

And are these differences of buildings so different. We are not so much
talking about the now-famous stretching of work into the home and the breaking
of the border that upsets the work and homelife balance as a...

He makes references to film, both in semiotic terms in the external design of
the prostheses (“Borg Collective” Art Nouveau curves) and in also pointing out
that his own inventions have proved influential within certain filmic
representations (James Bond subcutaneous chip is embedded in exactly the same
place, a place unnecessary in itself as a subcutaneous location, as his own). He is
very much tied then to his technology as a user-inventor of the old C19 shed-
based/sideshow tradition. And also gains, of course, a certain ethical prestige,
through not putting someone else through what he himself would also not go
through. This provides a very overdetermined nexus of presences, just as he presents his inventions and his reinvented self.

Although it is not available to me, a titillatingly titled 2001 documentary called 'Digital Sex' has Warwick talking about being able to experience his wife's pleasure and vice versa. While electrical implants are spoken about in the quotation below in terms of a direct brain-to-brain communication, this documentary takes a much more chemical approach where the presence of secretions of sexual hormones are passed along to the other and vice versa. The idea here is to complete a sexual-circuitry where again, as we will point out below, intercourse would itself presumably become its own absence.

Or 'Singularity' to use Kurzweill's "master" term.

Touch is, of course, a metaphor that carries a lot of gravity or weight. As Derrida has pointed out (in 'On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy) 'touch' often figures as the teleology of communication and acts therein as a sort of economic guarantor or gold-standard. "...I could almost touch it" can be attached to so many other apparatuses that it acts as a sort of master-prosthesis. This highly geo-metric figure (Berkeley himself saw sight as a becoming-touch sense and that the tactile quality of locating something is that something's guarantee of what exactly it is. Add to later (imp. note for immediation idea)

Intercourse: "speech" in the sense of Dvorsky, "sex" in the sense of Warwick.

[The Intercourse of] Touch is here not listed as it is the supervisory authority-sense (as in footnote...) that serves these other two (speech and sex). As the master-sense it would have these other two be able to reach-inside-the-other and find something singular that it can touch. Such is the whole that such touching presupposes and upon which the subject (as responsible agent) is presupposed, etc. (clean-up note, develop?)

This is the model of writing that McLuhanesque models of mediation work within. Something more than simply a village, and something better than a reintegrated higher-scale talk?

As somebody pointed out to me in conversation at the Cardiff Zoontotechnics conference where I delivered this paper, the figure of technological/telepathy has changed somewhat since the sc-fi images of 1950s/60s, from information transferral to something now much more ispec and intimate and which this paper has been attempting to address in a related sense. Perhaps this mutation within the figurology of the tele-pathology (from a wish for a teleological structure of pure information to a desire for pure orgasmic immanent-interiority) fits or locks in well with a recent turn to the affective and the emotive, which has been mapped by many scholars recently (and which docusoaps in television reflect on a more quotidian or everyday lived-level.

This was Jakob Von Uexküll’s term that sought to tackle the predominantly Darwinian and anatomically centered theories that sought merely to take apart the physics of the particular creature or organism. Uexkull saw the more important goal as understanding how these physical apparatuses all glue together to form into an (gestalt-like) umwelt for the particular creature composed of these parts (sensory receptors, motor effectors, etc.). Neither outside nor inside, the umwelt enables the outside to appear as such. In a sort of pre-Derridean “Il n'y a pas de hors-texte” (often translated as “nothing outside the text”, but better to say "there is no outside-text"), Uexküll pointed out that we should not
look at the subject or its objects as merely entities with properties but as meaningful totalities each with its own containing bubble. In his famous essay 'A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men' he presents pictorial figures that show his drawing-room from the 'internal' perspective of both a human and a dog, showing the different 'views' of these same objects that each subject has depending on the requirements of each of the species of which they are a member. While the dog, caught within the total "institution" of its species, sees only a mechanical reflection of its rather entrapped species-being, the human is faced with an infinitely plastic universe. An example of this plasticity of being: any recent western visitor to Uexküll's drawing room would see something altogether different to what one of Uexküll's contemporaries would have seen. Such would be the richness of differing historico-cultural possibilities and uncertainties available to the human 'umwelt'. Human response versus animal reaction. Influential on Heidegger, he himself creates a huge unbridgeable gap between animals and men that betrays a certain religious gathering, even in the midst of a scientific endeavor: "animals" in all their variety and variegatedness are huddled together on one side and are poor, while "men" all stand upright on the other side and are rich and open in their gathering of the world.

As I am programmed to do.

(and of the remoteness of site or of our situatedness). Here we could add to the totality of this gaze a panop-tech-clairvoyance?.

This inevitably adds a sense input, which forms a sort of meta-sense input that would closely metaphorically mimic at least one of the accepted other five. A sixth sense is thus called upon which is a sense nonetheless. This supplement of a sixth sense however adds a dimension lacking in the poorer more accepted siblings. A teleesthetic apparatus is thus born. A newer extra-sensory third-eye arises then that would see further but also see altogether differently; it penetrates deeper just as it penetrates otherwise. This third-eye would operate right from the captain's inner eye without the need for the aspects of the physical vessel that the captain would rely upon: the captain here is in no need of the ship that he nevertheless is steering. The res cogitans sees purely outside of the embodied sensorium of the res extensa that nevertheless forms the contours of the very metaphoric interests that it needs as justification. Speaking of metaphorical extension, Hitschmann likens the myth of telepathy to "a psychic prosthesis, a stretched-out arm, which reaches out mystically toward that which is far off and cannot be approached in actuality by physical means" (p.126). Once the subject is subjected to psychoanalytic translation, the tele-language of telepathy gets reconverted into familial transactions displaced by the psyche.

Perhaps most strange is a certain acceptance of the possibility of telepathy by the physicist Einstein. He wrote a short forward for a book on telepathy by the American social critic Upton Sinclair called 'Mental Radio'. The book, again suggesting the centrality of telepathy to the family circle, surrounding tests on his depressed second wife, reports on tests of her ability to read certain signifiers that she herself did not have sensorial access to through her five accepted senses. We will see in the footnote below the metaphoric importance of secondary prosthetic apparatuses for likening these telepathic internal apparatuses.

Freud stated that: "What we call 'telepathy' is, as you know, the alleged fact that an event which occurs at a particular time comes at about the same moment to the consciousness of someone distant in space, without the paths of communication that are familiar to us coming into question. It is implicitly
supposed that this event concerns a person in whom the other one (the receiver of intelligence) has a strong emotional interest. For instance, Person A may be the victim of an accident or may die, and Person B, someone nearly attached to him—his mother or daughter or fiancée—learns the fact at about the same time through a visual or auditory perception. In this latter case, then, it is as if she had been informed by telephone, though such was not the case:” Leaning against a comparison with a secondary prosthesis, Freud points to a primary prosthesis that in bypassing the primary communicative apparatuses, ends up taking on the qualities of what is counted as a graft. Again the presence of a prior “connection” allows for this primary-prosthesis to be something much less invasive or secondary than a graft or techno-graft.

xlvii some temporarily missing or misplaced postcards that finally made it to their recipient. Playing on Lacan’s message that a letter always reaches its destination, it seems that these postcards did not make it through to their recipient in time for being published in “Postcard: From Plato to Freud and Beyond”. These postcards speak of the character’s love for his lover...

xlviii Although Derrida points out that Freud did not actually deliver these introductory lectures, but they make it into a transcription as delivered in this lively, public-forum way.

xlix Somnambulism is not of actuality or entelechy. Hegel sees actuality as an aggregate of interests that compose the individual who only comes together as “his genius” once out of an auto-matistic somnambulistic stage (which would include base-clairvoyance (see Philosophy of Spirit, S.406)

I Indeed it would be hard to find a reference to any act of telepathy that did not serve to solidify a family relation and the family relation itself, as we will see, is what commun-icates itself to us via clairvoyance and this telespheric telepathy. In an article titled ‘Telepathy and Psychoanalysis’ Edward Hitschmann, a close colleague of Freud’s, tells the story of the poet Max Dauthendey who had telepathic intimations of his father’s death and later received a tele-gram recording his father’s death as simultaneous with the thought he had earlier had. Hitschmann comes to explain this according to certain historical troubles within the trouble bubble of the family circle. But in a manner very similar to Freud (and Hegel) we find an ambivalence to telepathy that is something more than a middle ground, but where the family owns a sort of centralised position. Across a number of articles we find a vibrating indecision that at one time rejects and at another is more accepting. This splinter under the skin of the body of psychoanalysis finds within the family a very troubling and rather uncanny home that a more program-performative prosthetelepathy will come to inhabit in its turn, as we will see.

II For want of interpreting after the fashion of Wallace, environment here seems to refer, not so much to a physicality of environment, but to an environment that seems a little like Uexkull’s umwelt bubble....

III For this is not an invention, so much as an invention that, as we saw, pre-invents something natural and inherent. An invention is something, by definition, that comes out of nowhere (and we are thinking along the lines here of Derrida’s dual concepts of l’avenir/futur and of the invention/discovery duality that he excavates in his presentation/essay ‘Of the Aforementioned Human Genome Project’.
Warwick’s previous incarnation was as a British Telecom engineer, so telephony is something close to his heard, and no doubt something that haunted him in his youth, as he looked forward to inventions he is currently inventing. The end of the age of invention, he will show is not over with.

A theoretically exciting book titled ‘The Telephone Book’ by Avital Ronnell considers these envoi issues with telephonic communication which is very much in the spirit of Derrida’s (non-moralistic) questions concerning tele-technologies. Far from de-distancing the possibility of crossed-wires these technologies hauntologically allude and denude the “certainty” of paths of communication all the more. Similarly in the film ghostdance Derrida does not allow the post-feudal age of information technology to prevent the summoning of the ghostly or of the monstrous.

For we would like to play with a thought experiment where a third party might hack (or be invited) into a couple’s tech-clairvoyant circuitry. Just as the pornographic industries are to be found prowling close-by in greeting the births of almost all media opportunities so, no doubt, we can visualize a newer way of experiencing porn where we plug, as somewhat ‘interactive’ audiences, into a couple’s sexual activity. In a scene reminiscent of Spielberg’s ‘Minority Report’ we might find certain dirty old men plugging into (via a Warwickian embedded chip with credit-card payment options attached) certain apparatuses that interface with the interior of certain tele-distinguished bodies. In terms of the, now remote, possibility of a partner circumventing the watchful panoptic gaze of the ‘bloodfriend’ partner, one could foresee a ploy where a cheating spouse could convince their official blood-friend that they found the other to be pleasuring them through the devious syncing up a time where the person they really wanted to make love with was broadcasting their pleasure at the exact same time coordinate. What is to stop the official blood-friend from believing that it is them that is ‘supplying’ the transference of this signal-communication, rather than the one their partner would rather be with. “Were you thinking of someone else?” might still then be a possibility in terms of a hacking-to-the-path-of-the-proper. Again, shades of the somewhat circuitous slidings from the gaze of the panopticon which remind one of Minority Report in steeling somebody else’s eyes to slip the iris identity gaze of a truth/identity-seeking state apparatus. And further outside of the proper-home of the blood-friend tech-clairvoyancing, could we not, somewhat perversely perhaps, vacariously be-towards-someone-else’s-death by embedding a chip in certain suicidal bodies in something not altogether different to a taped or filmed suicide (this latter has been attempted on YouTube). Interesting as these apparatuses would no doubt be, such secondary or even primary identification (as in the cinema) is never so easily transposable, as do we ever truly identify with ourselves before we come to gaze? But there are further issues that take us into the vicinity of the (Austinian) performance of “the promise” and of any other first-person performatives, that depend upon the notion of an isolable causally responsible agency enveloped or wrapped up within their own secure decision-making apparatuses. Following again further through the territory of these two rather frivolous thought experiments on thought-transfer, will there be any future need for the “I do” of the marriage ceremony, or further of the sexual intercourse that performatively secures the bond within its very securing (thus in this latter case obviating the very thing which the apparatus was invented to augment)? “I do”, as Derrida points out in SEC, only accomplishes the intentional transposal of an “itself” by also simultaneously allowing itself to not accomplish itself. As soon as there is no need for the “I do”, because there is not now any uncertainty of intention that would need the “transmission” of an expressive-indicative “I do”, there is also no longer the thing itself. For how can the thing exist outside also of
its possible integral failure. Such is the strange logic of the performative which
Derrida uncovered within Austin’s impressive lecture course upon the (excitable)
saying that does things.