Collaborative governance: The case of mass transportation in London and Lagos

By

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Abstract

State actors have adopted policies which they claim will enable the provision of public services including mass transportation. In most global cities, dedicated strategic transport authorities are employed for the purpose of planning and implementing strategies to sustain mass transportation. While such bodies play key roles, not only planning mass transport policies, but also coordinating the system, not much is known about the dynamics of the relations among the actors who constitute the governance system responsible for sustaining mass transportation. This thesis therefore explores the systems of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos with the aim of evaluating the role of collaborative modes of governance in affecting and sustaining better transportation for the mass public. While it is claimed by the political leadership of both London and Lagos that ‘partnership’ is employed in delivering mass transportation, the cases investigated show that what really exists ranges from a few relatively genuine partnerships to relationships that are driven more by contracts and mandatory arrangements. The research is an analysis of two cases, employing a qualitative approach for data gathering through the use of semi-structured interviews. The primary evidence gathered from both cases is validated by the secondary data. The thesis contributes to the literature on collaborative governance by emphasising the importance of political and strategic leadership, the relevance of the nature of funding regime, accountability and the socio-cultural context for sustaining service delivery. A key finding from the study is that most of the partnerships in both cases are influenced by political leaders (the Mayor of London and the Governor of Lagos state). Furthermore, actors in both governance systems do not agree on the organisation that should take the lead in the system, although there is a fair measure of agreement that the Mayor is best placed to take the lead in London. Also, perhaps unsurprisingly, in both systems there exist conflicts and partnerships. The discussion of the findings, together with an analysis of the recurring themes in this study, offer significant insights into the factors that shape and influence the systems of governance of mass transportation in both cases, and the degree to which collaborative governance exists.
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<td>AMC</td>
<td>Association of Municipal Corporations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BRT</td>
<td>Bus Rapid Transit</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIL</td>
<td>Community Infrastructure Levy</td>
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<td>CLRL</td>
<td>Cross London Rail Links</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfT</td>
<td>Department for Transport</td>
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<td>DLR</td>
<td>Dockland Light Railway</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDA</td>
<td>French Development Agency</td>
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<td>FRSC</td>
<td>Federal Road Safety Corps</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>GLA</td>
<td>Greater London Authority</td>
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<td>GLC</td>
<td>Greater London Council</td>
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<td>GLDP</td>
<td>Greater London Development Plan</td>
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<td>GOL</td>
<td>Government Office for London</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILEA</td>
<td>Inner London Education Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAI</td>
<td>Kick Against Indiscipline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAA</td>
<td>Local Area Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAMATA</td>
<td>Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>LASTMA</td>
<td>Lagos State Traffic Management Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LASWA</td>
<td>Lagos State Water Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>London County Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCCI</td>
<td>Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCCI</td>
<td>London Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCT</td>
<td>Lagos City Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCTS</td>
<td>Lagos City Transport Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>LDA</td>
<td>London Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFEPA</td>
<td>London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority</td>
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<td>LIP</td>
<td>Local Implementation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LLP</td>
<td>London Labour Party</td>
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<td>LMTS</td>
<td>Lagos Municipal Transport Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>London Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSB</td>
<td>London School Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Local Strategic Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>LSTC</td>
<td>Lagos State Transport Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTB</td>
<td>London Transport Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Lagos Town Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LURN</td>
<td>Lagos Urban Rail Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>LUTP</td>
<td>Lagos Urban Transport Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBW</td>
<td>Metropolitan Board of Works</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS</td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPA</td>
<td>Metropolitan Police Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>Mayor’s Transport Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPA</td>
<td>Nigeria Ports Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPM</td>
<td>New Public Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>Nigeria Railway Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORR</td>
<td>Office of Rail Regulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>RMT</td>
<td>Rail Maritime and Transport Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>SHOA</td>
<td>State House of Assembly</td>
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<tr>
<td>TfL</td>
<td>Transport for London</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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Declaration

This is to certify that I am responsible for the work submitted in this thesis, that the original work is my own except as specified in acknowledgements or in footnotes, and that neither the thesis, nor the original work contained therein has been previously submitted to any institution for a higher degree.

Signed

Olanrewaju Olaoye
Chapter One:
Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Drawing upon Dahl (1976: 5), ‘system’ in this study is interpreted as a collection of elements that interact in some ways with each other. The study focuses upon the systems of governance of mass transportation (hereafter referred to as ‘the system’) in London and Lagos in order to evaluate the role of collaborative modes of governance in affecting better transportation services for the mass public. The study seeks to test the model of collaborative governance posited by Ansell and Gash (2008) by applying it to the two cases. While exploring both systems, it was clear that a variety of internal actors, such as the Mayor of London, the Governor of Lagos state, Transport for London (TfL) and Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA), all play different leadership roles in order to sustain mass transportation.

1.2 Rationale

A number of scholars including Ansell and Gash (2008), Rogers and Weber (2010), Chapman et al. (2010), Evans (1995), Healey (2006), Newman et al. (2004), Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), and Rhodes (1996, 1997) have offered suggestions on the nature of collaborative governance and on how it can be employed for sustaining public services. Nevertheless, there is a dearth of information available on the dynamics of the relations among actors in a mass transport system, including any consideration of both the negative and positive effects of collaboration and conflicts in the system.

The concept of collaborative governance began to feature in political science discourses from the 1990s, often being employed in relation to responses to the challenges of public service delivery (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002). Furthermore, during that period, the multiscalar nature (acting across more than one geographical scale) of decision making showed the opening up of new issues that needed to be addressed by the state, especially to deal with the challenges of public service delivery (Somerville, 2011: 81-82). In the UK, for example, Sullivan and Skelcher suggest that, due to the range of challenges that central government faced, reforms were introduced to improve the delivery of public goods and services especially through the establishment of partnerships and networks among stakeholders (2002: 15-16). Arguably, as discussed in Chapter 3, it could also be argued that
the reforms introduced were for ideological reasons. In contrast, in the 1990s Nigeria witnessed further military rule, leading to serious socio-economic and political problems and institutional sclerosis, as little attention was paid to building the capacity necessary to sustain mass transportation and other public services at federal and state government level.

London and Lagos can both be regarded as global cities as defined by Sassen, who saw global cities as functioning in four ways: first, as concentrated points in the organisation of the world economy; second, as important locations for finance and for specialised service firms; third, as sites of production; and fourth, as markets for the products and innovations produced (2001: 3-4). Furthermore, London and Lagos can be seen as mega cities according to the classification of the United Nations, which proposes that cities with a population of between 5 and 20 million inhabitants could be referred to as mega cities. Both cities were thus chosen for a number of reasons, including: their possession of features synonymous with other global cities; their possession of a functioning mass trans transport system and also complex urban systems; their different stages of development of mass transportation; the presence of a governance system responsible for sustaining public services such as mass transportation; and, lastly, they allowed the testing of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model of collaborative governance in states with different systems of government.

In managing the movement of people in global cities, there is the need for a system to plan, coordinate and implement schemes which will sustain mass transportation. Having defined a system according to Dahl (1976: 5), as a collection of interacting elements, similarly, interacting elements can be observed in systems such as those in London and Lagos. For instance, Chapter 5 shows that while conflicts may sometimes exist among the goals of some organisations, for example between London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee of the London Assembly, other bodies work in partnership, for example in delivering the Barclays cycle scheme. Also, in the case of Lagos, Chapter 7 demonstrates that there is competition among actors, especially between LAMATA and the State Ministry of Transport, but also that they have collaborated with others, such as the World Bank, French Development Agency (FDA), and Federal Government agencies, to deliver the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) which implemented the BRT-Lite scheme.

Thus, by exploring both primary and secondary data related to the systems in London and Lagos, the study enhances our understanding of the relevance, if any, of collaborative governance to both systems. The study also focuses on the processes by which actors in the systems are held to account, what they are held to account for and how. Furthermore, the
study examines the role of leadership as it exists in the systems, and the funding regime responsible for financing schemes. While drawing on evidence from the systems discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, the study goes on to establish that both conflict and cooperation can contribute to enabling the sustenance of both systems.

1.3 Thesis structure

Chapter Two outlines the research methodology employed. It discusses the process employed for the study, including the development of the research questions listed in Chapter 2, the approach used in collecting evidence from interviewees, the rationale for using case studies, and the means of data gathering and analysis. The chapter then moves on to discuss the components of the study in order to show the process that led to the emergence of the themes and findings discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. To address the objectives of the study, qualitative research using semi-structured interviews was employed to collect evidence from a number of strategic actors in the organisations that constitute the systems in Lagos and London. The research also made extensive use of secondary data, such as government publications, and reports of organisations which play significant roles in both systems, in order to validate and expand upon the results from the primary data gathered.

Chapter Three presents a review of the concepts of ‘collaboration’, ‘governance’, ‘collaborative governance’, and ‘urban transport governance’. It outlines and explains the key concepts employed in this thesis, and then goes on to critique the arguments of key scholars in the field of collaborative governance. This provides the analytical framework (see Figure 1) used in analysing the case studies. As collaborative governance can be argued to be both a framework for an analysis, and a means to an end, a working definition of collaborative governance was generated for the purposes of the study.

Chapter Four explores the historical background to the current governance structure of London. It traces how and when relevant democratic institutions were established in London, and the factors that led to their creation. The role of government, institutions, and other relevant stakeholders was examined in order to explain the processes by which public needs are met. The chapter goes on to examine the relationship between the Greater London Authority (GLA) and central government, and the role of partnership in sustaining mass transportation, especially in delivering the Barclays Cycle scheme and Crossrail 1. The chapter concludes by linking the evolution of government structures in London with the emergence of the present GLA which incorporates the Mayor and London Assembly.
Chapter Five discusses the findings and themes relating to the system in London. It begins with an explanation of the government and governance structures in London and how they relate to relevant actors, in particular to the organisations concerned with mass transportation governance. Thereafter, the goals of a number of key organisations are considered (the selection criteria are discussed in Chapter 2). Furthermore, conflicts, especially between organisations, and also between different aspects of the Mayor’s role, are discussed. Thereafter, there is a discussion of the key themes of the case study and their relevance to the model of collaborative governance posited by Ansell and Gash (2008).

Chapter Six examines the historical background to the current governance structure of Lagos, which has always been an amalgam of various ethnicities and commercial interests as in any other global city. Lagos was chosen because the way the system functions shares some similarities and differences with the system in London, as is discussed in greater depth in Chapter 8. The chapter shows that, while various governments have governed Lagos, Lagos has remained the commercial and financial capital of Nigeria. The chapter goes on to examine the relationship between the state and federal government, and the role of partnership in sustaining mass transportation, especially in delivering the BRT-Lite project.

Chapter Seven discusses the findings and themes related to the system in Lagos. In order to aid analysis and comparison the structure generally follows that used with regard to London. Building upon the information provided in Chapter 6, the discussion begins with an explanation of the government and governance structure in Lagos and how they relate to appropriate organisations, especially those concerned with mass transportation governance. Thereafter, the goals of a number of key organisations are considered (the selection criteria are discussed in Chapter 2). The existence of conflicts linked to competition among organisations is also explored. Subsequently, there is a discussion of the key themes of the case study and their relevance to the Ansell and Gash (2008) model.

Finally, Chapter Eight draws together the findings and themes discussed in the thesis to address the research questions. The idea and practice of collaborative governance are also evaluated. The chapter then engages in a comparative analysis of both systems for a more robust collaborative governance model. The researcher then highlights the implications of the study for future research and policy makers in systems similar to London and Lagos.
Chapter Two: 
Research methodology

2.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology employed in addressing the research questions guiding the study. The majority of the information and data needed to address the research questions falls into three categories: theoretical, conceptual and empirical (Bloomberg and Volpe, 2008: 69-70). The literature review in the following chapter (Chapter 3) provides the theoretical and conceptual grounding for this study, while the empirical aspect is outlined in this chapter. In achieving the aim of the study (answering the research questions), case study and comparative research designs were chosen. Semi-structured interviews were then employed to gather data from the actors who constitute the systems in both London and Lagos. Additional secondary forms of data, such as publications of the GLA, Transport for London (TfL), Department for Transport (DfT), Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA), government bodies and online resources were also utilised. Furthermore, newspapers, and the websites of different organisations in and outside the systems, were consulted for the purpose of gathering and verifying data for triangulation in order to obtain in-depth understanding of the systems. The process of the research, research questions including the case study research design, and semi-structured interview\(^1\) questions used in collecting evidence from actors (most of whom were members of organisations that play significant roles in the system in both cases), argument for the study, interviewee consent, method of data sampling, component of the research process, criteria for interpreting and analysing findings, and the summary of the methodological process are also discussed in this chapter.

2.2 Research questions guiding the study

As noted in the previous chapter, this study focuses upon the systems of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos (global cities). It provides new insight on the workings between elements constituting each of the systems and the relevance of the

\(^1\) See Appendix 2a (Semi-structured Questions for Actors in London) and 2b (Semi-structured Questions for Actors in Lagos)
occurrence of collaborative governance in both systems. To achieve this, the following three primary research questions and a number of supplementary research questions were developed to help understand the practice of collaborative governance in both cases. While some questions were developed before the commencement of the study, others were generated in the course of the literature review and before the field work.

**Question 1:** What is meant by collaborative governance?

This question aims to understand what is meant by collaborative governance by identifying and discussing the factors that led to its emergence, use and relevance, in addition to an evaluation of propositions on the concept.

**Question 2:** How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass transportation in London and Lagos?

Drawing on the discussion of collaborative governance, this question looks at the occurrence and usefulness of the concept in both cases. It explores the incidence of collaboration and governance, in addition with their limitations as relating to both cases.

**Question 3:** How far can collaborative governance improve mass transportation?

This question has been designed to investigate the degree to which collaborative governance can improve mass transportation in London and Lagos. The question thus provides the medium for reflection on the usefulness, of the concept to the sustenance of mass transportation.

In addition to the three primary research questions developed for the study and indicated above, additional five supplementary questions were generated to provide empirical evidence and insight on how collaborative governance exist in both cases, and on the problems and capacities existing within and outside each system related to mass transportation. These questions shaped the semi-structured interview questions designed for the study and available in Appendix 2a and 2b. The supplementary questions include:

- What forms of collaborative governance can be identified?
- What are the mass transport problems?
- What capacity (within each city) exists to solve these problems?
2.3 Case study research

In defining a case, Gerring (2007) and Yin (2009) suggest that it refers to the unit of analysis, and that can represent an individual, organisation, city or nation-state. In this study, the unit of analysis as with other cases was seen to have an identity, boundary and name. Thus, the system of governance of mass transportation was selected as the unit of analysis because of the roles it plays in sustaining mass transportation in both cities. A ‘system of governance’ is construed in this research as including strategic policy makers and actors who influence and shape the making and implementation of transport policies. By investigating the two systems in London and Lagos, additional knowledge is gained on the relations among actors in each system and on how and why the system sustains mass transportation policies in both cities.

The case study approach as employed in this study primarily uses qualitative data while drawing on other methods due to its ability to describe and explain a phenomenon within its real-life context as observed by Yin (2009: 2). The method was adopted due to its capability in allowing the understanding of any given context as it seeks to understand any particular phenomenon in its uniqueness. Two cases (Lagos and London) provided the focus for gathering, analysing and comparing data. These cases were chosen for a number of reasons including: their desirability for testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model of collaborative governance in states with different systems of government, the global city status of both cities as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, the different stages of development of mass transportation in London and Lagos, and the cases operating within countries at different levels of political and institutional development (the UK as a developed country and Nigeria as a developing country). This helped provide a variety of evidence on how the system of governance affects the delivery of mass transportation, including how stakeholders relate with other actors in states with varying levels of institutional development. In gathering data from the cases, the main tool employed was semi-structured interviews. In addition to the interview data, some of the interviewees in both cases also provided secondary data in the form of reports and publications.

Yin has defined a case study as a pragmatic inquiry which investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (2009: 18). Burnham et al. (2008: 63-64) suggest that a case study methodology allows researchers to focus on a particular individual, group, institution,
and study it in depth. This reflects the activities that were engaged in while investigating the systems in Lagos and London. Burnham et al. (2008) also argue that a researcher proposing to carry out case study research should have developed research questions to guide the study and the process of data collection, analysis and presentation.

From the review of the literature on the case study approach, it was clear that a case study method can generate both quantitative and qualitative data-sets in order to further our understanding of the unit of analysis in any given study; and generalisations can be achieved through the analysis of similarities and differences among cases. This research also draws on Gillham’s definition of a case study approach as investigating cases to answer specific research questions which demand the use of a variety of evidence in the domain of the case, as no single piece of evidence on its own will be sufficient to address the research questions (2000: 1-2).

Gerring (2007: 20) suggests that a case study approach involves the rigorous study of a single case where the purpose of that study is aimed at shedding light on a larger class of cases (research population). Drawing on the work of Yin (2009) and Gerring (2007), it is clear that a case study approach relies on multiple sources of evidence (such as interviews, secondary data from reports and literature review) to enhance the reliability and validation of data. However, Burns (2000: 473) notes that the case study approach has limitations, some of which are also applicable to other methods, focusing in particular on reliability and generalisation. As regards the limitation of making generalisations from case study research due to the specific nature of the cases investigated, Stake (2000: 3) suggests that case study research is important because it presents cases in their uniqueness instead of using cases for wider generalisation thereby presenting evidence related and arguably exclusive to particular cases. While both cases in the study are unique in their own right, the study suggests that there are some generalisations which can be drawn from the two cases, and these are highlighted in Chapter 8. Given the information on case study research as discussed above, and the relevance of such characteristics in addressing the research questions in this study, the methodology was adopted as the framework for this thesis.

2.4 Comparative analysis

The selection of two cases enabled the use of comparison in order to examine the governance structure, available capacities and the relations among actors in London and Lagos, and hence to better understand the two systems in particular the role of collaborative
modes of governance in affecting mass transport services. Thomas (2011: 171) suggests that the basic principle governing the act of comparing is to capture or summarise the essence of the data collected through contrasting. Burnham et al. (2008: 66) claim that political processes are often clarified by comparing them with similar events and processes in other contexts. However, it is also emphasised that there are differences between the two cities, for example, in the level of infrastructural development, and the capacity existing for effective transport delivery in and around the cities.

2.5 The study process and its commencement

The study commenced in January 2010 with a comprehensive review of literatures focusing on collaborative governance and the governance of both cities (Lagos and London). After identifying the unit of analysis for the study, an attempt was made to ensure that there would be sufficient access to sources and potential data (interviewees, literatures and secondary documents). A review of potential interviewees and the possible data such research participants would contribute was conducted before the commencement of the fieldwork. This included the identification and listing of key stakeholders drawn across the spectrum of mass transport governance in London and Lagos (a list of all the persons contacted for interview is included in Appendix 4).

From the review and electronic searches focused on collaborative governance and both cases, it was apparent that there was a dearth of research on how the concept of collaborative governance might be used to sustain mass transportation, and also enable the understanding of the systems in Lagos and London. The study thus aimed to bridge this gap.

Following the literature review, semi-structured interview questions were generated to address the research questions and the objectives of the study (the template of the semi-structured interview questions is presented in Appendix 2a and 2b). Before the primary data gathering process commenced, the researcher identified the actors known to play key strategic roles relating to mass transportation in both cases using a combination of snowball sampling and opportunistic sampling (DePoy and Gitlin, 1998: 172 and 2005: 153). Through opportunistic sampling, the researcher established inclusion and exclusion criteria and selects those individual who fit these factors and volunteer to participate in the study. The snowball sampling was also employed in asking research participants to provide access to others who meet study criteria (DePoy and Gitlin, 2005: 153). After consultation with the supervisory
team, it was agreed that data would be collected from organisations that play roles relating to mass transport strategy in both cases. While 52 actors (individuals and bodies) from across the organisations that play strategic roles in both cases were contacted (see Appendix 4 for a list of the actors contacted), the researcher was able to interview fifteen individuals from both cases; others sent their apologies for not being able to take part in the study due to their work commitment and limited time availability.

The fieldwork in London took about 4 months (August to November 2011), largely due to the difficulty of getting interviews scheduled. The fieldwork in Lagos saw data collected from interviewees in February 2012. In some respects this was more straightforward as the researcher was able to use his network of contacts in getting interviews scheduled. As regards the issue of identifying data/interviewee sources and gaining access to the sources, the researcher found access to most data, including policy documents, available online on the website of organisations constituting the system in London. In contrast, there was little data available online or in hard copy relating to actors in the system in Lagos. In addressing the data gap in Lagos, the evidence gathered by the researcher from relevant actors through in-depth semi-structured interviews and observations provided sufficient data useful for analysing the case. The interviews were transcribed verbatim from a dictaphone recorder and analysed in order to identify themes and findings that recurred in the study. The researcher used his interview notes to corroborate transcribed data in order to minimise the possibility of data loss or misinterpretation.

Overall, the researcher communicated with potential interviewees an average of three times. The main means of communicating with participants was through an introductory letter\(^2\) (email) which introduced the researcher and some of the objectives of the study while also seeking an appropriate time to meet the potential interviewee to conduct the interview. In a few instances the researcher’s first communication with interviewees was through mobile phone communication. The second communication aimed to remind potential interviewees about the need for them to be involved in the study while reassuring participants that the data they provided would be treated with confidentiality\(^3\). Some interviews were also scheduled at

\(^2\) See Appendix 3 – Introductory letter sent to potential interviewees
this stage. The third communication to research participants mainly thanked them for participating in the study.

Attempts were made to compensate for the limited response rate through the use of secondary data (strategic documents such as the Mayor’s Transport Strategy, London Plan and the Report of the Presidential Committee on the Redevelopment of Lagos State), most of which contained evidence related to the roles of individuals who declined to be interviewed and the organisations that they represented. This secondary data supported most of the evidence presented by the interviewees, so it was concluded that the interviews provided a good representation of the views of actors in the systems.

2.6. Semi-structured interviews

At the commencement of every interview, the researcher acknowledged some of the past achievements of the interviewee or that of the interviewee’s organisation in order to establish a rapport with the interviewee. This is consistent with the suggestion of Arksey and Knight, that it is important to build rapport at the beginning of an interview (1999: 122). During the interview process, it was observed by the researcher that the semi-structured interview approach was useful due to its flexibility in terms of being able to probe interviewees with follow-up questions. These follow-up questions allowed the researcher to keep asking the interviewee questions until satisfactory answers were given. It was therefore possible to gather data which might have been almost impossible to access if a structured interview was employed. The interviews enabled the gathering of key evidence, both in terms of providing insights as primary data for the analysis in the empirical chapters, and in terms of adding to and validating the secondary data gathered for the study.

As one might expect, some of the data provided by interviewees in each of the cases contradicted the evidence provided by other interviewees in the same case. For instance, the answers provided to the question: ‘In your opinion which organisation should be responsible

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3 Confidentiality and ethical considerations as relating to the wishes of interviewees to be anonymous was considered important in the study in order to protect interviewees while also assuring them of their safety. In protecting interviewees, Sieber suggests that a researcher could change the identifiable characteristics of the interviewee in order to protect the research participants (1992: 32-33).
for the overall strategy policy making of mass transportation in London? varied, as interviewees identified single and in some instances a mix of actors to lead the system. The diverse nature of the responses therefore added to the quality of data gathered in the study as it led to one of the findings of the study, namely that ‘actors involved in the systems of both London and Lagos do not agree on the organisation that should take the lead’ in the system. Overall, the researcher was able to ask each interviewee twenty-six questions, spanning government’s role in service delivery, public involvement, partnerships, accountability, performance, available capacity, funding, leadership, conflicts and challenges of mass transportation.

The organisations from which interviewees originated were: the Greater London Authority (GLA), Transport for London (TfL), London Underground, City of London Corporation, London First, London Travel Watch, Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA), Lagos State Water Authority (LASWA), Ministry of Transportation Lagos State, Lagos State University and the Office of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Evidence was gathered from individuals well placed to provide data representing these organisations due to the significant roles the organisations play as regards mass transportation.

In seeking to secure interviews in London, forty-four individuals working for strategic organisations in the system were contacted by emails and telephone calls, of whom seven, representing six different organisations in the system, agreed to be interviewed. While this number of interviewees is relatively small, they provided clear and extensive data sufficient for addressing the research questions and objectives of the study relating to the case of London. Furthermore, the majority of the seven individuals interviewed in London provided additional substantial secondary data in the form of organisational reports and policy documents, which corroborated the primary evidence given while also providing extensive additional information on other actors in the system who were not interviewed. In Lagos the system is smaller, and has fewer actors than in London. Following requests made to individuals in ten strategic organisations, eight interviews were conducted with actors representing six bodies which play roles that sustain mass transportation in Lagos. While it could also be argued that the numbers of interviews conducted in the case of Lagos is also relatively low, the quality of the data provided by the interviewees, in addition to other secondary data gathered, such as publications by the Lagos state government, LAMATA, and other actors such as Nigeria’s Presidency, was sufficient to address the objectives and
research questions related to the case of Lagos. Thus although the numbers of interviewees was low, however, the primary data gathered were from twelve different organisations (six in each case) in the cases explored therefore presenting a more variety of data representative of the cases investigated. Furthermore, although all the interviewees were the most familiar with the subject of the study, nonetheless, it was noted that they emphasised some of the information already accessed by the researcher in policy documents such as the Mayor’s Transport Strategy, London Plan and the Report of the Nigerian Federal Government on the redevelopment of Lagos state. This further demonstrate that the numbers of interviews conducted was just enough for each of the cases.

2.7 Interviewee consent

Before conducting all the interviews in both cases, the researcher asked interviewees whether they would be willing to be quoted verbatim in future write-ups and also to complete a consent form. While the University’s consent form lacked some information, such as a section explaining the purpose of the research and a description of how confidentiality or anonymity would be assured, as proposed by Sieber (1992: 33), the researcher included that information in the introductory letter sent to research participants. Of all the interviews conducted, only one interviewee requested to be quoted anonymously. In addition, a significant number of interviewees requested a copy of the thesis when it is completed, and these will be provided to those individuals.

2.8 Method of data sampling

In selecting research samples, the researcher established selection criteria (research samples must come from organisations that play roles linked to mass transportation strategy making and its governance) that must be met by the organisation of the interviewee. Once identified organisations in both systems were seen to possess this criterion, they were included in a list of possible research samples generated by the researcher and contacted for scheduling an interview. After carrying out the last interview in both cases, it was clear to the

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4 See Appendix 5 – Consent form for Interviewees.
researcher that there was unlikely to be new additional significant primary data which might emerge from the study as the last interviews conducted in both cases substantially reflected most of the data collected from previous interviews. Nonetheless, the researcher observed after the analysis of the evidence and findings from the case of London that additional interviews aimed at gathering evidence on the incidence of blurred boundary among actors and in their roles, including the effects of such blurring to the workings of the system, could have further enhanced the findings from the study. In Lagos, the researcher encountered the unavailability of some key data, such as the budgets of the main organisations in the system. This arguably reflects the degree to which the system in Lagos is open yet to adequate scrutiny and accountability. In contrast, the study of the system in London demonstrated the availability of key policy documents such as the budgets of the organisations playing roles relating to the sustenance of mass transportation. Nevertheless, it was observed in the system in London that some aspects of lines of accountability lines were blurred. This was seen to have an effect on the overall functioning of the system as some actors queried how others use their powers and resources. The researcher was also surprised by the way actors in both systems employed the word ‘partnership’ even when what such actors meant was contracting or imperative coordination.

2.9 Components of the research process and the research questions.

The research process employed in this study has four key components. The first is the review of literatures, focused on collaboration, governance, collaborative governance and mass transport in Lagos and London; the second involved the use of semi-structured interviews to gather data from relevant stakeholders; the third was the analysis of secondary data, such as institutional stakeholders’ publications and transport committee reports, to corroborate the data gathered; and the final part involved the development of ideas and new knowledge.

The first component of the research process reviewed key literatures focused on the theory and practices of collaborative governance. Following this, research questions 1, 2, 3 were partly addressed (1 - What is meant by collaborative governance? 2 - How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass transportation in London and Lagos? 3 - How far can collaborative governance improve mass transportation? and supplementary question such as, What capacity (within each city) exists to solve these
problems?). The conclusion of the first component led to the second, which was mainly concerned with the collection of primary data.

During the second component, seven semi-structured interviews with an average duration of fifty-three minutes each were conducted in London across organisations in the system and analysed. Eight semi-structured interviews with an average duration of forty-two minutes each were conducted in Lagos across organisations in the system and analysed. By the end of this component, the research questions and supplementary questions were addressed with data gathered (see section 2.2 for a list of the research questions and supplementary questions).

The third component involved the analysis of secondary data (publications) including that provided by some of the interviewees. Also, during this stage, references were made to some of the literatures examined in the first stage of the research, while some of the transcripts of the interviews conducted were also used in validating arguments. It is important to mention that further understanding was gained about the complexities and dynamics of both systems.

The final phase of this study involved the development and application of new ideas based on evidences from the data collected, analysed and evaluated. At this stage, the concept of collaborative governance was critiqued while relevant lessons linked to the dynamics of the system, in particular why and how organisations collaborate with certain actors in the system including the factors that shape such collaboration, were examined.

2.10 Data analysis

The data gathered were examined, analysed and categorised into themes to allow for the drawing of empirical conclusions. Themes emerged during the process of data analysis, with the researcher identifying the dominant issues and ideas emphasised by relevant literatures and most interviewees as crucial for sustaining the two systems. Thus, there was the emergence of meaningful patterns which supported the creation of themes during the process of data analysis, thereby enhancing what Yin (2009: 128) labelled research output. The themes identified as recurring in the study included leadership, accountability, culture and funding regime.
The data gathered for this study were analysed on three levels (Creswell, 2009: 185-186). The first level featured the transcription of all the interviews and their arrangement into different categories. The researcher also read through all the data in order to familiarise himself with the information and reflect on their meanings vis-a-vis the ideas (quality, tone and depth) presented by the research samples. This process was followed by the addressing of research questions and the establishment of new facts.

The second level was the use of the themes generated to describe the setting of the systems in London and Lagos while giving detailed information about relations among the stakeholders in the system and issues relating to how they collaborated. Thereafter, there was a discussion of how the stakeholders in the system as a whole functioned in the narrative. In discussing the themes that recurred in the study, illustrations (cases, figures and tables) and quotations from interview transcripts were used to sustain or contest arguments. This was followed by the third level, in which the lessons learnt from the second level were applied to answering the research questions and to inform and reflect on the approach and the methodological process employed in the study.

The components of the study and the process of data analysis thus illustrate the sequence of how the researcher distilled primary and secondary data to identify the themes that recurred in the study and the subsequent findings which arguably contribute to our understanding of the theory and practice of collaborative governance in the systems investigated.
2.11 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has discussed the research process that supports the study focused on the cases of the systems in London and Lagos including how the evidence employed for analysis was gathered. One of the strengths of this study is that it takes a cross-system case study approach, as this provides insights into how systems in different contexts function. The study not only provided new data on the systems in both cases but also highlighted features of the complex relations among actors in each of the systems. The actors who took part in the semi-structured interviews provided a mix of answers to many of the questions asked. For instance, it was observed from the responses of interviewees in both cases that while they all supported the presence of a leader for the system, they had contrasting views as to the factors that should be considered for choosing the leader for the system, and also on the issue whether the leader must be an individual or a mix of actors. Thus, due to the variation in the arguments of interviewees and the need to assure the quality of the data collected, other secondary data were employed in order to achieve the objectives of the study and address all the research questions generated. At the final stage of the research process, it was clear that the evidence gathered and employed in the study had provided significant insight into the workings of the systems in London and Lagos.
Chapter 3: Problematising collaborative governance

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explores concepts central to this study, including collaboration (partnership), governance and collaborative governance. It begins with an overview of the concept of collaboration and its key characteristics, and an exploration of the concept of governance and its features. Section 3.4 then discusses some of the definitions of collaborative governance and its characteristics, and the factors that shape the success or failure of collaborative governance. The Ansell and Gash (2008) model was adopted for the study initially due to its identification of key variables, argued by its proponents as playing crucial roles in ensuring the success of collaborative mode of governance. The model is presented in section 3.8 and is used as a comparative framework for examining both cases in Chapters 5 and 7. This is followed by the discussion of a range of ideas from the literature that focus on transport governance so as to better understand some of the factors that can sustain mass transportation. A working definition of collaborative governance is generated in section 3.6 since the latter can be argued to be a framework for analysis, or a means to an end, for example, the delivery of public services or the implementation of projects or policies in order to deal with problems. The chapter ends with section 3.9, which summarises key findings from the literature and links them with some of the research questions.

The chapter is particularly concerned with the concept of collaborative governance in relation to how it might or might not sustain the delivery of public goods, especially mass transportation. The arguments of authors such as Rogers and Weber (2010), Chapman et al. (2010), National Policy Consensus Centre (2010), Siriani (2008), Ansell and Gash (2008), Evans (1995), Healey (2006), Newman et al. (2004), Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), Cope and Goodship (1999), and Rhodes (1996, 1997) are examined in respect of how they inform the definition and practicability of collaborative governance in the context of this research.
3.2 The concept of collaboration

Collaboration as a concept is examined in this section, particularly in relation to how it fits with, and informs, the notion of a collaborative governance framework. It is, however, important to emphasise here that concepts such as ‘partnership’ and ‘collaboration’ are used interchangeably in the bulk of the literature. This thesis follows the practice of treating the concepts as having the same meaning even though they can be used by some authors to have slightly different meanings. In the 1990s, the New Labour Government used the concept of partnership interchangeably with other concepts like collaboration to refer to a new way of working in the public sector, during a time when various reforms including New Public Management (NPM) were implemented in the UK public sector. Collaboration is construed as shared effort undertaken by two or more people in order to achieve collective goals which none of the parties can achieve alone.

In this thesis collaboration shall also be interpreted in the context of its usage in public governance and evidenced during the reform programmes of the New Labour Government from the 1990s. It can be recalled that the New Labour Government from the 1990s invested resources in initiatives such as Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in order to encourage the public sector, private sector and third sector to work together across tiers of society in tackling problems of public service delivery (Chapman et al., 2010: 613). In justifying the use of collaborations, Blair argued that:

“If local people are to enjoy a sound economy and a better quality of life and if communities are to deal with cross-cutting issues like youth justice, drug abuse and social exclusion, we have to harness the contribution of businesses, public agencies, voluntary organisations and community groups and get them working to a common agenda” (Blair, 1998: 10).

It is thus clear that the use of collaboration from the 1990s is linked, on the one hand, to the inability of government to single-handedly fund the provision of public goods and services, and also to the desirability of collaboration as an ideology of the government.

Collaboration is discussed and examined here based on three themes developed from a review of the literature: collaboration as a means (strategy) to overcome the challenges and inflexibilities generated by organisational, sectoral and national institutions; collaboration as a means to address policies; and collaboration as a collective action shaped by relevant cultures.
Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 1) claim that collaboration is a new word in the discourse of public governance, a word that relates to the sharing of responsibilities and overcoming the inflexibility created by organisational, sectoral and even national boundaries. However, they did not indicate how the responsibilities would be shared equally in collaborations or identify the person who would be tasked with this role. They did however go further and discuss three types of collaboration: public-private collaboration, public-voluntary sector collaboration, and multi-level ‘vertical’ collaboration, for example, as seen in the EU (Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002: 80-93). They further suggested that these types of collaborations have issues which affect collaboration in the public sector. The identified issues include capacity issues, dynamics and organisational issues, and the way in which citizens participate or refuse to participate in collaborative governance schemes. From this categorisation, it was noted that while public-private collaboration has the potential for delivering relevant capacities as constituting actors have both strategic and funding powers, public-voluntary sector collaboration lacks this same degree of strategic expertise.

Along a similar line, Miliband (2006) argued that in order to enable collaboration, the government has a key role to play, especially pertaining to enabling voluntary organisations to deliver public goods and services in partnership with the public and private sectors, that is, ensuring the environment is conducive by guaranteeing security, established copyright system, and providing needed infrastructures. This affirms the steering role a government can play in the delivery of public goods. In addition, it can be noted that huge emphasis was placed on the use of partnerships under New Labour, while the government used area-based initiatives to involve the community and voluntary organisations in order to respond to emergent problems.

Harding (1997: 74), while suggesting that collaboration is a means (strategy) to overcome challenges in the governance process, classified collaboration into three types: defensive collaboration, offensive collaboration, and shotgun collaboration. He argued that a defensive collaboration materialises due to a reduction in the resource base of organisations thereby causing an incapacitation of operational functions and targets. The need to address the incapacitation of operational functions and targets often leads to the establishment of a defensive collaboration. An offensive collaboration, on the other hand, emerges when a particular organisation cannot achieve set targets independently without recourse to other organisations that have the necessary expertise and knowledge. Thirdly, shotgun collaboration is determined by the need of an organisation to ensure that organisational targets are met. Hence, it can be noted that the management or constituted authority of any particular
organisation is responsible for determining the relevant institution(s) or agency(s) it might partner with in order to achieve its organisational goals. In general, it is important to note that political, economical, social, technological, environmental and legal (PESTEL) factors affect the organisational capacity and institutional operation of relevant stakeholders in any given collaboration. This view is illustrated in the argument of Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 11-12), which states that the success of collaboration is dependent on the prevalence of contextual factors. While the conceptualisation of Harding (1997) has shed light on how collaboration can be employed to attain the aims of partnering bodies, it is not clear as to how the particular aims of individual members could be separated from the overall partnership goals so as to avoid conflicts occurring among the collaborating actors.

In order to reduce the influence of the complexities inherent in the process of establishing and operating partnerships, especially in the public sector, the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) (2000: 44-46) proposed that: partnerships must have a clear goal which incorporates a credible and coherent strategy; stakeholders (government, civil society, private and public sectors) involved in partnerships must learn to establish targets that are time-bound while also allowing a point in time which allows for the development of ways of working; and necessary consideration should be given to the functions of stakeholders and how they will shape the design of the partnership. While the propositions of DETR (2000) as pertaining to partnerships being goal orientated are consistent with the view of Harding (1997), the researcher is of the view that some of the preconditions suggested by DETR might not work, or work differently in various contexts, as demonstrated in the discussion of the study of Lagos in Chapter 7 where culture shapes policy related factors. Furthermore, the propositions of the DETR (2000) fail to consider other significant factors such as a sustainable funding regime and established rules in establishing and operating partnerships.

March and Olsen (1995), Kooiman (2003), and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) have argued that collaboration represents a means whereby people or bodies achieve a goal. Kooiman (2003: 102-103) argued that collaboration gained more prominence from the 1980s as it was desired by governments for the delivery of public goods and services. Consequently, governments entered into collaborations in order to use the market know-how, expertise and other qualities present in the private sector to respond to the challenges experienced in the public sector. In the same way, the private sector benefitted from increased profits and the removal of various legal or administrative bottlenecks in its operations while entering into
partnerships with the government and other stakeholders. Furthermore, the private sector benefitted from an established long-term relationship with the government, which was especially useful for competitive reasons and gaining of insight about the operation of public administration (Ibid). Nevertheless, the evidence from the discussion of partnerships in Chapters 4 and 6 shows that, while it can be argued that the private sector does benefit more than the public sector to some degree from partnerships, the public sector does not always benefit from partnerships; this was demonstrated by the failure of a transport partnership in London (Metronet partnership, discussed in Chapter 4), resulting in government payment of the debt accruing from the partnership while the private sector partners walked away.

The study of partnerships also demonstrates that collaboration can be vertical or horizontal. For instance, while referring to Rhodes’ (1997b: xv) comment which suggest that, ‘messy problems demand messy solutions’, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 315) commented that the apparently tidy hierarchy of public bureaucracy should be reshaped to establish diagonal and vertical relationships with other bodies operating at different tiers and in associated policy fields. This then indicates how modes of collaboration are developed and employed to address policy problems.

Whittington’s (2003: 15-16) conceptualisation of collaboration as an active form of ‘working together’ qualifies the understanding of collaboration as a collective action shaped by relevant cultures. Whittington (2003) argued that the process of collaboration involves the collection of knowledge, skills, values and motives which are applied by practitioners and relevant persons in transforming several plans and ideas into practice. He further stated that, while an institution or individual may promote collaboration using norms and cultures, the same institution or individual may also constrain the collaborative process due to personal or institutional goals. Newman (2001) offered an example while arguing that even as New Labour attempted to promote collaborative governance, the government controlled the collaborative process by centralising key governmental functions, such as funding and revenue generation. Furthermore, central government was also seen to steer the collaborative process through the use of goals, targets and performance management cultures. Hence, it makes sense to establish that in understanding any given collaboration, there is a need to determine its mode and sphere of operation.


3.3 Summary of the key characteristics of collaboration

In summing up the arguments of authors pertaining to the interpretation of collaboration, different themes were found to relate to different definitions. For instance, Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), Kooiman (2003), and Harding (1997) all suggest that collaborations exist as a means to an end. This is evidenced in the empirical study of this research discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. The authors also agree that collaborations share out responsibilities among their diverse members in order to achieve set goals. In another definitional stance, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) showed how vertical and horizontal relationships with bodies operating at different tiers and in associated policy fields constitute collaboration. Notwithstanding these definitional positions, it is clear that actors engaged in a partnership work towards the attainment of set collective goals while sharing effort.

The multi-sector characteristic of collaboration as argued by Sterling (2005) was shared by Harrison et al. (2003: 4) while stating that collaborations facilitate local mobilisation and the pooling of resources, institutional synergy, and leverage in tackling socio-economic development problems. One criticism of collaboration is that due to the competitive nature of the parties, underlying suspicion may limit the degree of commitment to any collaborative venture, while a few privileged members of any given collaboration could take advantage of the process for their personal agenda. Besides, it can also be argued that collaboration could lead to an overstepping of boundaries, thereby risking corruption, commercial bias and policy distortion between the political system, private sector and markets. This then leads to a dislocation of political accountability, as market-based actors penetrate the political domain for their own interest (Harrison et al., 2003: 99-112).

To conclude the discussion of collaboration, this section has shown its significance for the making and implementation of policies aimed at sustaining public goods and services. It was also shown that while collaboration exists across different spheres (horizontal and vertical), the absence of set rules and governance modes, discussed in the next section, could lead to negative actions and the incidence of overstepping the boundaries between actors. Also, it is important to note that there are certain challenges, such as how to, and who can, establish the criteria for determining the membership and leadership of collaborations. The failure to rise to these challenges may lead to collaboration failure. From the discussion of collaboration, it is clear that governance plays a key role in sustaining collaborations as argued by Healey (2006). The concept of governance is thus discussed in the next section.
3.4 The concept of governance

While there is no single definition of governance, it has existed for a long time and its formal use can be traced back to the work of Plato, who referred to governance as a way of designing a system of rule (Kjær, 2004: 3). Governance as a concept witnessed a renaissance in the 1980s and 1990s as several authors (March and Olsen, 1995; Kooiman, 2003; Kjær, 2004; Leftwich, 1993 and 1994; Rhodes, 1996 and 1997; Stoker, 1999, Rosenau, 1992 and 1995) redefined the concept based on emerging trends. However, despite the definitional problem suffered by the term, in the context of this thesis it is interpreted as those rules and forms that guide collective decision-making (Stoker, 2004: 3).

During the discussion of collaboration in the previous section, it was emphasised that governance is key for sustaining collaboration, especially through the use of rules. From the suggestions of Rosenau (1995), Stoker (2004) and Healey (2006), it is clear that governance includes governmental activities, especially the use of rules to regulate groups of actors who relate to each other within a socio-political system. For instance, Healey (2006: 206) comments that the system of governance of a society refers to the methods by which the collective affairs of that society are managed. Hence, “governance involves the articulation of rules of behaviour with respect to the collective affairs of a political community; and of principles for allocating resources among community members” (Ibid). Although government is not the only actor that influences a societal system, as observed in the study of the cases in London and Lagos discussed in Chapters 4 to 7, it is clear that it plays a key role in the governance process by which policies are made and implemented. To better understand governance, it can be discussed using two categories: governance as the rules and forms that guide collective decision making (Stoker, 2004), and governance as the networks that exist between actors (Rhodes, 1996).

The discussion of the first category of governance focuses on the arguments of Stoker (2004) and Lynn et al. (2001) who noted that governance is constituted by the judicial verdicts, rules and forms which restrain and guide collective actions linked to the delivery of public goods and services. Thus, emphasis is placed on the relevance of rules and modes of governance in shaping the behaviour of actors in the society. While it is clear that there exist two forms of rules, including formal and informal rules, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 316-318) argued for the existence of three modes of governance which shape the behaviours of actors in society: market governance mode, hierarchical governance mode and network
governance mode. Similarly, Kooiman (2003: 5) emphasised that governance operates in different modes including self-governing, co-governing and hierarchical governing.

While formal rules include statutes, laws (written and unwritten) and constitutional provisions, informal rules consist of norms, beliefs, values and customs shared by a group of people. Through this means, governments and constituted authorities are able to govern socio-political systems and mobilise resources to plan and implement policies which address the needs of citizens. During the governing process, rules are employed by governments who develop relevant institutions and bodies to act on its behalf in certain circumstances. To understand governance as structures that guide collective decision making and the behaviour of actors in a system, Lowndes and Skelcher (1998) proposed three modes of governance. They suggested that while the market-governance mode revolves around the establishment of contractual relationships over property rights, especially through the use of pricing mechanisms, hierarchical-governance focuses on the imposition of an authoritative integrating structure which employs bureaucratic routines. Lastly, the network-governance mode suggests that actors are able to identify complimentary interests while developing interdependent relationships based on trust and reciprocity. Similarly, Kooiman (2003) noted three modes of governance (self-governance, co-governance and hierarchical governance) of which two are similar to the modes identified by Lowndes and Skelcher (1998).

The discussion of the second category of governance draws upon the argument of Rhodes (1996: 658) which sees governance as self-organising networks where inter-organisational linkages define service delivery. While employing networks, Rhodes (1996) pointed to the several interdependent actors which need to exchange resources, such as information and expertise, to achieve their objectives and to avoid becoming dependent on other actors. Rhodes (1996: 660) supported the idea that regulatory mechanisms such as PPPs may function well independently, as they are self-organising and not directly accountable to the state. While the suggestion of Rhodes (1996) is different from the earlier definitions considered in terms of his proposition of governance as self-organising and inter-organisational networks with considerable independence from the state, the study as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6 did not find evidence of such self-organising networks. Nevertheless, his proposition of governance as a process incorporating exchange of resources, while there is also adherence to the rules of the game, is consistent with the arguments of Kooiman (2003), Stoker (2004) and Newman et al. (2004), and evidenced in the study.
Notwithstanding the challenges inherent in governance, it could be argued that the nature of governing in some states like the UK and USA has changed to the greater use of networks and collaborations, and from the state use of direct control to approaches devised to engage a number of stakeholders, thereby enabling the prospect of collaborative governance. However, despite such changes, the state still plays a key role (in terms of being both regulator and producer {Evans, 1995: 77-79}), using the tools of government; for example, law and regulation, public spending and taxation, bureaucracy, institutions, information and networks, especially to protect citizens, while also delivering relevant public goods and services (John, 2011: 10). In the UK for instance, the state has developed more means (for example, the use of commissions such as the National Audit Office and Ofsted) to regulate actors.

Governance has also been conceptualised as ‘good governance’ by Leftwich (1993: 610) who based his argument on three strands of good governance which include: the systemic (efficient public service), the political (respect for the rule of law) and the administrative (accountable administration). Thus, it is clear that the concept of governance is fluid and flexible as it takes different forms while ensuring public services are delivered by any permutation of government and the private and voluntary sectors in collaboration with other stakeholders such as citizens. The implication of this for the study is reflected in the empirical chapters where issues such as competition among actors and blurred boundaries were observed in the governance systems of both cases.

3.5 Summary of the key characteristics of governance

This section has examined some common and particular features which traverse the previous discussion. First, it can be established that governance is about ‘rules and forms’. Stoker (2004) and Healey (2006) suggested this in their definitions. Furthermore, in discussing the concept, two categories including: governance as rules and forms that guide collective decision making (Stoker, 2004) and governance as networks existing between actors (Rhodes, 1996) was explored. While the study demonstrates the occurrence of the first category (governance as rules and forms) of governance in both cases as discussed in Chapters 4 to 7, the second category (governance as self-organising networks) of governance was not observed in London and Lagos as the partnerships and networks existing are not self-organising as propounded by Rhodes (1996).
The discussion of governance according to Stoker (2004), Lowndes and Skelcher (1998), Rhodes (1996), Healey (2006), Kooiman (2003) and Lynn et al. (2001) also shows that the concept is flexible and fluid, and could be a means to an end as it uses different frameworks to mitigate problems while the government steers (or creates the enabling environment and methods for achieving set goals) the process by which rules and policies are made for relevant purposes. Notwithstanding the alleged capability of governance as argued by Healey (2006), some of the literature on the concept shows that the processes of governance have been construed by different authors to be marred by various factors such as conflicts and the challenge of how to determine who participates in the governance process.

In summarising the discussion of governance, it is clear that government plays a key role in the governance process, especially through the use of government tools, for example law and regulation, bureaucracy and taxation, for the purpose of creating an enabling environment for the planning and implementation of policies that sustain public services delivery. The literature reviewed shows that at the core of governance are political processes (inclusive or exclusive), participating institutions, networks, and collaborations including a mix of actors from the public, private, voluntary sectors and civil society. Furthermore, Lowndes and Skelcher's (1998) three modes of governance (‘market-governance mode’, ‘hierarchical-governance mode’ and ‘network-governance mode’) illustrate the complexity and fluid nature of the concept. Hence, a deep understanding about the process and elements constituting the governance system will arguably provide further insights into the usefulness of the concept towards enabling and sustaining policies and public services.

### 3.6 Collaborative governance

This section discusses the arguments of scholars who have focused on collaborative governance. The discussion begins by exploring the emergence of the concept. Thereafter, the definitions of collaborative governance by Ansell and Gash (2008) alongside the arguments of other authors are considered. The section then goes on to highlight the characteristics common to the definitions of collaborative governance.

During the discussion of collaboration, it was emphasised that governance through rules and forms is key for sustaining the activities of partnerships. Furthermore, in the course of examining the concept of governance, it was stressed that the governance process is characterised by networks, groups and partnerships (Rhodes, 1996). Thus, it is clear that
relations exist between the concepts of collaboration and governance. The discussion here first draws on the definition of Ansell and Gash (2008: 544) which argue that collaborative governance is a governing arrangement where one or more public agencies directly engage non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process, in order to make or implement public policy or manage public programmes or assets. In addition, the discussion draws on the definition of an American institution, the National Policy Consensus Centre (NPCC) (2010) which defined the concept as the process wherein a leader engages with all sectors (public, private, non-profit, citizens, and others) in order to develop effective, lasting solutions to public problems that go beyond what any sector could achieve on its own. It is thus clear that collaborative governance encapsulate a significant proportion of the ideas of collaboration and governance.

Collaborative governance emerged as a political science concept in the 1990s with significant focus on ‘governance’ as a result of the governance agenda (Ansell and Gash, 2008). Although there is no established theory of collaborative governance, there are several definitions and propositions on the subject. Ansell and Gash suggested that the concept emerged as a response to the high cost of regulation and the politicisation of regulation by the state (Ibid: 544). Scholars including Sullivan and Skelcher (2002), NPCC (2010), Chapman et al. (2010) and Newman et al. (2004) have suggested that collaborative governance emerged during the period when the concept of governance witnessed a renaissance, that is, in the 1980s and 1990s. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 14), for instance, suggested that the public sector in liberal economies, for example, the UK, witnessed remarkable changes (inclusion of more actors in the policy process) in their institutional structure due to domestic conditions such as an increasing demand for public goods. Thus, factors within states, such as partnerships and governance modes, enabled the participation of more non-state actors in the process of delivering public goods and services.

Drawing on the comment of Ansell and Gash (2008: 544) above, and the prevailing ideology in most Anglo-Saxon political systems, including the UK, USA and Australia during the 1990s, which largely favoured the inclusion of more actors in the governance process as opposed to the government delivering most public services, it is clear that the emergence of collaborative governance was ideologically motivated. Notwithstanding the degree to which the shift from ‘government to governance’ was contested, the 1980s and 1990s in the UK witnessed the central government using contracting-out and other reforms to address the challenges of public service delivery. Consequently, the government reduced its role in the
direct delivery of public services. It is also worth noting that the so-called movement from ‘government to governance’ partly reflected the increasingly multiscale nature (acting across more than one geographical scale) of decision making, which was an indication of the opening up of those new issues that needed to be addressed by the state, especially through the re-examination of state strategies in order to deal with the challenges of public service delivery (Somerville, 2011: 81-82).

While making reference to the occurrence of political and socio-economic changes in the USA, Ansell and Gash (2008: 543) argued that collaborative governance has emerged as a new approach to governing in order to replace adversarial and managerial modes of policy making and implementation, especially through the use of collaboration in coordinating governance and the delivery of public services. They further suggest that collaborative governance is different from earlier forms of governing as it is not a “winner-takes all” form of interest intermediation.

Ansell and Gash (2008) identified factors including face-to-face dialogue, the building of trust, the development of shared understanding, knowledge of prior history of cooperation or conflict among collaborating institutions and institutional design, as important for collaborative governance. Put simply, Ansell and Gash (2008) suggest that collaborative governance is when public agencies and non-state stakeholders primarily employ collaboration for decision making in a formal and consensus-oriented process. While this emphasises the use of collaboration for decision making in a formal way, it is argued that decisions are not often made in this manner, neither in London nor Lagos, where the Mayor or the Governor make most governmental decisions, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7.

The definition of NPCC (2010) reflects some of the arguments of Ansell and Gash (2008) especially on the use of collaboration between public agencies and non-state actors. The NPCC perspective identifies the need for a leader who engages with all sectors in order to address the challenges of public service delivery. Furthermore, NPCC (2010) argued that the best solutions to the challenges of public service delivery are realised when people from different spheres of life collaborate in addressing the issues. Thus, the body claims that solutions to challenges developed in collaborative governance last longer as they are the joint effort of all stakeholders. The researcher observes that collaborative governance may be appropriate in a policy area such as mass transportation because of the diversity of actors involved. However, in a sector such as military defence which employs particular actors and operates in a command and control way, it might not be relevant. It could also be argued that
collaboration has not been relevant in the armed forces, which are predominantly controlled by the government.

For collaborative governance to work effectively and efficiently, NPCC (2010) established that it must have three elements: a sponsor, a leader and a neutral forum. The ‘sponsor’ was suggested to be an agency, foundation, civic organisation or public-private coalition to initiate and provide support. The ‘leader’ was required to be a governor, legislator, or local official with the power to attract and bring various people together to work on common problems that would be solved collectively and which cannot be unravelled individually. Thirdly, it was argued that collaborative governance needed a ‘neutral forum’ to act as an unbiased organisation in terms of providing and ensuring a skilled process of management.

Following from these three elements, NPCC (2010) established that the collaborative governance system revolves around sponsors identifying and raising an issue, for instance the challenges of transportation, land use coordination and the need for improved coordination and collaboration between local governments and state/federal transportation agencies in the US (NPCC, 2006: 1); the convening of all needed participants by a leader; the adoption of a framework by participants for addressing the issue; conveners and participants’ framing and reframing issues for deliberation; a neutral forum/facilitator designing and conducting a process for negotiating interests and integrating resources; the writing of an agreement to establish accountability; and sponsors identifying and raising an issue or opportunity calling for a collaborative response. It was further argued by NPCC that the aforementioned system can work anywhere as long as several key principles such as: transparency; equity and inclusiveness; effectiveness and efficiency; responsiveness; accountability; and consensus-based decision making are adhered to. While the NPCC is an American based institution which has implemented collaborative governance schemes with stakeholders in the US, they present a scenario of actors in the US, in particular in the transport sector, as willing to work with each other in partnership. However, this view does not necessarily hold in places where actors only engage in partnerships when they cannot attain their goals alone. Nonetheless, some of the preconditions they identify, for instance equity and accountability, constitute some of the key factors which shape the degree to which a partnership would be successful.

In considering another definition of collaborative governance, Evans (2007: 15) suggested that the concept signifies a change for the method of governing society since it is the increasing way in which public services and public goods are delivered through
collaborative and networking structures of governance involving state and non-state actors based on clear operating rules and trust. Additionally, Evans (2007: 15-16, 47-48) defined collaborative governance as an administrative model involving: public-private partnerships, participatory appraisal supported by NGOs, and an increase in the use of non-departmental public bodies, for example, regional development agencies to enhance development. The strength of Evans’ (2007) arguments about the use of collaborative governance dwells on how various institutions can use each other’s strengths to negate weaknesses through ‘networking’\(^5\) in order to facilitate partnerships for the delivery of public goods. He is also of the view that the partnerships developed would further enhance information flow and knowledge sharing as various institutions collaborates in achieving their goals.

While Evans (2007: 15-16) argued that collaborative governance is dependent on the networking of various structures of governance involving state and non-state actors, the study of the cases in London and Lagos show that collaborative governance cannot be based on networks alone. Networks should be seen as embedded in socio-political environments, and shaped by formal institutions (stable structures) which form partnerships as independent units with goals focused on development and service delivery. Seeing institutions as independent units will reduce the duplication of functions and responsibilities as they work towards the same overall goal while being subjected to public scrutiny.

The arguments of Newman et al. (2004: 204-205) that focus on the two concepts of ‘project politics’ and ‘politics of presence’ provide a further explanation as to the process of collaborative governance. They argued that the policy context developed by New Labour and which was implemented across the UK saw policy papers full of concepts such as collaboration and partnership. Newman et al. (2004) suggested that it is precisely in the domain of ‘project politics’ (how to engage citizens in helping solve particular or local policy problems), and the ‘politics of presence’ (how to enable citizens to voice their interests, experiences and identities in the deliberative process), that deliberative forums were situated.

Newman et al. (2004) stated that New Labour introduced policies that involved a new form of collaborative agreement between the state and citizens based on a concept of active

\(^5\) Evans (2007) argued for networking as a vital component of collaborations due to it unifying collaborators in the delivery of governmental services. This same view of the use of networks for effective collaboration is shared by Rhodes (1996, 1997).
citizenship, involving service users and other stakeholders in the decision making process. Newman et al. (2004: 206) also argued that many of these policies required organisations to involve stakeholders in their organisational and community structural arrangements. In the NHS, for example, citizen representatives were included on the boards of the new Primary Care Trusts, while national and neighbourhood forums were established to involve patients and citizens in consideration of health care decisions. Thus, a collaborative form of governance was observed during the New Labour government of the 1990s.

Having explored some definitions of collaborative governance, a working definition is generated for the study in order to aid analysis. Regardless of its ambiguity, collaborative governance in this study is defined as ‘the process of providing public services and goods, for example, mass transportation, through a network of collaboration involving government and non-governmental actors based on clear operating rules’.

### 3.6.1 Factors that shape the success or failure of collaborative governance

Researchers in the field of collaborative governance have identified that power and resource unevenness will affect the incentives of stakeholders in participating in the collaborative process (Gunton and Day, 2003). Gray (1989) further argued that the degree of power possessed by stakeholders also influences their motivation to engage in collaborative governance. It was noted by Brown (2002) that the incentives that motivate stakeholders increase as they see a direct relationship between their participation and substantial powerful policy outcomes. Thus, it is clear that when the incentives of stakeholders are low, and when they can achieve their own goal without collaborating with others, they tend not to engage in any collaborative governance process.

In addition to the aforementioned factors that can shape the success and failure of collaborative governance, Ansell and Gash (2008: 554-555) suggested the presence of a facilitative leader to guide the collaborative process in order to ensure stakeholders focus on achieving set goals. Chrislip and Larson (1994: 125) further elucidated that the leadership style of any person coordinating collaborative governance should be like that of the custodian (for more information on the ‘custodian’ role of the state or facilitator or leader of any collaborative framework see Evans (1995: 78-79). In addition, Ryan (2001: 241) identified three key skills of an effective leader of a collaborative governance framework: the ability to adequately manage the process of collaboration, to maintain the credibility of the process, and to acknowledge that the collaborating stakeholders are empowered to make realistic decisions.
which are acceptable to all. Lasker and Weiss (2001: 31) further supported Ryan’s (2001) argument by arguing that leaders of collaborative governance set-ups should have the requisite skills to enable them to advance broad and dynamic participation, guarantee broad-based influence and control, assist in the development of fruitful group dynamics, and broaden the capacity of the process.

Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) used a series of studies to answer questions traversing accountability, collaboration, governance and citizenship to establish themes relevant to the concept of collaborative governance. They focused in particular on New Labour’s collaborative schemes such as Health Action Zones, City Challenge, Sure Start, Community Safety, Public Involvement and Neighbourhood Management Programmes. They identified five key imperatives dictating whether or not actors and organisations collaborate, including the need for achieving a shared vision, maximising the use of available resources, addressing complexity in policy or service environments, maximising power and influence in relation to a policy or service area, and resolving conflict.

Chapman et al. (2010: 613) argued that the move towards establishing collaborative governance in the UK witnessed the establishment of initiatives emphasising the use of partnerships, for example Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) and Local Area Agreements (LAAs). They also maintained the argument of Ansell and Gash (2008) regarding the use of a facilitator (individual or institution) in a collaborative governance framework.

3.6.2 An exploration of arguments which critique the idea of collaborative governance

From the discussion of collaborative governance, it is clear that the concept, along with others such as collaboration and governance, employ some similar elements, for example, the use of rules, thus creating a definitional problem for collaborative governance. For instance, the discussion of collaborative governance illustrates the relationship between concepts (collaboration, governance and collaborative governance) and some incidence of blurring in their definitions. Thus in evaluating collaborative governance, the discussion will focus on issues relating to the emergence of the concept, its definitional problems, its features, its practice, and the relevance of the concept for sustaining mass transportation.

The literature (Ansell and Gash, 2008; NPCC, 2010; and Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002) states that collaborative governance emerged in the 1990s as desirable for addressing
problems linked to the delivery of public services in the US and UK. In the course of exploring literatures focused on collaborative governance, it has become clear that the emergence of the concept was ideologically driven, as the governments in the US and UK implemented some reforms which considered it advantageous to employ more actors, including private sector bodies, to help the state in the provision and delivery of public goods. Thus, it could be argued that collaborative governance was an instrument used by the UK and US governments to reduce the state role in delivering services at particular times. Consequently, it is clear that the idea of collaborative governance as argued by Ansell and Gash (2008) and NPCC (2010) might only be useful in socio-political systems similar to the UK and US, which desire to delegate the delivery of some state services to non-governmental bodies.

Arising from the definitional problems suffered by collaborative governance are various claims by scholars on factors alleged to enable its success. While some of these claims are contentious, others were observed in the study. For instance, Ansell and Gash (2008) claimed that the history of cooperation and conflict between actors in a collaborative governance framework determines the degree to which the collaboration will be successful. While this may arguably be true, nevertheless, some bodies are likely to enter into collaborative frameworks due to what they perceive as the future benefits. Furthermore, Chrislip and Larson (1994), Evans (1995), Ryan (2001) and Ansell and Gash (2008) all argued that a leader (facilitator) is necessary to coordinate actors and enable the attainment of the overall aim of the collaboration. This assertion may be true, as it was demonstrated in the study in Chapters 5 and 7 that a leader is essential for coordinating the systems in London and Lagos. However, the literature failed to establish how a leader should be chosen for a collaborative governance framework and the factors that must be considered in choosing such a leader. Gunton and Day (2003) and Gray (1989) further argued that the level of power and resource unevenness in any collaborative governance framework will affect the success of such a structure. Resource inequality was seen in both Lagos and London as it was clear from the study that both the Mayor of London and the Governor of Lagos state wield enormous power. Nevertheless, the study makes it clear, as discussed in Chapters 4, 6 and 8, that the leaders in each city employ partnerships and compulsory means in coordinating actors in the system to enable service delivery.

While the UK Labour government in the 1990s claimed that its government reform programme aimed to involve more actors in the policy making and governance processes (Cabinet Office, 1999: 6), the arguments of Cope and Goodship (1999: 5) show that the
government instead regulated public and private sector agencies through the use of regulatory agencies located in the public sector and operating inside government and outside government in order to shape the activities of the agencies and institutions delivering public services. Cope and Goodship (1999: 6) also note that the act of regulating public services corresponds with the emergence of NPM which was used by central government in the restructuring of policy networks which were traditionally resistant to reform. Thus, the emergence of NPM witnessed the process of centralising government policy strategy and goals in the core executive (government), while also decentralising the delivery of policy to various agencies such as local authorities, private contractors and voluntary bodies.

It is therefore clear that while central government implemented its reform programme in the 1990s, it was perhaps just interested in transferring the delivery of some of its functions to the private sector and not necessarily interested in working in partnership with the collaborators due to the regulatory agencies it employed for regulating the sectors. It is then important to note the argument of Cope and Goodship (1999: 7) which affirmed that NPM advanced the capacity of steering agencies, such as government and core executive agencies, to manage rowing agencies, for example local authorities and quangos within their jurisdiction, thereby establishing interdependence and mutual dependence between sponsors (government and core executives), regulators (agencies such as the Audit Commission), and regulated (local authorities and other established bodies). This further confirms that public-service regulation especially that which relied upon the implementation of NPM was a means of control used by the central government to govern the activities of the agencies and institutions offering public services (Cope and Goodship, 1999: 10). Furthermore, since the government began steering the process of public service delivery, it also employed regulation as an instrument to coerce agencies and other bodies responsible for delivering public goods and services, into implementing its policy goals. Consequently, rather than working with partners from various sectors, central government was regulating the so-called partners.

In this instance, it makes sense to ask whether central government was truly interested in implementing collaborative governance or not. Rather, the researcher is of the view that the notion of implementing collaborative governance was a ploy to attain government policy priorities as shown in the study of the case of London discussed in Chapter 5. It is also important to note that the collaborative governance framework promoted by the New Labour central government (1997-2010) was the vertical, top-down approach which witnessed the use of centrally driven targets and performance indicators, which were set by the central government for local authorities. This framework affected the participation and process of
meeting the needs of locals as such needs were more often than not supported by central
government targets due to policy goal differences between the two levels of government.
Newman et al. (2004: 216) cited an example where a group of local people had identified
learning disabilities as a core area which they wanted to tackle but their wishes were not
granted as they were not reflected in central government policy targets. In summing up the
practice of collaborative governance in the UK during the New Labour government, Newman
et al. (2004) stated that the implementation of central government policies was full of rules
and participatory models forced on institutions and stakeholders.

Another assessment of collaborative governance by Ansell and Torfing (2015) suggest
that critical issues including the tensions inherent in collaboration across scales or at multiple
scales play key roles in influencing the process whereby the collaborative framework adapt to
changing problems and demands. The authors thus made the argument for the need to
understand cross- and multi-scale collaboration and the dynamics of collaborative scaling as
they were argued to be critical for realising the limits of collaborative governance.

From the discussion of collaborative governance, characteristics, including the
presence of a leader, partnership and networks were identified as common in the literature.
Arguably, the discussion of collaborative governance does not just present a variety of
interpretations which can be used as an analytical framework, but also demonstrates the
relations between concepts including collaboration and governance. While the discussion of
collaborative governance points to the relevance of collaboration from the 1990s, the study
also illustrates the existence and relevance of partnerships today, in both London and Lagos.
Collaborative governance has arguably the capacity to sustain mass transportation if practised
as demonstrated by the ‘Clark County habitat conservation plan for desert tortoise’.6 In this
case, the Clark County Desert Conservative Program (DCP) was established through a
collaborative medium that included local government representatives, interest groups and land
owners, and which aimed at implementing actions to ensure the survivability of desert
tortoises. Hence, the possibility of the concept existing in both cases shall be investigated and
discussed in the empirical chapters and concluding chapter.

6 See details of the collaborative governance process leading to the protection of the endangered desert
tortoise at http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/Depts/dcp/Pages/About.aspx
3.7 Urban transport governance

This section moves from the exploration of the concepts underpinning this study to examine literature particularly focused on transport governance, in order to better understand how mass transportation governance systems can be sustained. Kennedy et al. (2005: 393) suggested that the achievement of sustainable transportation requires the establishment of four pillars: effective governance of land use and transportation; a fair, efficient, stable funding regime; strategic infrastructure investments; and attention to neighbourhood design.

Bourne (1982) argued that a city is a complex system wherein changes in one part will affect other parts. Similarly, and due to several issues including capacity and funding issues, the cities investigated in this study are arguably complex systems. In choosing an ideal body to effectively plan the governance of a city, Kennedy et al. (2005: 398) argued for the balance of qualities including spatial representation, structure, democracy and market philosophy. These factors are considered in both London and Lagos and discussed in Chapters 4 to 7.

Kennedy et al. (2005: 401) state that the development of efficient and long-term financing for transportation systems is important for the wellbeing of cities, either for investing in old or new infrastructures or for the long term functioning of the system. However, the funding of transport infrastructures in the systems investigated in this study has faced enormous pressure in recent times due to a reduction in government grants. Hence, the relevance of funding shall be investigated in the empirical chapters of the study. Having re-evaluated the governance of transportation, Kennedy et al. (2005) argued that cities may benefit from alternative funding mechanisms for sustainable financing of transportation including: a general tax base as practised in places including Canada and the UK; fuel taxes as practised in countries like Germany and the USA; fees related to both vehicles and tolls as practised in places like France and Japan; Public-Private Partnerships of which some are judged to be more successful than others; the creative use of transit assets and fare revenue enhancements such as cashless fare payments.

Infrastructural investments in both transit and private vehicle infrastructures were also argued to be essential for the vitality of cities. Kennedy et al. (2005: 406) suggested that if the essence of sustainable transportation is to reduce auto dependence without compromising urban mobility and accessibility, it is important for sustainable transportation to include an extensive and well-integrated public transit system that is able to provide adequate capacity to meet the travel needs of urban commuters.
Through land use and supportive micro neighbourhood designs, neighbourhoods were argued as relevant, while supporting investments in capacity schemes to sustain transportation. For instance Kitamura et al. (1997) suggested that residents’ attitudes can play a more important role than land-use characteristics in explaining the choices of people as regards transport modes. Thus, it is argued that the role of local neighbourhood design in sustaining urban transportation requires more than just developing pedestrian-friendly neighbourhoods where people live, but also where they work and visit (Kennedy et al. 2005: 409). Having discussed the four pillars of sustainable urban transportation according to Kennedy et al. (2005), the relevance and occurrence of these themes shall be explored along with other concepts in both cases investigated in the study.

The complexity of transport governance has been confirmed by Docherty and Shaw (2009). They argued that planning and making transport policies for different transport modes requires collaboration between government levels and relevant stakeholders. Furthermore, they emphasised that government plays a key role in transport-related activities, as transport planning and implementation requires coordination and regulations. Also, government was argued as playing a key role in mass transport management and planning as it can employ the use of partnerships or coordination to ensure its policies are implemented. This view will be investigated further in the empirical chapters of this thesis.

### 3.8 The model of collaborative governance used for examining the case studies

After reviewing the literature on collaborative governance, the Ansell and Gash (2008) model was adopted to provide a comparative framework for analysing the case studies. The model was employed primarily due to its identification of key variables, presented in Figure 1 below, and argued by its proponents to play a crucial role in ensuring the success of collaborative modes of governance. It is important to note that the proposed variables were identified by the authors after reviewing 137 cases of collaborative governance across a range of policy sectors. By employing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model as a comparative framework, the study is able to test the relevance or irrelevance of the critical variables identified by the authors as influencing the success, or otherwise, of collaborations. Furthermore, reflecting on the roles of the variables and crucial factors proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) within the collaborative process using evidence from the cases explored here will advance the study on collaborative governance. Although some of the literature (Evans, 1995; Chrislip and Larson, 1994; Sullivan and Skelcher, 2002; and NPCC, 2010) supports
elements of the variables proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), others (Emerson et. al, 2012) have argued that the definition of the concept remains amorphous, and that there is inconsistency in its use.

For clarity, Figure 1 below presents the essential variables and ingredients of the Ansell and Gash (2008) collaborative governance model employed in analysing the cases investigated in this study.

Figure 1: Ansell and Gash (2008) model of collaborative governance


Ansell and Gash (2008) presented a number of variables, including starting conditions, institutional design and facilitative leadership, as influencing the collaborative governance framework they proposed. Their model suggests that within the collaborative framework is a variety of influential factors, including face-to-face dialogue, trust building, commitment to process, shared understanding and intermediate outcomes. While the propositions presented above by Ansell and Gash (2008) as helping to sustain the collaborative governance framework are tested by drawing on evidence and findings from the cases investigated in the study, as discussed in Chapters 5, 7 and 8, the model is further critiqued in the empirical chapters based on its overly normative stance, problem of generalisation and definitional problems as discussed earlier in this chapter.
3.9 Chapter summary

To conclude the discussion in this chapter, it is clear that governance, collaboration and collaborative governance are not clear concepts. However, these concepts do relate to one another. It was shown in previous paragraphs that there exist some similarities and differences among the propositions of scholars as to the concepts, thereby making it possible to identity cross-cutting characteristics such as the relevance of a leader and joint-working, the relevance or irrelevance of which is validated in the cases explored in this study.

This chapter has achieved three tasks central to this study. First, it has discussed and reviewed literature not just relating to the concept of collaborative governance, but also on the related concepts of collaboration and governance. Second, the chapter has attempted to address the first research question of the study (What is meant by collaborative governance?) while also providing the conceptual framework for the factors that must be considered while addressing both the second (How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass transportation in London and Lagos?) and third (How far can collaborative governance improve mass transportation?). Third, the discussion of concepts and the review of the literature in the chapter have shown that some of the empirical issues discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 such as the incidence of conflicts and partnership in both systems are consistent with conceptual arguments, while the finding relating to the disagreement among interviewees in both systems, as to which actor is best suited to lead the system, constitute a significant finding which enhances the understanding of the concept of leadership.

The chapter demonstrates that although the concept of ‘collaborative governance’ can be used as an analytical framework which can be employed to explain how the challenges of public service delivery might be addressed, nevertheless, the concept can also be problematic due to its fluid nature as argued by Emerson et al. (2012). Chapman et al. (2010) and Healey (2006) have commented that the cultures existing within organisations and across sectors play key roles in either enabling or hindering the use of collaborative governance to deliver public goods and services. It is worth noting that the various challenges pervading the collaborative governance process are due partly to the flexibility of the constantly changing governance process and the nature of the institutions constituting the governance process. To better understand the concepts discussed in this chapter, their relevance are explored in the study and discussed in Chapters 4 to 8.
Chapter Four:
The governance structure of London and mass transport capacity

4.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the historical background to the current government structure of London and the capacities existing to address mass transport problems in order to sustain mass transportation. It traces when, why and how relevant government institutions and mass transport bodies were established. The chapter commences with a discussion of the role of local authorities in London. Sub-sections 4.2.1 to 4.2.3 then explore the development of local government from 1835 to 2010. Thereafter, section 4.3 discusses the emergence of mass transportation in London. Section 4.4 then goes on to analyse central government – Greater London Authority (GLA) relations, including the factors shaping the relationship between both organisations. Sub-sections 4.5.1 to 4.5.3 discusses three forms of partnership observed from the system in London. This is followed by an overview of key projects, both delivered and ongoing, which contribute to the study of research questions 7 (What capacity (within and outside each city) exists to solve these problems?) and 8 (How can this capacity be strengthened?). Section 4.8 then goes on to present a summary of the chapter, while linking the evolution of government structures in London with the emergence of the present Greater London Authority (GLA), which incorporates the Mayor and London Assembly.

4.2 The place of local authorities in London governance

Local authorities in England and Wales historically have played two main roles: a service provider and a political instrument used for promoting local democracy (Keating, 1991 in Pierre, 1997: 2). London’s governance structure has evolved over time due to the changing socio-economic, political and cultural characteristics of the city. London’s economic dynamism, among several factors, has arguably enhanced its status in becoming a global city where mass transportation play key roles in sustaining socio-economic development, mobility and the status of the city. In understanding the workings of London governance, particular attention must be paid to different actors and local authorities (London boroughs) who are the closest government to people in communities.
London boroughs, including the City of London Corporation, aim to implement the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy to enable the provision of services to meet the needs of people while also improving welfare through the provision of services like housing and bus passes for people in certain age groups. The twenty-five members of the London Assembly (which scrutinises the Mayor and other bodies responsible for delivering services) represent different London boroughs. Furthermore, it was discussed in Chapter 5 that some of the elected members of the London Assembly serve as Deputy Mayors to the Mayor. This then shows that local authorities in London do not only aid the delivery of goods and services but also enable the rise of politicians from local constituencies to borough level and then to the GLA level where they constitute London’s governance system. It is thus clear that local authorities (boroughs) in London play some roles (implementation of some GLA policies, collection of taxes for instance council tax and other charges like the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) and enablers of actors constituting the GLA) which enable and sustain the governance of London thereby indicating some relationship between both levels of government (GLA and London boroughs).

4.2.1 London’s local authorities (1835-1889)

This section is the first of three which discusses the emergence of institutions in London, which sustains the governance process and the delivery of public services. The emergence of institutions in London commenced with the creation of the Metropolitan Police by the Metropolitan Police Act on 19th of June 1829. The Metropolitan Police force was created to address the societal challenges linked with urbanisation and the industrial revolution which led to an increase in London’s population and additional economic expansion. Thus, existing social systems such as the transport system and health structures were unable to meet the demands of users. Furthermore, the existing volunteer constables and ‘watchmen’ could not cope effectively with managing crime in London; consequently, Sir Robert Peel was nominated to head the Metropolitan Police so as to address the emerging and ongoing problems in London most of which were linked with urbanisation (National Digital Archive of Dataset-Metropolitan Police).

The Metropolitan Police was the first city-wide institution in London, and it was accountable to the Home Secretary (Travers, 2004: 22). After the establishment of the Metropolitan Police, emergent problems linked with urbanisation and sanitation, in addition
to increasing poverty, provoked the creation of other government institutions. Parliament passed the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 to give relief to the poor while establishing Poor Law Boards of Guardians to govern at the local level (Wilson and Game, 1994: 42-44). Thereafter, in 1835, the Municipal Corporations Act was passed by Parliament in order to establish the process of direct election of corporate boroughs in England and Wales so as to change the self-electing and corrupt medieval corporations (ibid).

Urbanisation due to the industrial revolution created some challenges including the need to provide sufficient transportation infrastructures as a result of the influx of people in and out of London, and to address sanitation problems such as those relating to housing and other welfare needs. Consequently, existing local authorities were not able to meet public demands and needs relating to transport provision and health care as they lacked the capacity needed to address the diverse problems in existence. These factors and others provoked central government to embark on reforms targeted at the activities of local authorities. The Metropolitan Board of Works (MBW) was established by Parliament through the Metropolis Management Act of 1855, and mandated to primarily address the sanitation challenges London faced, especially the terrible state of the Thames, which had a foul smell (Travers, 2004: 21-23). Other immediate responsibilities of the MBW were to create necessary infrastructures such as major streets, the embankment, and to set up the fire brigade to match the demands generated by London’s fast growth (ibid, 24).

In other places outside London around the end of the nineteenth century, various authorities oriented towards delivering public services to solve emergent problems were established and given certain economic and political powers, for example, as regards the financing and provision of services like housing, road infrastructures, and health care. Some of the authorities that provided the aforementioned services included counties, boroughs, county boroughs, urban districts, and rural districts. An important feature of these institutions was that they were urban authorities directly elected by ratepayers, although suffrage was restricted to adult male ratepayers with more than three years’ continuous residence in London (Wilson and Game, 1994: 44).

Although central government initiated reforms in the late 19th century in London, local authorities experienced chaos in some of their activities, for example, in the process of rate collection, which was marred by rate irregularities and collection disorderliness. Thus, central government played an enabling role facilitating the provision of public goods especially through the MBW, and its successor the London County Council (LCC), by
financing projects and developing infrastructures. The enabling role played by central government thus influenced local authorities to play similar roles. It is also worth noting the creation of other bodies for example, the Metropolitan Fire Brigade established 5th July 1865.

Some of the significant highlights in the activities of the MBW include the construction of a sewerage system, creation of embankments, and the establishment of a fire brigade. Regardless of the achievements the MBW made in terms of building some infrastructures, it did not allow for representative democracy, and its officials engaged in corrupt practices such as not declaring all the taxes they collected. As early as 1885, Lord Salisbury had claimed that the Cabinet was in support of full reforms of local authorities particularly in London. Such reforms, according to Salisbury, included having elected local authorities, ensuring that they are fully (financially and politically) independent, accountable and have sufficient powers (Young and Garside, 1982: 54). Consequently, central government initiated a reform which materialised through the Local Government Act of 1888, establishing the two-tier structure of elected local authorities throughout England (62 County Councils and 61 County Boroughs), and London’s first directly elected city-wide local authority - the London County Council (LCC) in 1889 (Wilson and Game, 1994: 45). In understanding the circumstances that led to the making of the Local Government Act of 1888, it is necessary to note the role of the Progressives (Liberals) who supported the Conservative government that was elected in 1886, which did not have the necessary political support (seats in Parliament). Consequently, the Progressives supported the Conservative government on the condition that the latter would introduce a bill (Local Government Reform) which would place county government under the control of elected councils (Young and Garside, 1982: 52-54).

Another factor worth mentioning was the desire of central government and London’s Conservatives from 1887-1889, to limit the powers of the MBW which had become a big institution and taken up enormous responsibilities (Young and Garside, 1982: 58). Central government thus deemed it fit to break up the MBW in order to reduce the powers of the Progressive party while simultaneously reviving the powers of the Conservative party (ibid, 64).
4.2.2 London’s Local Authorities (1889-1965)

The LCC emerged in 1889 as an authority piloting developmental projects in London, especially those related to the construction of roads and housing. The powerful status of the LCC was further enhanced by the political stance of central government as the party in power sought to make its presence felt in London. After the establishment of the LCC, it supported the functions it inherited from the MBW for example, the London School Board, and also delivered some new public services. During the early period of its existence, the LCC conducted an election for councillors from a population base of about 4.5 million people. However, there were huge doubts about the competence of prospective councillors (Gibbon and Bell, 1939: 83). Further reforms and Acts were then introduced by central government, for example, the London Government Act of 1899 which reformed the administration of London through the creation of 28 elected metropolitan boroughs while also transferring various responsibilities for example, street maintenance, local roads, and rate collection to the second tier of government. In addition, the LCC embarked on a programme of public service development by constructing tramways to improve transportation, and building hospitals and housing so as to advance welfare facilities (Travers, 2004: 26).

One of the incidences observed during the LCC period was the way in which political power shifted from one party to the other as a result of political party’s ideology. The dominant party in the LCC was initially the Progressives (Liberals), from 1889-1907. The policy thrust of the Progressives focused on consolidating all local authorities in London under one central control, that is, combining London government as an organic unit under the LCC through what it termed as ‘unification’. However, the policy goal of the Progressives was dealt a blow by the death of Firth (the Progressive’s leader), which created a leadership vacuum (Young and Garside, 1982: 59-62). In addition, the speech by Lord Salisbury in November 1897 where he advocated the reduction of the powers of the LCC through ‘tenification’ which was a breakup of the organic unit earlier established by the Progressives into 10 administrative units under the leadership of ten different mayors also furthered the shift of political dominance in the LCC from Progressives to Municipal Reformers (Conservatives) (Ibid: 87). Subsequently, the Municipal Reformers became the dominant party from 1907-1934, while the Labour Party became the last political party to dominate the affairs of the LCC, from 1934 until 1965, when the LCC was disbanded. The significance of the aforementioned shift explains how political decisions affected the relations between central government and London government.
Before the end of the first decade in the twentieth century, the LCC claimed to be the largest employer of labour in London, while they embarked on various projects such as building fire stations, schools, and public housing in communities (Travers, 2004: 26). In addition, the LCC and London boroughs provided additional services such as providing policing and social services. Furthermore, the LCC established elementary and secondary schools from 1904 and protected ancient monuments through conservation work. They also advanced transport infrastructures, especially through the building of bridges, subways, railways and tunnels from 1889-1899.

The period after the First World War witnessed a new era, in the sense that there was an increase in the services demanded from local authorities by citizens. As Pierre (1997) commented, local authorities became increasingly interested in strategy planning relating to the provision of infrastructures such as housing and roads. This shift in the service delivery orientation of local authorities was influenced by the realities of the time, that is, the need for infrastructures such as affordable housing and roads. This manifested in the duties of the LCC which included but not limited to providing public assistance, for example establishing training centres; health services, for example establishing District Medical Council while also making provision for hospitals and ambulances; and regulating and licensing which took the form of building regulations and town planning. However, the established local rating system for collecting taxes which had provided revenues for financing the aforementioned public services became regressive and ineffective in the post-war years due to the many diverse roles and services local authorities were performing and partly due to the limitations inherent in the local rating system (Wilson and Game, 2006: 217).

During the period that the Labour Party was in power (1934-1965), the key political leaders (Herbert Morrison, Charles Latham, and Isaac Hayward) understood the challenges occasioned by the fragmented nature of London government. Morrison, in particular, used his leadership position of the London Labour Party (LLP) to develop policies which focused on long-term education and large-scale housing developments in London in order to reduce the presence of slums (Young and Garside, 1982: 174 and 180). Furthermore, the Labour Party used its position as leader of central government (1929-1934) and LCC to unify issues traversing development planning, housing and governmental structures (ibid: 173). Herbert Morrison, who sat on the LCC, also led the LLP, and he used his tight control of the LLP and LCC to centralise power in order to enhance the development of infrastructures, especially in areas where the boroughs were weak. As the Minister of Transport in 1931 he introduced a
bill which later became the Act that created the London Passenger Transport Board (London Transport), which unified bus, tram and other modes of mass transportation with the Underground (Thurston, 1934). However, Herbert Morrison’s attempt to control the administration of London’s transport was frustrated by Lord Ashfield who wanted to administer London Transport in a different way (Donoughue and Jones, 1973: 140-149).

Furthermore, various events in the middle of the 20th century motivated the Labour Government to increase its pace of reforms in the 1960s in order to unify fragmented units and institutional divisions operating at the local authority level. This was partly in response to the poor relations that had existed between the Labour Party controlled LCC and districts in Middlesex which believed they should be county boroughs. Other events that provoked the Labour Party to increase their reforms included the problems of traffic planning in London and the declaration of the Macmillan government’s intent, in 1961, to dissolve the LCC and Middlesex County Council in order to redraw the administrative map of Greater London (Young and Garside, 1982: 305-308). By 1963, some of the recommendations of the Sir Edwin Herbert Royal Commission of 1960 were upheld especially as regards the coverage of most of the districts outside London (Outer London). Consequently, the London Government Act of 1963 established the Greater London Council (GLC) and thirty-two (32) moderately large London boroughs. The GLC is discussed further in the next session.

4.2.3 London’s Local Authorities (1965-2010)

London Labour Party’s (LLP) exposure to the national Conservative Party’s policy on London, especially as pertaining to the latter’s quest to capture political power in London led the LLP to modify the outer boundary of London by pursuing an initial aggressive policy of acquiring suburban land for developing public housing pre 1965 in order to have more political support especially from Conservative Party members. Thus, Labour’s victory during the first GLC election in 1964 was influenced by their land and housing policy. However, the London Conservative Party regrouped, based on their prediction that potential Labour administration in the GLC, especially through their wide-spread housing policy, might negatively influence suburban way of life especially through the submerging of outer London with public housing and Labour residential voters (Young and Garside, 1982: 325). Furthermore, the Conservative Party feared they would lose their relevance and political role in the governance of London because more suburban housing construction by the Labour
Government could lead to them losing their party members resident in the places where the Labour suburban housing construction were implemented. Hence at the election conducted in 1967, the Conservative Party, led by Desmond Plummer mobilised supports from residents residing in outer London.

During the early years of the existence of the GLC, the institution was involved in issues relating to metropolitan housing and writing of proposals to build major new roads (ringways) in London. Consequently, the GLC drew up a plan for land use in London (Greater London Development Plan, GLDP) in 1965, thus giving the institution a strategic role (Travers, 2004: 29). In another development, the power of the GLC to build housing even when it conflicted with borough plans (building against local authority wishes) was challenged by the outer London authorities, while the representatives of the Association of Municipal Corporations (AMC) also argued that the GLC’s powers regarding housing were enormous and might influence the GLC to dominate the housing field (Ibid: 319).

By 1973, the Conservative Party had lost control of the GLC to Labour Party. From this period till the next election held in 1977, Sir Horace Cutler took charge of the Conservative Party. During the next GLC election, he won and set out different policies including the inquiry he established under Sir Frank Marshall which aimed to justify the merits of the GLC. During Cutler’s time as leader of the GLC, he attempted to extend the Jubilee line into the Docklands however, he was refused grants by the Labour government. It was also noted that he was not able to make tangible investments in London Underground thereby leading to depleted rail transport infrastructures. After the 1981 GLC election, Ken Livingstone emerged as the leader of the GLC, and he implemented a variety of policies related to transportation for example cuts in London Underground fares by 32% reduction (Fares Fair Policy), the introduction of the congestion charge which increased the use of public mass transport modes in order to manage increasing traffic in London, and the Spatial Development and Economic Development Strategies.

Analysis of some of the policies of the Livingstone era show some negatives and positives. For instance, while some commuters did benefit from the 32% cuts in fares, it was a cost to the government as it was funded through a subsidy. In another gesture, the government of Ken Livingstone gave monetary support to minority groups. Furthermore, the oyster card was introduced thereby furthering efficiency in ticketing (Wilson and Game, 2006: 75-77).
The circumstances in which central government transferred the London Transport Board (LTB) to the GLC is arguably controversial because central government simultaneously withdrew its funding from the LTB while also transferring Country buses and Green circle line coaches to a new company called London Country Bus Services which was further incorporated into the National Bus Service in 1970. This action by central government led to less income for LTB as the profits of buses had hitherto been used to reimburse the losses made by other lines of business, for example trains. The GLC used the LTB executive in running the affairs of the LTB up till 1984 when the Conservative government took over the control of London Transport (Travers et al, 1991: 9-10). The reasons for the takeover of the LTB by the Conservative government were based on the need to improve the GLC which at a time introduced the ‘Fares Fair Policy’, and due to other political reasons which have to do with differing ideologies with the London Labour government. Regardless of the various challenges highlighted above, the GLC through the LTB delivered and controlled transport services within the boundaries of Greater London thereby setting the scene for the development of a transport strategy for London.

The GLC was abolished on the 1st of April 1986, bringing to an end city-wide government in London for the first time since 1855. Travers (2004:8-42) commented that the huge vacuum left by the abolition of the GLC presented the opportunity for kick-starting an innovative public sector driven by partnerships, which has become an important feature of London. The GLC will be remembered for the institutional structures it established especially units, such as planning, housing, local roads, just to mention a few, as they were instrumental in developing various sectors in London. For instance, the planning unit developed the Spatial Development and Economic Development Strategies which influenced the writing of the London Plan discussed later in the thesis. Also, the transport unit was instrumental in enabling the implementation of the Oyster card which furthered efficiency in the process of fares payments.

Before the abolition of the GLC, various challenges emerged within the political system, ranging from vagueness in terms of who to hold accountable and responsible for public service provision, challenges emanating from the political composition of the various local authorities, and problems of resource generation. Furthermore, the co-ordination of policies and public administration was difficult due to the cost of maintaining the two-tiered structure of administering local authorities (Wilson and Game, 1994: 53).
After the GLC was abolished, the Conservative government of Mrs Thatcher in 1986 targeted the governance structure of London by abolishing metropolitan county councils while making metropolitan boroughs have unitary status. The Thatcher era change began with the abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC), six metropolitan county councils, and the Inner London Education Authority. The reasons for the abolition of the GLC and the six metropolitan county councils were allegedly linked to the wastefulness of local authorities with their resources, them not being accountable to people, and them being out of control. To address these alleged excesses on the part of local authorities, the Thatcher government made several legislations (Streamlining the Cities) to modify the method of operations of local authorities including the ways they generate and spend funds.

After the abolition of the GLC, the period 1986-2000 witnessed a general shift among the political parties especially on the need to have an elected authority which would steer government activities in London. Having criticised some of the activities of local authorities, central government embarked on a reform programme involving the use of several laws to check the activities of local authorities while re-modelling their pattern of expenditure and revenues (Wilson and Game, 1994:55).

In order to assert its reform programme, the Tory Government introduced into its election manifesto a pledge to eliminate the six English Metropolitan County Councils and the GLC while arguing that the institutions scheduled for elimination were performing minute functions thus outmoded. Consequently, a Thatcher (Conservative) versus Livingstone (Labour) resentment emerged. Another viewpoint to understand the dilemma in the relationship between the Thatcher-led central government and Livingstone-led GLC can be understood from the fact that the change proposed by the Thatcher-led government regarding the elimination of the GLC and the Metropolitan County Councils was aimed at asserting central government control over local authorities in England in general, and in London in particular, as there had been increasing tension between local authorities and central government, especially as relating to the funding and expenditures of local authorities for instance through rate capping (Travers, 2004: 30).

Following the victory of the Conservative party in the May 1983 general election, the White Paper proposed to abolish the six metropolitan counties and the GLC recommended that the functions carried out by the abolished seven bodies be allocated to lower tier metropolitan district councils, London boroughs, ad hoc agencies, joint boards, and central government divisions. Examples of public services reallocated were the police, fire and public
transport outside London. Nonetheless, it is important to note that most of the GLC powers including that of managing London Transport had been removed from the GLC even before its abolition in 1986 and transferred to various bodies such as the London Residuary Body. The running of London Transport was thus transferred back to central government in 1984 (Travers et. al, 1991: 9-10). Other powers were devolved to joint boards consisting of councillors.

The study shows that the recommendation of the White Paper was pervaded by central government control of local authority activities through the use of joint committees and boards enforced on the district tiers. For instance, Wilson and Game (1994:56-57) notes that the conflict between the Labour party which controlled most of all the recreated councils and London boroughs, and the Tory led central government took another dimension, policy conflict. Moreover, in order to encourage the private sector to participate in public service delivery for certain services like transportation, local authorities were required by central government and London government to enter into collaboration with private sector organisations to establish companies which would deliver the needed services.

After the 1992 election, there was the creation of London government institutions such as the Cabinet Sub-committee for London (Ibid, 32-33), and the Government Office for London (GOL) which was a central government creation mandated to represent the interests of various central government departments while working with relevant stakeholders in delivering central government goals for London (Government Office for London, 2010). The influences of the aforementioned institutions and others on London have contributed to the inability of local authorities to set up and pursue their own development agendas in order to rise to emergent challenges particularly in their environment, and generally in London because they constitute another level of bureaucracy regulating the activities of local authorities. In commenting on the complexity of the governance process in London, the Commission on London Governance (2005: 2-4) argues that the complex nature of the governance structure in London is so vague that sometimes people do not know who to hold accountable for public services. This has been occasioned by the existence of various bodies and agencies created by central government in order to check the political and economic powers of London local authorities.
4.3 The emergence of mass transportation in London

This section discusses the context of the emergence of mass transportation in London. It explores the evolution of mass transport modes and discusses the key challenges confronting mass transportation in London. It is then followed by a discussion of the relationship between central government and London government.

The emergence of mass transportation in London can be traced to the middle of the nineteenth century when existing mass transport infrastructures could no longer meet the needs of the Victorians especially those relating to the provision of transport infrastructures. Consequently, some parliamentary enquiries were made in order to raise the funds needed to provide mass transport infrastructures. Furthermore, other features of London at the period included its increasing population, which grew six-fold from about 1,110,000 to 6,580,000 by the end of the nineteenth century, and urban sprawl. These made the establishment of mass transportation essential.

Mass transportation in London has gone through several phases of development and models (Horse-Drawn Carriage-Short Stage Coach-Omnibus-Trains-Buses-Cabs-Boats). One of the most important factors arguably to have influenced the development and spread of mass transportation in London was the increase in the distances commuters had to embark from home to work. In addressing this issue, London’s mass transport system gradually developed with the use of horse-drawn carriages along major roads and the use of steam boats on the river Thames. Subsequently, as it became obvious that existing mass transport capacities could no longer meet user demands due to the increasing population of London, railway construction began. London’s first railway emerged from Deptford to Spa Road, Bermondsey, on the 8th of February 1836 and further extension was made to London Bridge by the 14th of December 1836. In its first fifteen months of operation, the railway transported an average of about 1,422 passengers daily (Barker and Robbins, 1975: 45).

In building infrastructures to address mass transport needs in London, central government played an important role by engaging private businesses to set up rail companies to ply commercially viable routes that would meet the transport needs of Londoners. Furthermore, central government established the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Termini in the 1840s to consider the possibilities of building new rail lines into the heart of London. Thus, central government used Acts of Parliament to instigate partnerships such as London &
Greenwich, London & Blackwall, South Eastern & Croydon Companies, and London & North Western Railway companies in order to develop rail infrastructures (Barker and Robbins, 1975: 50-51). Hence, central government through its powers (statutes and funding) has been involved in the creation and operation of most forms of public transportation (train, ferries and buses) in London until July 2003 when it transferred the responsibilities of the operation of some train lines to TfL, thus making some operators accountable to TfL (Bayman, 2008: 4-5).

The London Underground was the first underground railway in the world, and it commenced operations in 1863 at Baker Street Station (Bayman, 2008: 4). Yet, despite the emergence of the railway and Underground in London in the middle of the nineteenth century, the omnibus remained the main transporter of most workers in London as it regularly provided mass transportation for the public, especially to work, while the emerging trains provided more of occasional trips and excursions. This was mainly due to the inability of railways to gain access into central London where the omnibuses dominated (Barker and Robbins, 1975: 56-57).

Since the establishment of London Underground, there have been increasing demands on central government for infrastructure funding including funding demands from other public sector institutions such as health bodies, police, and education. Hence, in funding mass transportation capacity in London, central government has regularly employed ‘Public-Private Partnerships’ (PPPs) and ‘Private Finance Initiatives’ since 1992 (Wilson and Game, 2006: 153-156).

4.4 Central government – London government relations and partnerships

This section discusses the relations between central government and the GLA due to the roles they play in sustaining mass transportation in London. Partnerships, with particular focus on Crossrail 1, Barclay’s cycle scheme and Metronet are also examined.

4.4.1 Central government – GLA relations

The relations between central government and London governments have been shaped by several factors including socio-economic, political and strategic influences. For instance,
section 4.2.3 point to some political issues between the Thatcher-led central government and Livingstone-led GLC which focused on the elimination of the GLC and Metropolitan County Councils. On the other hand, section 4.4.2 discusses the incidence of partnership in London including the Crossrail 1 partnership which involved both central government and the GLA, and other actors from different sectors. Thus, the study shows the incidence of both conflict and collaboration between central government and the GLA.

The study of the relations between central government and London government focuses on the period from 1966 when the Royal Commission led by Lord Redcliffe-Maud was established, and which argued that the division of England into 79 county boroughs and 45 counties which had independent jurisdictions that divided town from country facilitated improper planning of socio-economic development and transportation as it created an atmosphere of hostility between county boroughs, counties, and the central government thus causing a weakness in the relationship among the tiers of government (Wilson and Game, 1994: 50-51).

By 1999, there was consensus between central government and bodies representing the interests of Londoners and businesses on the need to have an elected authority to represent the interests of Londoners and govern the city. After some consultations between central government, interest groups and bodies in London, and a referendum, the Greater London Authority Act of 1999 was passed by Parliament and it made provision for the Greater London Authority (GLA) to constitute the Mayor of London and the London Assembly. Provision was also made in the Act with respect to how the GLA would relate with other local authorities and institutions in London. In Part 1 of the GLA Act, the section titled ‘The Authority’ stipulate the power of the GLA in section 3 – “The Authority shall have the functions which are transferred to, or conferred or imposed on, the Authority by or under this Act or any other Act” to be dependent on the UK Parliament.

Another way of evaluating the relations between central government and London government is by considering the political stance of the party at the central government level to that in the GLA. In a situation whereby the party in power at the central government level is different from that in charge of the GLA (Mayor), the likelihood of conflict between both actors will be high due to their support for different policies or opposing implementation process. An instance was the period when Prime Minister Thatcher and Ken Livingstone were in power at the central and London government levels. Table 1 below shows the characteristics that sometimes pervade the relationship between central government and GLA.
when the party in power at central government is different from the party in power at the GLA, and when the party in power at central government is the same as that at the GLA.

Table 1: Characteristic of the relationship that existed between central government and London government across different period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Party in power at central government</th>
<th>Party in power at London government</th>
<th>Characteristic of relationship that existed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Central government showed commitment towards the housing policy of the LCC regarding 'slum clearance'. The goal of the LCC which was to build more houses and reduce slums was later made the national policy goal of the Labour Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Central government under the leadership of Macmillan ensured that Conservative suburbs were incorporated into a wider Greater London thereby weakening the political leadership of Labour in London Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Labour Party</td>
<td>Central government under the leadership of Thatcher was enraged by the activities of the GLC which was led by Livingstone (Labour). The conflict between central government and the GLC ended with the abolishing of the GLC and the 6 metropolitan authorities through the use of the White Paper ‘Streamlining the Cities’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>Conservative Party</td>
<td>While Central Government has introduced cuts across governmental Departments through the Comprehensive Spending Review, the funding of key projects such as Cross rail 1 has been made secure (ring fenced) due to the support of central government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Due to the powers of central government, including its ability to enact statutes and fund bodies including their capital projects, it has been able to control London government in addition to other actors in the system. For instance, both the Conservative government (1979-1990) and the New Labour government (1997-2010) employed policies to address challenges linked to the delivery of public services at the local authority level in London. It is also clear that central government has been able to control local authorities through the use of means such as ‘rate-capping’ to control their expenditures and how they spend money allocated to them. The researcher observed in the 1999 GLA Act that the Mayor is not empowered to use the funds allocated for a particular functional body of the GLA for another or employ the funds allocated to the GLA by central government for other purposes contrary to that established by central government. In addition, it was noted that New Public Management (NPM) tools such as performance measurement and public private partnership (PPP) have also been used by central government to control the activities of local councils including London boroughs (Travers, 2004: 18).

The adoption of New Public Management (NPM) principles in the UK in the 1980s and 1990s redefined the roles and responsibilities of government agencies including bodies in the system in London. The new roles proposed that local authorities should serve as enablers in the delivery of public services. Furthermore, these roles were seen to include the setting of the general administrative, financial and regulatory structures to facilitate the delivery of public goods. Hence, it was not a surprise when New Labour in 1998 after being elected to office argued that public services should be provided by any sector or institution capable of providing the best services in an effective and efficient manner (HM Treasury, 1998).

To conclude, this section has examined the relationship between central government and London government while highlighting the factors that influence the relations between both bodies. Furthermore, the discussion in the section shows that the relations between both actors have been influenced by socio-economic, financial and political factors. More importantly, it was clear that central government was more dominant in the relations between both actors as it employs its powers such as Acts of Parliament to implement its policies. This then suggests that while private sector bodies now play a key role in the governance of London especially in sustaining mass transportation and other services, nonetheless, central government and the GLA play more influential roles relating to goals, funding, rules setting and the coordination of the system.
4.5 Partnerships

From 1986 to 2001, there was the creation of partnerships by actors from both the public and private sectors. For instance, while Kensington and Chelsea boroughs led the Central London Partnership which is constituted by actors from both the private and public sectors; the Thames Gateway Partnership is also constituted by bodies across sectors, and both partnerships aims to enable the provision of public goods since there was no city-wide government (Travers, 2004: 145). During this period, the political class embarked on various conferences, seminars, and report-launches to collaborate on how to further develop the infrastructures and institutions of London. This section thus aims to discuss the incidence of partnerships relevant to mass transportation in London as this is the focus of the study. To aid analysis, the partnerships delivering Crossrail 1, Barclays cycle scheme and an incidence of a failed partnership – Metronet are discussed. While the first two partnerships are discussed as a result of the frequency of their recurrence in the data gathered from London and due to their different capacities and goals relating to sustaining mass transportation in London, the third partnership is discussed as it is arguably the main incidence of partnership related to mass transport sustenance known to have failed.

The study of the case in London shows that partnership between the DfT, GLA, TfL, private sector organisations and London boroughs is encouraged by the Mayor especially for the purpose of pulling resources together to execute projects like Crossrail 1 and the Barclay’s Cycle scheme. To further the understanding of the relevance of partnership to mass transportation, and on how it exist in London, Crossrail 1 and Barclays cycle scheme partnerships are discussed below in addition with Metronet partnership.

4.5.1 Crossrail 1 partnership

Crossrail 1 is a major engineering programme cutting through the complex geography of London and integrating with several existing rail systems. It was ratified by the UK Parliament with the Crossrail Act 2008 after its introduction to the Commons in 20057. The Crossrail Act 2008 gave Crossrail 1 a confirmed route - Maidenhead and Heathrow in the west to Shenfield and Abbey Wood in the east, with new rail tunnels (and stations) under

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central London as required, and it is due to be completed in 2017. To deliver and fund the scheme, the DfT and TfL entered into a joint venture which created Cross-London Rail Links Ltd (CLRL) (also referred to as Crossrail Limited) as a subsidiary of TfL and responsible for delivering Crossrail 1. In delivering the scheme, Crossrail Limited works with Network Rail which is responsible for undertaking work to improve existing surface infrastructure to meet the needs of the new Crossrail 1 service. The actors thus identified as constituting the strategic partnership implementing Crossrail 1 include the DfT, TfL, Network Rail and businesses which stand to benefit from the railway.

Why Crossrail 1?

The strategic need for Crossrail 1 has become clearer over time as forecasts of population and employment growth in London have increased. Thus, both the DfT and TfL’s decision to invest in Crossrail 1 is based on forecast growth to the population in London and the South East, and continued increase in the demand for public transport. On the benefit of the scheme, the DfT forecasts that Crossrail 1 will bring £1.97 of transport benefits for every £1 of cost (National Audit Office, 2014). A Strategic Rail Authority review in 2000 found that new rail links were needed to relieve congestion on east–west routes across London. Furthermore, the government’s initial business case for Crossrail, in 2003, found that the line would reduce crowding by more than 25 per cent on a number of London Underground lines. The benefit–cost ratio in the latest update of the business case, in 2011, is 1.97. This is within the DfT’s definition of ‘medium’ value for money, a range of 1.5 to 2.

Furthermore, it became imperative to implement Crossrail 1 in order to address capacity issues linked to the inability of the Underground to cope with demands on the network, congestion problems on the network and the need to enable regeneration in areas such as the south Thames Gateway area, Woolwich and the Royal Docks.

In funding Crossrail 1, the sponsors (DfT and TfL) came up with a £14.8 billion funding package which is to be met as shown in Table 2 below. In developing a funding plan for the scheme, it was established by the expert team of officials from different central government departments and rail organisations who reviewed the Crossrail 1 Business Case that “It simply wasn’t practical for the Crossrail 1 project to be wholly financed by either the
public sector or the private sector”8. The team argued that the funding plan for Crossrail 1 must be met by key stakeholders including central government and GLA, and businesses who would mainly benefit from the scheme.

**Table 2: Allocated funding for Crossrail 1 by DfT and TfL**

Adapted from ‘Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General’, Department for Transport: Crossrail; National Audit Office (2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body</th>
<th>Amount to be contributed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department for Transport (DfT)</td>
<td>£4.8 billion (Setting aside an additional £5.2 billion in case it failed to secure private sector fund)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport for London (TfL)</td>
<td>£4.7 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contributions from businesses and other bodies (Donations)</td>
<td>£5.3 billion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In funding Crossrail 1 as shown in Table 2, it is clear that the scheme would be funded by government, TfL and businesses. Before this funding deal was accepted for the scheme, Crossrail Ltd submitted its Business Case to the DfT on 11th of July 2003. On the 14th of July 2003, Alistair Darling, secretary of state for transport, made a statement to Parliament commenting on the Crossrail 1 Business Case. In his statement, he confirmed that the government sees merit in the arguments for Crossrail 1 in addressing the increase in East-West capacity to support London's continued growth and success. While the funding looks simple in principle, it is complex in practice. For instance, while the DfT contribution is met by central government, TfL’s contribution is coordinated by the Mayor of London who devises means of raising the required contribution. For instance, the Mayor empowered London Boroughs to raise part of TfL’s contribution through the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL). Furthermore, the Mayor has deployed saving strategies in order to raise additional revenues to fund Crossrail 1 and other projects.

The analysis of the Crossrail 1 partnership shows that there was collaboration between the DfT, TfL and central government especially during the initial phase of planning the scheme as these actors jointly worked together in developing the proposal (business case) to

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8 Available at http://www.crossrail.co.uk/route/crossrail-from-its-early-beginnings#
address capacity issues linked to the sustenance of mass transportation in London. Furthermore, additional collaboration was evidenced between the partners delivering Crossrail 1 and another partnership (Thames Gateway Area Partnership) which is constituted by some of the boroughs affected by the scheme, whose areas would undergo regeneration as a result of implementing Crossrail 1. However, going by the working definition of collaboration in this study as shared task between two or more people in order to achieve collective goals and interests which none of the parties can achieve alone, it is argued that the process of implementing Crossrail 1 is also driven by contractual terms and the directives from central government who is the major funder of the scheme. Nevertheless, ongoing construction works shows that the scheme is working in terms of the infrastructures built to address congestion on the Underground and the different actors engaged in order to attain the policy goal of the scheme.

To conclude the discussion of Crossrail 1 partnership, the researcher observed from the study that the partnership employed in delivering the scheme has been able not just to raise the capital needed to fund the project but also to work with stakeholders affected by the scheme through regeneration projects. Aside from the benefit linked to cost saving and funding, the partnership delivering Crossrail 1 has also been able to reach out to different actors including those that do not constitute the Crossrail 1 partnership such as local businesses and ordinary Londoners in the proximity of the perimeter of the Crossrail 1 project. By engaging with these different groups, the partnership delivering Crossrail 1 has been able to accommodate the diverse needs of other stakeholders into the project cycle of the scheme so that they can also benefit from the operation of the project. For instance, Crossrail (2002: 2) established that they sought the views of key stakeholders including local residents and local authorities on the short-list of route corridors they identified and the kind of services that should run through Crossrail 1.

### 4.5.2 Barclays cycle scheme partnership

In the case of the partnership employed for the delivery of the Barclays Cycle scheme which is small in scope as compared with Crossrail 1 partnership, the partnership is constituted by Barclays bank, TfL and London boroughs. While it is clear cycling is not a mass transport mode, the scheme was implemented in order to encourage Londoners to use cycles as another means of moving around in London in order to reduce the demand on the
Underground. Arguably, while this partnership has been able to attain its purpose as some Londoners now use the Barclays cycles to move around London thereby making cycling account for the 3rd largest road based mode in London (TfL, 2013), nonetheless, there are several questions relating to the success and effectiveness of the scheme due to the unfortunate deaths of a number of cyclists in London, doubt over the bidding process (if there was any) which awarded Barclays bank the deal, and the unwillingness of Barclays bank to renew its contract as funder.

Why Barclay’s cycle scheme?

Johnson (2010: 187) states that encouraging more people to cycle is a key Mayoral priority, especially for the purpose of achieving a 5% modal share for cycling (currently 2%) by 2026. Furthermore, the Mayor argues that the high demand for limited road space makes it imperative to employ cycling as another alternative transport mode.

What is Barclay’s cycle scheme?

The Barclay’s cycle scheme is one of the forms of London’s public transport covering 65km and stretching from Shepherd’s Bush in the west of the capital, through central London and east to the fringes of the Olympic Park. There are about 8,000 bikes accessible from 570 docking stations, thereby making cycling the first choice for tens of thousands of short journeys made in central London every day (available at https://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/transport/cycling-revolution/a-cycle-hire-scheme-for-london). The scheme was launched on 30th of July 2010 to registered users and payment for its use is through a Visa or MasterCard credit/debit card or Visa Electron. In implementing the Barclay’s cycle scheme, actors including the Mayor, TfL, Barclays bank and London boroughs who play key roles through the process whereby they embed the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) in their Local Implementation Plans (LIP) are responsible for delivering the scheme. The fees charged for the usage of the cycles are £2 for 24 hours, £10 for 7 days and £90 a year.

In funding the scheme, TfL claims to have advertised for a sponsor in March 2009 and suggested that energy company EDF and phone giants Nokia submitted bids which were not accepted. However, evidence from BBC⁹ suggests that the Mayor (Boris Johnson) approached

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⁹ Additional information available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-14326295
Barclay’s bank chairman – Marcus Agius, offering him “an exciting opportunity – Barclay’s bikes”. Furthermore, BBC comments that during the process the Mayor was negotiating with Barclay’s bank, he assured the bank that no rival bank would be able to sponsor any future Mayoral cycling initiatives, and that Barclays could have access to the personal data of those registering to use the bikes. While the details of the sponsorship package for Barclay’s cycle scheme is not made available by TfL, who claim that to do so would adversely affect TfL’s bargaining power when negotiating other sponsorship deals, the evidence provided by Hoscik (2012) on the sponsorship package is indicated in Table 3 below.

**Table 3: Facts on Barclay’s cycle scheme funding**

Adapted from Hoscik (2012)\(^{10}\) and Donovan (2011)\(^{11}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cost of setting up and running the bike scheme till 2016</td>
<td>230 to 240 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cost Barclays bank is to pay under the 5 year sponsorship deal</td>
<td>50 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The cost London borough’s pay to get an expansion of the Barclay’s cycle scheme to their borough</td>
<td>2 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible cost of the scheme to be met by tax payers by 2015/16</td>
<td>225 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table shows that the Barclays cycle scheme is mainly funded by tax payers and does not arguably reflect the perception that the majority of the public hold of the scheme in terms of it been fully funded by Barclays bank. Furthermore, unlike the detailed process and Terms of Reference (TOR) employed for the partnership which delivered Crossrail 1, evidence from the

\(^{10}\) Additional information is available at http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/exclusive-tfl-reveals-how-much-barclays-has-paid-for-cycle-hire-scheme/

\(^{11}\) Additional information is available at http://www.mayorwatch.co.uk/exclusive-tfl-reveals-how-much-barclays-has-paid-for-cycle-hire-scheme/
study shows that the policy process which led to the creation of the partnership delivering the Barclays cycle scheme is not as transparent and detailed as that which is delivering Crossrail 1. The questioning of the degree to which the process is transparent is related to the lack of relevant information relating to the funding and contributions of the actors delivering the scheme. In commenting on the transparency of the bidding process for the Barclays cycle scheme, John Biggs (Labour London Assembly member) suggests that “We need to understand how the bidding took place, how transparent it was, whether there were deals on the side to encourage them and whether we as taxpayers got proper value out of that”\textsuperscript{12}.

The analysis of the Barclays Cycle scheme presents two types of findings relating to the occurrence of partnership among the actors constituting the partnership. First, the evidence discussed relating to how Barclays bank emerged as the funder of the Barclays Cycle scheme point to the possibility of some act of collusion between the Mayor and the chairman (Marcus Agius) of Barclays bank. The meagre contribution of Barclays bank to the scheme further raises question on the extent to which the acceptance of Barclays bank as the sponsor of the scheme represent value for money considering the amount of publicity the bank gets on the cycles. On the other hand, since the cycle scheme constitutes an element of the Mayor’s transport strategy and also embedded in the London Plan, it is compulsory for London boroughs to implement the Cycling scheme in their Local Implementation Plans which is authorised by TfL. This therefore demonstrate the use of imperative coordination alongside some degree of collaboration observed between the Mayor and Barclays bank (in establishing a funding and contractual plan) and between the Mayor and TfL (in establishing an implementation plan) who both work towards ensuring boroughs implement the cycle scheme. The study thus shows that the Barclays cycle scheme is complex both in principle and in its implementation. Nevertheless, the scheme has arguably reduced the numbers of people who would have used the Underground for short journeys although this has come with a problem manifesting in the increasing death of cyclists.

4.5.3 Metronet partnership

The discussion of the Metronet partnership described by the House of Commons Transport Committee (2008) as ‘pathetic under-delivery’ due to its inability to achieve its aim (to modernise the London Underground) and the amount of tax payers money lost is

\textsuperscript{12} The details of the views of John Biggs is available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-14326295
significant as it highlight how and why a partnership which could have been employed to sustain mass transportation might fail. In establishing the Metronet partnership, the DfT, Treasury and London Regional Transport (which owned London Underground until July 2003 when it was transferred to Transport for London (TfL)) had responsibility for the strategy and design of the Metronet PPP arrangements. London Underground negotiated and managed the contracts. DfT retained a crucial role after the PPP contracts were put in place as it gave assurances to Metronet’s lenders that it would not stand by and do nothing should London Underground be unable to meet its financial obligations and provided an annual grant of around £1 billion for the modernisation (National Audit Office, 2009: 5).

In modernising the London Underground network, central government announced in 1998 that PPP agreements would be employed. London Underground Limited (acting on behalf of central government) entered into three separate PPP agreements between December 2002 and April 2003: first with Tube Lines for the maintenance and renewal of the Jubilee, Piccadilly and Northern Lines; second with Metronet Rail BCV for the maintenance and renewal of the Bakerloo, Central, Victoria and Waterloo & City Lines; and third with Metronet Rail SSL, which was responsible for the maintenance and renewal of the ‘sub-surface lines’: the Circle, District, Hammersmith & City, Metropolitan and East London Lines (House of Commons Transport Committee, 2008: 3).

Under the PPP Agreements, which were for 30 years, these private sector infrastructure companies would maintain, renew and upgrade discrete parts of London Underground’s infrastructure. The PPP Agreements set out a performance-related incentive and penalty scheme to remunerate the bodies for the improvements they make to the network. The bodies were given a large degree of flexibility in how they choose to deliver improvements but London Underground also specified a number of achievements that must be met by given target dates, such as for station refurbishments, replacement of train fleets and track replacement. Furthermore, the agreements allowed for an extraordinary review by the PPP arbiter where an implementing partner considers that it is incurring additional costs above the level allowed for in its bid (Ibid). This effectively allows Metronet (partnership consortium) to claim additional remuneration from London Underground where their costs exceed the level that was originally anticipated. The bodies (shareholders) constituting the Metronet partnership include Bombardier, WS Atkins, EDF Energy, Thames Water and Balfour Beatty.
Issues:

In his evidence to the members of the House of Commons Transport Committee, Mr Graham Pimlott, former Chairman, Metronet, gave evidence on the problem faced by Metronet by saying “It ran out of cash and the reason it ran out of cash was that it had spent too much money and the banks were no longer prepared to advance it any more money, and if one were to pick one area which had caused the most difficulty it was the stations project”. Furthermore, Mr Pimlott presented the view that the specification of the Metronet contract was not clear enough and that also enabled the problems Metronet confronted.

The House of Commons Transport Committee (2008: 34) however suggests that Metronet’s inability to operate efficiently or economically proves that the private sector can fail to deliver on a spectacular scale.

By the second year of implementing the goals of Metronet PPP, National Audit Office (2009: 43-44) states that departmental notes suggest that all the bodies that constitute the partnership were ‘slightly behind on stations’ and it is not clear that Metronet can catch up. Furthermore, it was established that by the end of the second year of its operation, Metronet did not complete any of the eight stations it was due to revamp. Hence, the National Audit Office (2009) reports that the Financial Times (FT) suggest that the Mayor will declare PPPs unworkable if Metronet is not back on schedule by year end (2005). Once in its third year, it was clear that Metronet overspending was running into tens of millions of pounds thereby prompting London Underground to commission PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to undertake an audit of Metronet. In addition, London Underground made it known to the public that Metronet cannot catch up the delay on its stations programme as it was only able to deliver eleven out of thirty-five stations. By its fifth year of implementing the Underground upgrade, the National Audit Office (2009: 46-47) note that Metronet was seeking guidance on good industry practice while its credit rating was downgraded by S&P from BB+ to CCC. Later in the year (2007), DfT established a steering committee to decide on a permanent solution for the Tube modernisation while also obtaining EU state aid clearance to rescue loans. Metronet later went into administration after lenders refused further loan drawdown thereby prompting TfL to announce its formal bid to take control of the partnership body.

It was observed that the Metronet partnership was a creation by central government bodies, of a group of actors (constituent partners) not representative of the system whose problems they were meant to address. The analysis of the Metronet partnership identifies
various issues which arguably led to its failure. First, from the inception of the partnership, there was no acknowledged leadership structure unlike the other two partnerships discussed. The absence of leadership was identified by the National Audit Office (2009: 6) as one of the causes of the failure of the Metronet partnership. Furthermore, the researcher observed an imbalance in the make-up of the Metronet partnership as it failed to include the representatives of key stakeholders such as users, operators, train drivers and TfL, who will be affected by the upgrade programme. More importantly, as regards the actors constituting the Metronet partnership, the researcher observed that the same bodies (Bombardier, WS Atkins, EDF, Thameswater and Balfour Beatty) constituting the partnership were the main suppliers to the Underground upgrade scheme. This situation could further conflict of interest as constituent bodies might likely seek to maximise the gains and profits of their individual organisations with their influence in the partnership. Also, by allowing bodies constituting the partnership to supply rolling stocks and other materials, the possibility of getting competition for the pricing of goods and supply is reduced as partners would use their access to information within Metronet in winning bids.

The National Audit Office (2009: 6-7) identified other reasons which led to the failure of Metronet to include poor quality information available to management, particularly on the unit costs of the station and track programmes; DfT reliance on public sector monitoring by London Underground, TfL and thearbiter, and private sector monitoring of the contracts by Metronet’s shareholders, who all proved to be unreliable; London Underground lack of information to take a ‘partnering approach’ with confidence and its inability to drive improved performance when necessary. The National Audit Office (2009) report concludes that at the heart of Metronet’s fate lie problems of internal governance. Hence, its recommendations focus on improvements in governance, co-ordination, and assurance on costs as DfT and its partners seek a lasting solution to the problems of the Metronet PPP contracts.

4.6 Conclusion on partnerships in London

From the discussion of partnerships in London, it is clear that it does exist within actors in London and across actors at the central government and GLA levels. Nevertheless, it was noted that while some of these partnerships employ mandatory arrangements, others rely on both contracts and joint-working among actors for the purpose of services delivery. For
instance, it was noted that TfL works with boroughs by giving them local transport grant and maintenance grants which are then used in strengthening and supporting transport capacities in London (Johnson: 45). In another instance, imperative coordination was observed in London as the Mayor through the use of his statutory powers makes it essential for London boroughs to implement transport schemes such as cycle highways, embedded in their Local Implementation Plans which is approved by TfL.

It is thus clear from the study that funding, especially from government (central government and GLA), plays a key role in the partnerships identified for instance, Crossrail 1 and Metronet partnerships. More importantly, the study of partnerships in London demonstrate the significant powers of both central government and the GLA in instigating and sustaining partnerships as evidenced with the three forms of partnerships discussed. Furthermore, the study shows two forms of ‘partnership’ in the case of London. The first is that in which government (GLA and central government) selected the actors constituting the partnership in order to achieve certain government aims, such as improving transport infrastructures in London, for example Crossrail 1. The second form of partnership is centred around voluntary participation, with the only example clearly identified in the study being that of the Barclays cycle scheme. Nonetheless, the study also show that the Mayor, perhaps played a role in choosing partners in the Barclays cycle scheme thereby questioning the degree to which participation in the partnership is voluntary. In addition, it can be argued that the actors involved benefited from the collaboration. For instance, government gained from the Crossrail 1 partnership because it led to the development of infrastructures which sustain mass transportation in London; and Barclays bank got recognition for its partial funding of the Barclays cycle scheme, while the GLA also gained as the partnership relieved aspects of overcrowding on the transport network.

In discussing the incidence of partnership in London, the study also reveals that in some cases as illustrated with the Metronet partnership, the reasons for creating a partnership might not be fully attained while the partnership may become a liability to its creator, in this instance, central government. Similarly, the House of Commons Transport Committee (2008: 34) suggests that it is difficult to lend any credibility to the claim that the Metronet PPP contracts were effective in transferring risk from the public to the private sector as the reverse was the case: Metronet’s shareholders (partners) stood to make some returns. However, when they failed, it is the taxpayer and the tube passengers who must meet the cost. Thus,
partnerships as existing in London are influenced by various factors including political ideology, leadership stance, attitude of partners and ultimately government policies.

4.7 The key projects delivered and ongoing

In addressing the mass transport problems in London which arguably has to do mainly with inadequate capacities, the Mayor through TfL has identified some projects as key deliverables. These projects are set in the TfL Business Plan for the period 2010-11 and 2012-13, and they include London Underground upgrade, London overground upgrade, Docklands Light Railway (DLR), Crossrail 1, Surface Transport Highways and Roads, London Buses, and Fare Ticketing. These schemes are discussed below while also stating the mass transport problems they address.

4.7.1 London Underground

The Mayor of London suggest that the funding of upgrade works across the modes of mass transportation in London is germane to modernising and enhancing the operation of the tube in order to ensure present and emergent service levels and demands are met (Johnson, 2010b: 22). London Underground carries as many passengers as the entire National Rail network, with up to 4 million journeys made each day, on 11 lines serving 270 stations (Mayor of London, 2010d: 131). After decades of under-investment, the tube is now undergoing major transformation programme comprising asset renewal, rebuilding and refurbishment. Also, there are upgrades on some lines, including the Jubilee line whose capacity was boosted by 17% in 2006 through the addition of a seventh carriage to all its trains and completed in 2010. In addition, the Victoria line upgrade was completed by 2012 and some of the features of its improvement include the introduction of a new fleet of faster trains, and with modern technological gadgets such as CCTV in every carriage. In 2012, there was also the purchase of a new control centre and digital signalling system installed on the Northern line, which is the most complex line in the London Underground network, to further help trains to operate at higher speeds thereby reducing journey times by 18% while also increasing capacity by 20%.

Since 2003, more than 124 stations have been refurbished. TfL will also build on the foundation of the 58 step-free stations already in place while further improving street to
platform accessibility in order to reduce congestions. Further projects relating to the strengthening of station capacities include the step-free access projects at Blackfriars and Farringdon – and important interfaces with Crossrail 1 which will be completed by 2018 (Johnson, 2010b: 22-23).

4.7.2 London overground

The majority of the upgrades carried out across the London overground network were aimed at increasing the capacity, quality and reliability of the overground rail network in London, in time for the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. A new connection from Surrey Quays to Clapham junction with the use of the South London lines was implemented to complete the overground’s orbital route by 2012.

There was also the introduction of additional carriages on North London railway to lengthen the train thereby increasing the North London railway’s capacity by 50%. The East London line extension was also connected to the North London railway via new track in the Dalston area. The East London line services are now operating as far as Highbury and Islington thereby providing users with more services. London overground has also benefitted from 65 new train since June 2010 when the East London line opened thereby providing additional trains to reduce the incidence of overcrowding during peak period.

4.7.3 Docklands Light Railway (DLR)

In enhancing mobility in London and regeneration in the Thames Gateway, the operations of the DLR (which was established in 1987) have been of immense help. The key improvements to the DLR include a network extension to Stratford International and the upgrading of its carriages by 55 new ones to allow for three-car operation, thereby leading to a 50% increase in the capacity of the trains since June 2010. Furthermore, in order to enable regeneration in areas including south of Lewisham, west of Bank and north of Stratford International, the Mayor is working with TfL and other stakeholders to provide additional capacity for the new areas under consideration (Mayor of London, 2010d: 130).
4.7.4 Crossrail 1

Having discussed the partnership which is delivering Crossrail 1 earlier in this chapter, the aim of the scheme is emphasised here. Crossrail 1 was implemented to contribute to the upgrading of London mass transport system while also providing the Eastern and Western outer suburbs of London with fast and high-capacity links to central London, Heathrow airport and the Docklands. Thus, upon completion, Crossrail 1 will increase the capacity of London rail by 10% while easing congestion by 45% on the rail and tube lines. This can be translated to the movement of about 1.5 million more people to the heart of London. Construction began at key locations such as Canary Wharf and Tottenham Court Road in 2010 and the scheme is delivered by a partnership.

4.7.5 Surface transport highways

In order to improve the highway and road traffic in London, TfL invested in a programme which increased traffic signals using the ‘intelligent’ SCOOT (Split Cycle Offset Optimisation Technique) system. Furthermore, TfL has improved existing road tunnels by embarking on a programme of safety improvements which included the installation of mechanisms that detects fire incidence, vehicle overweight, new lighting, and advanced communication and ventilation systems. Furthermore, TfL is planning to complete various safety and environmental improvements on the A406 at Bounds Green and a junction improvement scheme at Henley’s Corner in order to ensure highway infrastructures support the needs of not only transport users but all road users.

4.7.6 London buses

The Mayor has planned progressive upgrading to the bus fleet of TfL in order to improve passengers comfort and safety especially through an improvement in the design of seats, air-cooling systems, CCTV and the creation of more space in the bus through an outward-opening door mechanism. Furthermore, a new iconic bus called the New Bus for London has been developed and now in operation in order to replace the bendy-buses which are being withdrawn from operations (Johnson, 2010b: 22-26). The new London buses are
equipped with high standards of accessibility, safety and emissions abatement. It is also claimed by the Mayor that the buses are more fuel efficient and better ventilated.

4.7.7 Barclays cycle scheme

Although each of the bicycles used on the Barclays scheme is not capable of transporting two or more people thereby not making it a mass transport mode, however, due to the numbers of journeys made by the scheme, it can be argued that Barclays cycles have helped in reducing the demand on the Underground network and other modes. For instance, the Barclays cycle hire quarterly performance statistics (November 2013 to January 2014: 3) shows that there was an average of 995 hires and docks per week day. This shows that the scheme helps in reducing the capacity problems on other modes in particular the Underground and buses. Nevertheless, as discussed in section 4.5.2, it is clear that the scheme does not offer tax payers good value for money due to its cost. The Barclays cycle report also shows that the scheme is not financially sustainable as shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4: Barclays cycle hire cost/revenue statistics

Adapted from Barclays cycle hire quarterly performance statistics (November 2013 to January 2014: 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>£m</th>
<th>2010/11</th>
<th>2011/12</th>
<th>2012/13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cycle Income</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsorship Income</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Costs</td>
<td>(13.3)</td>
<td>(21.0)</td>
<td>(24.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net Operating Costs</td>
<td>(7.1)</td>
<td>(9.3)</td>
<td>(11.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.8 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has attempted to trace the emergence of government institutions in London especially those whose roles have an effect on mass transport capacities. The transformation of government institutions for instance, the MBW to LCC, later to GLC, and thereafter to GLA shows the changes that have occurred in the governance structure of London. In engineering these changes, it was noted that central government played key roles relating to funding and coordination through the enacting of rules which shaped the working of the system and the limit of the powers of London government including that of the Mayor. Arguably, fragmentation occasioned by central government policies and legislations was identified as the primary cause of the series of reforms and changes London government has witnessed, and which impinge on the delivery of public services, thereby making it to depend on central government for the funding of development projects especially mass transport.

Throughout its existence, London governments have been influenced by central government in different capacities. While the formation of the Mayoral system and Assembly in 2000 reintroduced a city-wide authority after fourteen years of abolishing the GLC which was a city wide authority, evidence from the study shows that the GLA like its predecessors is still influenced and controlled by central government who funds majority of its schemes. Although the GLA was established as an independent institution, however, it is restricted in its operational capacity by the central government for example, through the 1999 GLA Act which stipulates the powers of the GLA. Nevertheless, the GLA has been able to enable and sustain the delivery of goods and services to Londoners using a combination of partnerships and strategies as observed in the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy in addressing current and emergent challenges confronting the system in London.

The discussion of partnerships in the chapter also illustrates its relevance in delivering public goods and services through schemes like Crossrail 1. While the incidence of partnerships in London recurred more from the late 1990s due to the ideology of central government as discussed in Chapter 3, the GLA has subsequently employed partnerships in delivering its policy priorities embedded in the London Plan and Mayors Transport Strategy. The study of the case in London has thus shown that partnerships including its modification and other mandatory ways of working have been employed by the Mayor in ensuring capacities are deployed to sustain mass transport modes in London.
Chapter Five:
Discussion of themes and findings in the case of London

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss findings concerning the governance of mass transportation in London. The discussion begins with an explanation of the government and governance structure in London and how they relate to actors, in particular to the organisations concerned with mass transportation governance. Thereafter, the goals of a number of organisations are considered (the selection criteria are discussed in the methodology chapter). In addition, the key themes that emerge are examined in order to establish their significance to the study. Drawing on the findings from London, some of the weaknesses of the collaborative governance model presented by Ansell and Gash (2008) are then presented.

As noted in Chapter 2, information was gathered from a number of actors: Rob Fox (London First); Jonathan Hollis (London Assembly); Rhodri Ball (Transport for London - TfL); Richard Tracey (London Assembly); an individual from London Underground, who wished to remain anonymous; Andrew Phipps (City of London Corporation); and Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch). All of these individuals provided primary evidence on how their organisations contribute to advancing the system in London. This evidence was further corroborated using secondary data, such as reports of the Transport Committee of the London Assembly and publications by London First and the GLA. As noted in the discussion of methodology in Chapter 2, it was not possible to collect primary data from other actors, such as the Mayor of London (Boris Johnson), bus operators, the National Union of Rail and Maritime Transport (RMT) Workers and London boroughs. Nevertheless, some of the data that might have been provided directly by such actors was collected from secondary sources, such as the London Plan, TfL’s 2011/12 Annual report, the 2012/13 Mayor’s final consolidated budget and the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (2010).

13 A discussion of the system (Unit of Analysis) including the actors that constitute it is available in Chapter 2 (Research methodology).
5.2 Overview of the governance structure of mass transportation in London

As discussed in Chapter 4, London government is directed by the Greater London Authority (GLA), which is made up of the office of the Mayor, Boris Johnson (Conservative), his deputy, Roger Evans (Conservative member of the London Assembly) who represents the Mayor at local and London-wide events. In addition, there are seven Deputy Mayors\(^\text{14}\) appointed by the Mayor including Isabel Dedring – Deputy Mayor for Transport, who oversees the relationship between the GLA and TfL to ensure the delivery of the Mayor’s priorities. Furthermore, the Deputy Mayor for Transport acting on behalf of the Mayor or with the Mayor undertakes negotiations with central government departments concerning transport issues, and to influence this to ensure no detriment to London or the Mayoral priorities. The Deputy Mayor for Transport while relying on TfL’s reports and studies commissioned by the Transport Committee of the GLA also monitors the provision of transport services, implement and make recommendations for appropriate changes required in the interests of effective management as ordered by the Mayor (http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/mayor/mayoral-team/isabel-dedring).

Aside from the Deputy Mayors, the London Assembly of the GLA, chaired by Jennette Arnold OBE (Labour Party), which has several committees, including the Transport Committee, plays a scrutiny role. The Assembly looks after London’s interests in two key ways: first, by questioning the Mayor and his team at Assembly meetings on their major activities, which include making strategic plans and decisions affecting key policy areas including policing, transport, planning and the economy; second, working through its committees, such as the Transport Committee, it conducts investigations linked to the Mayor’s decisions and policies (London.gov.uk). In identifying and implementing various policies linked with the four key policy areas identified above, the Mayor of London collaborates both with governmental actors, including central government and London boroughs, and non-governmental actors, such as London First, through a variety of mechanisms including co-funding, policy planning and implementation, and resource sharing.

The advent of an elected Mayor and Assembly in 2000, as discussed in Chapter 4, incorporated a number of checks and balances so that the Assembly members can hold the

\(^{14}\) For a list of the Deputy Mayors, see http://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/mayor/mayoral-team
Mayor to account on relevant policy issues. While the Mayor and his deputies take decisions regarding policies and plans relating to Transport for London (TfL), the Metropolitan Police Authority, London Fire and Emergency Planning Authority (LFEPA), and London Development Agency, the Assembly can overturn his decisions with a two-thirds majority vote (Wilson and Game, 2006: 76), although this has not happened so far.

In Chapter 4, the relationship between the GLA and central government was discussed. It was emphasised that the latter plays a vital role in the governance system of London. For example, Travers shows that central government provides about 70 to 80 per cent of the money spent by the GLA and London boroughs (2004: 142). In addition, the relationship between central government and London government has been shaped by several factors including political, economical, cultural, demographic and infrastructural influences. After an analysis of the relations between the two actors, it was clear that both collaboration and contracts were employed by both actors in delivering infrastructural projects, such as the construction of Crossrail 1\textsuperscript{15} discussed in Chapter 4. It was clear that the GLA and central government, fund most of the cost associated with the delivery of major public infrastructures such as the London Underground upgrade and Crossrail 1, with the rest being funded by some private and third sector organisations.

Within the governance system in London is embedded the mass transport governance system, referred to earlier in the thesis as the system. Given the diversity of organisations and interests involved, this system essentially functions through a wide variety of different mechanisms, including the use of partnership working, contracts, and networks of relations among bodies such as the London Assembly (including its elements for example, the Transport Committee), TfL, London boroughs, and London Travel Watch. This shows the existence of governance as defined by Kooiman (2003) in London. It was clear to the researcher that, in general, these organisations collaborate with one another where they find it advantageous to do so but not otherwise. For instance, London First and the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry collaborate on how to advance London’s competitiveness and transport infrastructures by using business briefings with key figures in City Hall, Westminster, Whitehall, the ‘Square mile’ and London boroughs to influence mass transportation policy making and implementation. Also, actors are sometimes required to

\textsuperscript{15} See section 4.5.1 titled Crossrail 1 partnership for the discussion of the Crossrail 1 scheme.
collaborate as a result of particular government policies which favour partnership, such as the emphasis placed on partnership in the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) where the Mayor comments that partnership shall be employed in delivering the mayoral priorities.

From the discussion above, it is clear that to understand the governance process in London, it is essential to identify and study actors operating at the local (London) and national (central government) levels of governance, and how such actors engage with one another in the governance process. Furthermore, it is apparent that in delivering public goods and services, the position and office of the Mayor of London bestow certain powers and leadership roles, such as strategic capacity, which enable the Mayor to consult and delegate necessary functions to individuals and organisations in or outside of the system. For emphasis, some of the Mayor’s powers include: the power to levy three transport-related charges (a congestion charge, emissions charge, and workplace parking levy); the power to raise funds through the Business Rate Supplement and Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) which is being employed for funding Crossrail 1; and the power to direct boroughs to change their local plans to ensure conformity with the London Plan (Sandford, 2013). The Mayor also has the power to appoint members to the boards of the functional bodies in London and to set their budgets and strategy. In practice, he has full authority over them in terms of appointing and dismissing board members; however, in some respects his powers are also restricted because the majority of funding for the boards comes directly from the Treasury, and cannot be moved to another budget area (Ibid).

Bache and Flinders (2004: 97-98) interpret ‘governance’ as an increase in the roles of non-governmental actors in public policy making and delivery through an increasingly complex state-society relationship in which networks are prominent, while the state’s primary roles include funding and policy coordination. This is evidenced in the way in which the mass transport system works in London, as the GLA and other elements of the state coordinate actors and fund initiatives in the system. Also, in situating the new role of government as the coordinator of the system, evidence from the London Plan, developed by the Mayor of London, the 32 London boroughs and the City of London Corporation and non-governmental actors such as London First and London Travel Watch, shows that the Mayor engages different actors for the purpose of delivering public services. For instance, quoting the Mayor:
“Delivery is not just for us in City Hall – boroughs and neighbourhoods (community based organisations and private sector bodies) have an increasingly important role, and I want to see this Plan used by them as a resource for localism, helping them develop and then implement local approaches to meet their needs” (London Plan, 2011: 6).

Thus, through the implementation of the London Plan, as discussed later in the chapter, the various roles16 played by the Mayor were made clear.

5.3 The goals of relevant actors and conflicts in the system

This section begins with a discussion and illustration of the actors that constitute the system in London. Thereafter, the goals of the actors and others (non systemic actors) who work with them are discussed. Next, the relationships between actors are considered in addition to the incidence of conflict as it occurs among organisations. Finally, Table 5 summarises the primary goals of the key actors in the system in London.

Figure 2 shows the different categories of actors in and out of the system in London and linkages between actors across the system. The importance of these was clear from the study; for instance, the analysis of the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS), showed that both placed significant emphasis on the use of partnership working among actors and stakeholders in delivering public services in London thereby confirming relations among actors in and out of the system. Furthermore, Figure 2 highlights that it is possible to identify different levels among the actors in the system. For instance, key actors including the Mayor and TfL occupy the main component of the system where they coordinate and communicate to actors in other level about the policy priorities of the Mayor. Thus, due to the leadership, funding and coordinating roles they play in the system, the Mayor and TfL constitute a level. It was also noted that secondary actors include bodies from different sectors such as London First, London boroughs, operators and London Travel Watch (mix of public, private and third sector bodies), thereby constituting another level in the system. These actors however relate with other secondary actors and actors in the main component and with bodies in (GLA) and outside (DfT) of the system. The secondary actors identified constitute another level due to

16 The identified roles played by the Mayor include as producer, funder, planner and as the champion of Londoners.
the implementation, funding and delivery roles they play. Another level of actors includes the Treasury and DfT who are outside of the system. These bodies play funding and coordinating roles for actors in the system for instance, it was shown in the discussion of the funding regime later in this chapter that central government through the Treasury and DfT is a major funder of the system including transport initiatives in London. For clarity, Figure 2 below shows systemic and non systemic actors in addition with the level of actors.

![Network diagram of actors inside and outside the system in London.](image)

**Figure 2: Network diagram of actors inside and outside the system in London.**

The actors identified by the researcher as constituting the main component of the system in London are TfL and the Mayor of London, as without them the system cannot function effectively as they play strategic roles and leadership roles. TfL’s expertise relating to mass transportation strategy, planning and implementation, including their role in enhancing capacity, and the four key roles (funder, regulator, champion of the masses and producer) of the Mayor, make these two actors central, for both the short term and long term
survival of the system. Other bodies, including the Transport Committee of the London Assembly, London First and London Travel Watch, play roles such as providing evidence, through studies they commission, that is relevant to the long term sustainability of the system. For instance, it was noted from the study that findings from the studies commissioned by London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee influence policy decisions and actions which address different challenges linked to mass transportation in London. Examples of such studies are cited later in the chapter.

Other actors who constitute secondary actors include the City of London Corporation, London boroughs and the RMT union. In addition, it was clear that the Treasury and DfT who constitute actors outside the system also play key roles through their funding of the projects implemented by systemic actors to sustain mass transport capacity as illustrated in the funding regime section later in the chapter. The Treasury and DfT are perceived by the researcher as non-systemic actors because they are not directly involved in the daily operation and planning of mass transportation in London.

5.4 The goals of the actors inside and outside the system

The goal of the Mayor of London (primary actor) is to make London the best place to work, live, study, invest and do business (https://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/mayor/vision-2020). In developing and implementing policies aimed at sustaining Londoners, the Mayor works with other actors, some of whom are discussed below (http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/4510.aspx). The researcher observed from the study that while it is clear the Mayor works with other actors in delivering mayoral policy priorities, nonetheless, the Mayor is able to influence the actors he works with through his powers. Hence, it was not always clear whether the Mayor is the champion of Londoners as he claims, as some of his policies for instance the introduction of driverless trains which was opposed by most actors, contradict his champion role.

The goal of the Transport Committee (secondary actor) of the London Assembly is to scrutinise actors in the system, especially on how they use resources to sustain the delivery of mass transportation. The researcher observed from the activities of the Transport Committee that the body employs questions and invitation to call for evidence in examining actors. Furthermore, the researcher also observed that the committee make recommendations to operators and other actors playing roles related to the delivery of mass transportation in
London on how they can address the challenges facing mass transportation. London First is another secondary actor in the system and its goal is to make London the best city in the world in which to do business (http://londonfirst.co.uk/about/mission/). In considering this goal, the study shows that London First contributed to the development of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) and to the implementation of schemes such as Crossrail 1 through donations in order to meet the expectations of its members who sustain the organisation through membership fees. The goal of the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry was seen to be similar to that of London First in some respects, as the organisation aims at promoting and defending the interests of its members while representing London business to the Mayor, GLA, national government, the opposition, international audiences and the media (http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/lcc_public/article.asp?aid=4073).

London Travel Watch is another secondary actor inside the system, and its goal is to press for better public transport London-wide with higher standards of quality, performance and accessibility through its scrutiny of the services provided by operators (http://www.londontravelwatch.org.uk/about/). It was observed from the study that, due to the broad roles of London Travel Watch and its work, which investigates a wider category of users and organisations, bodies including TfL and DfT invite the institution to present relevant evidence related to users, accessibility and the delivery of modes of mass transportation in London. It was also observed that London Travel Watch sometimes works with the Transport Committee by presenting evidence from the studies it commissions, for example, bus passengers’ priorities for improvements in London (2010), which relate to how mass transportation can be sustained in London.

Another organisation which constitutes a secondary actor and relates to the key components of the system is the Rail Maritime and Transport (RMT) Union, whose objective is to protect and better the pay and conditions of its members who are from almost every sector of the transport industry such as mainline and underground railways, shipping and buses (http://www.rmt.org.uk/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeId=89764). It was also clear from the study that the RMT Union protects the interest of its members as the body influences policy decisions which might have effects on the working conditions of its members. London boroughs and the City of London Corporation are also secondary actors, and they play implementation roles for some policies, for example the Barclays cycle scheme. While the City of London Corporation aims to sustain the competitiveness of the City by acting as the local authority for the ‘Square Mile’ business district around St Paul’s, and to provide
relevant services for London and the wider UK (http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-city/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx), London boroughs aim to develop and deliver a comprehensive and sustainable approach for public services delivery at the local level, while implementing the Mayor’s policies as set in the London Plan and Mayors Transport Strategy (http://www.london.gov.uk/priorities/business-economy/working-partnership/london-boroughs). In coordinating the activities of London boroughs with regards to mass transportation, TfL and the Mayor of London play key strategic and funding roles, as discussed later in this chapter.

In addition to the organisations discussed above, the DfT and Treasury (central government agencies) constitute important actors outside the system, whose goals include coordinating the overall transport system in England, and setting the policy framework which regulates the system in London. The primary aim of the DfT is to work with transport agencies in supporting the transport network that helps the UK’s businesses and gets people and goods travelling around the country.17 It was also clear from the study that the DfT and Treasury implement their goals by funding the system and setting the rules guiding the operation of the strategic transport authority (TfL).

In considering the strategic role of organisations as they relate to the system, Boris Johnson (2009: 7), in the London Plan18, emphasised that strategic planning in London is the shared responsibility of the Mayor and actors including London boroughs, TfL and organisations from the private and third sectors. However, while the researcher observed that the significant power held by the Mayor enables him to make, influence and implement any plan, it was also clear from the study, especially in relation to the process by which the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) was developed, that joint working was employed between certain organisations including London First, Transport Committee and London Travel Watch for the purpose of policy development and implementation. The study therefore shows that the Mayor of London employs partnerships as instruments to attain set objectives, including sustaining mass transport infrastructural developments and the delivery of public services

17 Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-transport/about

18 The London Plan is the overall strategic plan for London, setting out an integrated economic, environmental, transport and social framework for the development of London over the next 20-25 years. As regards transport, the plan links improvements to infrastructures while setting out proposals for implementation, coordination and resourcing; and helping to ensure joined-up policy delivery by the GLA Group of organisations including Transport for London (The London Plan, 2011: 10).
while dictating who gets what, when and how as seen in the Barclays Cycle scheme partnership.

TfL is a statutory body created by the Greater London Authority Act 1999, and is the key organisation tasked with the implementation of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy. The body works with actors such as London boroughs, the DfT and private sector funders such as Barclays bank in order to implement schemes, for example the Barclays cycle scheme and Crossrail 1, discussed in Chapter 4, all of which are directed at supporting the Mayor’s Transport Strategy. TfL and other organisations such as London Travel Watch and RMT union were observed to influence the DfT through the evidence they present which relate to the capacity of the network and the functioning of the licensing regime which award franchises to operators and organisations. Written evidence from TfL (RF 06 January 2013), and the Brown Review of the Rail Franchising Programme (January 2013), shows that while the licensing regime in the UK is coordinated mainly by the DfT, in 2007 the DfT devolved the power to award franchises for some limited national rail services to TfL, which is now known as London Overground and constitutes one of the transport modes in TfL. Furthermore, it was noted from the franchises awarded by TfL that the organisation is responsible for licensing bus operators, ferry operators and some train operators (London Overground, but not other mainline trains licensed by the DfT). By awarding the franchises, TfL is able to encourage some operators to facilitate the delivery of mass transportation to routes that are supposedly less profitable, through incentives such as its Quality Incentive Contract which aims to keep standards high by measuring the quality of service that passengers receive from operators, while rewarding some operators by developing training materials and qualifications for their operating staff.

During the consultation process which leads to the awarding of franchise(s), the key features of franchising, such as operating obligations, performance benchmarks, financial obligations and payments, are deliberated and approved by TfL. As is discussed later in the funding regime section, it was noted that TfL allocates grants to actors such as London boroughs and City of London Corporation to work together to implement schemes supporting

19 Additional information on the Quality Incentive Contract of TfL is available at http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/modesoftransport/1548.aspx
the Mayor’s Transport Strategy and the London Plan. This power to allocate grants is another example of TfL’s strategic powers.

The London Assembly, and in particular its Transport Committee, is empowered by the GLA Act 1999 to scrutinise the activities of actors, such as the Mayor and TfL, including its contractors and operators of mass transportation, especially on how the activities of those organisations advance mass transportation in London. It works with other organisations to gather evidence which is then used in making recommendations to appropriate organisations or in holding actors to account for their use of resources. For instance, after identifying challenges such as overcrowding on the network and a lack of information on alternative routes, the Transport Committee (2009a: 15-19) recommended that London Underground and Tube Lines should ensure improved train design to relieve overcrowding. It was observed from the study that London Underground implemented the recommendations of the Transport Committee through its Underground upgrade programme.

The Transport Committee also recommended that London Underground should pilot the provision of specific information at stations about crowding levels in order to address challenges linked to inadequate information on the network (Ibid: 21). During the study, the researcher observed that some of the recommendations of the Transport Committee, such as improved train design, were implemented on some lines on the Underground, while London Underground (2010: 12-13), in its report titled ‘Transport for London Investment Programme’, indicated that its milestones include the network installation Electronic Service Update Boards (ESUBs) which inform users on current services, and the ongoing work on the increasing of train capacities. Nevertheless, this does not mean that organisations implement all of the recommendations of committees in the London Assembly, as such recommendations are not legally binding and their non-enforcement is not penalized. Thus, the relationship between committees of the London Assembly and actors in the system is shaped by the scrutiny roles and recommendations of the Assembly in committees in relation to transport operators and other organisations whose operations have an effect on mass transportation in London. In addition, at present the Transport Committee cannot directly hold to account organisations such as the mainline train operators, for example Virgin Trains East Coast and
Cross Country, most of whom are instead accountable to the DfT and Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).^20^ During the study it was observed that London First, more than other non-governmental organisations, engages with central, regional and local government policies. For instance, it contributed to the making of the 2010 Mayor’s Transport Strategy for London in terms of the case it made for the funding of transport infrastructures such as Heathrow expansion and the Underground upgrade to avert the breakdown of the aged rail transport system in London. It also provides the DfT with data and reports from the studies it commissions, such as ‘Getting London to Work’ (2006), which explored the state of rail transport carriages in London. The evidence given by Rob Fox suggested that London First does not collaborate with organisations such as London Travel Watch because their goals compete due to the different policy programmes they support. The former focuses on addressing the needs of its business membership organisations while the latter focuses on a broader remit^21^ of mass transportation. Since London First aims at supporting its members by ensuring their employees have access to operational modes of mass transportation to convey them to and from their place of work, it mainly funds mass transport projects that positively affect the business of its members and the competitiveness of London. For instance, in contributing to the funding of Crossrail 1 and the DLR, London First mobilised the Canary Wharf group and other organisations into making donations (however, such contributions may be viewed as largely tokenistic when compared to the significant grants from central government). Thus, it is clear that in attaining its core goal, which is to provide competitive advantage for its members while also making London a destination for business, London First partners with government bodies and organisations it identifies to further its interests. On the contrary, the relationship of London Travel Watch with users and bodies in London is shaped by the degree to which users needs and demand for modes of mass transportation are met.

The City of London Corporation, as with all boroughs in London, supports the implementation of the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS) by integrating

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^20^ The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) regulates the UK rail industry’s health and safety performance. The body also hold Network Rail and High Speed 1 (HS1) to account while making sure that the rail industry is competitive and fair (Available at http://orr.gov.uk/about-orr/what-we-do).

^21^ London Travel Watch aims to meet the transport needs of a wide variety of actors including the membership organisations of London First and ordinary Londoners as well as visitors to the City.
relevant policies from the MTS and London Plan in their Local Implementation Plan. During this process, the Corporation engages with organisations such as the GLA, London boroughs, TfL and actors from the private sector, partly by contributing some funding to initiatives (such as £200 million in the case of Crossrail\textsuperscript{22}) to enhance the delivery of mass transportation to organisations located and operating in the ‘Square Mile’. While it is clear that the City of London Corporation relates mainly with actors which provide services that enhance the global status of the City, evidence from the study shows that the Mayor is able to influence the Corporation, as well as other London boroughs through the Mayor’s powers, as identified earlier in the chapter. For instance, the study shows that for boroughs and the Corporation to get GLA and TfL funding, they must implement programmes that support and further the attainment of Mayoral policy priorities as established in the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Policy.

Other organisations, such as the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) and the Rail and Maritime Transport (RMT) union, play roles in the system that are not as strategic as those played by the actors constituting the main component. For instance, the RMT union and other unions in the transport sector are fundamentally concerned with protecting and improving their members’ working conditions by seeking shorter working hours and higher remuneration from employers. This is likely to reduce the profits accruing to operators and other investors in the transport system in London. Hence, a lack of agreement between operators and workers on remuneration and conditions of work through relevant unions can sometimes lead to industrial action, which can have a negative effect on business activities in London. For instance, The Independent\textsuperscript{23} (January 11th 2013) reported that when train drivers went on strike on Boxing Day (26\textsuperscript{th} of December 2012) in a long-running dispute over bank holiday pay, Tube services were considerably disrupted. Nonetheless, officials of the ASLEF union played a key role in ensuring the suspension of the strike action in order to allow for talks of resolution. This incident suggests that union officials sometimes work with operators in addressing employee demands (in this instance, train drivers) in order to prevent strike actions in the system, especially when such actions affect union members.

\textsuperscript{22} The funding framework for crossrail is available at http://www.crossrail.co.uk/about-us/funding

\textsuperscript{23} Further details on the pay row between Tube workers and ASLEF the train drivers’ union are available at http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/pay-row-tube-strikes-called-off-8447514.html
The London Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) is closely involved with the development of enterprise and industries in London. The LCCI partners with both government and private sector organisations through projects, such as ‘Enterprise Zones’, one of which is situated at the Royal Docks, and aims to promote enterprise and innovation and the acquisition of skills for sustained employment in London in order to protect and enhance London’s competitiveness. It was noted by the researcher that mass transport modes such as the DLR and Underground form a key component of the enterprise zone at the Royal Docks. This therefore point to the relevance of mass transportation in the economy of London. Another initiative of the LCCI is ‘Changing the way we work’, which is a partnership between LCCI, central and GLA governments, focused on developing flexible working patterns to reduce the numbers of users of modes of mass transportation. This scheme is another example of how businesses, through the LCCI, work with government and TfL in sustaining mass transport delivery in London.

Drawing on the discussion in previous paragraphs relating to goals of actors, the primary goals of systemic and non systemic actors are stated in Table 5 below.

Drawing on the analysis of the goals of actors in the system, their distinctive goals are highlighted in Table 5 below.

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24 The enterprise zone is in the Royal Docks in London which was historically the throbbing artery of UK trade and commerce. Currently, the Mayor argues that it presents a huge opportunity to develop a world class international business district where jobs are created while also experiencing growth and the strengthening trade between east and west London by means of integrated transportation. The key assets located in the Royal Docks to facilitate economic growth and developments include DLR, Crossrail and London City Airport.
Table 5: The distinctive goals of the actors constituting the system in London and other external actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Stated primary goal</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport for London (TfL)</td>
<td>To do strategy and planning relating to the implementation of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy and manage transport services across the capital for which the Mayor has responsibility. These services include London’s buses, London Underground, DLR, London Overground, Tramlink, London River Services and Victoria Coach Station (<a href="http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/4510.aspx">http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/4510.aspx</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Travel Watch</td>
<td>To be recognised as an impartial body, whose views are taken seriously and either acted upon or, if not, reasons should be given as to why not in order to sustain better public transport, with higher standards of quality, performance and accessibility (<a href="http://www.londontravelwatch.org.uk/about/">http://www.londontravelwatch.org.uk/about/</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Assembly of the Greater London Authority (GLA)</td>
<td>To scrutinise the Mayor as well as other relevant actors playing roles related to key areas such as transport and economic development, and provide recommendations to support them (London Assembly, 2012). The Assembly including its committees holds regular discussions with the chairs and chief executives of organisations such as TfL and operators in order to press for improvements to services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of London Corporation</td>
<td>To support and promote 'The City' as the world leader in international finance and business services. The Corporation does this by providing local government and policing services for the financial and commercial heart of Britain, the 'Square Mile'. (<a href="http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-city/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx">http://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/about-the-city/what-we-do/Pages/default.aspx</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London First</td>
<td>To influence national and local government policies and investment decisions to support London’s global competitiveness and the business interests of its members (<a href="http://www.londonfirst.co.uk/about-us/">http://www.londonfirst.co.uk/about-us/</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rail Maritime and Transport (RMT) Union</td>
<td>To protect and improve the pay and conditions of its members. It negotiates with over 150 transport-sector companies to drive home its agenda for better pay, shorter hours and safer working conditions (<a href="http://www.rmt.org.uk/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeId=89764">http://www.rmt.org.uk/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeId=89764</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Chamber of Commerce and Industry</td>
<td>To be an independent, not-for-profit business support and networking organisation that puts the needs and interests of its members and stakeholders at the heart of everything it does (<a href="http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/lcc_public/article.asp?aid=3929">http://www.londonchamber.co.uk/lcc_public/article.asp?aid=3929</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London boroughs</td>
<td>To develop and implement policies within the overall policy framework of the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy (<a href="http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/aboutus/default.htm">http://www.londoncouncils.gov.uk/aboutus/default.htm</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department for Transport (DfT)</td>
<td>To set up a transport system that is an engine for economic growth, but one that is also greener and safer and improves the quality of life in our communities (<a href="http://www.dft.gov.uk/about">http://www.dft.gov.uk/about</a>).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.5 The incidence of conflict in the system

The mass transportation system in London as with most political systems experiences conflict and consensus. Dahl (1976: 59) comments that the members of a political system pursue conflicting aims, which are dealt with, among other means, by the government of the political system. In the system in London, the GLA especially the Mayor plays a role in dealing with potential issues by initiating policies. Three types of conflicts were identified in the system: conflict between organisations who have the same goal and compete to achieve that goal, conflict within organisations and conflict between the roles of the Mayor. The study however shows that the forms of conflicts were addressed by a combination of means including through government (GLA) policies as established in the London Plan, through set organisational rules and TORs, and lastly through the individual actions of some actors in the system. Of all the means identified for addressing the incidence of conflicts in the system in London, arguably, the use of government policies was seen as the most effective for reducing conflicts due to the broad remit and effects of such policies and government action. For instance, the Mayor made it clear in the Mayor’s Transport Strategy and London Plan that
schemes related to mass transport infrastructure shall be delivered with the use of partnerships.

It is clear that during the processes through which organisations implement their goals, conflicts are bound to occur. Furthermore, it was noted that additional conflicts originate from the make-up of the system in London. For instance, Haugaard (2002: 309) suggests that structures do not confer power equally across a system because large amounts of power are conferred on some actors and none upon others. This was argued to cause conflict by Haugaard. Considering the system in London, the view of Haugaard (2002) is sustained because it is clear that central government, through the DfT and Treasury, and the Mayor have majority of the powers in the system and allocate elements of such powers as they deem fit. By acting this way, there is conflict sometimes between some central government policies and the policy needs of communities. This was shown in Chapter 3 while discussing Newman et al. (2004: 216) whose comments show how a central government policy conflicted with the needs of a community as their demands were not reflected in central government policy targets.

The three forms of conflict observed within the system in London are, discussed below, considering how each conflict emerges and the consequences of this for the overall functioning of the system. In discussing conflict, Mao’s (1968) distinction between antagonistic (irreconcilable) and non-antagonistic (reconcilable) conflicts is employed. He (1968: 45-46) argued that while antagonistic conflicts are those between ourselves and the enemy, non-antagonistic conflicts are those among the people themselves.

Overall, non-antagonistic conflict appears more common than antagonistic conflict in the system. For instance, non-antagonistic conflict can be seen to exist between some organisations, such as London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee of the London Assembly. Conflict between these organisations came about due to competition over who should be mainly responsible for scrutinising operators and organisations against their service delivery benchmarks. For instance, while London Travel Watch claim they carry out better scrutiny of actors in the system because they are non-political and they employ quantitative methods through surveys and qualitative means through consultations for the purpose of

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25 Enemy in the case of the system in London is construed as the actor who takes undue advantage over others while also serving as a threat to the existence of any actor.
gathering data from the users of the modes of mass transport in London, the Transport Committee argue that they play a better scrutiny role than London Travel Watch because they are set up to scrutinise actors in the system. However, the researcher observed from the study that London Travel Watch play a better scrutiny role than the Transport Committee because the body employs both primary and secondary data as evidence from the study it commissions. On the contrary, the Transport Committee mainly rely on the evidence they get through discussions with relevant actors in particular organisations whose activities influence mass transport modes.

Moreover, the conflict between the two bodies increased due to the purported plan of the Transport Committee to integrate London Travel Watch within its own structure in 2011, as it argued that such a move would reduce the incidence of role duplication (scrutiny roles) in the system. London Travel Watch, however, argued that such integration would put at risk its political impartiality (London Travel Watch, 2011: 4). It was noted that the powers conferred on the GLA including the London Assembly and its Transport Committee played a role (funding and regulatory roles) in its relations with London Travel Watch and in its attempt to integrate the latter in its structure. While there is the occurrence of non-antagonistic conflict between London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee, both bodies engage in the scrutiny of bodies responsible for providing elements of mass transportation in the system. Furthermore, the study shows that both bodies (London Travel Watch and Transport Committee) support some of the workings of the other; for instance, while the former body provides the latter with data from the studies its commissions to enable the recommendations it makes, the latter body funds the budget of the former so as to ensure users of all mass transport modes get good experiences.

Despite the conflict between the Transport Committee of the London Assembly and London Travel Watch, there was a positive relationship between the organisations. For instance, London Travel Watch is accountable to the London Assembly, including the Transport Committee, since it was established and funded by the London Assembly. Furthermore, London Travel Watch submits evidence and reports to the Transport Committee to enhance its work relating to the scrutiny of actors (contractors and operators) responsible for elements of mass transportation in London, and such reports are employed by the Transport Committee and Assembly while questioning the Mayor and other actors on their use of resources. From the analysis of some of the reports of the Transport Committee, for example, ‘Too close for comfort: Passengers’ experience of the London Underground’
(2009b) and ‘The big squeeze: Rail overcrowding in London’ (2009a), the researcher observed that the Committee rely on some of the evidence and findings from the studies the London Travel Watch and other bodies commission. This therefore indicates that, although conflict exists between the two bodies, they also work with each other on issues of interest to both actors.

Another form of conflict (non-antagonistic) occurred within organisations between staff (union and non-union members) and employers within an organisational context. While employers such as TfL employ and implement cost saving strategies, such as Project Horizon (discussed in the funding regime section), some staff are disadvantaged by the implementation of such strategies which lead to redundancy, and there is a possibility of antagonistic conflict, especially when the redundant staff are not given a compensation package which meets their expectations. Consequently, employees of service oriented organisations such as TfL sometimes disagree with employers about their working conditions, while also seeking a better remuneration and contract. One instance when employees’ demands contradicted the cost-saving and profit-making strategies of their employers was the ‘fare-free’ scheme introduced on Arriva trains in January 2002. During this scheme, unions decided to stop strike action in favour of the ‘fare free’ days in order to reduce Arriva’s profits but not disrupt services for passengers, according to the RMT. Nonetheless, it can also be argued that sometimes the demands by employees for better working conditions are addressed covertly as illustrated by the negotiation between the train drivers union (ASLEF), the RMT and London Underground, which agreed a £350 bonus for train drivers who voluntarily worked on Boxing day (26th December 2013) in order to avert the proposed train drivers’ strike which had occurred on the past two Boxing days in 2012 and 2011. The deal, termed a ‘cost-neutral deal’ by Phil Hufton, London Underground’s Chief Operating Officer, was said to be funded from productivity savings from various parts of the trains operations. This deal could be said to be an example of a negotiated truce in an ongoing conflict between employers and employees, thereby indicating how a form of conflict is addressed in the system.

26 Additional information, on the ‘fare free’ days is available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1834296.stm
27 Additional information on the cost neutral deal is available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/transport/no-tube-strike-this-boxing-day-as-bosses-agree-350-bonus-for-drivers-8994958.html
The conflicts discussed above have dysfunctional consequences not only in the immediate organisational context but also in the wider system. For instance, if the ‘cost-neutral deal’ described above had not been struck between London Underground, train drivers union (ASLEF) and the RMT, the strike action proposed by train drivers on the 26th of December 2013 would have gone ahead, impacting on socio-economic activities in London while also increasing distrust among systemic actors.

The third form of conflict identified in the study and which was also non-antagonistic was between two of the Mayor’s four multiple roles, namely: producer (chair of the TfL board which plans the enhancement of capacities, for instance on the Underground), political leader (champion of Londoners), planner (of the London governance system), and funder (of initiatives in London). While each of these various roles is legitimate, there is potential for conflict between the political and producing roles. For instance, using the example of the scrapping of the policy on the introduction of driverless trains to the network, the Mayor’s role as producer, through TfL, by which he declared his support for the implementation of the driverless train scheme, might be perceived as contradicting his role as the champion of Londoners because most Londoners, including the RMT union and their affiliates, were against the scheme. Indeed, the Mayor eventually dropped the idea of implementing the scheme due to the opposing stance and threats of some Londoners, unions and train drivers. This shows how the interests of some groups representing a cross-section of London can challenge either of the Mayor’s roles. Notwithstanding this, the degree to which the bodies that challenged the Mayor’s driverless trains represent the views of Londoners is another issue for debate.

It is clear that while the Mayor used his position as the chair of the TfL board to introduce the driverless train scheme (perhaps not considering the effects of such policy on other actors such as train drivers and health and safety officials), it was obvious the policy would meet stiff opposition, especially from bodies representing train users and drivers. For instance, the RMT union feared its members would lose their jobs if the driverless train scheme were implemented. It was therefore not surprising to see how the Mayor failed in his acclaimed role as champion of Londoners because his view regarding the implementation of the driverless train scheme contradicted that of bodies and groups (RMT, Passenger Focus and London Travel Watch) representing some Londoners. While the degree to which the views of most Londoners are reflected by the bodies that opposed the driverless train scheme could be queried, nevertheless, evidence from the study in particular Richard Hollis (London
Assembly) and Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) suggests that the implementation of the driverless train scheme failed mainly because most of the concerned stakeholders (for instance the RMT Union and Association of Train Drivers) affected by the policy were not consulted.

Although the study shows the presence of contradictions in the Mayor’s role, it is clear that simply due to the position of the Mayor, he has to perform different roles. In performing some of his roles, the study also shows that the Mayor employs Deputy Mayors to take some decisions on his behalf while also coordinating the implementation of some of the policies developed to attain set Mayoral objectives.

Notwithstanding the degree to which conflicts exist in the system, the Mayor and TfL (main actors) are usually able to coordinate other actors playing roles related to sustaining mass transportation through policies such as the London Plan and CIL, while also getting them involved in the process of making and implementing policies such as the Mayor’s Transport Strategy. From the discussion of conflict in this section, it is clear that, although there is some divergence between actors over who should be responsible for the function of scrutiny such as London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee of the London Assembly, these bodies work together on some schemes. Furthermore, the discussion of conflict has shown that while it is possible for an organisation, for instance TfL, to mobilise its workforce to implement cost saving strategies such as ‘Project Horizon’, nevertheless, such strategies can lead to conflicts within the organisation thereby hindering the workings of the organisation internally and externally. This therefore suggests that there is the occurrence of both conflicts and collaboration in the system in London thereby sustaining the argument of Haugaard which suggest that conflict and consensus exist as phenomena (2002: 308).
5.6 Key themes that emerged from the study

Key themes including ‘leadership’, ‘funding regime’ and ‘accountability’ emerged from the investigation of London. These are discussed in subsequent paragraphs, together with an examination of the position taken by organisations and actors on each of the themes.

5.6.1 Leadership

All interviewees in London were of the opinion that leadership is key for the coordination of the system and for sustaining public services such as mass transportation. In this section the concept of leadership is discussed. Also, the process of how leadership advances or obstructs the occurrence of conflicts among actors is considered. Finally, the relevance of different leadership roles played by actors in the system, in particular the Mayor, is examined, while conclusions are drawn for the practice and sustainability of the system.

In defining leadership, here the view of Northouse (2013: 5), who defines leadership as a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal, is employed (see also Western, 2008: 23). This definition was adopted because in this study it was found that the Mayor of London, as leader, influences actors through his powers and capacity within a group context in order to achieve goals such as making London the best place to work, live, study, invest and do business. The Mayor, as the political leader, employs some elements of strategic leadership, which can be defined as the creation of an overall sense of purpose and direction which guide integrated strategy formulation and implementation in organisations (Hosmer, 1982). For instance, evidence from the study reveals that in sustaining the delivery of the key priorities of the GLA, the Mayor works with non-governmental actors, committees and some politicians in the London Assembly, including those serving as Deputy Mayors. Furthermore, the Mayor uses his leadership position to engage with business and London boroughs by working jointly with them on relevant aspects of their Local Implementation Plans in order to ensure the implementation of London-wide initiatives, such

28 The Mayor employs several politicians and non politicians to work in the Mayoral team which is responsible for running London (This is available at http://www.london.gov.uk/who-runs-london/mayor/mayoral-team).
as the Barclays Cycle Hire and Barclays Cycle Superhighway schemes.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, due to the powers of the Mayor it was not surprising to observe that he played different leadership roles (political and strategic) in order to coordinate the system and sustain mass transportation delivery.

While it is clear the Mayor provides leadership for the making and implementation of relevant policies and for governing the system in London, the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy shows that mass transportation schemes would be implemented through partnership working among some actors for projects such as the Upgrade of the Underground, Crossrail 1, and the Barclays cycle scheme. It can also be argued that these partnerships are not immune to problems, such as the exclusion of certain actors or interests, thereby serving as additional potential sources of conflicts. For instance, the Borough Partnership, which consists of 33 London boroughs, works closely with TfL to provide a range of local transport initiatives while excluding actors from the private sector. While the operation of this partnership could result in some degree of conflict as the excluded actors may withhold their supports (small amount of funding and policy know-how), there was no evidence of such an occurrence to support this argument. The discussion of the leadership functions of the Mayor thus enables an understanding of the Mayor’s role in the system in order to gain further insight into how such roles enable or restrict collaboration and conflicts in the system.

Notwithstanding the powers possessed by the Mayor as conferred under the GLA Act 1999, which enable him to employ and deploy resources for the planning and implementation of relevant policies, some interviewees, including Andrew Phipps (City of London Corporation) and the interviewee who requested to be quoted as anonymous, were of the opinion that central government should lead the system in London due to its resource capacity (to provide funding), which they see as key for the sustainability of mass transportation in London. Other interviewees, including Richard Tracey (London Assembly) and Jonathan Hollis (London Assembly), believed that the Mayor and TfL were most suited to lead the system in London due to TfL’s strategic expertise on integrated mass transport, and the Mayor’s powers.

\textsuperscript{29} These schemes are sponsored by Barclays which is a major global financial services provider. TfL claims that both schemes make a positive contribution to London by offering sustainable environmentally friendly means of transport and helping Londoners and visitors to the Capital lead more active lives (Available at http://www.tfl.gov.uk/roadusers/cycling/15153.aspx).
Rob Fox (London First) was of the view that the leader of the system should have strategic and resource capacity, and also should be allowed by central government to retain a significant proportion of the tax revenue London generates, as he argued that central government control over revenues generated from London limits the funding power of the Mayor. Richard Tracey (London Assembly) and Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) were also supportive of the Mayor’s leadership, as they presented the view that the existence of a powerful Mayor is in the interest of London as regards enabling socio-economic development and sustaining the delivery of public services such as mass transportation. Lastly, Rhodri Ball (TfL) supported the leadership of TfL and the Mayor as he was of the view that both actors play significant roles relating to strategy, planning and the coordination of the system in London.

It is clear that the majority of interviewees wanted the Mayor and TfL to lead the system due to the funding capacity of the former and the strategic competence (the capacity to plan and implement transport projects) of the latter. Thus, interviewees made the argument for a leadership structure which employs official powers in influencing and coordinating actors in the system. Most interviewees favoured leadership by the Mayor due to the powers of the office in relation to the making and implementation of policies aimed at London-wide development. All of the interviewees indicated that they were in support of the various London-wide policies and projects implemented by the Mayor, irrespective of the inconvenience associated with some of the projects, as evidenced by the temporary closure of some Underground lines due to engineering/maintenance work, causing hardship to users. This therefore shows that regardless of the differences existing among organisations and in the Mayor’s role, key actors from relevant organisations as evidenced by interviewees supported the office of Mayor.

In conclusion, the researcher observed that the Mayor was delivering on some of his vision and plans relating to mass transportation (for instance, the upgrade of the Underground and implementation of Crossrail 1) to aid capacity as set out in the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (2010) and The London Plan (2011). During the process by which the Mayor exercises his leadership roles and implements policies, both collaboration and imperative coordination were identified. Although the Barclays Cycle scheme discussed in Chapter 4

30 Imperative coordination is the process whereby the Mayor employs his powers in mandating actors to implement his policies or collaborate with him on certain schemes.
illustrates joint-working among actors including TfL, GLA, London boroughs, and Barclays bank, which funds the project, the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) is an incidence of imperative coordination (the use of Mayor’s powers in mandating systemic and non-systemic actors to carry out certain functions as directed by the Mayor). The London Plan statutorily requires all 33 London boroughs and the City of London Corporation to work jointly with TfL for the purpose of the collection of the CIL. Thus, through the Mayor’s leadership and policies in the MTS, in particular the CIL, which must be implemented by both London boroughs and the Corporation while also embedding it in their Local Implementation Plan, which is approved by TfL, a structure was observed to be in place to foster collaboration in the governance process. This practice illustrate the incidence of offensive collaboration in London as opined by Harding (1997), to emerge when a particular organisation cannot achieve its set targets independently without recourse to other organisations that have the necessary expertise and knowledge. In this instance, the Mayor including other elements of the GLA and TfL employed collaboration with actors such as London boroughs and the Corporation in raising additional revenue through CIL to fund schemes such as Crossrail 1 in London. The funding and implementation of Crossrail 1 and Underground upgrade, which are both delivered mainly by the GLA, TfL, DfT and other relevant organisations such as Network Rail, point to the Mayor’s use of partnership while implementing relevant projects. This therefore shows that the system in London employs and relies on means such as partnership working for the purpose of delivering and sustaining mass transportation.

This section has shown evidence of the practice of collaboration and the use of leadership in coordinating the governance system in London. While contradictory views exist among actors in the system in London on the preferred actor to lead, the evidence gathered shows that all actors believe there is need for strategic leadership, as outlined in the propositions of Ansell and Gash (2008), Williams (2012), and Sullivan and Skelcher (2002). However, it was also clear that these actors have different opinions on the criteria (funding capacity and the possession of power) that should be used in selecting the leader. Nonetheless, most of the interviewees indicated their desire for a strategic leader who would play different (strategic and political roles) leadership roles in advancing mass transportation in London. Also, it was the view of all interviewees that the leadership of the governance system should be able to hold other actors to account for their functions, as is discussed in the section on

31 See Chapter 3 for further discussion of forms of collaboration
accountability. In instances where actors supported schemes that furthered their individual organisational goals, as witnessed with London First and operators of mass transportation, it is the opinion of the researcher that the leader of the system has a role to play in terms of coordinating the behaviours of actors.

Clearly, the study of the case of London shows that the Mayor as the political leader of the GLA employs collaboration, contractual arrangements and imperative coordination for the purpose of coordinating systemic and non-systemic actors in implementing schemes which support the policy priorities of the Mayor relating to mass transportation. Thus, while the researcher observed from the study that the Mayor is effective in meeting the transport needs of a significant numbers of users, nevertheless, the means (use of collaboration, contractual arrangements and imperative coordination) employed by the Mayor to sustain mass transportation demonstrate the degree of its complexity, its capital intensive nature and the varieties of actors it engages. To better understand the mass transportation governance system in London and the relevance of capital to its sustenance, the funding regime of mass transportation in London is discussed next.

5.6.2 Funding regime

As discussed above, it is clear that key actors, such as the GLA and central government, play significant roles such as coordinating and funding projects which can enable or restrict the functioning of the mass transport governance system in London. In particular, as indicated in Table 7 below, the grants from central government to the GLA and TfL constitute a key component of the funding regime in London. Thus, it was not surprising to see all the interviewees in the study advocating that the funding regime in place must be sustained while also seeking to diversify sources of income because of, first, the limited levels of funding available from central government, and second, the limits to the extent to which fares (the major income earner for TfL) can be increased. Hence, this section aims to identify the key actors and relationships that constitute the funding regime while also indicating the sources of funds (revenues) and how such funds are utilised. The significance of the funding regime for the existing accountability framework and the governance of mass transportation shall be explored. Lastly, the role of private and public sector funding in driving partnerships shall be explored.
The actors constituting the funding regime include some of the actors shown in Figure 2 which consist of main actors such as TfL and the Mayor, secondary actors such as London First and City of London Corporation, and key external actors to the system such as the DfT and Treasury. Section (159)1 of the GLA Act 1999 empowers the Mayor to give financial assistance to anybody or organisation in respect of expenditure incurred or to be incurred by that body or person in doing anything that in the opinion of TfL is conducive to the provision of safe, integrated, efficient and economic transport facilities or services to, from or within Greater London. London First was seen as one of the non-governmental organisations which make some limited contribution within the funding regime, as it is able to mobilise the private sector (businesses) to contribute to the funding of transport projects. Fare paying users were also identified as making a considerable contribution to the funding of mass transportation in London.

These actors provide funds in various forms. For instance, users generate fares income. Funds from government, which constitute a significant proportion of the funds used for mass transportation, came in the form of grants, some of which went directly to TfL, while others went through the GLA to TfL. Also, some modest funding of TfL was seen to emerge from London Councils. However, while the amount of grants given by the organisations could not be verified, some interviewees (Rob Fox of London First and Andrew Phipps of City of London Corporation) presented the view that the funds given by their organisations were largely tokenistic, and clearly not as significant as those contributed by central government or raised from fares. Lastly, other forms of secondary income included revenues from advertising, rents, asset financing, TfL property disposal, TfL ‘prudential borrowing’ against future revenue, contributions from the private sector, for example, developer funding for associated transport investments, the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), direct London borough funding and other government funding sources including specific allocations to support regeneration, education, and the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games Transport Plan (Mayor of London, 2010: 315).

In examining how the funding regime raises and spends funds for mass transportation, relevant financial reports and budgets were consulted. Tables 6 and 7 below are extracted from the TfL Budget (2012-13) and the Mayor’s final consolidated budget (2012-13). Table 6 is about revenue and Table 7 is about capital, as illustrated in the GLA 2012-13 consolidated budget and TfL budget 2012-13.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fares</td>
<td>3,762</td>
<td>(3,800)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congestion Charge, Low emission zone and enforcement income</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>(295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other operating income</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>(330)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest income</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>(11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross income (excluding revenue grants)</td>
<td>4,391</td>
<td>(4,436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating costs (net of third-party contributions)</td>
<td>5,784</td>
<td>5,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt Interest</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group items</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross operating expenditure</td>
<td>6,246</td>
<td>6,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net operating expenditure</td>
<td>1,855</td>
<td>1,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General grant</td>
<td>(1,948)</td>
<td>(1,948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overground grant</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLA precept</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other revenue grants</td>
<td>(105)</td>
<td>(103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total revenue grants</td>
<td>(2,086)(^{32})</td>
<td>(2,083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Surplus)/ deficit</td>
<td>(231)</td>
<td>(234)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[^32]: Note that totals in tables may appear to be incorrect due to rounding (Mayor of London and TfL, 2012: 1)
Table 7: Capital budget (capital)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital expenditure</td>
<td>1,890</td>
<td>1,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-party contributions – Capital</td>
<td>(46)</td>
<td>(53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net capital expenditure</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>1,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross rail</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>1,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net capital expenditure including Crossrail</td>
<td>3,209</td>
<td>3,401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Funded by:**

| (Surplus)/ deficit from the operating budget               | (231)                                   | (234)          |
| Crossrail funding sources                                  | (2,058)                                 | (2,058)        |
| Investment grant                                           | (881)                                   | (881)          |
| Metronet grant                                             | (352)                                   | (352)          |
| Other capital grants                                       | (24)                                    | (55)           |
| Sales of property and other assets                         | (113)                                   | (122)          |
| Working capital                                            | 101                                     | 71             |
| Net borrowing and reserve movements                        | 348                                     | 229            |
| **Total**                                                 | **(3,209)**                             | **(3,401)**    |

*Note: Figures in the tables above are from the GLA Consolidated Budget 2012-13, pg. 53-54 and from TfL budget 2012-13, pg. 16-19.*
From Table 6 above, it is clear that the fares paid by users of mass transportation generated the highest income (£3,800m) for TfL, constituting 58.3% of the total revenue funding for mass transportation projects in London. Next came government grants (£2,083m), constituting 32%, of which central government was the main donor, while other actors, such as London Councils, the City of London Corporation and organisations from the private sector made smaller contributions. However, the consolidated budgets of the GLA and TfL do not identify and indicate the contributions of the other actors listed earlier. It is clear from Table 7 that the cost of operating mass transport in London exceeded the income generated, and that the revenue grants from central government played a key role in addressing this deficit.

With a total revenue grant of £2,083 million as indicated in Table 6 above, and an additional £3,428 million coming from different funding sources, TfL was able to meet its obligations while also funding capital expenditure, including Crossrail 1. From Table 7 (capital budget), the funding of the net capital expenditure for mass transport projects including Crossrail 1 was £3,209 million. The Crossrail 1 sponsors’ funding account (£1,382 million) is ring fenced, and not available for use on any other TfL expenditure. Furthermore, it was identified from the 2012-13 TfL Budget that TfL maintains a minimum of £250 million at all times to ensure liquidity and allow for fluctuations in income and expenditure. Thus, the funding regime in the system in London is capable of sustaining ongoing mass transportation projects, but only because of support from central government grants and other money saving schemes, as discussed later in the chapter. Also, in relation to examples such as Crossrail 1, the Mayor has used partnership between organisations across the public, private and third sectors to provide funding.

It was observed that the Mayor employs various budgeting means, including fare increases, shedding of more jobs at TfL, and increases in prudential borrowing to raise funds for sustaining mass transportation. It was shown in the TfL Business Plan (2011/12 – 2014/15: 5) that, in managing and sustaining the funding of TfL, the Mayor and his team have deployed savings strategies such as Project Horizon and the Continuous Savings Exercise (CSE). The latter was established in 2009 as part of TfL’s planning process, while the former was implemented following the 2010 Spending Review (in which the government reduced its deficit by making significant cuts in its spending) as a fundamental reorganisation of TfL’s back office and corporate functions, designed to protect investment and front line services, and deliver a 20% reduction in support staff costs (Ibid: 5).
It was clear that the funding regime is a focus for conflicts between actors, for instance between employers (Spending Review and Project Horizon) and employees (union demands). On the other hand, partnership between the GLA, TfL, private sector organisations and London boroughs is encouraged by the Mayor especially for the purpose of pulling resources together to execute projects like Crossrail 1 and the Barclays Cycle scheme. For instance, the researcher observed from the study that the partnership employed in delivering Crossrail 1 has been able not just to raise the capital needed to fund the Crossrail 1 project, but more importantly to save cost through efficiency means developed by actors in the partnership.33

The significance of government funding of GLA projects was observed in Tables 6 and 7. Furthermore, it was clear that collaboration exists across governmental and non-governmental levels in practice. It was noted that TfL works with boroughs by giving them local transport grant and maintenance grants which are then used in strengthening and supporting transport capacities in London (Ibid: 45). It was stated in the City of London Local Implementation Plan (2011: 22) that the Corporation would work with TfL to trial a method of dust suppression while also engaging with City businesses to gain their support for improving air quality in the Square Mile, thereby indicating another example of how government funding is used to drive partnership in the system.

It is thus clear that funding, as evidenced in the Crossrail 1 funding package discussed in Chapter 4, especially from government (central government and GLA), plays a key role in the partnerships identified in the study. While uncertainty and the risk of cuts in central government funding have made it necessary to diversify mass transportation funding in London, the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (2010: 25) makes clear that it will be funded and delivered by partnership working among actors, including government (central, GLA and boroughs), Network Rail, the London Development Agency (LDA) and developers, through a process whereby each actor would make a significant contribution, either financially or through other means such as expertise given to the implementation of projects such as the Underground upgrade and Crossrail 1. This further illustrates the importance of collaboration to the funding regime and delivery of mass transportation and other transport projects in London. The Planning and Transportation Committee of the City of London Corporation

33 See discussion of Cross rail 1 in Chapter 4 for more details.
(2012) confirmed that TfL makes a number of grants\textsuperscript{34} to all boroughs in London to support schemes such as the development of more cycling routes, which complement Mayoral initiatives, thereby indicating an aspect of TfL’s contribution to the sustainability of mass transportation in London.

To conclude, the discussion of the funding regime in the case of London has shown that, aside from fares income, central government and the GLA are the key funders of mass transportation in London. Also, it was indicated that other means of funding had to be explored and adopted due to the limited scope of central government grants and limits to the extent to which fares (the major income earner for TfL) can be increased. It was also shown that the Mayor, through his statutory power, employed imperative coordination in making actors such as London boroughs raise funds through the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) to finance the delivery of Crossrail 1. It is thus clear that the Mayor has the powers not only to initiate policies and plans, but can also play a major role in gathering together funds to finance projects relating to mass transportation. However, he is also to some extent restricted by central government through its central role in providing funding and in the development of policies and regulations by the DfT, including establishing the overall strategic framework regulating mass transport across the UK. It is thus clear that the Mayor is more powerful than other actors in the system in London such as London Travel Watch, TfL and London First, due to his statutory powers. However, the central government has more powers and is able to restrict the powers and policies of the Mayor. The discussion of the funding regime also demonstrate the relevance of collaboration for the purpose of raising funds to finance transport schemes such as Crossrail 1, and the significance of leadership for the purpose of identifying strategies such as ‘Project Horizon’, aimed at cutting cost.

\textsuperscript{34} An example of the grants given by TfL to Boroughs is the £100,000 in the 2012 fiscal year TfL’s budget, titled ‘Local Transport Funding Grant’.
5.6.3 Accountability

In this section, accountability is interpreted as the process by which organisations or individuals are held to account for their roles and actions by others. First, how accountability is construed by different actors is considered. Thereafter, different forms of accountability (electoral and administrative) are explored, including how they relate to one another. Furthermore, the complex nature and multiple levels of holding to account are discussed. Finally, the implications of the forms of holding actors to account in the system are considered.

Accountability was interpreted by all interviewees as a process in which an actor demands an account of resource use from another actor while the latter actor also gives an account of his or her use of resources. This is also the view of Schedler (1999: 14), who suggests that accountability embraces different ways of preventing and redressing the abuse of power and resources by subjecting those controlling resources to the threat of sanctions, while also requesting them to justify their acts. In the process of collecting data from interviewees on accountability, it was observed that most did not want to discuss the subject initially but opened up when the researcher prompted them further. This arguably demonstrates the attitude of some actors in the system relating to the process of holding to account and the complexity of the accountability process due to the diverse numbers of actors in the system. To aid the discussion, accountability is discussed on two levels: electoral accountability, which is from politicians to electorates, and administrative accountability, which is from all actors to those responsible for the scrutiny of their performance (e.g. in terms of efficiency, contractual obligations, fairness, legality, probity, professional codes, adherence to policy or accepted practice, campaign promises, manifestos, etc).

A variety of lines of accountability were identified in London. Elected politicians are of course, accountable to their electorates, and so the Mayor is accountable to the citizens of London. But he is also held to account administratively - for instance, the London Assembly employs its Committees to question him on his policies while also scrutinising his budget and projects as established in the GLA Act 1999. In addition, another means, such as appearance before Select Committees (administrative accountability), both at the UK Parliament and in the London Assembly, are other significant means that could be used for holding the Mayor to account in London. However, there is no recent use of appearance before Select Committees at the UK Parliament as observed by the study. It was however noted that the Mayor appeared
before the London Assembly including its committees to present evidence relating to his use of resources.

The GLA, as one of the key actors in the system in London, is accountable to central government, as established in the GLA Act 1999 (for instance, TfL send its annual financial reports to DfT while the GLA send its reports to the Treasury). Also, the 25 elected members of the London Assembly of the GLA are accountable to the electorates who voted them into office. The Greater London Authority Act 1999 stipulates the roles and responsibilities of the GLA, while also indicating in Part 1, Number 1 that “The Authority (GLA) shall have the functions which are transferred to, or conferred or imposed on, the Authority by or under this Act or any other Act” 35.

The London Assembly hold to account London Travel Watch. The London Assembly, including its committees, assesses the extent to which London Travel Watch has delivered or failed in delivering its goals and objectives, which are mainly focused on addressing the needs of the travelling public through the process of scrutinising relevant actors. It was confirmed by Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) that his organisation was established by the London Assembly to serve as the watchdog organisation representing the interests of transport users in and around London, while it was also being fully funded by the London Assembly to carry out studies that will improve the travel experiences of the users of the modes of mass transportation in London. Based on secondary data for example, ‘Bus passengers’ priorities for improvements in London’, produced by London Travel Watch (2010), it was clear that London Travel Watch implements its objectives thereby sustaining mass transportation in London. London Travel Watch is held to account by the London Assembly (Transport Committee) on how it uses the grants it gets from the GLA. In holding London Travel Watch to account, the London Assembly uses audits, reviews of projects and annual reports, and meeting sessions to investigate the failures and achievements of the organisation. Based on its findings, the Assembly which authorises London Travel Watch funds could reduce the funding allocated to the organisation if it is not satisfied with their report. While not giving any reason, Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) established that the London Assembly reduced its grant in the 2011 budget of London Travel Watch.

35 The legal framework constituting the GLA including its elements, and on how it is to operate is stipulated in the Greater London Authority Act 1999 available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/29/pdfs/ukpga_19990029_en.pdf
TfL is held to account by the Mayor, who chairs its board, and holds the board members to account through reviews and questioning based on the degree to which they have implemented the goals set in the budget of the organisation and the degree to which they have implemented the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (Ball, 2011). The board members submit a report to the Mayor annually, and on request, on their achievements and setbacks. Furthermore, the Budget committee and other relevant committees in the London Assembly hold TfL to account employing questioning and a review of their reports on other issues, such as the capacity of the Underground, and on the challenges faced by the travelling public.

Turning to the accountability of non-key actors, Romzek and Dubnick (1987: 229) identified set rules and performance indicators as means by which employees and contractors are held to account. For instance, TfL holds its contractors to account for services outsourced to them in order to ensure value for money and compliance with set performance indicators, such as adherence to CO2 emission levels and level of customer satisfaction. Professionals such as members of staff of organisations like TfL and London Underground are also held to account, not only by their employers or clients but also by independent regulators, for example the Office of Rail Regulation.

The study thus shows that actors in the system in London employ different means for holding each other to account. After evaluating the accountability modes, it was clear that while some means, such as target setting, enhanced systemic performance in some instances (such as during the upgrade of lines on the Underground), the use of targets to increase productivity was criticised by the interviewee at the City of London Corporation who argued that targets could limit staff and organisational performance. However, targets could be helpful in ensuring, for example, that suppliers of rolling stock to London Underground deliver engineering parts on time.

Furthermore, the study shows that London Travel Watch collaborates with the Transport Committee of the London Assembly in holding operators to account on their adherence to regulations linked with aspects of mass transportation, such as arrivals and departure timings, bus and train carriages capacity and design, and on the availability of information to the public on relevant aspects of mass transport. It is thus clear that while targets (administrative) and political means (election) are employed for holding actors to account, the particular means by which this modes operates has their disadvantages and advantages.
While suggesting that the Mayor does not fully hold TfL to account despite chairing its board, London First (2010: 16) recommends that actors, including TfL, should establish mechanisms that provide greater transparency over their efficiency programmes, such as Project Horizon, while also monitoring the actual progress achieved. The researcher is of the view that the suggestion by London First is linked to the inadequate information provided by TfL on how it spends the money it makes from its cost reduction programmes discussed earlier in the chapter. Nevertheless, the existing structures used for holding actors to account, such as statutes, targets, performance measurement and multiple accountability lines, have both advantages and disadvantages. For instance, using TfL as an example, while its multiple lines of accountability, including to the Transport Committee, Mayor and DfT, improve its transparency (as these bodies are able to scrutinise its accounts, operations and schemes), joint working and resource sharing with other organisations, thereby enabling the achievement of its Continuous Savings Exercise\(^36\), the same multiple lines of accountability serve as a constraint on its resource time as argued by Rhodri Ball (TfL) (although he did not specify the degree of such constraint).

While interviewees such as Jonathan Hollis (London Assembly) and Tim Bellenger (London Travel Watch) criticised the means by which governmental actors (politicians) were held to account, they suggested that other means, such as enquiries and the media, can also be used to hold politicians to account because they can be employed as and when necessary, unlike elections, which are held every four years in London. It is however clear that these have implications for the use of resources and for costs. In relation to non-elected officials, such as the staff of the City of London Corporation and TfL, it was clear that there are established targets and performance indices used in assessing staff performance and rewarding performance. Nevertheless, it is clear that election gives democratic authority and legitimacy to those who are elected, while non-elected officials are unable to claim this authority. This therefore shows that although elected officials have more authority than non-elected officials, these actors are held to account by either electoral accountability or administrative accountability.

To summarise the accountability lines in the system in London, Table 8 and Figure 3 below indicates who is accountable to whom and how.

\(^{36}\) The Continuous Savings Exercise embarked upon by TfL is an organisational wide savings target of £7.6billion which is to be achieved by cost cutting and the process of ensuring the accountability of staff for resources in their custody.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nos.</th>
<th>Name of actor (organisation)</th>
<th>Who actor is accountable to and what for</th>
<th>How the organisation or body is held to account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>London Travel Watch</td>
<td>Answerable to its funder which is the London Assembly. The body is mainly held to account for its use of grants from the Assembly.</td>
<td>Scrutiny of its annual audit reports by the London Assembly. Calls for evidence on aspects relating to mass transportation, for example, user satisfaction and complaints handling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>London First</td>
<td>Answerable to its funders, such as British Airways and Siemens. London First is held to account for how much it has advanced the interests of its funders.</td>
<td>Subscribing members assess the extent to which their interests are promoted and the relevance of projects commissioned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Transport for London</td>
<td>Answerable to the Mayor, GLA and DfT for its use of resources.</td>
<td>Held to account based on the extent to which it implements the Mayor’s Transport Strategy through an audit of its projects and activities by relevant audit bodies. Also, the organisation is held to account through calls for evidence in both the London Assembly and UK Parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>City of London Corporation</td>
<td>Answerable to the GLA, voters and business organisations in the ‘square mile’ for its use of resources.</td>
<td>Held to account through elections by residents and businesses. Also, like other London boroughs, is legally held to account by the GLA through an examination of its policies and the degree to which the policies conform with the London Plan and Mayor’s Transport Strategy.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>London Underground</td>
<td>Answerable to TfL for various aspects of mass transportation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Held to account based on set targets and performance indicators linked to reliability, emissions and capacity through the audit of its operations and budget.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>GLA including London Assembly</td>
<td>Answerable to central government, UK Parliament and the public for the exercise of its powers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Held to account through question and answer session, and appearance before Committees in the London Assembly and UK Parliament to give evidence based on the extent it adheres to guidelines in the GLA Act 1999, and through investigations by organisations such as the National Audit Office and the Audit Commission. Elected members of the GLA and Assembly are also held to account through elections.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Answerable to the London Assembly, Londoners and central government for its use of resources and power.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Mayor is held to account through election, question and answer session at the London Assembly and the Mayor’s Question Time at the London Assembly.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While Table 8 shows how bodies and actors are held to account and who they are accountable to, Figure 3 illustrates accountability relations in the system. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that some actors in the system are held to account by another actor. Also, Figure 3 shows that at the heart of the process of holding to account are the GLA (in particular the Mayor) and TfL who also play leadership roles in the system. This shows the significance of both actors to the functioning and sustenance of the system and mass transportation in London, and existing relations between actors in the system.

To conclude this section, the research has shown that while electoral and administrative lines of accountability exist in the system, both are relevant for holding particular type of actors to account. The two modes of accountability have features which cannot be realistically compared. The study also shows that during the process of employing administrative accountability, individuals and bodies tend to work together in order to gather evidence to be used for holding particular actors to account.
The research thus shows that while the process of holding to account actors such as members of organisations like TfL and London Underground through means such as established performance benchmarks, for example the degree to which they support and reduce carbon dioxide emissions by encouraging new developments (London Plan, 2011: 260), this accountability mode through the use of benchmark could limit staff performance to the standard set thereby hindering innovation within organisations in the system. In commenting on the usefulness of performance benchmarks and targets as a means of holding actors to account, Andrew Phipps (City of London Corporation) suggests that actors in the system and within organisations should not be held to account against set benchmarks and targets, as these could influence people not to innovate and deliver outputs beyond the established benchmarks. Nonetheless, the researcher is of the view that rather than to be seen as a confining means, benchmarks and targets could be seen as guide and tasks to be done in order to attain and exceed some set goals. Furthermore, the discussion of accountability has also shed further light on the relevance of the GLA especially the Mayor (through its relation with systemic and non systemic actors) and TfL in enabling the process in which bodies and individuals are held to account.

Furthermore, the study shows that the process of holding to account sometimes encourages collaboration among actors, for instance during the process by which the Transport Committee and the London Assembly hold the Mayor to account, the bodies gather evidence from different organisations and partner with others for the purpose of resource sharing to enable the holding of the Mayor to account. In addition, the study shows that during the process by which key bodies such as London Underground are held to account by TfL, the latter body partners with bodies such as London Travel Watch and London First for the purpose of getting evidence to be employed in querying the activities of London Underground. On the other hand, the study also shows that conflicts sometimes emerge from the process of holding to account particular actors, as observed between the Transport Committee and London Travel Watch.

37 For an illustration of how the Mayor is held to account, see the Mayor’s Question Time held on the 23rd of July 2014 available at https://www.london.gov.uk/mayor-assembly/london-assembly/webcasts
5.7 Testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in the case of London

This section seeks to test the model of collaborative governance proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008). In testing the model, the evidence gathered from the case in London shows that the propositions of the authors as regards the essential ingredients they suggest as enabling collaborative governance are insufficient. From the collaborative governance model presented in Figure 1, key ingredients including starting conditions such as prehistory of cooperation or conflict, facilitative leadership and institutional design were identified to enable collaborative governance. Furthermore, the authors identified variables including trust building, the development of commitment and shared understanding to be crucial within the collaborative process. They also observed that a virtuous cycle of collaboration tends to develop when collaborative forums focus on ‘small wins’ that deepen trust, commitment, and shared understanding. In subsequent paragraphs, these variables are examined based on how they exist in the system in London. The themes identified by the study to be crucial for the system are also considered.

On the relevance of starting conditions, such as the prehistory of cooperation or conflict shaping the collaborative framework, the study of the system in London shows that rather than actors being influenced by prior history of collaboration or conflict, as argued by Ansell and Gash (2008), Andranovich (1995) and Gray (1989), actors such as London First were seen to be motivated by factors such as what they stood to gain from the collaborative framework and government policies. For instance, it was observed from the study that most of the actors that engaged with the GLA government of Boris Johnson did so because of what they stood to gain from such a partnership, and the policy stance of the government which placed significant emphasis on the use of partnerships to deliver schemes as a condition for government grants. The case of London suggests that rather than depending on the prehistory of cooperation or conflict, actors such as the government can influence the workings of collaborative frameworks through their policies and powers.

Although the idea of facilitative leadership playing a key role in the system in London, especially for initiating policies, was observed through the Mayor’s leadership, nevertheless, the system in London shows various complexities linked with leadership roles, which were not noted in the Ansell and Gash (2008) model. For instance, the model failed to indicate how the ‘facilitative leader’ would emerge. This was one of the issues identified by actors in the system in London. Furthermore, the inability of the model to show how leadership is
constructed within the collaborative framework is also a weakness. This was evidenced where systemic actors did not agree on the individual or institution that should constitute the leadership structure tasked with facilitating the system. The case of London showed that strategic leadership by TfL and political leadership by the Mayor constituted this leadership structure. These forms of leadership were lacking in the Ansell and Gash (2008) model.

In designing a collaborative governance framework, Ansell and Gash (2008: 555) argued that factors such as basic protocols and ground rules are critical for the procedural legitimacy of the collaborative process. Also, access to the collaborative process was alleged to be the most fundamental design issue, as they and other authors (Andranovich 1995; Chrislip and Larson 1994; Gray 1989; Gunton and Day 2003) opined that the process must be open and inclusive. Nonetheless, although it was observed in the system in London that protocols and rules guiding the mass transport governance system were in policy documents such as the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (2010), the discussion of partnerships in Chapter 4 shows that key actors such as the Mayor and TfL influence and determine who participates in established collaborative frameworks. Thus, rather than an open collaborative process, the system in London shows the existence of partnerships with restricted membership, and which could be argued to be successful, as shown with the Barclays cycle scheme partnership and Crossrail 1 partnership. This further highlights the weakness of the Ansell and Gash (2008) collaborative governance model.

Ansell and Gash (2008) also suggest that variables including trust building, face-to-face dialogue, commitment to the process and shared understanding are important for sustaining the collaborative system. The case of London demonstrates the occurrence of some of these variables, for instance, shared understanding by actors, in terms of the need to develop more transport capacity to enable transport sustainability. The study also shows that rather than just face-to-face dialogue, other less formal means of communication, including the use of social media and information technology, were employed for communication purposes. Furthermore, while Ansell and Gash (2008: 558) suggest that direct dialogue allows for “thick communication”, which is necessary for stakeholders to identify opportunities for mutual gain, the case of London shows that stakeholders also communicate directly and indirectly through representative bodies such as London First, representing business organisations, and London Travel Watch, representing users. These organisations communicate among themselves to identify and execute schemes that serve their common interests.
Finally, as shown in Chapter 4, the study of partnerships in the system in London shows that collaboration develops among organisations not just because of the need to focus on ‘small wins’ that deepen trust, as suggested by Ansell and Gash (2008), but more importantly because of over-arching government policies and the quest of organisations to meet needs that they cannot achieve by themselves. Thus, drawing on the discussion of the system in London, it is argued here that rather than just the normative variables proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) such as starting conditions and face-to-face dialogue, the key actors identified to influence collaborations in the system include the GLA, especially the Mayor, TfL and external actors such as central government. Furthermore, the study shows that the nature of the funding regime existing to fund capacity improvement also plays a crucial role in enabling or restricting collaborations. The means of ensuring accountability also emerged as a central factor that could determine the degree to which the collaborative framework in the system would be successful. Having examined the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, the case of London has, in some instances, shown the existence of some of the variables proposed. However, the case has also provided substantial evidence that contradicts some of the variables proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), and adds new variables such as strategy and imperative coordination, in order to enhance our understanding of the factors that shape and influence collaborative frameworks.
5.8 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has discussed some of the findings from the case in London. It was clear from the study that both conflict and collaboration pervade the system. The discussion of the system in London tells of the roles of systemic actors, the use of collaboration and imperative coordination. The study shows that while some actors supported the presence of a lead actor to facilitate the system, they did not agree on who this leader should be. This contributes to debates on the relevance of a facilitative leader and on how such a leader is selected. For instance, it is important to note that the actors did not identify how the facilitative leader would emerge and whether the leader would be one or more individuals. The discussion of the themes that emerged from the study also sheds further light on the workings of important systemic features like the funding regime. This demonstrates that other factors must be considered aside from the prescriptions of Ansell and Gash (2008).

The study also showed that both the Mayor and TfL play leadership roles in the system while enabling the process whereby actors are held to account. It was clear that the Mayor has significant powers as established in ‘The Act’ in Section (159) 1, which enables him to employ imperative coordination and regulations in getting actors in and outside of the system to support government initiatives. This further illustrates the degree to which the Mayor is powerful. The power of the Mayor was also observed while he compels boroughs to implement the London Plan and collect Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL). Hence, beyond the variables identified by Ansell and Gash (2008) to enable the collaborative framework, the case in London has identified crucial factors such as the nature of the funding regime, government policies, questions of accountability, and typologies of leadership, as influencing collaborative modes of governance. The study also shows the relevance of a strategic body (TfL) for the purpose of sustaining mass transport modes.

It was also noted from the study that in enabling the sustenance of mass transportation in London, central government transferred certain powers to actors in the system while also working with such actors thereby indicating joint working between actors in and out of the system. This further shows that collaboration is not just a systemic feature but employed between systemic and non-systemic actors. The implication this has for public services provision such as mass transportation is that central government or the GLA may or may not employ partnership or imperative coordination to provide a service or aspects of a service, due to ideological motivation such as to allow the market to rule and encourage growth.
6.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the historical background to the current government structure of Lagos and the capacities existing to address mass transport problems in order to sustain mass transportation. It traces when and how government institutions were created in the state. Furthermore, the chapter explores the role of actors from the public and private sectors in the process of sustaining mass transportation. The chapter commences with a discussion of the evolution of government institutions in Lagos from the period the state was a colony. Subsections 6.2.1 to 6.2.3 then explore the development of the state from 1800 to 2014. Section 6.3 discusses the emergence of mass transportation in Lagos. Section 6.4 then goes on to analyse federal government – Lagos state government relations including the factors shaping the relations between both bodies. Sections 6.5 and 6.5.1 discuss the partnership observed in the system. This is followed by the summary of the key projects delivered and ongoing in Lagos in sections 6.6.1 and 6.6.2 so as to enable the answering of research question 7 (What capacity (within and outside each city) exists to solve these problems?). Section 6.7 then presents a summary of the chapter showing how the state government has emerged to establish institutions such as LAMATA to coordinate mass transportation.

6.2 The place of local authorities in Lagos government

Like England, where local authorities have played the roles of enablers of the delivery of some public services, and a political instrument used for promoting local democracy, local authorities in Lagos state also serve as enablers and sometimes providers of public services including public transportation, construction and maintenance of some roads, public highways and the collection of some taxes. The administration of local authorities in Nigeria as a whole has undergone immense transformation (from pre-colonial era to the 1980s) including the native authority/indirect rule system, local administration system, and the period local authorities were democratised, thereby separating the informal traditional administrative system from the democratic local government system. Local authorities have therefore played a key role in the process leading to the development of infrastructures in Lagos.

In understanding the place and role of local authorities in the evolution of Lagos government, the relevance of formal and informal institutions and age-old structures such as
the Obaship structure shall be examined. In addition, the impacts of democratic deficit and sclerotic institutions occasioned by long years of military rule and maladministration across all levels of government shall be discussed.

6.2.1 From Colony to State (1800-1900)

The governance of the area known as Lagos before the emergence of colonial rule had been the exclusive responsibility of Obas (Kings) who ruled absolutely over their kingdom and land. However, with the arrival of colonial powers who did not settle in Lagos especially due to the fear of being infected with malaria and yellow fever, there existed a governance structure made up of two administrations (colonial rule through an administrator, and traditional rule through an Oba). It is important to note that while colonial rule came to Lagos, it co-existed with the Obaship institution which was embedded in society. Lagos Island had become a favourite place for the Portuguese merchants in the 19th century, who later named the place Lagos do Curamo due to its significance as a port of call for slave traders (Folami, 1982: 8-12).

As trade became more prominent in Lagos Island, European civilisation became more evident, thereby attracting people from nearby towns and villages to Lagos. The subsequent migration of people to Lagos created urbanisation challenges for the government. After the abolition of the slave trade in 1807 came the signing of several treaties with the Oba and chiefs (local lords) of Lagos in order to effectively put an end to the trade in humans. Lagos has thus witnessed several transformations, including those due to its geographical location and missionary impact on Nigeria (1842-1914). Due to the economic prosperity of Lagos since the pre-colonial period, the state has become the economic gateway to Nigeria, as London is to the UK. The city has grown commercially, economically and in industrial terms, thereby becoming Black Africa’s most populous city.

From the middle of the nineteenth century, the administrative system used by the British colonial government in governing Lagos changed frequently due to changes in leadership. For instance, the state was governed by a British administrator from 1848-1853, a consular authority from 1853-1861, subsequently by a local governor from 1861-1866, then by the Sierra Leone governor from 1866-1874, followed by the Gold Coast governor from 1874-1886, and finally by its own colonial governor and administrator from 1886. During the colonial era, commerce sustained the colony of Lagos as exports were valued at about
£78,000 and imports valued at £62,000 in 1862. By 1900, exports were valued at £830,000 and imports were about £885,000. Hence, Lagos was valuable to the British colonial government because of its commercial potential, notwithstanding the menace of malaria and yellow fever which made West Africa a ‘white man’s grave’ (Peil, 1991: 9). Since the colonial administrators realised the commercial capability of Lagos, by 1886, they separated the city from the rest of Nigeria and made it a crown colony under direct rule.

In 1892, electricity was introduced in Lagos thereby making it possible to set up other infrastructures like telephones. The use of telephones for business purposes consequently aided the commercial prosperity of Lagos. While Lagos prospered, Governor Carter in 1893 made an attempt to introduce house and land taxes in order to meet the cost of providing public services, especially health service, which was in high demand at the time. In showing their resentment to the introduction of the taxes as they had never paid any form of service and property tax, the natives demonstrated at the government house. Consequently, the house and land taxes were abandoned (Folami, 1982: 39). At several times when the colonial establishment attempted to implement policies such as the house tax and water tax without the Obas’ support, such policies often failed because they were not implemented by the Obas’ known to the natives. This therefore shows that while the colonial government existed to govern the colony of Lagos, most Lagosians were opposed to its policies and remained loyal to their traditional authority.

Notwithstanding the problems that existed between the colonial government and Lagosians, commercial activities in Lagos increased, and by the latter part of the nineteenth century, a Lagos Chamber of Commerce was established in 1897 to coordinate trade and commercial activities (Fry, 1976). While commercial activities increased in Lagos, the need for an efficient transportation system to cope with emergent challenges became imminent. Badejo (2011: 1) comments that transportation is a necessity due to its utilitarian roles which help in meeting the day-to-day political, social, economic, cultural, and even technological needs of the individual and society along with the obvious challenge of ensuring the distribution of goods and services. Subsequently, a railway was built from Lagos to Abeokuta in 1898 in order to facilitate trade with Abeokuta in western Nigeria while the rail network was further extended to Kano in northern Nigeria in order to facilitate trade.

During the colonial period, there was also health problems linked to urbanisation. For instance, increasing death rates were linked to the crowded condition of Lagos, absence of drainage systems, lack of an embankment by the north side of the Island and the indifference
shown by the sick and their friends to skilled and qualified medical practitioners because most people believed in orthodox (traditional) medicine.

In reviewing transport development in Nigeria including Lagos during the colonial period, it is imperative to note that the basic structure of the transport system was imposed from abroad, thereby having some implications for the design and routing of the networks. The British colonial government designed the transport system in Lagos and Nigeria, especially the railway to assist in the exploitation of the country’s natural resources. Thus, the transport networks were established in a way to encourage the exportation and importation of goods and advance colonial administration. In assessing the impacts of the colonial government on the development of transport infrastructures in Lagos and Nigeria, Filani (2011) comments that the pattern of colonial transportation development had tremendous implications not only for the movement of goods and services but also for the levels of development of the country’s rural areas and the urban centres that service them as the railway for instance, was developed to link centres of production thereby neglecting the rural areas. This according to Filani has contributed to the regional inequalities (concentration of infrastructures in some region as observed with rail network in Lagos) which still prevail in the Nigerian space-economy.

Another consequence of the colonial transport system was evidenced in its broad pattern of regional specialisation as transport networks were concentrated in regions that produced exports for the colonial government. This therefore led to the emergence of some cities such as Lagos and Ibadan. Notwithstanding the socio-economic changes (for instance increase in trade and urbanisation) brought about by the colonial transport system, some features of the system shaped post-colonial transport development. For instance, due to the structure of the colonial transport system, there was neglect of intra-regional transport networks and inadequate investments to fund mass transport modes. Thus, while the transport network was efficient for the colonial administration, it can be argued that it was inefficient for the overall development of the country as the investments made into the transport system were aimed at facilitating exports to serve colonial government interests.

6.2.2 From Colony to State (1900-1960)

The first attempt in Lagos at establishing a governmental structure was in October 1899 when the General Sanitary Board made up of appointed nine members was created to
address health issues in the colony. The board commenced operations by playing an advisory role to Governor MacGregor. In 1909, this board was replaced by the Board of Health Ordinance, which included government officials as well as members representing various interest groups. Like its predecessor, this board carried out its functions using appointed members while also improving the cleanliness of Lagos through its programmes (Folami, 1982: 170).

The challenges of urbanisation in Lagos in the 19th Century continued to be unaddressed throughout most of the 20th Century. Thus, there was overcrowding in houses and on the streets, leading to poor sanitation and the spread of endemic diseases. Furthermore, the unwillingness of the colonial government and the Obaship institution to raise and spend money to address the urbanisation challenges made the problems worse (Peil, 1991: 8). Nevertheless, due to the position of Lagos in hosting the colonial governors and administrators, and also its economic advantages, its hinterland became the Protectorate of Lagos. It subsequently developed into the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria by 1906 while Lagos was named as the colonial headquarters of Nigeria.

In 1914, Governor Lugard unified the northern and southern parts of Nigeria while Lagos retained its administrative headquarter status thereby furthering governmental activities which continued until Nigeria’s independence in 1960. However, by 1914, the socio-political landscape in Lagos was divided into anti and pro colonial government factions, with the anti-government faction supporting the Obas. Consequently, individuals such as Mr Kitoyi Ajasa supported the colonial government with his weekly newspaper (The Nigerian Pioneer) to disseminate the colonial government’s policies. On the contrary, those opposed to the taxes and water rate levy of the colonial government, for example, Dr. J. K. Randle, founded the first political party (The People’s Union) in Nigeria in 1908 to mobilise people to engage in anti-colonial activities (Folami, 1982: 43). Through the political activities in Lagos, political awareness increased and extended to other parts of Nigeria thereby enabling the emergence of nationalists.

By 1921, a year before the Legislative Council was launched, the problem of increasing density in Lagos including inadequate housing and transportation could not keep up with urban growth. The density of north Lagos Island, for example, has always been much higher than the density of the city as a whole, with 19,305 people per sq km in 1921 and 48,263 per sq km in 1963. This was greater than the density of Manhattan Island in New York City during the same time (Peil, 1991: 20). In 1922, a Legislative Council was launched,
enabling local elites to participate in electoral politics and influence the delivery of public services. However, the Legislative Council restricted voting to males with a declared annual income exceeding £100 (Peil, 1991: 9). Furthermore, most of the early members of the Legislative Council were Western educated Christian Yoruba immigrants and professionals in career-field such as law, engineering and business who later created groups which took part in political activities. Thus from the 1930s, the campaign for Nigeria’s independence began in Lagos and in a short time the nationalist elites largely displaced the ‘Black Victorians’ who constituted the leadership in Lagos.

One important feature of the elected Town Council established in Lagos is that it challenged the policies of the colonial administrators (Peil, 1991: 50). In 1951, Lagos lost its independence as a Crown Colony due to the 1951 constitution which placed Lagos under the Western Region. Thus, the transfer of Lagos governance to the Western Region government meant that local decisions affecting the state were decided at the Western Region government house in Ibadan (outside the geographical boundary of Lagos). This affected developments in the state as it led to a more bureaucratic process of policy making and implementation.

6.2.3 Lagos governance from 1960 to 2014

After Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the federal government retained the regional form of government employed by the colonial government. Lagos state was formally created in May 1967, through the States (Creation and Transitional Provisions) Decree No. 14 that restructured Nigeria into twelve states from a federation of four regions. The state was also made the capital of Nigeria. At the time, Lagos was the richest, with the best-educated professionals, and most densely populated state in Nigeria. The military truncated democratic rule (Nigeria’s First Republic) and assassinated several politicians including the Prime Minister in 1966. Unfortunately, once they took power, the various military regimes reduced the amount of power available to political office holders by suspending democratic institutions. They also replaced democratic institutions with military units.

Despite the roles Lagos played while it was the capital of Nigeria for instance, through revenue generation from its port, and other economic benefits that accrued from the location of financial bodies in the state, different stakeholders presented diverse arguments on the need for a new central Federal Capital Territory for Nigeria which would not be under the control of any ethnic group.
The government of Lagos state is led by the executive (Governor) who also controls local governments within the state. At its inception, the state was divided into nineteen local authorities to facilitate the delivery of goods and services and encourage democratic participation. However, because the local authorities were too small to raise capital and generate revenues, they were reorganised into seven Local Government Areas (LGA) which included Lagos City Council, Mushin Town Council, Epe, Awori/Ajeromi, Egun/Awori, Ikeja and Ikorodu District Councils. Local Government structural reforms in 1976 and 1989 increased the local authorities to eight and twelve – eight local governments for the Lagos Metropolitan Area and four for the rest of the state (Peil, 1991: 52-54).

Notwithstanding the creation of local authorities in order to advance the delivery of public goods and services such as refuse collection management, construction and maintenance of some roads and bus parks, most of them were incapacitated by the lack of resources including funds and technology. Hence, they were not able to carry out the majority of their services. Despite the challenges local authorities encountered from when they were created till the mid 1970s before the local government reforms, they could still raise two-thirds of their budget from local revenue (car park fees, tv licence, taxes and tenement rates), mainly in the form of taxes on land and buildings. For example, Lagos City Council was able to use incomes generated from general rates and taxes to meet 62 per cent of its total expenditure (Ibid), while the state government grants were used in addressing the other shortfall.

In reflecting on this section, it is clear that some challenges in Lagos state experienced during the colonial period also pervaded the post colonial and independence period. This therefore shows that the various colonial administrators, politicians and military rulers that have governed Lagos (which was, and still is, the commercial capital of Nigeria) have failed to establish relevant institutions which can enable and sustain the delivery of public goods and services in the state. Nonetheless, while the colonial government can be credited for establishing mass transport modes in Lagos, subsequent indigenous governments have failed to consolidate the infrastructures bequeathed by the colonial government. Although Lagos state lost its official status as the capital of Nigeria in 1976 to Abuja (known as the Federal Capital Territory), it has not lost its unique significance in Nigeria as it remains the gateway to Nigeria’s commerce, industry and transportation (Peil, 1991: 49).
6.3 Emergence of mass transportation in Lagos

This section discusses the context in which mass transportation emerged in Lagos. It explores the evolution of mass transport modes (mainly bus and train) and discusses the key challenges confronting mass transportation in Lagos. It is followed by a discussion of the relationship between the federal government and Lagos state government.

The geography of Lagos played an important role in shaping the emergence of mass transportation in the state from the colonial period when boats were mainly employed for transporting people and goods in the populated area of Lagos known then as Lagos Island and which was also where the colonial government set up their administrative office. About 65.4% of the population of Lagos in 1950 lived on Lagos Island, which covers about 1.55 square miles, some of which was swampy, and is separated from the mainland by a lagoon and creeks. Early attempts to develop transport infrastructures thus focused on the use of boats to transport people and goods across the lagoon while the building of bridges was considered (Durrant et al., 1981).

The emergence of mass transportation in Lagos arguably coincides with the period of colonial rule because it was the colonial government who first made the attempt in building a railway line to move people and raw materials within the colony for shipment abroad. Commercial mass transportation in Lagos commenced with the Lagos Steam Tramway which was operated by the colonial government between 1902 and 1913. This line was opened on the 23rd of May 1902 and called the Lagos Steam Tramway. Furthermore, in linking Lagos Island with the mainland to aid trade and mobility, construction work started on the Carter Bridge in 1896 and reached completion in 1901.

While the colonial government pioneered and coordinated mass transportation through trains, mass transport through bus in Lagos was established by two Nigerians, Charlotte Olajumoke and Dawodu in the 1920s. After these individuals came J.N. Zarpas, which was a company established by some Levantine expatriates. With their investments, they dominated the bus mode of mass transportation in Lagos until Lagos Town Council acquired their buses in 1958 to create the Lagos Municipal Transport Service (LMTS), which became the first indigenous government owned transport company. In establishing LMTS, Lagos Town Council wanted to establish a monopoly in charge of bus transport in Lagos with a view to provide the general public with efficient transportation means while also reducing the challenges (arbitrariness in fares charged, lack of services to some areas and unreliable
service) users encountered with private bus operators. By 1960 when Nigeria gained its political independence, commercial mass transportation in particular through buses had expanded with the growth of Lagos as institutions such as the orthopaedic hospital and the growth of satellite towns on the mainland increased the demand for more bus services.

The LMTS continued to function until the 1960s when many private operators went into commercial transport business. After Nigeria’s independence, Lagos Town Council was renamed Lagos City Council and the transport body – LMTS was renamed Lagos City Transport (LCT). From post-independence period, LCT was not able to fully meet the travelling demands of the increasing number of users. Nonetheless, private operators began to increase as they handled some percentage of mass transport delivery. In a survey of August 1962, Benson Transport Service conveyed 14,000 passengers per day, while LCT transported 100,000 users (Olukoju, 2003: 224). However, while the numbers of private operators increased, the mass transport assets and infrastructures owned by the government decreased as they were not managed well even as movable resources were stolen by officials and other public sector actors playing roles related to transportation. Furthermore, fixed assets like bridges and rail tracks were not adequately maintained due to the diversion of the funds meant for such maintenance works to the accounts of individuals and government cronies. Osoba (1996: 375) argues that right from the time Nigeria gained her independence; political elites began to use state resources to solve their dearth of private resources through the awarding of unsecured government loans to cronies, inflating of government contract values through kickbacks, and the looting of government resources.

With a decline looming and confronting mass transportation provision across Nigeria after independence, rather than the government at all levels consolidating the infrastructures established by the colonial government, they engaged in the development of policies that they were unable to implement. The earliest major attempt at transport development by Nigeria’s federal government post-independence was the commissioning of the Standard Research Institute (SRI) to report on the economic coordination of transport development in Nigeria. The institute was charged with the responsibility of preparing an economic analysis of Nigerian Transport that would suggest guidelines for future action (SRI, 1961).

The SRI report presented a detailed analysis of the transport modes (rail, river, road and air) within the country. Furthermore, it made projections for a ten-year traffic demand and some intermodal allocation of traffic which was believed would lead to a coordination of the Nigerian transport system. The report in essence, supposedly became the basis for transport
planning in the country and for the allocation of capital investment in the sector in the first and second Nigerian National Development Plans. For the first time in 1965, Nigeria’s transportation objectives were spelt out through a government White Paper on transport development to include coordinated development in the transport sector and by implication, the promotion of socio-economic integration of the country through its transport system. While these objectives are arguably laudable, their implementation depended on the strategy employed in intermodal allocation of investments, urban-rural allocation and the federal-state mix of responsibilities in transport matters. After evaluating the first three National Development Plans (1962-1968, 1970-1974 and 1975-1980), Filani (1981: 214) notes that there was no clearly articulated strategy for making investments and accountability in the transport sector in order to bring about spatial efficiency in the country’s socio-economic and political systems, and in coordinating the transport policies of states. Thus, although the SRI report made several recommendations whose implementation would have improved existing mass transport modes including their coordination, however, the report was never fully implemented.

Although the Federal Ministry of Transport (MOT) exist and is charged with the responsibility of planning, managing and coordinating public policy on transportation in Nigeria for instance implementing the SRI report, nevertheless, this ministry has not discharged its responsibilities as argued by Badejo (2011). It was the view of Badejo (2011: 14-17) that using the essential ingredients of transport management critical success factors including planning and policy, organising, human capacity development, coordination and integration, regulation, information management and budgeting, the Federal Ministry of Transport has failed as it does not perform most of all the key functions listed above. Furthermore, it was claimed that the MOT has no serious interaction or engagement with state governments and Ministries of Transport at the state level outside its annual National Council on Transportation meeting, which was last held in 2007 (Ibid: 18). This therefore shows some disconnection between the MOT and states.

In order to establish a unified control for LCT, the Lagos City Transport Board was established in March 1964, by Federal Statute (City Transport Regulations Act of 1964), which empowered it to determine the policies governing transport services and to make provision for the administration of such services within the City of Lagos. The Lagos City Transport Board was constituted by six members including five persons from Lagos City Council and one experienced businessman chosen from the public by the Minister for Lagos.
Furthermore, there were three ex officio members who included the City clerk, the City treasurer, and the general manager of Lagos City Transport. There was also a chairman appointed by the Minister of Lagos affairs and who presides over the board meetings on a monthly basis (Williams and Walsh, 1968: 109). The transport service was headed by a general manager responsible for the daily operations and administration of services, and the general manager was accountable to the Transport Board which appoints him or her.

Of the three modes (trains, buses and ferries) of mass transportation in operation in Lagos from the 1960s, buses were the most significantly used and a key feature of the bus mode was the dominance of three destinations including Lagos Island, Apapa, and Ikeja. It is around the aforementioned destinations that the major mass transport routes lay due to the presence of economic features such as industries and financial organisations (Williams and Walsh, 1968: 108).

The LCT operated a total of 102 buses by February 1965, increasing to 136 buses by July 1966 (Ibid: 109) in order to meet the demands of an increasing population. The financing of the LCT was mainly from the earnings generated from fares and from federal government subsidies. The profit made by the body went to the City council and was subsequently used for providing other public services (Williams and Walsh, 1968: 111). While the gross revenue of the LCTS increased especially due to a rise in the numbers of passengers carried from 37.4 million in 1961-1962 to 50.1 million in 1965-1966, there was tremendous increase in wages and operating inefficiency.

Notwithstanding the success recorded by the LCT as relating to its capacity in sustaining mass transportation, corrupt practices and the problem of pilferage reduced the revenue that it received. Nonetheless, it was clear that by the late 1960s public and private sector actors played a key role in the delivery of mass transportation in Lagos while there was no known government policy to regulate their activities. This observation is similar to the comment of Williams and Walsh (1968: 112-114) who suggest that the problem of lack of coordination by government agencies and standardisation of service delivery translates to poor transport infrastructures such as badly maintained buses and poor enforcement of transport regulations in Lagos. This shows that although a service such as mass transportation can be delivered without government regulation on a short term basis in a place such as Lagos, nevertheless, for its long term sustainability and effectiveness, there is need for proper regulations, rules and benchmarks to ensure operators deliver standardised services which meet user needs while also justifying fares charged.
In what could be termed a setback, the development of infrastructures including transport related capacities across Nigeria slowed down due to the civil war which occurred from 1967 to 1970. This war had colossal effects particularly through the insecurity it created in the society, and the diversion of the funds that would have been invested in transport infrastructures to fund the civil war. Furthermore, the incidence of military takeover of government hindered the establishment and growth of institutions which would have developed transport infrastructures in Nigeria. This led to the existence of a sclerotic transport structure in Lagos for a long period of time. Thus, most of the structures left by the British colonial government were not even consolidated, let alone sustained.

The period after the civil war from 1970 to 1999 mainly witnessed military rule and the growth of private operators who have become dominant in delivering mass transportation in Lagos. While there was a change in the name of the state transport body from Lagos City Transport (LCT) to Lagos State Transport Corporation (LSTC) in 1974, private operators continued to increase. From the mid 1980s, the onset of structural adjustment policies, devaluation of the naira and liberalisation of import controls allowed for an immense importation of used vehicles from Europe. With the absence of regulations guiding entry and exit into mass transport operations, individuals who could afford to import used vehicles from Europe took the advantage thereby increasing the numbers of vehicles available to users. Olukoju (2003: 220) comments that while private operators run into tens of thousands and organised mainly into the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), they are so important that any dispute between them and government agencies often lead to them withdrawing their buses from operating thereby paralysing the transport system, commercial activities and social life in Lagos. Nonetheless, while the increasing numbers of commercial private operators and existing state transport body (LCT) continued to deliver mass transportation, it was clear that the operators could not meet users’ demands.

While the military administered Lagos from the 1970s to 1990s, the population continued to grow at a growth rate of about 6% per annum even as necessary infrastructures such as good road networks, and maintained rail tracks and carriages were lacking. Gandy (2006: 374) comments that the spread of rent seeking activities on the part of the state, driven by a sequence of nefarious military regimes, had led by the late 1990s to an almost complete break-down in the public realm and an extensive collapse in the provision of basic services. Consequently, numerous transportation problems emerged for instance traffic congestion, disrepair roads, deteriorating comfort of road-based public transport, increasing levels of road
accidents, growing menace of robbery inside buses and sky-rocketing fares. The identified transportation challenges in Lagos, in addition to problems relating to urban growth caused by the status of Lagos as Nigeria’s economic capital as it houses the nation’s principal commercial sea port and airports, and financial institutions, have all pressurised existing infrastructures in the state.

After the transition from military rule to democratic rule in 1999, the then Governor of Lagos state (Bola Tinubu) presented the case for the renewal of transport infrastructures in the state to the federal government and World Bank. Subsequently, the federal government ratified the governor’s proposal and agreed to stand as the guarantor of the loan to be taken from the World Bank. In order to address the challenges of urbanisation and those related to mass transportation delivery, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) was conceived by the federal government and Lagos state government with the aim of facilitating sustainable and effective integrated transport system for Lagos state. In implementing the LUTP, the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) discussed later in the chapter was created as the strategic transport authority to coordinate and implement mass transport policies in the state.

The discussion of the emergence of mass transportation in Lagos thus shows that mass transportation evolved with the inputs of different actors, consequently having different outlooks at varying times. For instance, while the study shows that the colonial administrators established the first formal mode of mass transportation through the use of trams and trains in the 19th century, individual entrepreneurs such as Charlotte Olajumoke and Dawodu, and J.N. Zarpas dominated the bus mode from the early to the middle of the 20th century. Thus from its inception, mass transportation has been delivered in an unregulated environment (free entry and exit) by actors from both the public and private sectors in Lagos. The implication this has had for the functioning and sustainability of mass transportation has been immense. For instance, while the free entry and exit into the sector has enabled many Lagosians to make quick money through the process of profiteering from fare increments, there is the neglect of infrastructures and lack of maintenance thereby leading to deterioration. Also, due to the nonexistence of a regulatory body when mass transportation emerged in Lagos, there has been the establishment of a body such as the NURTW discussed later in the chapter, and which has established itself as the coordinator of mass transport operators across bus parks in Lagos.

In the course of exploring the operation of mass transportation in Lagos especially from the colonial period till the establishment of LAMATA, it was clear that the transport
bodies established lacked the necessary capacity to sustain the infrastructures bequeathed by the colonial government and develop additional capacities to address the mass transport needs of Lagosians. Also, the absence of a particular body at the federal government level to coordinate the planning and operation of mass transportation across Nigeria in addition to the absence of relevant policies at all levels of government have led to a lack of standards in the mass transport system in Lagos prior the establishment of LAMATA.

Arguably, the various intrinsic challenges of mass transport in Lagos have influenced urban planners to argue that mass transportation in the state needs unified control, planned development and the imposing of sanctions to offenders. The study shows that there are inadequate mass transport infrastructures for buses, trains and ferries, which undermine the effective delivery of mass transport in Lagos in the long term. Also, while the Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC) has existed since the 1960s, it has operated at a deficit due to operational, resource and capacity problems. Furthermore, while there has been a series of National Development Plans (1962-68, 1970-74 and 1975-80), none of them has had a clearly articulated strategy for making investments in the transport sector to bring about spatial efficiency in the country especially Lagos (Filani, 1981: 214). Thus, although the emergence of mass transportation in Lagos dates back to the colonial period, factors such as corruption, lack of competency and political instability have adversely affected the development of the capacities that could have sustained mass transportation in Lagos.

To conclude this section, it is clear that, the inability to maintain the infrastructures developed by the colonial administrators, in addition to factors such as the lack of effective institutions and political instability due to military rule after Nigeria’s independence have hindered the sustainability of mass transportation in the country, and particularly in Lagos. It is clear that government, from the colonial authorities to post-colonial governments and military administrators, has played different roles relating to mass transportation in Lagos. In order to further understand these roles, the relationship between the federal government and Lagos state government is explored in the next section.

6.4 Federal government – Lagos state government relations and partnership

This section considers the relations between Nigeria’s federal government and the Lagos state government due to the importance of both actors and their roles in sustaining mass transportation and other related public services in Lagos. Also, the incidence of
partnerships, with particular emphasis on the BRT Lite partnership, is examined in order to shed light on their importance in the system.

6.4.1 Federal government – Lagos state government relations

The relations between the federal government of Nigeria and the different governments that have governed Lagos state have been shaped by diverse factors such as socio-economic, political, strategic and funding influences. For instance, it was clear from the discussion in sections 6.2.3 and 6.3 that the federal government has always been influential in taking key decisions relating to infrastructures since the creation of Lagos state in 1967 as the state was the capital of Nigeria thereby prompting the interest of the federal government in the state. Furthermore, section 6.5 discusses the incidence of the partnership which delivered the BRT Lite scheme in Lagos. In discussing the partnership, the significant powers of the federal government in enabling and supporting the planning of the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP), which delivered the BRT Lite scheme, and in currently implementing the Lagos rail project was observed. Thus, the study shows the incidence of partnership between the federal government and Lagos state government during the process whereby major schemes are delivered. Nonetheless, conflicts also persist between the two actors, especially when the ruling political party in government (president) at the federal level is different from the party of the governor at the state level.

The study of the relations between the federal government and Lagos state government focuses on the period since 1967 when Lagos state was created. From 1967 when the military took over the governance of Lagos state, the federal military government sought to make its presence felt in the state by locating two military barracks in the city. This could be argued to be important for the military government in suppressing political rallies organised by protesters and demonstrators opposing the military government. Thus, at the inception of the state, the federal military government was particularly concerned with the protection of its interests including those linked with socio-economic capacities and revenues present in Lagos.

In relating to the state government, the federal government employs bodies such as the Federal Ministry of Transport (MOT) whose role is to reach out to stakeholders from both the public and private sectors playing roles relating to the sustenance of mass transportation.
Badejo (2011: 17) comments that unfortunately, the Federal Ministry of Transportation has narrowly defined the radius of its relationship to incorporate only federal institutions.

Another means of evaluating the relations between the federal government and Lagos state government is by comparing the political stance of the party at the federal government level to that of the party at the state government level especially since the return of the country to democratic rule. Since 1999 when Nigeria transited to democratic rule, the key issues shaping the relationship between the federal government and Lagos state government as with other states are linked with resource control and disagreement over the revenue sharing formula among the 36 states in the federation. In a situation where the political party of the President is different to that of the Governor of Lagos state, there is always conflict between them. One instance was the period from 1999 to 2008 when President Obasanjo (PDP political party member) was in power at the federal government level and Governor Tinubu (AD political party member) was the Governor of Lagos state. During this period, both leaders questioned the other’s commitment to the development of infrastructures in Nigeria, with the latter leader frequently accusing the President and his political party of not doing enough to accelerate and sustain socio-economic development through investment in infrastructures and capacities such as energy, roads and security.

Notwithstanding the degree to which ideological and political differences shape the relationship between the federal government and Lagos state government, it is clear that due to the concentration of powers (for instance ability to raise tax, statutory powers, control over material and human resources, and control over the armed forces) in the federal government, government at that level is able, for example through its funds, to influence the state government. For instance, the federal government including the Federal Ministry of Transportation were instrumental in drafting the TOR and the framework of the proposal of the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) which is delivering the BRT-Lite buses and Lagos Rail. Another example is that the federal government guaranteed the loan LAMATA requested from the World Bank. This shows that while the actors disagree on certain issues, they tend to work together on issues identified by both of them as pertinent for sustaining public services including mass transportation in Lagos.

To conclude, this section has identified the factors that constitute and shape the relations between the federal government of Nigeria and the Lagos state government. The section also shows that such relations arguably determine the degree to which some policies would be made and implemented as decisions relating to the building of infrastructures to
support mass transportation in Lagos were seen to be influenced by government ideology, political and socio-economic factors and the powers of the federal government.

It is thus clear that the federal government through its powers controls the relations between both actors. Nonetheless, evidence of partnership working was observed between both governmental actors especially for the purpose of establishing the LUTP, which created LAMATA as a strategic transport authority. To further understand the relations in the system, partnership is discussed in the next section with particular focus on the partnership which delivered the BRT-Lite scheme.

6.5 Partnership

Since the establishment of LAMATA in 2002, the state government has attempted to both create partnerships and enter into partnership with relevant bodies for the purpose of attaining its transport policy aim, which is to develop intermodal mass transport system in the state. This section discusses the incidence of partnerships relating to mass transportation in Lagos. To aid analysis, the partnership delivering the BRT-Lite scheme is discussed. The study of the case of Lagos shows partnership between the federal government, Lagos state government, LAMATA, World Bank and operators for the purpose of combining resources in order to deliver the BRT-Lite scheme.

6.5.1 BRT-Lite partnership

The Bus Rapid Transit (BRT-Lite) scheme is a new form of BRT focused upon delivering a system to meet key local user needs while aiming to improve the quality of life, economic efficiency and safety within a clearly established budget framework. It was delivered at a cost of $1.7million per km and it carries about 200,000 people per day through the use of high capacity buses despite a capacity that does not allow it to satisfy all forecast demands (LAMATA, 2009: iii). The BRT-Lite network consists of a 22km route that is 65% physically segregated and 20% separated by road markings. The scheme was implemented to address the mass transport problems in Lagos including those relating to capacity and crowding.

To better understand the argument for the BRT-Lite scheme, by 2006, the population of Lagos was estimated at between 15 and 18 million, and projected to grow to more than 25 million by 2025. This would place Lagos as the third largest agglomeration in the world, after
Tokyo and Mumbai (LAMATA, 2009: 1). Mobility in Lagos during the period relied on a large fleet of approximately 75,000 mini-buses (danfo) in addition to much smaller numbers of midi-buses (molue) and shared taxis (kabu-kabu) which all add to the traffic congestion and traffic-related emission. The qualities of these forms of transport are appalling in terms of journey experience, and the variable fares charged by their operators. In addressing these challenges, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP), was employed to set the strategic framework for building capacity to manage the transport system in the state and identify priority actions, investments and enabling measures for improving it.

In addition to the aforementioned capacity issues, there was no mechanism to coordinate and regulate the entry and exit of operators. Thus, LUTP enabled the creation of the Lagos Metropolitan Transport Authority (LAMATA) in 2002. Once established, LAMATA then drew the Terms of Reference (TOR) and framework for the BRT-Lite scheme while relying upon technical assistance and funding from the World Bank.

The partnership that delivered the BRT-Lite scheme included LAMATA (coordinator and regulator), Lagos state government (provided $35 million counterpart contribution for infrastructure development), World Bank (provided technical advice and $100 million credit facility used for infrastructure development), the federal government of Nigeria (guaranteed $100 million credit facility from the World Bank and provided additional grants) and the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW). In implementing the BRT-Lite scheme, the aforementioned actors entered into a partnership where each body delivered aspects of the scheme while LAMATA coordinated the framework of the partnership and ensured relevant targets were met.

In assessing the BRT-Lite scheme which was completed in the autumn of 2008, it is clear that users now save more journey time while travelling in more comfortable and safer buses. Furthermore, the success of the BRT-Lite scheme has been promoted by the World Bank and used as model for other countries including Ghana and Japan. However, there are some negativities associated with the BRT-Lite scheme. These include inadequate buses and a lack of proper maintenance of the buses. Nevertheless, the evaluation done by LAMATA (2009: iii-iv) claims that the scheme is an unprecedented success because it meets the needs of users and is delivered within budget and established time frame. The researcher, however, is of the view that the operation of the BRT-Lite scheme can be considered to be successful in terms of the alternative (secured bus, comfortable seating arrangement and high capacity) and
value for money (affordable and stable fares) it presents to users of mass transportation in Lagos as compared to the services delivered by private operators.

6.5.2 LAMATA, NURTW and Eco bank partnership

Another partnership was observed to be employed for the purpose of supporting the NURTW to run routes on the BRT-Lite network. This was to enable the union to be part of the mass transportation reform process in the state so as to prevent any likely opposition to the BRT-Lite scheme by the union or from any of its affiliates. The partnership was constituted by LAMATA (regulator and guarantor), NURTW (operator) and Eco Bank (funder). In commenting on the relevance of the partnership, interviewees including Desmond Amiegbebhor and Olukayode Taiwo (both from LAMATA) commented that due to the significant role the NURTW plays in the delivery of mass transportation before the emergence of LAMATA, it was in their interest to support the NURTW in the state to participate in the process of mass transport delivery through franchising in order to ensure the union support the acceptability and sustenance of the BRT Lite scheme. While the NURTW had grown in membership size from the 1960s due to the free entry and exit of operators into the bus mass transport mode, the membership size of the union was significant for instance, when they go on strike, the economy of Lagos state comes to a standstill. Furthermore, as NURTW was the only body which coordinated bus operations at bus parks and terminals across the state, the body was well established.

Interviewees including Desmond Amiegbebhor and Olukayode Taiwo noted that the previous mass transportation scheme implemented in 2006 in Lagos Island failed because the NURTW were not involved in the process. Hence, the support given to the NURTW by LAMATA in terms of standing as a guarantor for the body in order to secure loan to purchase BRT buses in running certain routes was observed by the researcher to be responsible for the low incidence of conflicts relating to the implementation of the BRT-Lite scheme. The interviewees at LAMATA confirmed that NURTW paid up their loan before the loan term and made profits by running the route allocated to them on the BRT-Lite network. Hence, while LAMATA stood as guarantor for the loan given to NURTW by Eco bank, NURTW operated on the routes assigned to them while also abiding by franchising terms. Through this means, LAMATA was able to work with NURTW while also been rewarded with the stability of the BRT-Lite scheme as one of the stakeholders (NURTW) in the sector has a stake in its
operations. Thus, while the partnership aimed at supporting the NURTW to run routes on the BRT network was implemented, each of the partners gained.

Notwithstanding the incidence of partnership between LAMATA, the NURTW and financial institutions, it was reported by Desmond Amiegbebhhor and Taiwo Salami that the NURTW independently collects illegal revenues from operators in motor parks across Lagos state, thereby depriving the state of revenues that could be employed in funding capacity development. The researcher’s view on this development is that it could be possible that relevant government enforcement officers do not have the power to confront the members of the NURTW engaging in the illegal collection of fees, or there is the possibility that the government has deliberately turned its face away from them since most of the people engaging in the collection of the illegal fees are employed for electioneering. Theroux (2010) in his documentary titled ‘Law and disorder in Lagos’ demonstrate how members of the NURTW collect illegal fees from bus drivers, cyclist and traders claiming such money are NURTW ticket fees. Furthermore, Theroux (2010) shows that some members of the union relate with the governor and some enforcement agencies in the state. This all illustrate the roles and relevance of NURTW in the governance process in Lagos.

While partnerships exist in the system, Bawa-Allah noted that, since LAMATA was created on January 13th 2002, it has consistently competed with the Lagos State Ministry of Transportation as to which organisation is best placed to coordinate, regulate and strategically plan mass transportation in Lagos, and this has given rise to conflict between the two organisations (for further discussion, see Chapter 7).

To conclude, the study shows that the creation of LAMATA which was due to the partnership which implemented the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) has been able to address some of the challenges faced by users of mass transportation in Lagos in terms of the need for a decent mass transport mode to address capacity issues. Furthermore, the creation of LAMATA and partnerships as observed has been able to facilitate joint-working among different actors and bodies. This has furthered the acceptability of the public of the mass transport schemes implemented by LAMATA thereby increasing the chances of the sustainability of the scheme and other related ones. Having discussed how partnership is

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employed in Lagos to deliver schemes, some completed and ongoing projects aimed at addressing capacity issues are highlighted in section 6.6 below.

6.6 Key projects delivered and ongoing

In sustaining mass transportation capacities in Lagos, the Lagos Urban Transport Project (LUTP) has identified some projects whose implementation will enable the attainment of government policies relating to sustaining mass transportation in the state.

6.6.1 LAMATA

LAMATA was created by LUTP to address problems of insufficient capacity in order to meet user demands, and also to coordinate, plan and implement policies to sustain mass transportation in Lagos state. LAMATA’s structure consists of five key departments: Corporate planning, Public transport, Roads, Traffic management and Finance. Furthermore, other elements of the five departments including safeguards, external relations, internal audit, information technology, corporate and legal, procurement and human resources are mainly responsible for administering LAMATA in order to coordinate mass transportation in Lagos (LAMATA, 2006: 8-10). Once created, the institution identified and implemented schemes such as the BRT-Lite project and Lagos Rail, which it perceived as vital for delivering integrated and intermodal mass transportation in Lagos state. The study shows that LAMATA has achieved most of its aims; for instance, it has increased the mass transport capacity available in the state by establishing a bus route franchising scheme while ensuring private sector organisations participate in the process of increasing capacity through partnerships. In addition, LAMATA has also been able to revamp water mode of mass transport in the state while working with relevant government and non-governmental bodies during the reform process. Notwithstanding these achievements, the study shows that the institution has not been able to address all the challenges in the transport sector in Lagos especially that of curtailing the excesses of NURTW whose members have breached established transport laws in the state and those relating to the use of the buses of some private operators for robberies. Despite these challenges, it is clear that LAMATA has advanced the operation of modes of mass transportation in the state thereby enabling users to get value for the fares they pay while commuting from one point to the other.
In attaining its accomplishments, various factors were identified to have enabled LAMATA. The study shows that factors including the presence of technocrats as members of staff, in addition to the use of reputable and competent consultants for professional advisory assistance have all enabled the success of the body. Interviewees from LAMATA also established that the use of targets and benchmarks for members of staff and contractors have played a key role in the success achieved by the organisation. Arguably, the personnel employed by LAMATA are thus responsible for the high quality of projects executed by the body, and recognised by the World Bank as one of its key successful projects in Africa. Furthermore, interviewees at LAMATA confirmed that their success is due mainly to their separation from the core bureaucracy of government, thereby enabling them to implement policies they deem fit to enable the sustenance of mass transportation in the state. More importantly, all the interviewees at LAMATA unequivocally established that the political will and support of the Governor in ensuring non-interference with their work and processes by politicians is mainly responsible for the degree of success they have accomplished in developing transport infrastructures in the state.

6.6.2 BRT-Lite

BRT-Lite was implemented to address the lack of adequate means of mass transportation in Lagos. It offers high capacity rapid transit services carrying 10,000 to 30,000 passengers per hour in each direction, and mostly on segregated lanes. The BRT-Lite scheme offers users an alternative to the other means of mass transport in the state which is through the use of mini-buses whose conditions are not user friendly in terms of the interior of the buses, their safety and their fare variability. BRT-Lite buses are better placed due to the exclusive right of way they have, the regulations that guide their operations thereby making them secure and comfortable, and their use of about 4,000 high capacity buses which have low emission. However, the study shows that the quality of the services delivered by BRT is depreciating as some of the buses in the BRT fleet are due for maintenance while others need the upgrading of facilities such as chairs.

In attaining the goal of the delivery of integrated mass transportation including buses, trains and ferries, LAMATA after its creation set out to implement the Lagos Urban Rail Network (LURN). LURN was conceived as a network of urban rail-based systems covering seven major corridors of high commuter traffic demand. The lines are to link the major population and activity centres in the state while integrating the network with planned and existing BRT-Lite routes and water routes. The first part of the project signed in March 2005 is between the Lagos state government and LEMNA International Inc. of the United States, and it is a ‘Build, Own and Transfer (BOT)’ contract agreement for the delivery of the first phase of the light rail scheme along the western corridor Mile 2 – Okokomaiko/Agbara axis. This is estimated to cost $240 million and has an implementation period of 48 months. Like most other schemes in the state, the light rail scheme has not been delivered based on the forecast of 48 months implementation as the MD of LAMATA recently in a press release suggests that Lagos rail may begin operations in 2014. Nonetheless, it was observed during the study that construction work is ongoing thereby indicating that the project is not abandoned.

6.7 Chapter conclusion

This chapter has explored the factors linked to the emergence of government institutions and mass transportation in Lagos. It was clear that the geography of Lagos, in addition to the colonial establishment, all played different roles which enabled the emergence of modes of mass transportation, including trains, boats and buses. It was shown that the colonial government (before Nigeria’s independence) and federal government (after Nigeria’s independence) played key roles in terms of funding transport schemes in Lagos. The chapter has also shown that Lagos played numerous roles as the capital of Nigeria before and after independence due to several reasons including its economic capability and the political atmosphere it provided for the nationalists who advocated Nigeria’s independence.

During the period both civilian and military personnel governed the state, the study shows that the policies conceived by the government were significantly influenced by the federal government because of its powers and the grants it gives to the state. It was also shown from the study that, although Lagos state was created as a state within Nigeria’s federal system, it does not have financial independence as it relies on the monthly revenue allocation distributed by the federal government and seeks federal government approval for most capital projects. This therefore demonstrates a relationship between the state and federal government.

The chapter has also shown that arguably, the low incidence of partnerships in Lagos is due to the long years of military rule in the state. Nonetheless, while the two cases of partnerships discussed, which relate to the sustenance of mass transportation illustrate some collaboration among actors in Lagos, it is also clear that the actors constituting these partnerships benefit from the implementation of the partnerships. This therefore shows that the partnerships delivering mass transportation in Lagos are arguably shot-gun partnerships, as defined by Harding (1997: 74) to be a collaboration determined by the need of an organisation to ensure that organisational targets are met. In the two partnerships discussed, LAMATA could be seen as the organisation ensuring mass transport targets are met as its management determined the relevant institution(s) and body it partnered with in order to deliver sustainable mass transportation. Notwithstanding the partnership type adopted by LAMATA, the study shows that the body while collaborating with other actors has been able to implement its mass transport policies by relying on internally generated revenues, grants from the federal government and donors, as discussed further in Chapter 7.
Chapter Seven:

Discussion of themes and findings in the case of Lagos

7.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses findings related to the governance of mass transportation in Lagos. In order to aid analysis and comparison, the structure generally follows that used with regard to London. Building upon the information provided in Chapter 6, the discussion begins with an explanation of the government and governance structure in Lagos and how it relates to appropriate organisations, especially those concerned with mass transportation governance. Thereafter, the goals of some relevant organisations are considered. In addition, the key themes that emerge are examined in order to ascertain their significance to the study. The vulnerabilities of the collaborative governance model presented by Ansell and Gash (2008) are then presented drawing on findings from the case in Lagos.

As indicated in Chapter 2, information was collected from a number of actors: Dr Frederic Oladeinde (Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority, hereafter LAMATA); Dr Desmond Amiegbobh (LAMATA); Dr Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport); Engr. Dr Bawa-Allah (Consultant to Lagos State Government and initiator of School of Transport at Lagos State University); Engr. Olabanji Omotosho (Lagos State Ministry of Transport); Prof. Olukayode Taiwo (LAMATA); Engr. Frederic Olofin (Lagos State Waterways Authority - LASWA); Prof. Akin Mabogunje (Federal Government consultant). All of these individuals provided evidence on how the organisations they work for seek to advance mass transportation in Lagos. The primary evidence provided by the interviewees was further validated using secondary sources of data, such as LAMATA’s reports and publications, and the presentations of actors to audiences that have interest in mass transportation in Lagos, for example the presentation of the Managing Director (Dayo Mobereola) of LAMATA to the World Bank Group and representatives of businesses operating in the system in Lagos. As discussed in the methodology chapter, it was not possible to collect data from other significant actors, for example, the Governor of Lagos state and the Minister for Transport of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, on the roles of such actors in the system. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of the data that might have been provided directly by such actors was gathered from secondary sources, such as the Report of the Presidential Committee on Redevelopment of Lagos Mega-City Region (Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006).
7.2 Overview of the governance structure of mass transportation in Lagos

As outlined in Chapter 6, Lagos state government is directed by the executive (Governor). The executive includes the governor’s office, in particular Governor Akinwunmi Ambode (the current political leader of Lagos, who was elected in May 2015), as he coordinates the making and implementation of policies aimed at sustaining socio-economic activities in the state while engaging with relevant actors through partnership and consultations. Thus, the executive arm of government, under the leadership of the Governor (Ambode) and his deputy (Idiat Adebule), who represents the Governor at events within and outside the state, is primarily responsible for the daily administration of the affairs of the state. Also, there are thirty-seven commissioners who head various parastatals/departments, such as transport and health, who are responsible for the delivery of public services to Lagosians. The Governor gets political power and legitimacy through elections held every four years, and is responsible for appointing the members (commissioners) of his cabinet (executive). The thirty-seven commissioners appointed by the Governor run various departments such as the Ministry of Transport. These commissioners implement projects that are in harmony with the overall policy programmes of the Governor. Thus, in practice, the decisions and projects of the commissioners are significantly shaped by the stance of the Governor who appoints them, and the ideology of the party in government in the state. In implementing projects and providing public services such as mass transportation, the Governor of Lagos state (hereafter known as the Governor) works with actors including the federal government, private sector organisations, and other non-governmental actors, such as the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW), through the implementation of schemes like the Bus Rapid Transit Lite (BRT Lite) system, which involves the use of buses on certain parts of some dedicated roads. Due to the strategic nature of the functions of the Governor, his political legitimacy and the powers attached to his office, such as the power to raise revenues within the state in the form of tax, he is able to influence the activities of organisations in the system.

41 The BRT Lite scheme became operational in Lagos on 17th March 2008 and was delivered with the aim of improving quality of life, economic efficiency and safety within a clearly defined budget. It consists of a 22km route that is 65% physically segregated and 20% separated by road markings. As observed from secondary data (LAMATA, 2010: iii), the success of the BRT Lite scheme is due to the use of an holistic approach that involved re-organisation of the bus industry, financing of new bus purchase, and creation of a new institutional structure and regulatory framework to support the scheme, while also training personnel to drive, maintain, enforce and manage BRT Lite buses.
There also exists a thirty-nine member Lagos State House of Assembly, headed by Rt. Hon. Mudashiru Obasa (Speaker of the House), the primary role of which is making laws, including to enhance service delivery in the state. For instance, ‘A law to provide for road traffic administration and make provisions for road traffic and vehicle inspection in Lagos State and other connected purposes’ was enacted in 2012 by the state legislature to regulate the modes of transport using roads. However, in commenting on that piece of legislation, all interviewees were of the view that, while the law is useful in principle, implementing such laws is often problematic due to the culture of Lagosians, discussed later in this chapter. While most of the proposed legislations are initiated from the executive (Governor), others are from bodies like LAMATA and the Ministry of Transportation. The draft legislations then goes through review stages in the Assembly before it is either quashed or enacted as law. Unlike its equivalent in London, the Lagos State House of Assembly plays a relatively limited role in scrutinising the actions of the executive. However, while the researcher did not gather any data which might suggest that the State House of Assembly has challenged or defeated any of the policies initiated by the governor in the past, it was noted that relevant committees in the Assembly, such as the Public Accounts Committee and Transport Committee, do investigate the projects implemented by ministries and agencies in the state. The work of these committees is discussed in the accountability section later in this chapter. The judiciary is the third arm of the state in Lagos, and is responsible for interpreting its laws.

The extent to which the governance system in Lagos is influenced by the federal government was discussed in Chapter 6. For instance, it was noted that the federal government plays a prominent role, especially through the resources (mainly the monthly revenue allocation) it provides for the delivery of services in the state. Notwithstanding the resources (grants) provided by the federal government, the State and Local Government Programme (SLGP) is of the view that, due to the need to provide and sustain public services in Lagos, and the limited allocation from the federal government, there is increasing need for the state government to source and rely on internally generated revenue within the state, in particular in the form of tax revenue. Currently, the federal government allocates

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42 The State and Local Government Programme (SLGP) is a programme delivered by DfID in partnership with the Lagos State Internal Revenue Service with the aim of improving the tax system within Lagos in order to raise revenues to fund public services. Additional information is available at http://www.slgpnigeria.org/uploads/File/lago_case_study.pdf
26.72% of all the incomes generated by Nigeria to the 36 states of the federation including Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (Federal Ministry of Finance Nigeria, 2012). From the Lagos state budget for 2011, it was shown that while the federal government contributed 25.50% (statutory allocation as 13.10% and value added tax as 12.40%) of the revenue of the state, the state government funded the remaining 74.50% revenue from sources including the Lagos Internal Revenue Services (54.50%) which is from forms of taxes such as property tax, tenement rates and company tax, Internally Generated Services (10.30%), Dedicated Revenue (7.40%) and Extra Ordinary Revenue (2.30%). The implication of the federal government allocations to the system in Lagos is discussed further in the section on funding regimes.

Furthermore, it was also clear that, due to the absence of independent scrutiny organisations such as London Travel Watch, which operate as watchdogs of transport operators in London, and regulatory bodies performing functions similar to those of the National Audit Office and DfT, certain actors, in particular operators in the system linked to the delivery of transport services, have more freedom to engage in activities like profiteering and the delivery of poor services. Thus, conflicts in Lagos are partly linked to lack of capacity to create and enforce relevant, effective and appropriate rules.

7.3 The goals of relevant actors and conflict in the system

This section begins with a discussion and illustration of the actors that constitute the system in Lagos. Thereafter, the goals of the actors and others (non systemic actors) who work with them are discussed. Next, the occurrence of conflict among actors is also considered. While Figure 4 shows the systemic and non systemic actors in Lagos, Table 9 present a summary of the key goals of the actors in and out of the system.

Figure 4 shows the categories of actors that play roles relating to the sustenance of mass transportation in Lagos. The importance of this was clear from the study; for instance, the analysis of the funding regime showed that LAMATA and the Governor placed great emphasis on the use of PPPs in implementing mass transport projects in Lagos as they have employed such mechanisms in implementing key projects including BRT Lite, Lagos Ferry services and Lagos Rail. In addition, Figure 4 shows that key actors including the Governor and LAMATA form the main component of the system and coordinate the work of other actors at different levels so as to execute the transport policy of the Governor. The leadership
and strategic roles of both the Governor and LAMATA thus make these actors constitute a level (main component) in the system.

It was also noted that secondary actors such as governmental bodies (State Ministry of Transport) and non-governmental bodies (LCCI and NURTW) constitute another level in the system while also relating to other actors thereby showing a mix of actors in the system. These actors are recognised as secondary actors because of their roles, explained later in this chapter and their importance to the delivery and sustainability of mass transportation. Furthermore, another level of actors includes the Federal Ministry of Transport, World Bank and French Development Agency. These bodies mainly play funding and advisory roles. Furthermore, they are non-systemic actors because they do not play daily roles which directly affect mass transportation delivery in Lagos. Notwithstanding the levels of actors in the system, the analysis of the delivery of the BRT Lite scheme discussed in Chapter 6 shows that the World Bank, French Development Agency, the Lagos state government and the Federal Ministry of Transportation all work together in planning, funding and during the process of implementing mass transport schemes in Lagos.

The actors identified by the researcher as constituting the main component of the system in Lagos are LAMATA and the Governor as without them the system cannot function effectively. LAMATA’s expertise relating to mass transportation strategy, planning and implementation, including their role in enhancing capacity, makes this actor key, for both the short term and long term survival of the system. Furthermore, the Governor plays key roles in funding and setting the overall policy framework. Other actors, including LASTMA and LAGBUS, play roles such as enforcing traffic rules and sustaining mass transport operations.
For clarity, the actors responsible for sustaining mass transportation in Lagos are illustrated in Figure 4 below.

**Figure 4:** Network diagram of actors inside and outside the system in Lagos.
7.4 The goals of the actors inside and outside the system

The goal of the Governor of Lagos state (a primary actor) is to achieve effective healthcare, integrated modes of mass transportation, and the security of life and property. The Governor’s office, which was created by Decree No. 14 promulgated by the Federal Military Government in 1967, assists the Governor in the discharge of his duties while also coordinating projects to realise his policy plans.43 The researcher observed that a significant proportion of the Governor’s policy plans have been implemented, in particular the establishment of integrated mass transport modes in the state as evidenced with the operation of BRT-Lite buses and ferries, and ongoing development of the capacity to support the operation of Lagos rail.44

The goal of LAMATA (a primary actor) is to enable the delivery of integrated mass transportation in the state by means of strategies and schemes which address capacity issues and sustain mass transportation. As discussed in Chapter 6, it was shown that LAMATA was established to address the transport challenges in Lagos state. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, LAMATA carries out transport planning and coordinates the sustainability of mass transportation modes in Lagos.

The goal of the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation (a secondary actor) is to establish a mass transit system which can address the transport problems in Lagos. Nevertheless, the research shows that the ministry has not been able to consistently implement its goal as it has been to some extent incapacitated by a lack of resources and technocrats. Also, there was considerable duplication of roles between the ministry and LAMATA until the passage of the New LAMATA Act in 2006, which defined LAMATA’s function to include planning, regulating and co-ordination of all travel modes within Lagos (http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/pagemenus.php?p=116&k=38).

The goal of another secondary actor, the Lagos state Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA), is to stabilise traffic by managing and enforcing traffic rules. In carrying out this goal, members of LASTMA educate and enlighten the public, including for example operators and motorists, on the proper use of the highways (http://lastma.gov.ng/about-

43 Available at http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/entities.php?k=175
44 Available at http://www.lamata-ng.com/LAMATA%20BROCHURE3updated%20%20latest%20track%20changes%accepted.pdf
us/responsibilities/). While all interviewees stressed the importance of the work of LASTMA in managing traffic in Lagos, the study showed that in performing its roles it clashes with the enforcement officers of the Federal Road Safety Commission (FRSC), another secondary actor, who enforces traffic rules on federal highways. This furthers the incidence of conflict between LASTMA and the FRSC thereby affecting mass transport operations.

The goal of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI), another secondary actor, is to promote trade and industry by organising public-private dialogue sessions and roundtable series to address its members’ priority issues, while also representing the interests of local businesses to the Lagos state government and investors (http://www.lagoschamber.com/index2.php?page=profile). The researcher observed that the LCCI sometimes facilitates trade, for example through its introduction of the cashless payment scheme on the BRT system.

The goal of the Lagos State Water Authority (LASWA) (a secondary actor) is to provide clean and safe waterways for transportation (http://web.laswanger.com/authority/about-us) by protecting, restoring and preserving Lagos waterways through the education of Lagosians and the enforcement of relevant laws. The research shows that LASWA has enabled the delivery of water transport in the state as it has developed additional jetties and terminals through PPP joint ventures with organisations such as MTN.

The Lagos State House of Assembly (SHOA) is another secondary actor which aims to represent Lagosians by passing laws that enable socio-economic development and the provision of infrastructures in the system. Furthermore, the SHOA, through its committees, such as the Public Accounts committee, is able to scrutinize mass transportation projects executed by organisations in the state. 45

In addition to the primary and secondary actors constituting the system, and discussed above, the Federal Ministries of Finance and Transport, and international organisations including the World Bank and French Development Agency (FDA), constitute important external actors to the system. For instance, the external actors constitute the principal funders (capital) of the system in Lagos. Furthermore, bodies such as the World Bank and FDA provide technical assistance in the form of strategy and policy advice.

45 Available at http://www.lagoshouseofassembly.gov.ng/?n=&up=comd&comid=26
The primary aim of the Federal Ministry of Transport is to set the policy framework that guides transport authorities across Nigeria and fund identified major transport schemes. Interviewees including Frederic Oladeinde (LAMATA) and Frederic Olofin (LASWA) presented the view that the Ministry has not delivered its goals due to its lack of technocrats to aid the development, implementation and sustenance of the policy framework to maintain mass transportation in Nigeria.

In view of the strategic role of bodies as they relate to the system, the former Governor of Lagos state (Babatunde Fashola) stressed that the implementation and attainment of mass transport policies and schemes in Lagos will be delivered through PPP framework between organisations in and out of the system. LAMATA, in partnership with actors such as the NURTW, seeks to influence the Ministry of Transportation at the federal level by offering advice which supports the implementation of mass transportation. An instance indicating such advice and partnership was before the purchase of BRT Lite buses, when the NURTW, LAMATA and the Lagos state government asked for an import duty waiver from the Federal government for the high capacity buses imported into the country to allow for the purchase of more buses. Furthermore, LAMATA and the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation are responsible for awarding franchises to operators, and so are able to influence operators, through incentives, to operate on less profitable routes.

Alongside LAMATA, there exists the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation (a secondary actor), which is also partly responsible for formulating and implementing mass transport policies in Lagos. The draft Transport Policy of the state Ministry of Transportation states that the Ministry is one of the key bodies that influence mass transportation, and that it has three aims which include: to set up a mass transit system, to tackle chaotic mass transport operations by awarding franchises to relevant operators, and to plan the implementation of mass transport policies. While this Ministry was established to coordinate the planning and implementation of mass transport policies in the state, its operations have been marked by a lack of human and material resources over the years, and by corruption as discussed in Chapter 6. Given the problems of the Ministry, it is perhaps understandable that the government chose to create a new agency (LAMATA) instead of reforming the Ministry. In confirming the similarities between the two organisations, LAMATA (2006: 25) comments that the roles and responsibilities of the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation are similar to those of LAMATA, and that this overlap in roles, together with factors such as inadequate
regulations and capacity, constitutes a major impediment to the sustenance of mass transportation in Lagos.

The members of the Lagos State House of Assembly are responsible for enacting laws aimed at regulating the behaviours of actors in the system and empowering bodies such as LAMATA and transport operators to perform their roles. While the Assembly does not engage in delivering mass transportation, the laws that it passes set the framework for other actors, including organisations providing services that affect mass transportation provision. For instance, through its legal backing for committees in the Assembly, the Transport and Public Account Committees of the Assembly audit contractors, ministries and agencies, in order to make on-the-spot assessments of the various developmental projects embarked upon by the government.

The NURTW also influences the workings of the system. For instance, through its membership strength (about 1.5 million in the country) and the use of means such as strike actions or the threat of them, it is able to negotiate with actors in the system for policies that will favour its members. Thus, the NURTW, both at the national and state levels, is sometimes consulted by the state government before and during the process of implementing mass transport policies. For example, during the planning process for the introduction of BRT Lite buses in Lagos, some of the members of the NURTW were selected by LAMATA as part of the team that visited Bogota, Colombia, to study how its mass transport system, which is mainly through the bus mode, is planned and delivered. Also, due to the influence of the NURTW on the operation of mass transportation, and the role the union plays in mobilising votes for politicians during elections, LAMATA supported the NURTW in playing a key role in the system, especially by acting as a guarantor for the loan facility for the union to enable it to secure a franchise to operate certain routes on the BRT Lite network. The working between LAMATA and NURTW was aimed at getting the union including its members and affiliates to support LAMATA’s schemes.

As discussed in Chapter 6, previous attempt at implementing mass transportation project in Lagos failed because the NURTW was not consulted and engaged as a partner in implementing such projects. Olukayode Taiwo (LAMATA) argued that in the interest of sustaining mass transportation, the NURTW must be supported to act as an operator in order for them to take ownership of the BRT Lite Project. Also, the interviewee was of the view that it was imperative for LAMATA to partner with the union as the latter coordinates the
activities of operators in bus parks across the state. Thus, by engaging the NURTW in the system, the incidence of conflict, especially those between operators and other actors related to mass transportation delivery was minimised. It is therefore clear that the NURTW plays key roles relating to mass transport operations while also delivering mass transportation through the BRT Lite network. Nevertheless, Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport) and Desmond Amiegbegbhor (LAMATA) claim that, due to the involvement of the NURTW in the transport system, especially as relating to the collection of illegal proceeds by the NURTW, together with the Lagos state government own inadequate capacity for checking the collection of revenues from unions and their affiliates, the government has not been able to collect substantial revenues in the transport sector. This view was further sustained by Theroux (2010) in his documentary entitled ‘Law and disorder in Lagos’, where it was shown that the unofficial money collected by members of the NURTW ends up with the state treasurer (MC) of the union, and is spent by the treasurer on whatever he deems fit, such as giving donations to religious organisations and buying exotic cars. Nevertheless, while there may be certain legitimacy issues related to some of the activities of the NURTW, the organisation is a significant actor in the system due to its roles.

The Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry (LCCI) works with the state and federal governments through the provision of evidence and information which addresses the economic and transport needs of business organisations in the state. An example of such information provided by the LCCI is its report entitled ‘Cashless Lagos’46, which explores the challenges and benefits of implementing cashless payment initiatives on the BRT Lite system in the state, as payment for services in the transport sector is mainly through cash exchange. Through the cashless Lagos scheme, the LCCI was able to enter into a contract with organisations including financial institutions such as Sterling Bank, LAMATA and operators as regards the collection of fares through cashless means, and the disbursement of such earnings for mass transport schemes. The bodies that delivered the cashless payment system include Sterling Bank which provide the funds for the purchase of necessary technology, and LAMATA, which set the regulatory framework, while the operators ensured that the technology worked effectively. The Chamber also works with policy makers and

46 In its analysis of the Lagos Cash-less policy initiated by the Central Bank of Nigeria, the LCCI found that the Cash-less policy initiative reduced risk of cash related crimes while also reducing revenue leakage, for instance, in the collection of mass transportation fares. The full Lagos Cash-less policy report is available at http://www.lagoschamber.com/admin/docs/Cashless%20Lagos%20Report.pdf accessed on 18 April 2013.
organisations through business meetings and conferences so as to present the transport demands of the private and public sectors to politicians, investors and other key actors in the state. An instance of such meetings is the Business Environment Roundtable (BER) series held to address members’ priority transport challenges and how it impacts on their businesses. As in London, where business organisations through London First and the London Chamber of Commerce and Industry contribute to transport initiatives that advance the interests of organised business, it was observed that in Lagos private sector organisations, such as Eco bank, may fund transport projects that facilitate their business activities by providing loans for schemes in the state. Hence, relevant needs of business organisations and the Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry are met (which is also useful for users of BRT Lite, as witnessed with the implementation of the cashless payment scheme on the BRT Lite network).

Local authorities (the equivalent of London boroughs) in Lagos state are seen as partners by actors in the system, and especially LAMATA, as playing consultative roles during the process of implementing projects at the community level, while also engaging with local people on how to address their needs, which include the availability of mass transportation, healthcare and education.47 The study shows that, while local authorities do not constitute a part of the system as they do not play any daily role which affects the planning and implementation of mass transport schemes, they are relevant for disseminating information about schemes in order to ensure the acceptance of mass transport projects by the public.

Another actor that relates closely to the system in Lagos is the federal government, which operates through bodies such as the Federal Ministries of Transport and Finance. Both ministries, working closely with other bodies such as the National Assembly, are responsible for ensuring that institutional and legal frameworks are put in place to support state Ministries of Transport to deliver mass transportation across the country. However, due to the inability of the Federal Ministry of Transport and their counterparts at the state level to develop and coordinate the modes (train, buses and ferries) of transport in Nigeria, mass transportation within each state as well as between states has lacked coordination. Notwithstanding the supposed strategic role of the federal government, some actors in the system, for example Frederic Olofin (LASWA) and Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport), presented

47 Available at http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/pagemenus.php?p=60&k=32
the view that federal government agencies such as the National Inland Waterways (NIWA) and the Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), have become ineffective over the years due to low investment in infrastructures and human resources. Also, corruption was identified by Desmond Amiegbebhor (LAMATA) as a key factor working against the delivery of mass transportation in Nigeria including Lagos, as public servants were alleged to misappropriate public funds and siphon government resources. These factors, were argued by the interviewees identified above to have influenced the inability of the Federal Ministry of Transportation to implement its primary goal, which is to create the policy framework for mass transport initiatives across Nigeria.

As shown in the funding regime section later in this chapter, both the World Bank and French Development Agency (FDA) (external actors) were seen to have provided the majority of the funds used by LAMATA in implementing the BRT-Lite scheme. Furthermore, the World Bank has provided technical support in the form of planning, budgeting and evaluation, for projects implemented by LAMATA, and in particular the BRT scheme. Thus, although the World Bank and FDA are external actors to the system, it is clear that these bodies enable the sustenance of the system through their roles.

Drawing on the analysis of the goals of actors and the incidence of conflicts in the system, the researcher provides an expression of the goals of actors inside and outside the system in Lagos in Table 9 below.
Table 9: The distinctive goals of the actors constituting the system in Lagos and other external actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor</th>
<th>Stated primary goal(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagos Metropolitan Transport Authority (LAMATA)</td>
<td>To do strategy and planning for the provision of rapid, affordable, efficient and effective public transportation accessible to all in metropolitan Lagos (<a href="http://www.lamata-ng.com/vision&amp;mission.htm">http://www.lamata-ng.com/vision&amp;mission.htm</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Governor of Lagos State</td>
<td>To enable the renewal of the infrastructure of the state by investing in projects that increase the capacity and effectiveness of health, education, transport and socio-economic infrastructures that are critical for economic growth and poverty alleviation in the state. As regards transportation, the Governor aims to develop and sustain integrated mass transportation (an integration of road, rail and water modes of transport) in the state through LAMATA to transform Lagos into Africa's model mega-city (<a href="http://www.tundefashola.com/about/tunde/index.html">http://www.tundefashola.com/about/tunde/index.html</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lagos State House of Assembly (SHOA)</td>
<td>To enable socio-economic development in the state by passing laws and scrutinising actors including the Governor and bodies operating in the system (<a href="http://www.lagoshouseofassembly.gov.ng/?in=&amp;up=comd&amp;comid=26">http://www.lagoshouseofassembly.gov.ng/?in=&amp;up=comd&amp;comid=26</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Transportation, Lagos</td>
<td>To set up a mass transit system which can tackle the chaotic transportation problems in the State (<a href="http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/entities.php?k=38">http://www.lagosstate.gov.ng/entities.php?k=38</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos State Water Authority (LASWA)</td>
<td>To protect, restore and preserve Lagos waterways. The body educates Lagosians on water transport while enforcing relevant laws in order to provide for clean and safe waterways for transportation, recreation and enjoyment (<a href="http://web.laswa-ng.com/authority/about-us">http://web.laswa-ng.com/authority/about-us</a>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union of Road Transport</td>
<td>To ensure favorable conditions for its members, including owners and employees of operators across Lagos state and Nigeria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers (NURTW)</td>
<td>Lagos State Traffic Management Authority (LASTMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To manage and enforce traffic rules. The body educates and enlightens the public on the proper use of the highways, traffic safety and accident management while also promoting alternative methods of traffic management and road safety (<a href="http://lastma.gov.ng/about-us/responsibilities/">http://lastma.gov.ng/about-us/responsibilities/</a>).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Lagos Chamber of Commerce and Industry | To promote, support or oppose legislative or other measures affecting trade, industry, commerce and agriculture as well as representing the opinion of the business community on the above matters in particular, and on the economy as a whole (http://www.lagoschamber.com/index2.php?page=profile) |

| Federal Ministry of Transportation | To set the policy framework for the modes of transport and inter modal co-ordination. The policies and budgets of the ministry are implemented through its various agencies including Nigeria Railway Authority, Nigeria Ports Authority, Nigeria Maritime Administration and Safety Agency (NIMASA), Nigeria Shippers Council, National Inland Waterways Authority, and Nigeria Institute of Transport Technology (http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/politics/38206-government-alone-cannot-fund-the-transportation-system) |
7.5 The incidence of conflict in the system

The discussion of conflict here draws significantly on the literature employed while discussing conflict in the case of London. Key actors in Lagos, including the Governor and LAMATA, have not been able to address both potential and incidences of conflicts among actors in the system. To be specific, conflicts existing in the system in Lagos are discussed under two categories including pre-LAMATA (conflicts during this period were due mainly to the absence of a regulating institution due to the effects of military rule) and those witnessed post-LAMATA (conflicts were linked to competition between actors as each sought to outdo the other in delivering mass transport services). Conflicts were mainly linked to the duplication of organisational roles and the processes through which actors attempt to achieve their individual goals.

On the whole as was the case in the system in London, non-antagonistic conflict (Mao, 1968) appears more common than antagonistic conflict in the case of Lagos. The study shows that conflicts exist relating to the similar roles performed by the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation and LAMATA. Effectively, the two organisations have acted as rival establishments for developing and implementing mass transport policies because of the absence of clear rules stating how they should operate. The study shows that while LAMATA was created, there was no attempt by the government to establish mechanisms and policy framework to guide the operations of the body while another transport body (Lagos state Ministry of Transportation) existed. Bawa-Allah (consultant to the state government), argued that the lack of key institutions to regulate and coordinate organisations had furthered the incidence of conflict among actors before the establishment of LAMATA. He also presented the view that conflicts still exist in the system and are linked to absence of rules and effective enforcement agencies, in addition with competition among actors, for example between the State Ministry of Transport and LAMATA. Furthermore, he stated that other problems confronting mass transportation in Lagos are linked to the lack of joint working amongst actors in the system and caused by the fall-out of military rule which did not allow for the strengthening of democratic institutions and partnership working across sectors and levels of government. In his view, this lack of joint working could be linked to the ‘culture of competition among organisations’ and ‘show off by some actors to get the attention of the governor’. Nonetheless, the researcher observed from the study that the absence of key institutions such as watchdog bodies to scrutinise and hold actors to account, may also be responsible for the incidence of conflict in the system.
Furthermore, all interviewees suggested that additional conflicts in the system were linked to the effects of long years of military rule, which witnessed the weakening of government institutions and agencies responsible for service delivery, especially through the use of the command hierarchy of the military, which employed its own structure (military administrators and tribunals) as a replacement for democratic institutions such as the legislature for the purpose of coordinating the governance process. The period of military rule was before the emergence of LAMATA and was characterised by the absence of effective democratic institutions. Thus, while the military ruled, they established an elite clique which benefitted financially from the regime, thereby aiding the spread of corrupt practices (see also the discussion of the implications of military rule in Chapter 6).

Evidence from all interviewees in Lagos suggests that the incidence of conflict has mainly worked against the sustenance of mass transportation. However, with LAMATA’s emergence and growth, conflicting elements in the system, such as the NURTW’s illegal collection of revenue, have been identified and acted upon by LAMATA and the Lagos State House of Assembly (SHOA) through the ‘New Lagos Traffic Law’. Notwithstanding the efforts of LAMATA and the SHOA, analysis shows that the incidence of conflict has not been fully addressed due to the lack of political will by the government to enforce laws which could criminalise offenders, including members of the NURTW, and prohibit them from collecting unlawful charges from bus operators. Thus, while the government put in place relevant policies to prevent such activities by the members of the NURTW, members of the union still persist in their illicit revenue collection, which is known to most actors in the system as certain established policies are not fully implemented (as reported in Punch Newspaper, September 1st 2012). Hence, inadequate resources, policies and institutions to coordinate, regulate and prosecute erring organisations in the system in Lagos are partly responsible for the problems and conflicts inherent in the system.

Conflicts were observed only between organisations in the system, unlike in London, where conflicts existed also within the roles of an individual, namely the Mayor. The Governor does not directly control actors by chairing the board of key organisations as is the case in London, thus conflict in his roles was less likely.

In the course of examining the data gathered from LAMATA and the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation, it became clearer that certain conflicts in the system were linked to the differences between the two organisations, their varying roles and the strategic powers they had. For instance, the state Ministry of Transport lacks the powers to implement the scale of the projects executed by LAMATA as it is underfunded. Also, it was noted that the personnel at the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation did not have similar access to the key actors that could advance their work, such as the World Bank and French Development Agency. Hence, in addressing the key challenges of the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation, Taiwo Salami suggested that “the only way is, rather than competing, the government should coordinate intra sector activities and get more professionals to the state Ministry of Transportation to enable the planning and implementation of the schemes of the Ministry”. As discussed earlier, this suggests that there is a dearth of human and capacity resources in certain parts of the system and lack of joint-working.

The researcher observed that conflicts in the system have also enabled actors to develop partnerships as a viable means for addressing key irregularities relating to inadequate capacity, as witnessed in the partnership between LAMATA, World Bank, FDA, the state government and the NURTW while developing the BRT Lite system (LAMATA, 2009: 19). Another irregularity at the delivery level in the system causing conflict between operators and bus drivers is fares pilferage, and this was addressed with the implementation of the cashless scheme initiated by the LCCI in partnership with other actors as identified in Chapter 6. Furthermore, the cultures of people that have grown in an environment where there is little regard for rules, in addition with lack of clearly understood rules have also enabled conflicts in the system. It is therefore clear that some conflicts have stimulated actors to push for additional laws and coordination, such as ‘The new Lagos traffic law’ and cashless scheme referred to earlier. Thus, Healey’s (2004, 2006: 318) suggestion that conflict offers government the opportunity to develop co-ordination among relevant actors was observed in the system in Lagos.

In seeking to draw together the discussion in this section, it is apparent that conflicts linked to organisations in the system, a lack of systemic coordination and effective enforcement agencies, and lack of clearly understood rules, have significantly affected the sustenance of mass transportation in Lagos. The baleful activities of the NURTW illustrate the weakness of existing enforcement agencies in the state and the lack of political will by the Governor to address the activities of the body and the capacity issues facing the state Ministry.
of Transportation. Thus, interviewees including Desmond Amiegebbeh (LAMATA) and Taiwo Salami (Lagos state Ministry of Transport), suggested that joint working between the principal organisations in the system is key for the planning, implementation and sustenance of mass transportation. Furthermore, due to the strategic role of the Governor, it is important for him to create and strengthen relevant institutions.

To conclude the discussion of conflicts in the system in Lagos, the evidence examined suggests that key issues furthering conflicts between actors in the system include duplication of roles by organisations in the system, the inability of the government to address existing and emerging occurrences as witnessed in the baleful influence of the NURTW, and inadequate capacities linked to military rule. Hence, achieving collaboration across the system in Lagos was observed to be a difficult task, especially due to the unwillingness of some actors to work with others when they observe that they will not benefit from such collaboration. The researcher therefore concludes that conflicts are likely to continue to shape the extent to which organisations collaborate in the system in Lagos as its occurrence has led to the passage of some laws and more coordination in the system. Nevertheless, all interviewees presented the view that the establishment of relevant institutions and enforcement agencies which regulate actors in the system will reduce the effects of conflicts relating to disregard for rules.
7.6 Key themes that emerged from the study

The key themes that emerged from the study of Lagos include ‘culture’, ‘leadership’, ‘funding regime’ and ‘accountability’. These are considered in subsequent paragraphs, together with an examination of the position taken by systemic and non-systemic actors on each of the themes.

7.6.1 Culture

Culture featured prominently during the collection of primary data as one of the factors affecting the system and the sustenance of mass transportation in Lagos. This section explores how culture in Lagos is understood and the role it plays in the system. Lastly, recent attempts by the government and other relevant organisations to eradicate some of the negative influences of culture in the system are assessed.

Interviewees in Lagos construed culture as the practices and norms that Lagosians, including individuals and bodies in the system, regard as general ways of life. The concept can be understood according to Tylor’s (1881: 54, and 1913: 1) definition, which suggests that culture is a complex whole that includes knowledge, beliefs, morals, customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by people in society. In Lagos the researcher observed two types of culture: culture from the perspective of the general public and culture from the perspective of an organisation. In the former case, evidence gathered from interviewees and through the observation of some members of the public shows that most people were initially opposed to mass transport reform change, for example as witnessed through the implementation of the BRT Lite strategic plan, as this required individuals in Lagos to change their travelling behaviour. For instance, Desmond Amiegbebhor (LAMATA) and Bawa-Allah (consultant) presented the view that, during the introduction of the BRT Lite scheme, the project was initially opposed by some Lagosians, especially individual car drivers and owners, as they were banned from using the dedicated road routes assigned to the BRT Lite buses. Hence, culture as relating to the general public in Lagos shows how they may resist certain government policies which they view as not beneficial to their daily ways of life, especially when such policies are related to transportation and taxation.

In the case of organisations, interviewees, including Frederic Oladeinde (LAMATA), Olukayode Taiwo (LAMATA), Akin Mabogunje (Federal Government consultant) and Taiwo
Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport), presented the view that there exist negative organisational cultures, such as corrupt practices (as briefly identified earlier in this chapter), whereby individuals take from the resources of the state and organisations for their personal use, and unmeritocratic recruitment processes, whereby people are employed based on family ties and friendship rather than on merit or professional qualifications. This was discussed by Healey (2006: 228-230) as clientelism, and the study shows that it has led to the moribund status of some past transport agencies in Lagos, and indeed in Nigeria generally. In contrast, Frederic Oladeinde and Olukayode Taiwo (both from LAMATA) suggested that the organisational culture at LAMATA was one of transparency, professionalism, credibility and commitment. Akin Mabogunje (consultant to the Federal government) also suggests that the achievements of LAMATA are due mainly to the calibre of the staff that constitutes the organisation, and their openness.

In the case of Lagos, organisational and public cultures were therefore identified as key factors shaping the extent to which mass transportation would succeed due to factors identified earlier. Furthermore, prior to the emergence of LAMATA, certain practices had developed, such as indiscriminate fare increases by operators due to a lack of established fare pricing, and practices by the public such as poor driving, including disregard for traffic rules and regulations. In attempting to address these practices LAMATA initially encountered opposition from some people who doubted the usefulness of the BRT Lite scheme in addressing mass transport problems relating to overcrowded buses and arbitrary fare increases. However, the organisation has been able to enlighten the public, for example through media programmes and advocacy campaigns, thereby gradually changing some of the previous negative culture of the public.

With the emergence of LAMATA and its strengthening with the LAMATA Act 2006, the institution has been able to coordinate the activities of operators delivering services through its franchising process. For instance, it was observed that while the NURTW controlled the bus mode of mass transportation delivery prior to the establishment of LAMATA while also charging high fares for lucrative routes, through its franchising system LAMATA has been able to ensure the functionality of most mass transport routes (profitable and non profitable) while ensuring that flat fares are charged on most routes in order to increase the delivery of mass transportation to Lagosians. Furthermore, LAMATA has been able to partner with enforcement agencies such as KAI, LASTMA and the Nigerian police to ensure violators of traffic laws are arrested. While there have been instances when military
traffic offenders have resisted arrest, as evidenced by the clash between men of the Nigerian Police force and those of the Nigerian Navy in the Apapa area of Lagos on the 25th of January 2013 over the enforcement of the new traffic law\(^{49}\), the previous Governor (Fashola) has lobbied the State House of Assembly to pass additional laws to empower enforcement agencies to prosecute road traffic offenders.

The previous state government has not only enacted laws, but has also invested additional capacity and resources in media programmes, aimed at the reorientation of the negative attitudes of Lagosians and organisations in the system in order to support cultures that advance and sustain intermodal mass transportation. The interviewees at LAMATA presented the view that these initiatives, such as BRT’s half hour programme on radio Lagos, broadcast every Sunday (repeated on Tuesday), informs the public on how LAMATA is developing capacities and infrastructures and on the effects of such initiatives on road users and Lagosians generally.

To conclude the discussion in this section, the study of Lagos has shown evidence of the significance of culture, especially on how it can enable or hinder the sustenance of mass transportation. While the evidence provided by interviewees supported the creation of relevant rules and institutions to re-orientate actors in the system in doing away with negative cultures, it is clear that new rules will be confronted by various factors, including the organisations and persons that would like to oppose new ways of joint-working in order to preserve the former ways of working in the public sector (as witnessed by the initial opposition of some Lagosians to the implementation of the BRT Lite project). Nevertheless, the researcher’s view is that while there may be the creation of more appropriate institutions, and the enactment of laws, of significant importance is the enforcement of laws and the enabling of established institutions to perform their tasks. Furthermore, the political will of the Governor in tackling the bad political culture of NURTW and other bodies will be important in addressing the occurrence of negative individual and organisational cultures.

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7.6.2 Leadership

Interviewees in Lagos unanimously held the view that the failure of past governments in Lagos state and Nigeria to establish key institutions and invest in relevant capacities to sustain mass transportation and other public services, in addition to other factors such as corruption, is largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the mass transport sector in the state. Thus, all interviewees supported the view that good leadership will among other things enable the building of infrastructures to address public needs while including the public through consultations in the governance process. Drawing on the definition of leadership as discussed in the case of London, this section examines the process through which leadership increases or reduces the occurrence of conflicts in the system in Lagos. Thereafter, the leadership roles played by actors such as the Governor shall be examined. Lastly, conclusions are drawn for the practice and sustainability of the system.

As discussed earlier, Northouse’s (2013: 5) definition of leadership as a process whereby an individual influences a group of people to achieve a common goal is adopted in the discussion here. In the case of Lagos, it is clear that the Governor influences actors in the system, including those who compete for his attention in the process of providing public services such as health-care and mass transportation through his funding and political powers. As an elected official, the Governor has strategic and political leadership powers. His strategic powers include the power to raise tax within the state, the power to raise money through the capital market, and the power to plan and implement policies in the state. His political powers include the power to devolve authority to local authorities and bodies, and the power to get his political party members who constitute a majority in the State House of Assembly to support and vote for his policies. Through this means and others, especially the use of PPPs, the Governor is able to plan and implement mass transport schemes. In addition, the existence of groups of commissioners chosen by the Governor, and technocrats in some agencies, present the Governor with alternative elements to be employed for a variety of projects delivered through partnership in the state.

Due to his leadership position, and the powers he wields, he is able to play different leadership roles (political, through his expertise, and strategic, through his policy making and planning abilities). Nevertheless, some interviewees argued that LAMATA should lead and coordinate the system in Lagos due to its strategic expertise in transport planning but others disagreed. For instance, Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transportation) was of the
view that the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation should be the key organisation coordinating the system. However, the view of the researcher as regard leadership for the mass transport governance system is that the capacity and professional expertise possessed by LAMATA puts the organisation in a better position to coordinate and regulate the system in Lagos. Thus, while the Governor may possess the political power in the state, a body such as LAMATA possess strategic and planning powers.

The study shows that most agencies and institutions in the system are significantly influenced through the Governor’s powers to award grants, some of which specify that recipients must engage in the PPP framework in order to be eligible. It was also observed in Lagos (as in London) that the Governor, as the political leader of the state, appointed a technocrat and professional to head LAMATA. This then indicates the presence of two forms of leadership. First, the Governor is a political leader with some strategic powers which enable him to make decisions, while also using means such as funding powers to either support an organisation like LAMATA or not fully support an agency of the state as exemplified by the State Ministry of Transport. As the political leader, the Governor influences the policies to be implemented in the state in order to ensure such policies are consistent with established political ideology and party manifesto pledges. Second, LAMATA also plays strategic leadership roles in the system as it is responsible for planning and implementing schemes aimed at delivering mass transportation while also coordinating actors to minimise the incidence of conflicts.

The Commissioner of Transport, who heads the State Ministry of Transport, plays some leadership roles as he ensures the goals of the Ministry are achieved, for instance through the authorisation of projects relating to transportation. The study shows, however that, due to their lack of transport expertise, such commissioners have not been able to provide the leadership that would enable the Ministry to discharge its responsibilities effectively. For instance, Taiwo Salami (Lagos State Ministry of Transport) bemoans the inexperience of a commissioner (Kayode Opeifa), whom he describes as a biologist. He suggests that in a situation whereby ‘round pegs are not fit into round holes’ then there would be problems such as those confronting the Ministry. He further argued that it is not right for him with a significant knowledge of transport planning to be taking orders from the head of the Ministry whose educational background is in biological science.

Although the Governor has the powers to restructure the State Ministry of Transport, he has not done so. This may be because the Ministry, like some other agencies, serves the
purpose of rewarding patrons of the Governor through political appointments to positions in the agencies. Taiwo Salami (State Ministry of Transport) presented the view that most of the commissioners that have been appointed to head the ministry, with the exception of Prof. Badejo (previous Lagos State Commissioner of Transport), are not technically and professionally fit for the position. On the other hand, the managing director of LAMATA (Dayo Mobereola) has extensive expertise in transport planning, implementation and regulation. This therefore places him in a strong position to lead LAMATA.

The federal government also plays a leadership role in the state, especially through the establishment of the policy framework that guides elements of the governance system in the state, such as its recommendation for the planning of the redevelopment of the Lagos megacity region and through its grants used by the state for capital projects such as the construction of the third mainland bridge completed in 1990.

In concluding the discussion of the theme of leadership, unlike in London where many actors appeared to be interested in leading the system, the evidence gathered from interviewees in Lagos suggests that LAMATA and the Governor are playing leadership roles. However, of these two actors, most interviewees except Taiwo Salami and Olabanji Omotosho (both of Lagos State Ministry of Transport) presented the view that LAMATA is more suited to make and implement mass transport policies in Lagos due to its capacity and expertise. Drawing on the evidence collected, it is argued that a leader is important, especially for coordinating and managing the system towards the attainment of systemic goals. It was noted from the study that while both political leadership by the Governor and strategic leadership by LAMATA exist in Lagos, both rely on each other in sustaining mass transportation. For instance, while LAMATA depends on the Governor for its funding and political support, the Governor also relies on LAMATA’s expertise in delivering mass transportation projects in order to attain the policy priorities of the government as relating to mass transportation which subsequently enable him in seeking re-election to retain his leadership position in the state. Thus, the joint-working between the Governor and LAMATA in particular can be argued to have enabled the feats achieved in the transport sector in Lagos state as evidenced with BRT Lite, Lagos rail and ferry services. Nevertheless, it is clear from the study that the existing leadership in Lagos has not been able to address the criminal activities of NURTW relating to the illegal fees they collect from operators and the conflicts between organisations, for instance between LAMATA and the State Ministry of Transport.
7.6.3 Funding regime

During earlier discussion in this chapter it was emphasised that in Lagos the system relies on funding from various actors such as the federal government, Lagos State government and World Bank. This section aims to investigate the actors constituting the funding regime and how they influence the system. Furthermore, the sources of the funds used in the system and the priority areas catered for by the state budget are also highlighted. While the evidence in Table 10 shows that LAMATA receives most of the allocations to transport agencies in Lagos, it is also clear that grants from the federal government and other donors to Lagos state constitute a significant proportion of the funding available for mass transportation. Due to the reliance on such grants, interviewees, especially those from LAMATA, presented the view that a more diverse funding stream feeding into the Transport Fund managed by LAMATA is essential for sustaining mass transportation in Lagos in the face of current and future government cuts.

The actors that constitute the funding regime are a mix of governmental and non-governmental actors as shown in Figure 4. The governmental actors identified include the federal government, comprising its agencies such as the Federal Ministry of Transportation and Ministry of Finance (funding through grants), and the Lagos state government (funding through grants). The World Bank (funding through loan), French Development Agency (FDA) (funding through grant) and private sector organisations like Eco Bank and Sterling Bank (funding through loan) constitute the non-governmental actors. Aside from these actors, interviewees at LAMATA noted that other funds employed for sustaining mass transportation include secondary income, such as the proceeds from the Motor Vehicle Administration, earnings from licenses, and concessions and savings in the Transport Fund established and monitored by LAMATA. Unlike in London, where income from fares constitutes a significant component of the funding regime and goes to TfL, in Lagos, most of the fares income goes to operators who then pay established fees for franchises/licenses to deliver mass transportation.

As discussed earlier, it was noted that members of the NURTW collect illegal fees from operators. This fee arguably constitutes part of the income that would have gone to the coffers of either LAMATA or operators to sustain mass transportation. While some of the funds LAMATA gets go through the state government, others, for example grants from donors such as the FDA and fees earned from route franchises issued, are transferred into the Transport Fund managed by LAMATA. It was clear from the study that LAMATA was able
to secure its first loan from the World Bank by collaborating with the state and federal
governments on the technicalities and planning of LUTP. Having identified the actors that
constitute the funding regime, the researcher observed from the study that such actors fund
the system in different ways. For instance, funds from the federal government take the form
of allocations, which go through the Lagos state government to LAMATA, while others, as
indicated above, go directly to LAMATA.

In exploring how funds are gathered and spent on mass transportation projects, key
reports and budgets were examined. While it was not possible to access the budget of
LAMATA due to reasons explained in Chapter 2, aspects of the Lagos state government
budget were employed for analysis. See Table 10 below for information extracted from the
2012 budget of the Lagos state government.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function, Budget Group and Agency</th>
<th>Budget Y2012</th>
<th>Budget Y2011 (Revised)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagos State Ministry of Transportation</td>
<td>3,582,673,001</td>
<td>3,064,890,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos State Traffic Management Agency</td>
<td>270,000,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Administration</td>
<td>696,196,037</td>
<td>2,635,863,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos State Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA)</td>
<td>28,969,105,864</td>
<td>24,411,268,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAGBUS</td>
<td>1,680,000,000</td>
<td>1,796,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lagos State Waterways Authority</td>
<td>1,162,020,000</td>
<td>1,677,703,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for Transportation</strong></td>
<td><strong>36,359,994,902</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,585,726,079</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in the tables above are extracted from the Year 2012 Budget of Lagos state

It is clear that the Lagos state government is the key funder. In his 2012 budget speech
to the State House of Assembly, the then governor (Babatunde Fashola) emphasised that, due
to the reduction in the grants received from the federal government, the state government is
looking inwards and relying on tax revenue to fund developmental projects. While presenting his view, the governor asserts that,

“Self-sufficiency through tax compliance has certainly proven more reliable than depending on oil revenues which are proving increasingly unstable, as the key to building our prosperity” (Babatunde Fashola, 2012).

While the state relies on federal government grants, it also relies heavily on tax revenues generated within the state. In the 2012 budget of Lagos state, federal government grants (110,158 billion naira) constituted about 27.6% of the total income proposed, thereby highlighting the federal government’s role in the funding regime, with other income being internally generated from sources such as investments and tax, and loans and grants from external partners. From Table 10, it is clear that LAMATA received the highest budgetary allocation of all the agencies in the Transport sector in Lagos state. With an allocation of 28,969,105,864 naira, this constitutes about 79.7% of the total funds allocated to the transport sector in the budget. Also, it was noted that various transport projects constitute part of the budget expenditure on economic affairs, which represents 31.52% of the state total budget. This shows the extent to which the state government support the activities of LAMATA and the degree of the responsibilities of the institution in the system.

The previous Governor reiterated in his 2013 budget speech that the government will continue to pursue public-private partnerships as means of getting private sector funding for projects in the public sector. This explains the finding that the government in Lagos plays a significant role in the initiation of partnerships, as bodies such as LAMATA take the lead role in identifying strategic partners (international donors and private sector funders) with funding powers to assist in advancing systemic and operational capacity while also sustaining the funding regime. The data gathered from interviewees at LAMATA suggests that the strategic funding partners of LAMATA are identified based on their capacity to fund LAMATA’s projects and the degree to which relevant expertise can be transferred to LAMATA.

The study also shows that there exists a relationship between the funding regime and conflicts in Lagos. For instance, as LAMATA receives the lion’s share of grants from the state government, other actors that receive fewer grants, such as the State Ministry of Transportation and LASWA, complain about this. For instance, Frederick Olofin (LASWA) argued that LAMATA receives more funding than other agencies because it is favoured by the Governor. This observation is sustained by the evidence of Bawa-Allah (Consultant to
Thus, while LAMATA is considerably funded, other bodies disagree with the attention and funding LAMATA gets. However, it is the view of the researcher that the funding received by LAMATA is linked to the technical and coordinating roles the organisation plays in the system as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Also, it was noted that, irrespective of the political party governing at the federal government level, and due to the challenges of providing necessary capacities in Lagos, the federal government supports the government of Lagos state through separate grants for developmental projects such as that given for the building of an embankment for the bar beach on the Island while also collaborating with the government on schemes such as the construction of the Light Rail Transit project and the granting of right of passage for the implementation of the BRT Lite scheme.

As indicated in Chapter 6, partnerships play an important role in the funding regime as they are employed by the state government and LAMATA for the purpose of funding mass transport projects and sustaining mass transportation. The study shows that partnerships in Lagos are not as established as in London, because it was not until the establishment of LAMATA in 2002 that attempts were made to employ partnership with actors outside government in raising funds and to solicit for inputs to sustain mass transportation in Lagos. Before the emergence of LAMATA, the state government paid all the public funds for the provision of mass transportation through the Lagos state Ministry of Transportation.

Nonetheless, with the establishment of LAMATA, it was clear to the actors in the system that partnership with organisations across sectors in the state was necessary to raise additional funding. Hence, for example, organisations including LAMATA, NURTW, and financial institutions such as Eco bank, established a partnership to deliver some of the buses used on the BRT Lite network. While the practice of employing partnerships for the purpose of transport policy planning, implementation and evaluation in Lagos is still developing, due to the limited experience and period of existence of relevant organisations, in reflecting on the understanding and practice of partnerships in Lagos, Desmond Amiegbebor (LAMATA) presented the view that the state government understands Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a means to transfer the funding responsibilities of government to the private sector. In commenting on this stance, the interviewee suggested that the government should not transfer all its responsibilities to the private sector as the private sector in Lagos and Nigeria is in a developmental phase and also vulnerable to political uncertainties and the absence of relevant copyright laws. This view was supported by Frederic Olofin (LASWA), who indicated that...
the state government had reduced its budgetary allocation and tasked the agency (LASWA) to seek funding from the private sector to finance planned initiatives for water transport in the state. This then indicates that, while the federal and state governments constitute the key funders of mass transport initiatives in Lagos, due to inadequate resources, the state government is employing partnerships with organisations in the private sector to raise private sector equity funding to further the sustenance of mass transportation.

To conclude, the discussion of the funding regime in Lagos has shown that, since the emergence of LAMATA, the funding regime in place has influenced the emergence of partnerships in the system while the latter also shape the former in sustaining mass transportation, for instance the partnership between LAMATA, NURTW and Eco bank, funded some of the BRT Lite buses operated by the NURTW. Furthermore, the study showed that PPPs were employed for funding mass transport schemes and projects due to the limited capacity of the grants that came from the federal government to the state government. Thus, the researcher is of the view that the success of the funding regime in Lagos is partly linked to the Governor’s leadership as exemplified through his use of PPPs in raising funds aimed at implementing initiatives such as the BRT Lite scheme and the Light Rail project which have increased mass transport capacities in Lagos thereby sustaining socio-economic activities and users mobility. It is thus clear from the study of Lagos that the Governor of the state plays a key role in raising funds employed for financing projects aimed at sustaining the system.

7.6.4 Accountability

This section discusses the process by which actors are held to account for their roles and actions by others. As in London, interviewees in Lagos interpreted accountability as the process through which an actor holds another actor to account for their roles and resource use while the latter actor also gives an account of his or her use of resources. The structure of the accountability framework in Lagos was found to be similar to that in London in terms of the forms of accountability found. The discussion in this section explores accountability of two kinds: electoral accountability, which is from politicians to electorates, and administrative accountability, which is from all actors to those responsible for scrutinising their performance.

In the course of exploring how actors are held to account in the system in Lagos, it was noted that politicians, and in particular the Governor, are held to account by citizens mainly through elections. The Governor is also held to account through administrative means,
for instance, the State House of Assembly, especially its Transport Committee and Public Account Committee, scrutinises the Governor’s budget and investigates his policy initiatives and ongoing projects. The 39 elected members of the Lagos State House of Assembly are also accountable to the electorates who voted them into office.

An instance of administrative accountability is evidenced in the 2002 LAMATA’s Act, which stipulates that the leadership of LAMATA shall be accountable to the Governor. The interviewees at LAMATA stressed that the organisation is held to account by the Governor of the state through the use of performance targets set in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) establishing LAMATA. In addition, the study shows that the State Ministry of Transportation is accountable to the state government as the former was established through the 1967 Decree No. 14 promulgated by the Federal Military Government, which also created the state and established that the state government is responsible for funding all ministries in the state and also for holding the ministries to account for their use of resources. However, because the heads of the ministries are political appointees, the holding to account of such heads is at the discretion of the Governor.

In addition to the use of statutes in holding certain actors to account, another administrative means of holding to account is through committees in the Lagos State House of Assembly. For instance, the Public Accounts Committee and Committee on Works and Infrastructure audit some of the projects implemented by ministries and agencies in the state based on the terms of reference and contractual details of such projects. For instance, after touring the construction of Ariyo-Ira-Muwo-Tedi-Abule Oshun Bridge in Ojo Local Government, the Committee on Works and Infrastructure summoned the contractor in charge of the project over its failure to finish the scheme on schedule. Hon. Rotimi Olowo, Chairman of the Committee on Works and Infrastructure further commented

“You have collected a large sum of money from the coffers of the state to execute this project, and this job has been on over four years. To date you have not delivered up to 75% of the work: I see no reason why the contract should not be revoked and why it should not be awarded to another firm and I learnt that you have a bad record as a company with the state”\(^{50}\).

\(^{50}\) Available at http://www.lagoshouseofassembly.gov.ng/?in=&up=newsd&evid=88, accessed on 15th July 2013
Thus, it is clear in Lagos that, while elected officials are held to account by citizens through elections, the State Assembly officials also hold the government and its agencies and other bodies delivering any services in the state to account for their use of resources. The study shows that offenders are rarely prosecuted thereby showing a weakness in the process by which actors are held to account.

The Governor and the members of the State House of Assembly are held to account by other actors, including the opposition parties (electoral accountability), based on the policies promised by the Governor in his manifesto before being elected. Furthermore, it was noted that opposition parties and civil society groups have used petitions to hold the government to account. For instance, the Democratic Peoples’ Alliance (DPA) party petitioned the State House of Assembly on the controversy surrounding the legality of the purchase of the Sunborn Yacht at the cost of 25 million Euros, and renamed Lagos Yacht Hotel. However, while an inquiry was carried out into the details of the contract, the details of the findings of the inquiry, like most other inquiries in the state, were not published or communicated to the public. In commenting on the inaction of the committee charged with the inquiry, the DPA party argued that Lagos state would be better governed with greater accountability and less impunity if all of the Governor’s actions were scrutinised by the House of Assembly.

To show his intention to strengthen accountability, the previous Governor employs the mass media to give an account of his use of resources every 100 days in office. On the 6th of June 2013 at the Lagos State University (LASU), the Governor gave another account of his stewardship on spending 2,200 days in office. In the forum, he reassured Lagosians that the government is focused on service delivery while also informing academics of the need to access the 1.5 billion naira research fund created in the state’s budget, thereby indicating that, while the government is committed to the process of giving an account of its use of resources, it also aims to inform the public on how they can engage with the government, in this case through grants for research purposes. Another instance where the Governor accounts for his use of resources is during the annual budget speech delivered at the chamber of the State House Assembly. For instance in his Year 2012 budget speech, the Governor established that

“Our focus would be to continue and complete as many on-going projects as we could, whilst starting only critical ones that we could fund, with the intention of leading our Party to victory at the general elections with great optimism that our performance score card would be good enough to secure a return for us” (Babatunde Fashola, 2012).
This therefore makes it clear that, due to factors such as the need to gain and maintain political power, the Governor engages in a variety of activities that are designed to indicate his openness and answerability for resource use.

Administrative accountability was also observed from the study of Lagos through the process whereby actors, including the staff of LAMATA, LAMATA’s contractors and other partners are held to account by their organisations. For instance, the staffs of LAMATA are held to account by their employer against contracts and established performance indicators. Also, it was clear that LAMATA holds its contractors and staff to account based on set Terms of Reference (TOR’s) for contractors and performance targets for staff.

The research identified an absence of significant established ‘watchdog’ institutions (such as London Travel Watch and the National Audit Office in UK, which scrutinise relevant aspects of the operations of the actors in the system in London).

While there may be a number of challenges in relation to accountability in Lagos, often reflecting institutional cultures and practices, the government realising the need for an effective institution, established LAMATA with the 2002 LAMATA Act of the Lagos State House of Assembly to be accountable to the Governor. This Act was amended in 2006, specifying that LAMATA is responsible for coordinating and implementing mass transport policy planning in Lagos (LAMATA, 2009: 17). The 2006 LAMATA Act also established that the institution shall be called as and when necessary by the State House of Assembly to present evidence relating to its work. While no specific time frames were given for such meetings, the evidence presented by interviewees (Desmond Amiegbebhor, Kayode Taiwo and Frederic Oladeinde) at LAMATA suggests that the institution works with relevant members and committees of the State House of Assembly while sponsoring bills and, in the process, educating legislators on aspects of mass transportation planning and policy making. LAMATA’s 2006 Act also shows that the organisation is accountable to the Lagos state government and the Governor through the submission of its annual reports and budget performance against proposed transport projects.

In considering the process used in holding LAMATA to account, aside from the Governor demanding an account of LAMATA’s workings and projects, it was clear that committees in the State House of Assembly use meetings to question the leadership of LAMATA on resource use. Nonetheless, while the researcher was not able to observe any copy of the report of the review/audit of LAMATA by the State House of Assembly, the
previous Governor, Babatunde Fashola (2009: i) in his review of the activities of LAMATA comments:

“The remarkable success of the BRT Lite initiative delivered by LAMATA has demonstrated clearly that the hitherto seemingly intractable transportation problems of Lagos such as the gridlocks of erstwhile Oshodi or the bottlenecks previously experienced in Apapa, Iyana-Ipaja, Ikorodu road to the heart of Lagos Island are indeed surmountable…. May I commend the efforts of LAMATA for the safe delivery of the first BRT in the whole of Africa, and which has since become a reference point for other cities” (Babatunde Fashola, 2009: i).

From the quote, it is clear that the Governor endorses the activities of LAMATA.

To conclude the discussion of accountability in Lagos, relations between actors holding others to account and actors being held to account show that partnership is employed for various purposes including as a means to gather information used in the holding to account process. Also, additional relations were observed by the researcher between the Governor and Lagosians through the 100 days in office media parley he holds, and where he answers questions linked to his performance and service delivery.

It is noted that the means of holding actors to account as discussed above all have benefit and cost implications for the performance of the system. For instance, while the cost associated with the use of statutes and contracts in holding actors to account includes that of putting in place relevant systems such as an independent and effective judiciary including structures for assessing performance, benefits of using statutes and contracts relate to the support and structure they provide for implementing contractual agreements. For instance, in LAMATA, the use of contracts and performance targets provides guidance to staff across various departments, thereby furthering the delivery of elements of the BRT Lite project. Thus, although there are different units in LAMATA, they work together to implement LAMATA’s goals. Furthermore, it was noted that the use of statutes, contracts and performance targets enabled the establishment and strengthening of enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, the researcher observed that certain costs, such as the high price of building capacities for the judiciary, are associated with the process of holding actors to account. Also, the case of Lagos, where the judiciary is funded by the state government, raises questions concerning the degree to which the judiciary is independent of government influence. To sustain this argument, the former Chief Justice of Lagos state, Justice Inumidun Akande,
urged her successor to strive to strengthen the cause of an independent judiciary in the state (Adesomoju, 2012)\textsuperscript{51}.

To summarise the discussion of accountability, Figure 5 and Table 11 below indicate who is accountable to whom, for what and how.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Accountability.png}
\caption{Accountability Framework of the System in Lagos}
\end{figure}

Table 11: The accountability framework of the mass transport system in Lagos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nos</th>
<th>Name of actor (organisation)</th>
<th>Who actor is accountable to and what for</th>
<th>How the organisation or body is held to account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>LAMATA</td>
<td>Answerable to its funder including the Governor and to SHOA for its use of resources.</td>
<td>Held to account through meetings and inquiries by Committees in the SHOA. Its annual report is also scrutinised by the SHOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Lagos State government</td>
<td>Accountable to the Federal government, State House of Assembly and public for its use of resources and exercise of power</td>
<td>Held to account based on its delivery of relevant projects through questions and answer session at the SHOA, and through electoral means.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Lagos State Ministry of Transport</td>
<td>Answerable to the State House of Assembly on how it has used appropriated funds in the state budget</td>
<td>Held to account through questioning by Committees in the State House of Assembly and through an on-the-spot check of its projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>LASWA</td>
<td>Answerable to the SHOA and Governor for its use of resources</td>
<td>Held to account through questioning at the SHOA on the extent to which it has implemented the Governor’s transport policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Answerable to the SHOA, Lagosians, Federal government and other institutions like the World Bank for its use of resources</td>
<td>Held to account through question and answer session at the SHOA, through the media forum he organises, and through electoral means</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While Table 11 shows how bodies and actors are held to account and who they are accountable to, Figure 5 illustrates accountability relations in the system. Furthermore, Figure 5 shows that at the heart of the process of holding to account is the Governor who also play leadership roles in the system. This then indicate the relations existing among actors in the system and between the roles played by certain actors.

The discussion in this section has shown that political and administrative kinds of accountability exist in Lagos. However, of these two kinds, it is clear that administrative accountability is more employed due to its flexibility and ability to be used at any given time. Furthermore, it was also clear that certain actors such as the Governor are held to account by both political and administrative kinds of accountability as committees in the State House of Assembly hold him to account for the extent to which he implements his policies and projects while Lagosians use elections as a means to hold the Governor to account based on the degree to which he has delivered his electoral promises and manifesto.

Analysis of the study shows that due to the powers possessed by the Governor, he is able to circumvent certain processes which affect the sustenance of mass transportation. For instance, the Governor’s inaction to revamp the State Ministry of Transportation which performs similar functions to that of LAMATA raises certain questions relating to the commitment of the governor in supporting institutions and agencies in the state to sustain mass transportation. Furthermore, the government’s inability to act against NURTW as a body and its members for collecting illegal fees in bus parks also raises additional questions concerning the Governor’s dealing with the NURTW and its members.

7.7 Testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in the case of Lagos

As with the case in London, in testing the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, the evidence gathered from Lagos demonstrates a number of weaknesses in the propositions of the authors with regard to their essential ingredients of collaborative governance. In subsequent paragraphs, these propositions are examined based on how they exist in the system in Lagos. The themes identified through the study to be fundamental for sustaining collaborative modes of governance in the system in Lagos shall also be highlighted.

The evidence from this study suggests that rather than actors being influenced by a prior history of collaboration or conflict as postulated by Ansell and Gash (2008), actors in
Lagos were mainly motivated by what they stood to gain from the collaborative framework and the government (primarily in the form of the Governor). For instance, the bodies constituting the partnership between LAMATA, NURTW and Eco Bank participated in the partnership because of what they perceived as the gains for them. While LAMATA participated in order to involve the NURTW in the transport reform in the state, so as to enable the acceptability of the mass transport reform by majority stakeholders, NURTW worked with the other partners in order to get funding to obtain franchise for running a mass transport route. Similarly, Eco Bank took part in the partnership because of the potential profits it would make. Thus, the case in Lagos shows that actors do not necessarily participate in partnerships because of a prehistory of cooperation or conflict.

The study showed that the Governor and LAMATA play leadership roles in the system while enabling the process where mass transport policies are implemented. The study also points to the significant powers (funding and statutory) of the Governor, and how such powers are used to influence systemic and non-systemic actors. Furthermore, as Ansell and Gash (2008) did not identify how the facilitative leader would emerge and whether the leader would be one or more individuals or bodies, the study has provided some evidence which suggests that some actors in the system in Lagos want different actors to constitute the leadership of the system, due to the expertise and powers of each of the actors. This has furthered the understanding of how leadership modes (political and strategic) can be employed to enable and sustain the delivery of public services such as mass transportation. As was the case in the system in London, forms of leadership were found in Lagos that were not noted in the Ansell and Gash (2008) model. The researcher observed that both the Governor (political leadership) and LAMATA (strategic leadership) played significant roles in sustaining relations in the system and transport capacities.

While Ansell and Gash (2008: 555) argued that factors such as basic protocols and ground rules are critical for sustaining the collaborative process, the system in Lagos shows that ground rules and basic protocols by themselves cannot sustain the collaborative process, as there were incidences of both a lack of sufficient rules and an inability to enforce some rules. The study shows that the existing culture in Lagos arguably plays a fundamental role in sustaining or hindering the collaborative process responsible for maintaining transport modes. The system in Lagos demonstrates the challenges of enforcing some rules as some people (for example, some military personnel) see themselves as above the law. Thus, although Ansell and Gash (2008) identified the relevance of basic protocols and rules, the case in Lagos shows
that basic protocols and ground rules lacking enforcement powers might not attain necessary results relating to sustaining collaboration. The discussion of partnerships in Chapter 6 shows that key actors such as the Governor and LAMATA influence who participates in PPPs aimed at delivering mass transport schemes. Thus, rather than the Ansell and Gash (2008) model of collaborative governance, the system in Lagos shows the existence of only a few partnerships with restricted memberships and which could be argued to be successful as all the constituents of each partnership benefitted from their operations.

From Figure 1, Ansell and Gash (2008) show that variables including trust building, face-to-face dialogue, commitment to process, and shared understanding are important for sustaining the collaborative system. While the case in Lagos demonstrates the existence of some of these variables, for instance, shared understanding by actors, in terms of the need to develop more transport capacity in order to enable transport sustainability, the study highlights that in addition to face-to-face dialogue, other means of communication, particularly through social media and information technology (IT) were employed. Furthermore, while Ansell and Gash (2008: 558) suggest that direct dialogue allows for ‘‘thick communication’’ which is necessary for stakeholders to identify opportunities for mutual gain, the case in Lagos shows that stakeholders communicate directly and indirectly through representative bodies such as NURTW representing operators.

As shown in Chapter 6, the study of partnerships in the system in Lagos shows that collaboration develops among organisations not just because of the need to focus on ‘small wins’ that deepen trust as suggested by Ansell and Gash (2008), but because of the need to attain over-arching government policies through PPPs, and the quest of organisations to meet needs they cannot achieve individually. Thus, the evidence from Lagos has shown that rather than variables such as starting conditions and face-to-face dialogue, the key actors identified to influence collaborations in the system include the Governor, LAMATA and other actors constituting the funding regime. The study also shows that the means of accountability constitutes one of the factors that sustain the collaborative framework in the system. While discussing accountability earlier in this chapter, it was suggested that it helps enable collaboration among actors. However, the Ansell and Gash (2008) model failed to consider this factor, and others, which shape the system in Lagos. Drawing on the evidence from the study, it is argued here that majority of the ingredients argued by Ansell and Gash (2008) to enable collaborative governance are not valid in systems with characteristics such as those in Lagos and London, where key influential actors such as the Mayor and Governor, ensures that
the scope and operations of partnerships are aligned towards the attainment of their policy priorities. The prescriptive nature of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model developed from cases explored in the United States, within a socio-political and cultural context arguably different from elsewhere, also demonstrate the weakness of the model.

Another limitation of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model is its failure for not considering the influence and relevance of culture in shaping collaborative frameworks as discussed earlier in this chapter. The evidence gathered from the study of the case in Lagos, as discussed in Section 7.6.1, shows that existing cultures (public culture and organisational culture) affect the system and the sustenance of mass transportation. For instance, potentially problematic cultures were observed, as with the resistance to reform and the violation of transport rules, and some negative organisational cultures in the form of corrupt practices and unmeritocratic recruitment processes.

Clearly, some of the propositions of Ansell and Gash (2008) were seen in Lagos, as with the relevance of facilitative leadership that was observed in the system. Nevertheless, the study has shown some evidence that differs from many of the variables proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008). Hence, beyond the variables identified by Ansell and Gash (2008) as presented in Figure 1 to enable and sustain collaborative frameworks, the study of Lagos has identified crucial factors, such as culture, the nature of the funding regime, government policies, accountability and leadership types, as influencing collaborative modes of governance. By identifying these factors, our understanding is enhanced on the possible factors that shape collaborative frameworks.

7.8 Chapter conclusion

The discussions in this chapter have shed further light on the factors crucial for sustaining the system in Lagos. The study of Lagos shows that while actors supported the idea of having a leader to coordinate the system, they did not agree on who is best suited to play this role. This then shows an incidence of divergence between actors on the leader of the system. Notwithstanding the views of actors on the leadership of the system, the leaders (Governor and LAMATA) are able to employ their powers in influencing actors to implement government policies and deliver schemes through partnerships. Hence, while the Ansell and Gash (2008) model identified facilitative leadership as one of the key variables that enables the collaborative governance framework, the model failed to illustrate how the leader would
emerge and whether systemic leadership is best constituted by an individual, organisation or a combination of both.

The chapter has particularly shown that while the ingredients identified by Ansell and Gash (2008) as required for collaborative governance are insufficient, and cannot be applied to all collaborative frameworks, for instance the cases explored in this study, other crucial factors, such as culture, government policies, means of holding to account, and funding regime were identified as playing fundamental roles in enabling collaborative modes of governance. Discussions in the chapter also focused on the roles of actors in Lagos, the ways actors interpret partnerships, as well as how and why conflicts emerge among actors. The study of the system in Lagos shows that culture plays a key role in shaping phenomena such as corruption, conflicts and cooperation.

As in London, it was noted in Lagos that the government plays an interventionist role while employing delegation and partnership working with organisations for the purpose of public service delivery. For instance, in supporting LAMATA’s work, the Governor delegated to LAMATA the power to make regulations subject to the Governor’s approval (LAMATA, 2009: 18). Also, in implementing the LUTP, the Governor emphasised the use of public-private partnership as the means for funding the delivery of mass transportation in the framework in which, while LAMATA provides the enabling infrastructures, including the traffic systems, private sector organisations would provide funding (loans and capital) and operators would accept the regulatory enforcement (LAMATA, 2011: 5). This all point to the strong influence of the government in the system in Lagos.

While the immediate past Governor has indicated his resolve to fund and sustain the provision of capacities that would enable mass transportation in the state, as seen with the operation of BRT Lite and investment in the Lite Rail project, the lack of policy guidance at the federal government level has impeded the sustenance of mass transportation in the state. Nonetheless, the creation and strengthening of LAMATA as the strategic transport authority responsible for coordinating mass transportation is yielding dividends as illustrated with the operation of BRT Lite whose success has been commended by the World Bank and used as a model for mass transport initiatives in countries such as Ghana and Japan, and also in other Nigerian cities including Port Harcourt, Ibadan and Kano. LAMATA’s (2009: 37-38) evaluation of BRT Lite shows that the scheme has improved the quality of lives not only of those using it along the Ikorodu road corridor, but also those who travel along the corridor by
other modes (cars and motorcycles). Nevertheless, challenges remain, including the need to establish appropriate regulations to ensure compliance among actors in the system (Ibid).

The chapter also discussed how overlaps in the functions of certain organisations (in particular LAMATA and the State Ministry of Transportation) furthered conflicts. While interviewees emphasised that actors in the system competed against each other, especially for a leading role in the system, the study shows that conflict has had both positive and negative effects on the development of mass transportation in Lagos. The negative effects include the competition it causes in the system, which has allowed for more coordination among actors and the enactment of laws to regulate actors. On the other hand, key actors in the system, in particular LAMATA and the Governor have embraced PPPs as a means for addressing funding problems in the system, although the latter’s interpretation of PPPs was criticised by some interviewees in the system thereby questioning the validity and relevance of PPPs in Lagos. The evidence from the study also suggests that the incidence of conflict in Lagos furthered the emergence of partnerships. The implication of this for the practice of collaborative governance is that, although all the interviewees in the system deplore the occurrence of conflicts, the observed positive and negative effects of conflicts have provided additional evidence for understanding its role in the collaborative framework.

To conclude, the study of the system in Lagos has identified key themes such as culture, leadership, funding regime and accountability as important in influencing the degree to which mass transportation will be sustainable. The study and discussion in this chapter have shown that these themes relate to one another and do not necessarily exist in isolation. For instance, it was clear that key actors such as the federal government and Governor, who all constitute the funding regime, also play leadership roles in the system. These same actors are involved in the process in which actors are held to account thereby indicating the relations between actors in and out of the system.
Chapter Eight:
Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This study set out to assess the occurrence of collaborative modes of governance in the systems of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos, by focusing on the relationships among actors. The motivation for the study was the desire to better understand the dynamics of the relations among actors in both systems and the relevance, if any, of collaboration, conflicts and collaborative governance to the sustenance of mass transportation. The research thus began with an interest in the idea of collaborative governance in both analytical and normative senses. In the course of analysing the literature on collaborative governance, the researcher observed the fluid nature of the concept and contrasting definitions of partnership and governance, which together constitute the concept of collaborative governance.

This chapter begins with a discussion of how the research questions of the study have been addressed (section 8.2). Thereafter, section 8.3 compares the key empirical findings arising from the attempt to apply the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in both cases investigated, identifying the similarities and differences in both cases to contribute to the development of a more robust model of collaborative governance. There is then a concluding remark on the model focusing on its normative stance, the problem of generalisation, and definitional problems, drawing on the discussions in Chapters 3, 5 and 7. The chapter then goes on to list the contributions of the study and its policy implications in section 8.5. Section 8.6 then presents the final conclusion of the study.

8.2 Addressing the research questions

The research questions generated for the study are of two types (primary and supplementary questions), and discussed in Chapter 2. The primary questions relate to the meaning and use of collaborative governance. They include: What is meant by collaborative governance? How useful is the concept of collaborative governance for understanding mass transportation in London and Lagos? How far can collaborative governance contribute to improving mass transportation? These questions were addressed in Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7.
The supplementary research questions focus on the manifestation of collaborative governance and they include: What forms of collaborative governance can be identified? What are the mass transport problems? How are these problems actually addressed? What capacity (within each city) exists to solve these problems? These questions were addressed using the data gathered from the study, drawing on primary (use of in-depth semi-structured interviews) and secondary (use of publications and other soft resources in electronic form) sources. The answers to these questions can be found in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7.

In addressing the first research question (What is meant by collaborative governance?), the review of the literature on collaborative governance highlights the variety of sometimes contrasting definitions. Nevertheless, two definitions stood out: firstly, that of Ansell and Gash (2008: 544), with collaborative governance seen as a governing arrangement, with one or more public agencies directly engaging non-state stakeholders in a collective decision-making process that is formal, consensus-oriented, and deliberative, in order to make or implement public policy or manage public programmes or assets; secondly, that according to the NPCC (2010), which defined the concept as the process in which a leader engages with all sectors (public, private, non-profit, citizens) in order to develop effective, lasting solutions to public problems that go beyond what any sector could achieve on its own.

The definitions considered above relate to cases of collaborative governance in the US, and elsewhere academics have worked extensively on the use of partnerships for public services delivery, and, as noted by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002: 9), it is possible that the principles of collaborative governance advocated by Ansell and Gash (2008) and NPCC (2010) might not be applicable and useful in some other political contexts. For instance, the study of the systems in London and Lagos shows that some systemic actors and other stakeholders playing roles related to the sustenance of mass transportation are not always necessarily motivated by a desire to implement public policies related to sustaining mass transportation, but are primarily motivated by what they stand to benefit from the collaborative framework. The discussion of the Barclay’s cycle scheme partnership, and of the LAMATA, NURTW and Eco bank partnership, both demonstrate how participants in a partnership stand to gain from its implementation.

The definitions above also point to some elements of collaborative governance existing in both systems and explored in this study. For instance, while the use of joint-working and a leader (facilitator) was observed in both systems, there are also elements of collaborative governance, as defined by Ansell and Gash, which do not exist in either of the
cases. For instance, collective decision does not exist in either of the cases as it was up to the political leader in each city to determine and make compulsory the key decisions relating to mass transport planning, strategy and schemes after consulting with individuals or a group (or groups) of actors perceived to play roles relevant for the sustenance of mass transportation. This, then, shows that rather than a particular definition of the concept, there exist different views as to what constitutes collaborative governance and how it is employed.

Drawing on the data gathered for the study, the exploration of the literature has shown that the concept of collaborative governance was particularly useful, especially due to the insight it provided as to how the characteristics of collaborative governance, including a facilitative leader, networks, and joint-working, are employed to sustain mass transportation in both cities.

It was clear from the study that at the heart of the mass transport governance systems in both cities were key actors, perhaps most notably the Mayor of London and the Governor of Lagos state. These actors play leadership roles (political and strategic) and significantly influence the degree to which collaborative governance exists in both systems. Due to the powers of both leaders, they were able to significantly decide and influence the workings of partnerships aimed at sustaining mass transportation and thus enable the attainment of their policy aims. Hence, the study shows that some of the actions of the leaders such as the Mayor’s use of ‘imperative coordination’ for implementing the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) in order to raise the GLA’s counterpart funding for Crossrail 1 disregarded a principle of collaborative governance such as collective decision making as propounded by Ansell and Gash (2008). Nevertheless, public-private partnerships as a principle of collaborative governance as argued by Evans (2007: 15-16) was observed in both cases.

In demonstrating the occurrence of collaboration in both systems, the classification of the concept by Harding (1997: 74), including defensive collaboration and shot-gun collaboration was observed in both systems, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7. Furthermore, vertical and horizontal partnerships, as identified by Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 315), were also observed in the cases, as actors entered into collaborations with systemic actors and non-systemic actors across governmental levels. Similarly, governance as defined by Stoker (2004: 3) as rules and forms that guide collective decision making was observed in both systems. Furthermore, while the hierarchical and co-governance modes of Kooiman (2003) were evidenced in both cases, the latter’s self-governance mode and Rhodes’ (1996) governance as self-organising networks were not observed. Thus, the view taken here is that
the concept of collaborative governance is useful for understanding the relevance of partnerships and rules, including how they exist to sustain public goods and services such as mass transportation.

By understanding and addressing the first and second research questions, it was clear that collaborative governance presents a framework which can be employed to analyse the sustenance of public goods and services and schemes, especially those relating to mass transportation as explored in this study. Consideration of the third research question (How far can collaborative governance improve mass transportation?) enabled an in-depth understanding of the relevance of collaborative governance to the sustenance of mass transportation.

Drawing on the discussion of collaborative governance in Chapter 3 and the analysis of the cases in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, it is clear that collaborative governance, as defined by Ansell and Gash (2008), does not really exist in the two cases. Both cases demonstrate how the political leaders (Mayor and Governor) mainly employ their powers and influence in attaining their policy priorities. For instance, in raising its financial contribution for the funding of Crossrail 1, the Mayor mandated London boroughs to levy upon developers a fee known as the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), which is in line with the regulations of the Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). Furthermore, the Deputy Mayor for Transport, acting on behalf of the Mayor, is responsible for approving the Local Implementation Plans (LIP) of all London boroughs, which must be consistent with the delivery of the Mayor’s Transport Strategy (MTS), in order to receive transport related grants from TfL. This exemplifies how the Mayor is able to control and influence actors that may be claimed to be collaborating with him in the system in London. Nevertheless, the study also shows evidence of collaboration in the system through the Barclay’s cycle scheme partnership, which has reduced the numbers of users of the Underground, and by so doing, has improved integrated mass transportation in London.

The system in Lagos demonstrates how the Governor’s lack of political will in not curtailing the excesses of the members of the NURTW in the state (in relation to their illegal activities) points to the non-implementation of some rules and the lack of others to address emergent problems. Furthermore, the governor’s interpretation of PPPs as a means of transferring governmental responsibilities to the private sector, as suggested by Desmond Amiegbbehbor (LAMATA), demonstrates the human and capacity problems confronting the system. Thus, due to the absence of some of the practices (the collective decision making
process, consensus orientation and the leader engaging with all sectors) of collaborative governance as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) and NPCC (2010) in the system in Lagos, and other issues related to the absence of key institutions, it was not surprising to observe few incidences of partnerships in the state. Nonetheless, key systemic actors, with the support of non-systemic actors, have implemented partnerships such as the BRT-Lite partnership discussed in Chapter 6, which has significantly improved mass transportation in Lagos state. Thus, the system in London and Lagos has shown that not employing the principles of collaborative governance as identified in the literature for the purpose of public service delivery will not necessarily translate to service failure. The study shows that rather than collaborative governance, the ways of joint-working initiated by both leaders enabled the sustenance of mass transportation in both cases.

The second category of questions focused more on empirical data, unlike those discussed above, and were designed to gather data which would provide in-depth understanding about the occurrence, if any, of collaborative governance in both cases. The questions also sought to identify existing problems of mass transportation, and the capacities employed to address those problems, in both cities. In addressing these supplementary questions, the data (primary and secondary) gathered from the study, and discussed in Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7, were very useful.

In addressing the first question (What forms of collaborative governance can be identified?), instead of forms of collaborative governance, the study identified forms of collaboration as noted by Sullivan and Skelcher (2002) and discussed in Chapter 3. These included, in both cases public-private collaboration, public-voluntary sector collaboration, and multi-level ‘vertical’ collaboration. For instance, while the partnership which delivered the Barclay’s cycle scheme is an example of public-private collaboration, the partnership which delivered the BRT-Lite scheme typified a multi-level vertical collaboration. The study also shows the occurrence of vertical and horizontal partnerships, as defined by Lowndes and Skelcher (1998: 315). Nonetheless, the analysis of partnerships in the study, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6, show that most of them are influenced by political leaders (Mayor or Governor) in order to attain their policy priorities. This then raises a question about the autonomy of partnerships in both systems and the degree to which partnership tasks are shared and not forced on collaborators, as observed in the study.

The second supplementary question (What are the mass transport problems?) was clearer, as it was observed that the partnerships established in each city, and which plays
significant roles in the governance process, aimed to address some of the problems confronting mass transportation, such as the overcrowding of carriages and inadequate mass transport infrastructures. For instance, in London the latter problems were mainly addressed through the upgrade of the Underground and the implementation of the Crossrail 1 scheme. Furthermore, the discussion of the key projects, delivered and ongoing, in Chapters 4 and 6 point to how operational problems were addressed. At the strategy level, similar problems recognised as confronting mass transportation in both cities included inadequate funding to implement mass transport schemes, the influence of key governmental actors such as the Mayor and Governor on the systems, and the manipulation of partnerships by certain actors playing key roles in the funding regime, as well as the process of holding other actors to account. As regards the system in Lagos, a key problem appeared to be the inability of enforcement agencies to enforce transport laws and traffic rules as some stakeholders see themselves as being above the law. Furthermore, some of the actions of the NURTW, as discussed in Chapter 7, demonstrate how the actions of the body has added to the problems of coordinating mass transportation in Lagos.

In addressing the third supplementary question (How are these problems actually addressed?), this research has found that while some problems have been addressed through the implementation of schemes, for instance, Project Horizon, which was implemented by TfL as part of its cost reduction strategy in order to fund mass transport schemes, others have been addressed through the use of modes of partnerships (defensive collaboration, offensive collaboration and shot-gun collaboration) proposed by Harding (1997: 74). Also, as suggested by Kennedy et al. (2005), it was found that the existence of a strategic transport authority in both cases, and the nature of a funding regime in addition to the funds it delivers, proved instrumental in addressing mass transport problems linked to land-use, franchising, planning and forecasting, the maintenance of infrastructures, the delivery of rolling stock and services, and the deployment of resources to sustain mass transportation.

In both cities, the study shows that the main capacities existing to address mass transport problems include rules (franchising agreements) that guide the behaviour of actors (Stoker, 2004), government (leadership), and a strategic transport authority (TfL in London and LAMATA in Lagos). A watchdog body (London Travel Watch) was also observed in London to address mass transport problems in order to enable user satisfaction. In sustaining and strengthening these capacities, interviewees made the case for various factors. For instance, the interviewees in London argued that the Mayor should be given more power and
control over mainline trains and taxation. Also, while interviewees made the case for leadership for the system in London, they disagreed on who the leader should be and on the criteria for selecting such a leader. This latter finding was also observed in Lagos, as interviewees were undecided as to whether LAMATA, the Governor or the state’s Ministry of Transportation should lead the system. In terms of strengthening the capacity of both systems, interviewees also emphasised that there must be clear accountability lines to address the occurrence of overstepping of existing boundaries, especially in the system in London. Similarly, interviewees in Lagos argued for the reorientation of the culture of Lagosians in order to reduce the incidence of corruption in the state and mass transport governance system. Interviewees in both cases also presented the view that there should be substantial investment made in mass transport schemes due to the utilitarian role of transport in enabling socio-economic development.
8.3 Comparative analysis

In comparing both cases, key empirical findings relating to starting conditions, institutional design, and facilitative leadership, arising from the application of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model are examined below.

8.3.1 Starting conditions

In the course of discussing the relevance and occurrence of the variables proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) in Chapters 5 and 7, it was established that starting conditions such as the prehistory of cooperation or conflict, which constitute one of the variables identified by the authors as enabling collaborative governance, did not play any significant role in determining whether actors would engage with one another in the collaborative frameworks responsible for sustaining mass transportation in both London and Lagos. While the study of the system in London shows that some actors collaborate with other actors due to what they perceive as potential gains for themselves, the influence of governmental actors, especially the Mayor of London and key bodies such as Transport for London (TfL), were observed to be the most significant factors which determined the degree to which stakeholders would work with other potential partners. As regards the system in Lagos, the researcher observed that, rather than systemic actors being influenced by starting conditions, as proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008), actors were again seen to collaborate with other actors that they would benefit from cooperating with. As in London, where the Mayor employs his powers to influence the workings of the mass transport system, the Governor of Lagos state and LAMATA were seen to play key roles in influencing the establishment and workings of partnerships. Both systems thus show the presence of key governmental actors and strategic transport authorities as the primary enablers of the governance of mass transportation. The implications of the roles played by key actors in both cases, notably the Mayor and Governor, and both strategic transport authorities, is that such actors can play a major role in enabling and influencing collaborative modes of governance. Hence, in both cases the key factor was not the starting conditions relating to prehistory of cooperation and conflict, but the influence and powers of the primary actors and some secondary actors, as presented in Figures 2 and 4.
8.3.2 Institutional design

In the attempt to apply the institutional design proposed by Ansell and Gash (2008) for sustaining a collaborative governance framework, some similarities and differences were identified in both cases. While institutional design issues such as commitment to process and shared understanding were proposed by the authors and identified in both cases, other institutional design factors, including systemic characteristics, capacities and challenges, were identified from the study as shaping the degree to which the collaborative framework would work. These will be employed in subsequent paragraphs to compare both cases investigated in the study.

The discussion and analysis of both cases as presented in Chapters 4 to 7 shows that the majority of the actors engaged in the partnerships showed a commitment to the partnership process due to a variety of factors, including what they stood to gain from the partnership and the policy stance of the government. Furthermore, actors engaged in partnerships in each of the systems were seen to share some agreements with other stakeholders, especially on the need to provide more capacities to sustain the mass transport system and on the need for a leadership for the system. This demonstrates that leadership and sustainable capacities are relevant for enabling public services delivery such as mass transportation.

Systemic characteristics in terms of the existence of both conflict and collaboration were observed in the two systems, thereby sustaining the argument of Haugaard (2002: 308) suggesting that conflict and consensus exist as systemic phenomena. While the study of the system in London shows the existence of conflicts in the Mayor’s role and between London Travel Watch and the Transport Committee of the GLA, conflicts in the system in Lagos were seen to be mainly linked to competition between actors for the governor’s attention, and in establishing the most relevant actor to lead the system. Hence, although conflicts were observed in both systems, they were manifested in different forms, as indicated earlier. Relations were also identified between actors due to the workings of the funding regime discussed in Chapters 5 and 7 and the process of holding actors to account. Furthermore, it is also clear that the funding regime which finances schemes enables joint-working during the process whereby stakeholders engage with one another in order to raise funds for capacity development and improvement.
Also, certain characteristics unique to each system appear to be responsible for the level of institutional development and available capacities. For instance, in Lagos there was a negative culture, highlighted by factors such as corruption and disregard for traffic laws, manifesting at organisational and individual (general) levels as discussed in Chapter 7. On the contrary, in London there was a positive culture, highlighted by factors such as Freedom of Information (accessibility to data) and regard for traffic laws.

Systemic capacities in the form of human and material resources are essential for the survival and sustenance of any organisation, scheme or development. While the study shows that both systems have, and are, still developing capacities, as shown in Chapters 4 and 6, it is clear that the capacities available in London are more advanced than those available in the system in Lagos. The differences observed between the systems are linked to the roles the economic and socio-political history of each city plays in shaping existing capacities. For instance, the system in London benefits from the presence of a pool of experts who have assisted at one time or another in building and maintaining the mass transport modes in London. On the contrary, few experts abound in Lagos due to lack of capacity building to sustain mass transport modes over the years, and the incidence of corruption.

The study of the cases in London and Lagos shows that both systems are confronting particular and similar systemic challenges, for example, conflicts linked to the goals and roles of organisations in each of the cases. There are problems specific to each of the systems. For instance, the overbearing influence of the NURTW, including its members, over the operation and coordination of bus parks, especially through their illegal collection of fees from operators, is a key problem for actors (including LAMATA and operators) in Lagos. Also, the effects of general (breaking of traffic rules) cultures are particularly severe in the case of Lagos. The particular issue identified in the case of London is linked to the additional power some actors advocated for the Mayor. This advocacy is contrary to the views of some other actors who think the Mayor is already too powerful and who therefore advocated that two or more actors should lead the system in London.

There is also the problem of holding some actors to account, especially those who play different roles with blurred boundaries in the system. This problem was emphasised by some interviewees in London who claimed that it is almost impossible to hold some actors in the system to account, especially the Mayor. Similarly, ‘holding to account’ is also a problem in the system in Lagos as interviewees commented that most bodies and actors in the public sector are not obliged to provide information relating to their budget expenses or render an
account of their use of resources to the public. Hence, it is more likely that actors and bodies in the public sector will be involved in corrupt practices and maladministration as they are not mandated to disclose their budgets and spending to the public for purposes of accountability or audit.

Another systemic challenge relates to the existence of a funding regime not able to independently fund the sustenance of mass transportation without recourse to external actors associated with the systems. This was also seen as a problem, in the sense that major funders of both systems often attach conditions to their grants. For instance, the cost cutting measure implemented by TfL, known as ‘Project Horizon’ (discussed in Chapter 5) was in response to the Comprehensive Spending Review of central government, tying central government grants to cost reduction plans and schemes. While the system in London is reliant on central government funding to enable the execution of projects like Crossrail 1 and Underground upgrade, the system in Lagos also relies on federal government monthly revenue allocations and key grants to enable the implementation of key projects such as the BRT-Lite bus scheme and Lagos rail, again requiring adherence to grant conditions. However, this problem also points to the incidence of joint-working across levels of government in both cities, as the GLA and central government work in partnership to implement schemes such as Crossrail 1, while the Lagos state government works in partnership with the federal government and World Bank to implement the BRT-Lite scheme.

8.3.3 Facilitative leadership

Leadership as defined by Northouse (2013: 5) is a process whereby an individual influences others to achieve a common goal. This was observed in both London and Lagos. For instance, both the Mayor and Governor use their leadership powers to instigate and enable the employment of partnerships in the system to implement mass transport schemes. While the Mayor of London is involved in the operation of the GLA Group, such as by chairing the Board of Transport for London (TfL), in Lagos the Governor delegates his authority to the heads of government agencies, including LAMATA. Notwithstanding the different leadership styles observed, both actors use their powers to influence the groups and individuals they lead towards the attainment of set mayoral and government policy goals. Furthermore, the study shows that some systemic actors expressed contrasting views on who should lead the system, for instance in London, while some actors made the case for central government to lead,
others wanted the Mayor to have more power. This further illustrates the divergence among actors in the system.

The study also shows two types of leadership, political and strategic, common to both systems. While the former is mainly performed by the Mayor and Governor, as they derive their powers from the GLA Act (1999) and the Nigerian 1979 constitution, the latter (strategic leadership) is mainly executed by the strategic transport authorities in both cities (TfL and LAMATA) due to their technical know-how and expertise. This demonstrates that, irrespective of the differences existing between the two systems, both require political and strategic forms of leadership to sustain mass transportation. Furthermore, the study made clear that both leaders employ their powers for the purpose of coordinating the system, especially through the use of policies such as the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL), used in the system in London to raise funds to co-finance Crossrail 1, and in Lagos, the fines used in the system to partly fund the maintenance and building of infrastructures.
8.4 Concluding remarks on the Ansell and Gash (2008) collaborative governance model

In the course of this study, the idea and occurrence of collaborative governance was explored focusing on the systems of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos. In concluding the evaluation of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, the discussion here focuses on three factors: the overly normative stance of the model as observed through the variables argued to enable collaborative governance, the inability to generalise from the model, and the definitional problems associated with ‘collaborative governance’.

From the discussion of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model in Chapters 3, 5 and 7, different factors and variables (ideal factors) were identified and argued to enable the occurrence of collaborative governance. However, the empirical chapters of this study have shown that the majority of the variables and the alleged enabling factors identified by Ansell and Gash (2008) cannot be relied upon to be responsible for the incidence of collaboration in the cases explored in this study as each case has unique factors which influence the degree to which collaboration exists and its nature. Hence, although some particular variables might be relevant in enabling collaborative modes of governance in a certain context, this does not necessarily mean that such variables will be useful for enabling collaborative modes of governance in other socio-political contexts.

Closely related to the normative problem (preconception on the ideal standard to enable collaborative governance) of the Ansell and Gash (2008) model is the inability to generalise from the model, including as a result of its vagueness in defining collaborative governance. The complex nature of the concept of ‘collaboration’ as outlined earlier in the thesis while discussing Sullivan and Skelcher’s (2002: 80-93) typologies of collaboration, demonstrates one aspect of the challenges inherent within collaborative modes of governance. The study has also highlighted the challenges in both cases of identifying genuine partnerships which in turn questions the extent to which the Ansell and Gash model can be generalised. It is clear that certain actors, due to the powers they possess, can enable, hinder or manipulate the operations of partnerships and collaborative modes of governance to serve their policy aims by employing a mix of collaboration, contractual agreements and imperative coordination. This demonstrates why the preconceived idea of collaborative governance by Ansell and Gash cannot be generalised. The dynamics relating to the roles and types of leadership (political and strategic) observed in both cases in this study, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, also demonstrate that the leadership of both systems influenced systemic
workings. This further illustrate why the Ansell and Gash model cannot be generalised as their preconceived idea of how collaborative governance should work did not consider the relevance of political and strategic leadership which both played fundamental roles in the cases investigated.

In addition, the Ansell and Gash (2008) model, as highlighted by Emerson et. al, (2012), suffers from the fact that the definition of collaborative governance remains amorphous and that there is inconsistency in its use. However, notwithstanding the problems identified and associated with the model, and its lack of suitability as a normative framework, this study has found that the variables proposed by the model may be seen to be useful tools and even to provide a framework for analysing collaborative modes of governance in different socio-political contexts.

8.5 Contributions of the study and its policy implications

The study of collaborative governance was undertaken at both theoretical and empirical levels. At the theoretical level, the review of the literature shows the divergence among authors on their views regarding the concept. The literature focused on the increasing use of partnerships, interpreted in different ways, and the relevance of leadership for the practice of collaborative governance. The study highlights that there are a variety of forms of partnership and working together, varying from some relatively genuine partnerships to those arrangements that are driven more by contractual or other mandatory requirements. The findings from the study, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 7, have shown that some of the propositions for example, starting conditions, of Ansell and Gash (2008) relating to collaborative governance are not relevant in the cases investigated. While some of the propositions of the authors regarding the relevance of facilitative leadership and commitment to process were observed in both cases, key factors such as a sustainable funding regime and means of holding to account emerged from the study as playing key roles in sustaining collaborative governance modes in the systems investigated.

The study indicates that leadership, accountability and a sustainable funding regime are key factors for the governance of mass transportation in cities such as London and Lagos. Leadership (strategic and political) is key, especially due to the need to ensure coordination by one or more actors tasked with the planning of policies and schemes aimed at sustaining services delivery such as mass transportation. Ansell and Torfing (2015: 327) suggest that the
identification of what kind of leadership, for example, is required to scale collaborative governance up or down, is likely to become more prominent in the years to come due to the relevance of leadership for sustaining services delivery. The study thus highlight the relevance of strategic leadership (TfL and LAMATA) and political leadership (Mayor of London and Governor of Lagos state) as playing crucial roles in the governance system. Accountability is important in order to ensure good use of resources and reduce the abuse of power. Schedler (1999: 14) argued that accountability embraces different ways of preventing and redressing the abuse of power and resources by subjecting those controlling resources to the threat of sanctions, while also requesting them to justify their actions. Lastly, a sustainable funding regime which can mobilise necessary funds for providing capacities aimed at sustaining mass transportation is also vital. Interviewees in both cases made it clear that the funding regime in place must be sustainable while having a diversified income source. This is due to, first, the limited levels of funding available from the UK central government and Nigeria’s federal government, and the challenge of increasing fares (the major income earner for TfL) and franchise fees (the major income earner for LAMATA) incomes.

Based on the findings from this study, especially in the case of Lagos, culture from the perspective of both an organisation and the public domain, was identified as an important factor influencing the planning and implementation of policies aimed at sustaining public goods and services such as mass transportation. While the cultures existing in the system in London do mainly support partnerships and good practices, the same cannot be said for the system in Lagos. Hence, further research is needed to enhance our understanding of the factors that enable positive cultures, and how negative cultures can be turned to positive cultures, both to address the issue of corruption generally, and the character of some Lagosians relating to disobeying traffic rules more specifically.
8.6 Concluding remarks

This study had the aim of better understanding how the systems of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos work, including the incidence of partnerships in both cases. While the study shows that governmental actors in both London and Lagos are increasingly employing policies featuring what are alleged to be ‘partnerships’ for the purpose of delivering and sustaining mass transportation, the analysis of both cases shows that a significant proportion of the mass transport policies implemented employ a variety of ways of working; these include partnerships and other mandatory arrangements. This then suggests that, rather than collaborative governance, what exists in the systems investigated is a variety of ways of working together. In addition, it is clear that organisations in both systems work with one another on issues which will benefit them, and do otherwise if they do not perceive any gain.

One of the strengths of this study is that it is a cross-systemic case study approach, providing insights into how systems in different contexts function. The study of the systems in London and Lagos has not only provided new data on both systems, but also highlighted the features of the complex relationships existing among actors in each of the systems. The actors who took part in the in-depth semi-structured interviews provided a mix of answers to many of the questions asked. For instance, it was observed from the responses of interviewees in both cases that, while they all supported the presence of a leader for the system, they expressed contrasting views as to the criteria that should be used for choosing the leader of the system, and also on the issue of whether the leader must be an individual or a mix of actors.

It was also noted from the study that in enabling the sustenance of mass transportation in London and Lagos, both the UK central government and Nigeria’s federal government, transferred certain powers to actors in the systems while working with such actors, thereby indicating joint working between actors across different governmental levels. This further shows that collaboration is not just an internal system feature in both cases, but also occurs between actors inside and outside the system. The implication this has for public service provision such as mass transportation is that governments may employ partnership or other, mandatory arrangements to enable, or not, the provision of a service or aspects of a service such as mass transportation, depending on their ideological motivation (such as to allow the market to rule and encourage growth).
Finally, the study of the systems in London and Lagos has identified key themes including culture, leadership, funding regime and accountability as important for influencing the degree to which mass transportation is sustainable. It was shown in Chapters 5 and 7 that these themes relate to one another and do not exist in isolation. For instance, it was clear that key actors such as the federal government, central government, Mayor and Governor, who all constitute the funding regime, also play leadership roles in the system. These same actors are involved in the process by which actors are held to account, thereby indicating relations between actors, in and out of the system. The discussion of the findings, together with an analysis of the themes recurring in the study, offer significant insight into the factors that shape and influence the systems of governance of mass transportation in both cases, and the degree to which collaborative governance exists.
Publications relevant to this thesis and conference contributions


Olaoye, O. (2014) A tale of two systems: Findings from the study which explored the systems Of governance of mass transportation in London and Lagos; 3rd Congress and Exhibition of African Public Transport


Appendices

Appendix 1:
The research questions generated for the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Research Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions Posed to Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What forms of collaborative governance can be identified?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the mass transport problems?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are these problems actually addressed?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What capacity (within each case) exists to solve these problems?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Research questions for the cases of London and Lagos.)
Appendix 2a:
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies

Olanrewaju Olaoye
Email: oolaoye@lincoln.ac.uk
School of Social Sciences
University of Lincoln
LN6 7TS
Lincoln, United Kingdom

Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies

Potential Interview Outcome – By the end of each interview session with a policymaker, politician or relevant transport stakeholder, I should have gotten important direct information from the perspective of a key stakeholder on the role of the government and other partners during the delivery of public services especially mass transportation. In addition, I should have received relevant data explaining how the government steers the process of public service delivery especially through partnership working with stakeholders in an atmosphere of trust and accountability.

Topics to be covered with interviewees include:

1. Multiscalarity and government role in service delivery e.g. mass transportation (Enabler or Provider of services)
2. Public involvement in the consultation and mass transportation policy making process
3. Effectiveness of partnerships or collaborations for the delivery of mass transportation
4. The accountability of service providers and policy makers
5. Measuring effectiveness and performance of modes of mass transport (Output)
6. Measuring how feedback leads to policy learning (Input)
7. Relevance of a facilitator in developing and implementing rules of the game
8. Addressing problems (conflicts) and challenges of mass transportation service delivery
9. Formation of partnerships
10. Legitimacy of partnership vis-a-vis democracy and stakeholder representation
11. Resources and funding

Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies

Note: Mass transport is construed in this research as the movement of large numbers of people from one point to another. Its key modes include Bus, Train and Tube (Underground)
1. How would you describe the responsibilities of your organization with regard to mass transport?

2. How would you describe your particular responsibilities within your organization?

3. What do you think are the responsibilities of stakeholders including Central Government, GLA, Boroughs, Private and Third sectors with regard to mass transport in London?

4. In your opinion which organization should be primarily responsible for the overall strategy policy making of delivering mass transportation in London:
   - Central government
   - GLA
   - Boroughs
   - Private sector organization
   - Third sector organization
   - Combination of above (Indicate the combination and which organization, if any, should lead it).

5. Could you explain to me, from your perspective, how the modes of mass transport in London are financed?

6. What are the challenges experienced from the current method of financing?

7. In your opinion, how should the modes of mass transportation in London be financed?

8. How are policy makers responsible for the delivery of mass transportation in London held accountable to tax payers, the government and public?

9. How do you think you and other relevant institutions concerned with the delivery of mass transportation in London should be held accountable?

10. How far are transport users involved in making decisions about mass transportation in London?

11. How far do you think transport users should be involved in making decisions about mass transportation in London?

12. In your opinion, how far are the general public involved in the decision making process of mass transportation in London?

13. In your opinion, how far should the general public be involved in the policy process affecting mass transportation in London?
14. What are the main challenges over the short term, medium term and long term with regard to mass transport in London?

15. In your opinion, how do you think each of the challenges (short, medium and long terms) identified above can best be resolved?

16. Who do you think should have the main responsibility for resolving the short term, medium term and long term challenges identified above?

17. Who else should have responsibility for resolving the challenges identified above and why?

18. How do you work with other stakeholders involved in the delivery of mass transport in London?

19. In your opinion, what would be the best possible way by which organizations and institutions can work together to improve mass transport in London?

20. What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of mass transportation in London/Lagos in order to gauge its effectiveness and performance?

21. How does your organization measure the effectiveness of the delivery of mass transportation in London?

22. In your opinion, what are the performance indicators by which the delivery of mass transport in London should be measured?

23. Do you think the use of performance targets confines innovation or enhances innovation? Why?

24. What is your overall view of recent occurrence in mass transport in London?

25. What is your overall view of the future of mass transport in London?

Thank you very much for your time and valuable answers.
Appendix 2b:
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies

Olanrewaju Olaoye
Email: oolaoye@lincoln.ac.uk
School of Social Sciences
University of Lincoln
LN6 7TS
Lincoln, United Kingdom

Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies

Potential Interview Outcome – By the end of each interview session with a policymaker, politician or relevant transport stakeholder, I should have gotten important direct information from the perspective of a key stakeholder on the roles of the government and other partners in sustaining the mass transportation governance system. In addition, I should have received relevant data explaining how the government steers the process of public service delivery especially through partnership working with stakeholders in an atmosphere of trust and accountability.

Topics to be covered with interviewees include:

1. Multiscalarity and government role in service delivery e.g. mass transportation (Enabler or Provider of services)
2. Public involvement in the consultation and mass transportation policy making process
3. Effectiveness of partnerships or collaborations for the delivery of mass transportation
4. The accountability of service providers and policy makers
5. Measuring effectiveness and performance of modes of mass transport (Output)
6. Measuring how feedback leads to policy learning (Input)
7. Relevance of a facilitator in developing and implementing rules of the game
8. Addressing problems (conflicts) and challenges of mass transportation service delivery
9. Formation of partnerships
10. Legitimacy of partnership vis-a-vis democracy and stakeholder representation
11. Resources and funding
Semi-structured Questions for Policy Makers and Members of Relevant Transport Bodies

Note: Mass transport is construed in this research as the movement of large numbers of people from one point to another. Its key modes include Bus, Train and Boat.

1. How would you describe the responsibilities of your organization with regard to mass transport?

2. How would you describe your particular responsibilities within your organization?

3. What do you think are the responsibilities of stakeholders including Federal Government, Lagos state government, Local governments, and Private and Third sector organizations with regard to mass transport in Lagos?

4. In your opinion which organization should be primarily responsible for the overall strategy policy making of delivering mass transportation in Lagos:
   - Federal government
   - Lagos State House of Assembly
   - Local Governments
   - Private sector organizations
   - Third sector organizations
   - Combination of above (Indicate the combination and which organization, if any, should lead it).

5. Could you explain to me, from your perspective, how the modes of mass transport in Lagos are financed?

6. What are the challenges experienced from the current method of financing?

7. In your opinion, how should the modes of mass transportation in Lagos be financed?

8. How are policy makers responsible for the delivery of mass transportation in Lagos held accountable to tax payers, the government and public?

9. How do you think you and other relevant institutions concerned with the delivery of mass transportation in Lagos should be held accountable?

10. How far are transport users involved in making decisions about mass transportation in Lagos?

11. How far do you think transport users should be involved in making decisions about mass transportation in Lagos?
12. In your opinion, how far are the general public involved in the decision making process of mass transportation in Lagos?

13. In your opinion, how far should the general public be involved in the policy process affecting mass transportation in Lagos?

14. What are the main challenges over the short term, medium term and long term with regard to mass transport in Lagos?

15. In your opinion, how do you think each of the challenges (short, medium and long terms) identified above can best be resolved?

16. Who do you think should have the main responsibility for resolving the short term, medium term and long term challenges identified above?

17. Who else should have responsibility for resolving the challenges identified above and why?

18. How do you work with other stakeholders involved in the delivery of mass transport in Lagos?

19. How does your organization work with other relevant organizations in the delivery of mass transport in Lagos?

20. In your opinion, what would be the best possible way by which organizations and institutions can work together to improve mass transport in Lagos?

21. What are the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of mass transportation in Lagos in order to gauge its effectiveness and performance?

22. How does your organization measure the effectiveness of the delivery of mass transportation in Lagos?

23. In your opinion, what are the performance indicators by which the delivery of mass transport in Lagos should be measured?

24. Do you think the use of performance targets confines innovation or enhances innovation? Why?

25. What is your overall view of recent occurrence in mass transport in Lagos?

26. What is your overall view of the future of mass transport in Lagos?

Thank you very much for your time and valuable answers.

Please who else can you recommend for me to approach and interview?
Appendix 3:
Sample of Introductory Letter Sent to Potential Interviewees

Dear .................,

Good day to you. I am undertaking research for a PhD in the School of Social Sciences, University of Lincoln and my research is concerned with an examination of 'collaborative governance and mass transportation'.

As part of this research I am seeking to interview a number of key individuals about the processes of policy making, collaboration and stakeholder participation in relation to the development of mass transportation in London and Lagos. These interviews will be conducted on a confidential basis and the anonymity of participants will be maintained in published work which results from the research, unless they specifically approve otherwise.

I would be very grateful if you could find the time to meet with me and answer some short questions about your views on these topics. Perhaps the easiest way of arranging a meeting would be for you to provide me with your time and date availability and I will then be happy to meet you at the place of your convenience.

I should perhaps mention that I will share the outcomes of the research with all of the individuals and organisations that participate through a brief report, and will be happy to provide further feedback should that be of interest. If you would like any further information about this project please do not hesitate to contact me.

Thank you for your kind reply.

Yours Sincerely,

Olanrewaju Olaoye
**Appendix 4:**
Table showing potential interviewees, interviews conducted and documentary evidence.

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<th>Secondary data (organisation)</th>
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<td>Valeria Shawcross, GLA</td>
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<td>Richard Tracey, GLA</td>
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<td>Boris Johnson, GLA</td>
<td>Declined</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Tim Steer, GLA</td>
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<td>Laura Warren, GLA</td>
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<td>Transport Committee reports, GLA</td>
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<td>John Barry, GLA</td>
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<td>Michele Dix, TfL</td>
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<td>Rhodri Ball who was interviewed</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Rhodri Ball also provided the 2010 Mayor’s Transport strategy</td>
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<td>Jonathan Hollis who was interviewed</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Paul Garnish, London Underground</td>
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<td>Stewart King, Third Sector</td>
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<td>Conference presentations on collaboration</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>Conducted. Also provided secondary data.</td>
<td>Rob Fox provided several policy reports and document of projects commissioned by London First</td>
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<td>Andrew Phipps, City of London Corporation</td>
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<td>Jasmine Anigbogu, London Underground</td>
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<td>Sir Robin Wales, Mayor of Newham</td>
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<td>Joanne McCartney, GLA</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Murad Qureshi, GLA</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Steve O’ Connell, GLA</td>
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<td>Department for Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Prof. Akin Mabogunje, Federal Government of Nigeria Consultant</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
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</table>

Prof. Akin Mabogunje provided the Report of the Presidential Committee on Redevelopment of Lagos Mega-City Region which he chaired.

|46 | Prof. Olukayode Taiwo, Deputy                                        | Conducted  |

Prof. O. Taiwo also
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name &amp; Position</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Engr. Frederick Olofin, Director of Projects – Lagos State Waterways Authority</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Engr. Frederick Olofin, Director of Projects – Lagos State Waterways Authority</td>
<td>Provided other documents including LAMATA programme of event for a stakeholder meeting; Frequently Asked Questions on Bus Rapid Transit (BRT); Lagos BRT-Lite</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Engr. Dr. Bawa-Allah, Dean School of Transportation, Lagos State University and Consultant to the Lagos State Government</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engr. Dr. Bawa-Allah, Dean School of Transportation, Lagos State University and Consultant to the Lagos State Government</td>
<td>Engr. Bawa-Allah provided a manual titled ‘Transport and National Development: Issues, Challenges and the Way Forward’</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Dr. Taiwo Salami, Director – Transport Planning Unit, Ministry of Transportation, Lagos State</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr. Taiwo Salami, Director – Transport Planning Unit, Ministry of Transportation, Lagos State</td>
<td>Provided the National Urban Transport Policy for Nigeria</td>
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<td>Engr. Olabanjo Omotosho, Ministry of Transportation, Lagos State</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>Mr Kayode Opeifa, Honourable Commissioner for Transport Lagos State</td>
<td>Partly Conducted</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>Dr. Frederic Oladeinde, Technical Adviser – Transport Planning, LAMATA</td>
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<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Dr. Desmond Amiegbobh, Deputy Director – Bus Services, LAMATA</td>
<td>Conducted</td>
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</table>
(Table showing potential interviewees, Status of interviews and documentary evidence)

Appendix 5:
University of Lincoln Consent Form

**UNIVERSITY OF LINCOLN**
**CONSENT FORM**

Name of participant:

**Name of interviewer:** Olanrewaju Olaoye

**Title of the project:** Collaborative governance: The case of mass transportation in Lagos and London.

I confirm that I am willing to participate in the research project named above.

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, or not answer any individual question posed, without specifying a reason.

I confirm that I am/am not willing to allow the interview to be recorded.
(Delete as appropriate)

I understand that the transcript of the interview with myself, will be used by the postgraduate student named above for research purposes.

**Signature of Participant:**

**Date:**

**Signature of Researcher:**

**Date:**

**Signature of Witness:**

**Date:**
## Appendix 6:
### List of key secondary data

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<td>Johnson, B. 2010</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>Badejo, B. 2011</td>
<td>Transportation: Removing the Clogs to Nigeria’s Development</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Central Rail Users’ Committee, 1996</td>
<td>Handling Complaints Better: Proceedings of a Seminar to Promote Good Practice on the Passenger Rail Industry</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2006</td>
<td>Report of the Presidential Committee on Redevelopment of Lagos Mega-City Region</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Filani, M.</td>
<td>Transport and National Development: Issues, Challenges and the Way Forward</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Her Majesty Courts Service (HMCS), 2010</td>
<td>Transforming Public Services Through Collaboration</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>LAMATA, 2009</td>
<td>Programme of Event for a Stakeholder Meeting to Commemorate the First Anniversary of BRT Lite</td>
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<td>London Assembly Transport Committee, 2009a</td>
<td>The Big Squeeze: Rail Overcrowding in London</td>
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<td>Annual Review</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>London Travel Watch, 2006</td>
<td>Getting to the Station</td>
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<td>Bus Passengers’ Priorities for Improvements in London</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>London First, 2010</td>
<td>Greater Returns: Transport Priorities for Economic Growth</td>
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<td>London Data Archive available at (<a href="http://data.london.gov.uk/taxonomy/categories/transport">http://data.london.gov.uk/taxonomy/categories/transport</a>) and UK Data Archive available at (<a href="http://www.data-archive.ac.uk">www.data-archive.ac.uk</a>)</td>
<td>Statistical Data</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>Sakthi Suriyaprakasam, 2010</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Webcast of London Assembly and Transport Committee meetings, GLA, Public Sector, (secondary data)</td>
<td>London Assembly Meeting, and London Assembly Transport Committee Meeting</td>
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